Commit Graph

23 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
stoffu
0e7ad2e2c9
Wallet API: generalize 'bool testnet' to 'NetworkType nettype' 2018-03-05 23:59:16 +09:00
Riccardo Spagni
087a773247
Merge pull request #3104
939629e8 Wallet API: all recover options with password (m2049r)
2018-01-27 17:24:08 -08:00
xmr-eric
18216f19dd Update 2018 copyright 2018-01-26 10:03:20 -05:00
m2049r
939629e837 Wallet API: all recover options with password
also renamed memo => mnemonic in api method parms
2018-01-17 18:46:31 +01:00
moneromooo-monero
4c313324b1
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing
Scheme by luigi1111:

    Multisig for RingCT on Monero

    2 of 2

    User A (coordinator):
    Spendkey b,B
    Viewkey a,A (shared)

    User B:
    Spendkey c,C
    Viewkey a,A (shared)

    Public Address: C+B, A

    Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a

    A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants)

    A and B watch for incoming outputs

    B creates "half" key images for discovered output D:
    I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D)

    B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D),
    and sending the pubkeys with I2_D.

    A also creates "half" key images:
    I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D)

    Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D

    Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction).

    A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D
    to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R).

    At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r,
    which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo).

    B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well).

    B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D
    to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well.

    NOTE:
    A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively.
    Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible:
    A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B.
    B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A.
    The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time!
    The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature).

    2 of 3

    User A (coordinator)
    Shared viewkey a,A
    "spendkey" j,J

    User B
    "spendkey" k,K

    User C
    "spendkey" m,M

    A collects K and M from B and C
    B collects J and M from A and C
    C collects J and K from A and B

    A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK)
    A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM)

    B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK)
    B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate

    Address: N+O+P, A

    The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other
    needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two.

    Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties:
    A gives j to B
    B gives k to C
    C gives m to A

    Address: J+K+M, A

    3 of 3

    Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others.
    The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it
    or send it back to A.

    N-1 of N

    Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around
    (using either the secure or insecure method).
    For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up):
    [4 of 5]
    User: spendkey
    A: a
    B: b
    C: c
    D: d
    E: e

    a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A

    Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with
    the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys.
    Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each.
    Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning:
    1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image)
    2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator
    must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use.

    You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might
    also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format.
    You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc.

The process is somewhat cumbersome:

To create a N/N multisig wallet:

 - each participant creates a normal wallet
 - each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant
 - each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N)

As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent:

 - each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant
 - each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants

Then, a transaction may be initiated:

 - one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT"
 - this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file
 - the initiator sends this file to another participant
 - that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx"
 - the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again
 - if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed
 - the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-12-17 16:11:57 +00:00
Riccardo Spagni
2e54e7ff0b
Merge pull request #2824
51895fd7 split wallet and wallet_api (moneromooo-monero)
2017-11-25 19:53:35 +02:00
stoffu
998777ecd7
Tx proof (revised):
- refactoring: proof generation/checking code was moved from simplewallet.cpp to wallet2.cpp
- allow an arbitrary message to be signed together with txid
- introduce two types (outbound & inbound) of tx proofs; with the same syntax, inbound is selected when <address> belongs to this wallet, outbound otherwise. see GitHub thread for more discussion
- wallet RPC: added get_tx_key, check_tx_key, get_tx_proof, check_tx_proof
- wallet API: moved WalletManagerImpl::checkPayment to Wallet::checkTxKey, added Wallet::getTxProof/checkTxProof
- get_tx_key/check_tx_key: handle additional tx keys by concatenating them into a single string
2017-11-18 20:44:27 +09:00
moneromooo-monero
51895fd7df
split wallet and wallet_api
This speeds up building a lot when wallet2.h (or something it
includes) changes, since all the API includes wallet2.h
2017-11-16 12:10:29 +00:00
m2049r
6ee1116d75 store is optional during close and defaults to true; except during descruction 2017-09-23 00:52:09 +02:00
m2049r
ad4649ac81 Enable verifying wallet password with having to load wallet. 2017-08-03 01:45:45 +02:00
Jaquee
a8646b0957
Wallet API: add hard fork info functions 2017-03-24 09:59:26 +01:00
Jaquee
db1c7d80b1
wallet api: add missing mining options 2017-03-02 14:09:04 +01:00
Riccardo Spagni
c3599fa7b9
update copyright year, fix occasional lack of newline at line end 2017-02-21 19:38:18 +02:00
Jaquee
774a21394a
Wallet API: Create wallet from keys 2017-01-30 23:28:09 +01:00
moneromooo-monero
a813ab50fe
wallet2_api: add solo mining API 2017-01-09 10:12:55 +00:00
moneromooo-monero
c0a0fcaff0
wallet2_api: some new APIs to access daemon state 2016-12-25 12:31:50 +00:00
moneromooo-monero
9a2cd72257
wallet2_api: add an API to the OpenAlias resolver 2016-12-17 13:05:17 +00:00
Randi Joseph
b2adfa8c51 Bitmonero namespace renamed Monero. Bitmonero namespace alias added so that third party uses of the wallet api can transition. 2016-12-13 10:21:38 -05:00
moneromooo-monero
fcd178ef33
wallet_api: add a few daemon related getters
Blockchain height, version, Mining hash rate...
2016-11-29 10:54:38 +00:00
moneromooo.monero
af8a2600aa
wallet_api: txkey checking functions for the GUI 2016-11-05 15:24:05 +00:00
Jacob Brydolf
36a89ab435
libwallet_api: Added option to restore from specific height 2016-10-08 00:57:09 +02:00
Ilya Kitaev
8390bfa770 Wallet API : WalletManager::findWallets() added 2016-06-23 16:01:41 +03:00
Ilya Kitaev
12345d382c api implementation splitted over separate files 2016-06-23 15:50:17 +03:00