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// Copyright (c) 2014-2017, The Monero Project
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//
// All rights reserved.
//
// Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, are
// permitted provided that the following conditions are met:
//
// 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, this list of
// conditions and the following disclaimer.
//
// 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, this list
// of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation and/or other
// materials provided with the distribution.
//
// 3. Neither the name of the copyright holder nor the names of its contributors may be
// used to endorse or promote products derived from this software without specific
// prior written permission.
//
// THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS" AND ANY
// EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
// MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL
// THE COPYRIGHT HOLDER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
// SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO,
// PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS
// INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
// STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF
// THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
//
// Parts of this file are originally copyright (c) 2012-2013 The Cryptonote developers
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# include <numeric>
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# include <random>
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# include <tuple>
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# include <boost/format.hpp>
# include <boost/optional/optional.hpp>
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# include <boost/utility/value_init.hpp>
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# include <boost/algorithm/string/classification.hpp>
# include <boost/algorithm/string/trim.hpp>
# include <boost/algorithm/string/split.hpp>
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# include "include_base_utils.h"
using namespace epee ;
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# include "cryptonote_config.h"
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# include "wallet2.h"
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# include "cryptonote_basic/cryptonote_format_utils.h"
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# include "rpc/core_rpc_server_commands_defs.h"
# include "misc_language.h"
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# include "cryptonote_basic/cryptonote_basic_impl.h"
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# include "multisig/multisig.h"
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# include "common/boost_serialization_helper.h"
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# include "common/command_line.h"
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# include "common/threadpool.h"
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# include "profile_tools.h"
# include "crypto/crypto.h"
# include "serialization/binary_utils.h"
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# include "cryptonote_basic/blobdatatype.h"
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# include "mnemonics/electrum-words.h"
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# include "common/i18n.h"
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# include "common/util.h"
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing
Scheme by luigi1111:
Multisig for RingCT on Monero
2 of 2
User A (coordinator):
Spendkey b,B
Viewkey a,A (shared)
User B:
Spendkey c,C
Viewkey a,A (shared)
Public Address: C+B, A
Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a
A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants)
A and B watch for incoming outputs
B creates "half" key images for discovered output D:
I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D)
B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D),
and sending the pubkeys with I2_D.
A also creates "half" key images:
I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D)
Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D
Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction).
A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D
to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R).
At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r,
which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo).
B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well).
B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D
to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well.
NOTE:
A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively.
Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible:
A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B.
B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A.
The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time!
The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature).
2 of 3
User A (coordinator)
Shared viewkey a,A
"spendkey" j,J
User B
"spendkey" k,K
User C
"spendkey" m,M
A collects K and M from B and C
B collects J and M from A and C
C collects J and K from A and B
A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK)
A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM)
B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK)
B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate
Address: N+O+P, A
The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other
needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two.
Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties:
A gives j to B
B gives k to C
C gives m to A
Address: J+K+M, A
3 of 3
Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others.
The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it
or send it back to A.
N-1 of N
Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around
(using either the secure or insecure method).
For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up):
[4 of 5]
User: spendkey
A: a
B: b
C: c
D: d
E: e
a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A
Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with
the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys.
Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each.
Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning:
1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image)
2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator
must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use.
You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might
also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format.
You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc.
The process is somewhat cumbersome:
To create a N/N multisig wallet:
- each participant creates a normal wallet
- each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant
- each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N)
As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent:
- each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant
- each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants
Then, a transaction may be initiated:
- one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT"
- this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file
- the initiator sends this file to another participant
- that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx"
- the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again
- if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed
- the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
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# include "common/apply_permutation.h"
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# include "rapidjson/document.h"
# include "rapidjson/writer.h"
# include "rapidjson/stringbuffer.h"
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# include "common/json_util.h"
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# include "common/memwipe.h"
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# include "common/base58.h"
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# include "ringct/rctSigs.h"
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extern " C "
{
# include "crypto/keccak.h"
# include "crypto/crypto-ops.h"
}
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using namespace std ;
using namespace crypto ;
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using namespace cryptonote ;
Change logging to easylogging++
This replaces the epee and data_loggers logging systems with
a single one, and also adds filename:line and explicit severity
levels. Categories may be defined, and logging severity set
by category (or set of categories). epee style 0-4 log level
maps to a sensible severity configuration. Log files now also
rotate when reaching 100 MB.
To select which logs to output, use the MONERO_LOGS environment
variable, with a comma separated list of categories (globs are
supported), with their requested severity level after a colon.
If a log matches more than one such setting, the last one in
the configuration string applies. A few examples:
This one is (mostly) silent, only outputting fatal errors:
MONERO_LOGS=*:FATAL
This one is very verbose:
MONERO_LOGS=*:TRACE
This one is totally silent (logwise):
MONERO_LOGS=""
This one outputs all errors and warnings, except for the
"verify" category, which prints just fatal errors (the verify
category is used for logs about incoming transactions and
blocks, and it is expected that some/many will fail to verify,
hence we don't want the spam):
MONERO_LOGS=*:WARNING,verify:FATAL
Log levels are, in decreasing order of priority:
FATAL, ERROR, WARNING, INFO, DEBUG, TRACE
Subcategories may be added using prefixes and globs. This
example will output net.p2p logs at the TRACE level, but all
other net* logs only at INFO:
MONERO_LOGS=*:ERROR,net*:INFO,net.p2p:TRACE
Logs which are intended for the user (which Monero was using
a lot through epee, but really isn't a nice way to go things)
should use the "global" category. There are a few helper macros
for using this category, eg: MGINFO("this shows up by default")
or MGINFO_RED("this is red"), to try to keep a similar look
and feel for now.
Existing epee log macros still exist, and map to the new log
levels, but since they're used as a "user facing" UI element
as much as a logging system, they often don't map well to log
severities (ie, a log level 0 log may be an error, or may be
something we want the user to see, such as an important info).
In those cases, I tried to use the new macros. In other cases,
I left the existing macros in. When modifying logs, it is
probably best to switch to the new macros with explicit levels.
The --log-level options and set_log commands now also accept
category settings, in addition to the epee style log levels.
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# undef MONERO_DEFAULT_LOG_CATEGORY
# define MONERO_DEFAULT_LOG_CATEGORY "wallet.wallet2"
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// used to choose when to stop adding outputs to a tx
# define APPROXIMATE_INPUT_BYTES 80
// used to target a given block size (additional outputs may be added on top to build fee)
# define TX_SIZE_TARGET(bytes) (bytes*2 / 3)
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// arbitrary, used to generate different hashes from the same input
# define CHACHA8_KEY_TAIL 0x8c
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# define UNSIGNED_TX_PREFIX "Monero unsigned tx set\004"
# define SIGNED_TX_PREFIX "Monero signed tx set\004"
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing
Scheme by luigi1111:
Multisig for RingCT on Monero
2 of 2
User A (coordinator):
Spendkey b,B
Viewkey a,A (shared)
User B:
Spendkey c,C
Viewkey a,A (shared)
Public Address: C+B, A
Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a
A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants)
A and B watch for incoming outputs
B creates "half" key images for discovered output D:
I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D)
B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D),
and sending the pubkeys with I2_D.
A also creates "half" key images:
I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D)
Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D
Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction).
A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D
to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R).
At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r,
which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo).
B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well).
B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D
to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well.
NOTE:
A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively.
Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible:
A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B.
B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A.
The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time!
The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature).
2 of 3
User A (coordinator)
Shared viewkey a,A
"spendkey" j,J
User B
"spendkey" k,K
User C
"spendkey" m,M
A collects K and M from B and C
B collects J and M from A and C
C collects J and K from A and B
A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK)
A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM)
B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK)
B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate
Address: N+O+P, A
The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other
needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two.
Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties:
A gives j to B
B gives k to C
C gives m to A
Address: J+K+M, A
3 of 3
Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others.
The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it
or send it back to A.
N-1 of N
Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around
(using either the secure or insecure method).
For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up):
[4 of 5]
User: spendkey
A: a
B: b
C: c
D: d
E: e
a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A
Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with
the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys.
Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each.
Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning:
1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image)
2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator
must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use.
You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might
also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format.
You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc.
The process is somewhat cumbersome:
To create a N/N multisig wallet:
- each participant creates a normal wallet
- each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant
- each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N)
As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent:
- each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant
- each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants
Then, a transaction may be initiated:
- one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT"
- this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file
- the initiator sends this file to another participant
- that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx"
- the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again
- if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed
- the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
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# define MULTISIG_UNSIGNED_TX_PREFIX "Monero multisig unsigned tx set\001"
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# define RECENT_OUTPUT_RATIO (0.5) // 50% of outputs are from the recent zone
# define RECENT_OUTPUT_ZONE ((time_t)(1.8 * 86400)) // last 1.8 day makes up the recent zone (taken from monerolink.pdf, Miller et al)
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# define FEE_ESTIMATE_GRACE_BLOCKS 10 // estimate fee valid for that many blocks
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# define SECOND_OUTPUT_RELATEDNESS_THRESHOLD 0.0f
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# define SUBADDRESS_LOOKAHEAD_MAJOR 50
# define SUBADDRESS_LOOKAHEAD_MINOR 200
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# define KEY_IMAGE_EXPORT_FILE_MAGIC "Monero key image export\002"
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# define MULTISIG_EXPORT_FILE_MAGIC "Monero multisig export\001"
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namespace
{
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// Create on-demand to prevent static initialization order fiasco issues.
struct options {
const command_line : : arg_descriptor < std : : string > daemon_address = { " daemon-address " , tools : : wallet2 : : tr ( " Use daemon instance at <host>:<port> " ) , " " } ;
const command_line : : arg_descriptor < std : : string > daemon_host = { " daemon-host " , tools : : wallet2 : : tr ( " Use daemon instance at host <arg> instead of localhost " ) , " " } ;
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const command_line : : arg_descriptor < std : : string > password = { " password " , tools : : wallet2 : : tr ( " Wallet password (escape/quote as needed) " ) , " " , true } ;
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const command_line : : arg_descriptor < std : : string > password_file = { " password-file " , tools : : wallet2 : : tr ( " Wallet password file " ) , " " , true } ;
const command_line : : arg_descriptor < int > daemon_port = { " daemon-port " , tools : : wallet2 : : tr ( " Use daemon instance at port <arg> instead of 18081 " ) , 0 } ;
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const command_line : : arg_descriptor < std : : string > daemon_login = { " daemon-login " , tools : : wallet2 : : tr ( " Specify username[:password] for daemon RPC client " ) , " " , true } ;
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const command_line : : arg_descriptor < bool > testnet = { " testnet " , tools : : wallet2 : : tr ( " For testnet. Daemon must also be launched with --testnet flag " ) , false } ;
const command_line : : arg_descriptor < bool > restricted = { " restricted-rpc " , tools : : wallet2 : : tr ( " Restricts to view-only commands " ) , false } ;
} ;
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void do_prepare_file_names ( const std : : string & file_path , std : : string & keys_file , std : : string & wallet_file )
{
keys_file = file_path ;
wallet_file = file_path ;
boost : : system : : error_code e ;
if ( string_tools : : get_extension ( keys_file ) = = " keys " )
{ //provided keys file name
wallet_file = string_tools : : cut_off_extension ( wallet_file ) ;
} else
{ //provided wallet file name
keys_file + = " .keys " ;
}
}
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uint64_t calculate_fee ( uint64_t fee_per_kb , size_t bytes , uint64_t fee_multiplier )
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{
uint64_t kB = ( bytes + 1023 ) / 1024 ;
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return kB * fee_per_kb * fee_multiplier ;
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}
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uint64_t calculate_fee ( uint64_t fee_per_kb , const cryptonote : : blobdata & blob , uint64_t fee_multiplier )
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{
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return calculate_fee ( fee_per_kb , blob . size ( ) , fee_multiplier ) ;
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}
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std : : unique_ptr < tools : : wallet2 > make_basic ( const boost : : program_options : : variables_map & vm , const options & opts , const std : : function < boost : : optional < tools : : password_container > ( const char * , bool ) > & password_prompter )
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{
const bool testnet = command_line : : get_arg ( vm , opts . testnet ) ;
const bool restricted = command_line : : get_arg ( vm , opts . restricted ) ;
auto daemon_address = command_line : : get_arg ( vm , opts . daemon_address ) ;
auto daemon_host = command_line : : get_arg ( vm , opts . daemon_host ) ;
auto daemon_port = command_line : : get_arg ( vm , opts . daemon_port ) ;
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THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( ! daemon_address . empty ( ) & & ! daemon_host . empty ( ) & & 0 ! = daemon_port ,
tools : : error : : wallet_internal_error , tools : : wallet2 : : tr ( " can't specify daemon host or port more than once " ) ) ;
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boost : : optional < epee : : net_utils : : http : : login > login { } ;
if ( command_line : : has_arg ( vm , opts . daemon_login ) )
{
auto parsed = tools : : login : : parse (
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command_line : : get_arg ( vm , opts . daemon_login ) , false , [ password_prompter ] ( bool verify ) {
return password_prompter ( " Daemon client password " , verify ) ;
}
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) ;
if ( ! parsed )
return nullptr ;
login . emplace ( std : : move ( parsed - > username ) , std : : move ( parsed - > password ) . password ( ) ) ;
}
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if ( daemon_host . empty ( ) )
daemon_host = " localhost " ;
if ( ! daemon_port )
{
daemon_port = testnet ? config : : testnet : : RPC_DEFAULT_PORT : config : : RPC_DEFAULT_PORT ;
}
if ( daemon_address . empty ( ) )
daemon_address = std : : string ( " http:// " ) + daemon_host + " : " + std : : to_string ( daemon_port ) ;
std : : unique_ptr < tools : : wallet2 > wallet ( new tools : : wallet2 ( testnet , restricted ) ) ;
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wallet - > init ( std : : move ( daemon_address ) , std : : move ( login ) ) ;
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return wallet ;
}
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boost : : optional < tools : : password_container > get_password ( const boost : : program_options : : variables_map & vm , const options & opts , const std : : function < boost : : optional < tools : : password_container > ( const char * , bool ) > & password_prompter , const bool verify )
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{
if ( command_line : : has_arg ( vm , opts . password ) & & command_line : : has_arg ( vm , opts . password_file ) )
{
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THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION ( tools : : error : : wallet_internal_error , tools : : wallet2 : : tr ( " can't specify more than one of --password and --password-file " ) ) ;
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}
if ( command_line : : has_arg ( vm , opts . password ) )
{
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return tools : : password_container { command_line : : get_arg ( vm , opts . password ) } ;
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}
if ( command_line : : has_arg ( vm , opts . password_file ) )
{
std : : string password ;
bool r = epee : : file_io_utils : : load_file_to_string ( command_line : : get_arg ( vm , opts . password_file ) ,
password ) ;
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THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( ! r , tools : : error : : wallet_internal_error , tools : : wallet2 : : tr ( " the password file specified could not be read " ) ) ;
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// Remove line breaks the user might have inserted
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boost : : trim_right_if ( password , boost : : is_any_of ( " \r \n " ) ) ;
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return { tools : : password_container { std : : move ( password ) } } ;
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}
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THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( ! password_prompter , tools : : error : : wallet_internal_error , tools : : wallet2 : : tr ( " no password specified; use --prompt-for-password to prompt for a password " ) ) ;
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return password_prompter ( verify ? tr ( " Enter new wallet password " ) : tr ( " Wallet password " ) , verify ) ;
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}
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std : : unique_ptr < tools : : wallet2 > generate_from_json ( const std : : string & json_file , const boost : : program_options : : variables_map & vm , const options & opts , const std : : function < boost : : optional < tools : : password_container > ( const char * , bool ) > & password_prompter )
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{
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const bool testnet = command_line : : get_arg ( vm , opts . testnet ) ;
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/* GET_FIELD_FROM_JSON_RETURN_ON_ERROR Is a generic macro that can return
false . Gcc will coerce this into unique_ptr ( nullptr ) , but clang correctly
fails . This large wrapper is for the use of that macro */
std : : unique_ptr < tools : : wallet2 > wallet ;
const auto do_generate = [ & ] ( ) - > bool {
std : : string buf ;
if ( ! epee : : file_io_utils : : load_file_to_string ( json_file , buf ) ) {
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THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION ( tools : : error : : wallet_internal_error , std : : string ( tools : : wallet2 : : tr ( " Failed to load file " ) ) + json_file ) ;
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return false ;
}
rapidjson : : Document json ;
if ( json . Parse ( buf . c_str ( ) ) . HasParseError ( ) ) {
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THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION ( tools : : error : : wallet_internal_error , tools : : wallet2 : : tr ( " Failed to parse JSON " ) ) ;
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return false ;
}
GET_FIELD_FROM_JSON_RETURN_ON_ERROR ( json , version , unsigned , Uint , true , 0 ) ;
const int current_version = 1 ;
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THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( field_version > current_version , tools : : error : : wallet_internal_error ,
( ( boost : : format ( tools : : wallet2 : : tr ( " Version %u too new, we can only grok up to %u " ) ) % field_version % current_version ) ) . str ( ) ) ;
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GET_FIELD_FROM_JSON_RETURN_ON_ERROR ( json , filename , std : : string , String , true , std : : string ( ) ) ;
GET_FIELD_FROM_JSON_RETURN_ON_ERROR ( json , scan_from_height , uint64_t , Uint64 , false , 0 ) ;
const bool recover = field_scan_from_height_found ;
GET_FIELD_FROM_JSON_RETURN_ON_ERROR ( json , password , std : : string , String , false , std : : string ( ) ) ;
GET_FIELD_FROM_JSON_RETURN_ON_ERROR ( json , viewkey , std : : string , String , false , std : : string ( ) ) ;
crypto : : secret_key viewkey ;
if ( field_viewkey_found )
{
cryptonote : : blobdata viewkey_data ;
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if ( ! epee : : string_tools : : parse_hexstr_to_binbuff ( field_viewkey , viewkey_data ) | | viewkey_data . size ( ) ! = sizeof ( crypto : : secret_key ) )
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{
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THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION ( tools : : error : : wallet_internal_error , tools : : wallet2 : : tr ( " failed to parse view key secret key " ) ) ;
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}
viewkey = * reinterpret_cast < const crypto : : secret_key * > ( viewkey_data . data ( ) ) ;
crypto : : public_key pkey ;
if ( ! crypto : : secret_key_to_public_key ( viewkey , pkey ) ) {
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THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION ( tools : : error : : wallet_internal_error , tools : : wallet2 : : tr ( " failed to verify view key secret key " ) ) ;
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}
}
GET_FIELD_FROM_JSON_RETURN_ON_ERROR ( json , spendkey , std : : string , String , false , std : : string ( ) ) ;
crypto : : secret_key spendkey ;
if ( field_spendkey_found )
{
cryptonote : : blobdata spendkey_data ;
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if ( ! epee : : string_tools : : parse_hexstr_to_binbuff ( field_spendkey , spendkey_data ) | | spendkey_data . size ( ) ! = sizeof ( crypto : : secret_key ) )
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{
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THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION ( tools : : error : : wallet_internal_error , tools : : wallet2 : : tr ( " failed to parse spend key secret key " ) ) ;
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}
spendkey = * reinterpret_cast < const crypto : : secret_key * > ( spendkey_data . data ( ) ) ;
crypto : : public_key pkey ;
if ( ! crypto : : secret_key_to_public_key ( spendkey , pkey ) ) {
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THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION ( tools : : error : : wallet_internal_error , tools : : wallet2 : : tr ( " failed to verify spend key secret key " ) ) ;
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}
}
GET_FIELD_FROM_JSON_RETURN_ON_ERROR ( json , seed , std : : string , String , false , std : : string ( ) ) ;
std : : string old_language ;
crypto : : secret_key recovery_key ;
bool restore_deterministic_wallet = false ;
if ( field_seed_found )
{
if ( ! crypto : : ElectrumWords : : words_to_bytes ( field_seed , recovery_key , old_language ) )
{
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THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION ( tools : : error : : wallet_internal_error , tools : : wallet2 : : tr ( " Electrum-style word list failed verification " ) ) ;
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}
restore_deterministic_wallet = true ;
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GET_FIELD_FROM_JSON_RETURN_ON_ERROR ( json , seed_passphrase , std : : string , String , false , std : : string ( ) ) ;
if ( field_seed_passphrase_found )
{
if ( ! field_seed_passphrase . empty ( ) )
recovery_key = cryptonote : : decrypt_key ( recovery_key , field_seed_passphrase ) ;
}
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}
GET_FIELD_FROM_JSON_RETURN_ON_ERROR ( json , address , std : : string , String , false , std : : string ( ) ) ;
// compatibility checks
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if ( ! field_seed_found & & ! field_viewkey_found & & ! field_spendkey_found )
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{
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THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION ( tools : : error : : wallet_internal_error , tools : : wallet2 : : tr ( " At least one of Electrum-style word list and private view key and private spend key must be specified " ) ) ;
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}
if ( field_seed_found & & ( field_viewkey_found | | field_spendkey_found ) )
{
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THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION ( tools : : error : : wallet_internal_error , tools : : wallet2 : : tr ( " Both Electrum-style word list and private key(s) specified " ) ) ;
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}
// if an address was given, we check keys against it, and deduce the spend
// public key if it was not given
if ( field_address_found )
{
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cryptonote : : address_parse_info info ;
if ( ! get_account_address_from_str ( info , testnet , field_address ) )
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{
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THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION ( tools : : error : : wallet_internal_error , tools : : wallet2 : : tr ( " invalid address " ) ) ;
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}
if ( field_viewkey_found )
{
crypto : : public_key pkey ;
if ( ! crypto : : secret_key_to_public_key ( viewkey , pkey ) ) {
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THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION ( tools : : error : : wallet_internal_error , tools : : wallet2 : : tr ( " failed to verify view key secret key " ) ) ;
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}
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if ( info . address . m_view_public_key ! = pkey ) {
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THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION ( tools : : error : : wallet_internal_error , tools : : wallet2 : : tr ( " view key does not match standard address " ) ) ;
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}
}
if ( field_spendkey_found )
{
crypto : : public_key pkey ;
if ( ! crypto : : secret_key_to_public_key ( spendkey , pkey ) ) {
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THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION ( tools : : error : : wallet_internal_error , tools : : wallet2 : : tr ( " failed to verify spend key secret key " ) ) ;
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}
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if ( info . address . m_spend_public_key ! = pkey ) {
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THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION ( tools : : error : : wallet_internal_error , tools : : wallet2 : : tr ( " spend key does not match standard address " ) ) ;
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}
}
}
const bool deprecated_wallet = restore_deterministic_wallet & & ( ( old_language = = crypto : : ElectrumWords : : old_language_name ) | |
crypto : : ElectrumWords : : get_is_old_style_seed ( field_seed ) ) ;
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THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( deprecated_wallet , tools : : error : : wallet_internal_error ,
tools : : wallet2 : : tr ( " Cannot create deprecated wallets from JSON " ) ) ;
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wallet . reset ( make_basic ( vm , opts , password_prompter ) . release ( ) ) ;
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wallet - > set_refresh_from_block_height ( field_scan_from_height ) ;
try
{
if ( ! field_seed . empty ( ) )
{
wallet - > generate ( field_filename , field_password , recovery_key , recover , false ) ;
}
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else if ( field_viewkey . empty ( ) & & ! field_spendkey . empty ( ) )
{
wallet - > generate ( field_filename , field_password , spendkey , recover , false ) ;
}
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else
{
cryptonote : : account_public_address address ;
if ( ! crypto : : secret_key_to_public_key ( viewkey , address . m_view_public_key ) ) {
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THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION ( tools : : error : : wallet_internal_error , tools : : wallet2 : : tr ( " failed to verify view key secret key " ) ) ;
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}
if ( field_spendkey . empty ( ) )
{
// if we have an addres but no spend key, we can deduce the spend public key
// from the address
if ( field_address_found )
{
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cryptonote : : address_parse_info info ;
if ( ! get_account_address_from_str ( info , testnet , field_address ) )
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{
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THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION ( tools : : error : : wallet_internal_error , std : : string ( tools : : wallet2 : : tr ( " failed to parse address: " ) ) + field_address ) ;
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}
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address . m_spend_public_key = info . address . m_spend_public_key ;
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}
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else
{
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THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION ( tools : : error : : wallet_internal_error , tools : : wallet2 : : tr ( " Address must be specified in order to create watch-only wallet " ) ) ;
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}
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wallet - > generate ( field_filename , field_password , address , viewkey ) ;
}
else
{
if ( ! crypto : : secret_key_to_public_key ( spendkey , address . m_spend_public_key ) ) {
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THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION ( tools : : error : : wallet_internal_error , tools : : wallet2 : : tr ( " failed to verify spend key secret key " ) ) ;
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}
wallet - > generate ( field_filename , field_password , address , spendkey , viewkey ) ;
}
}
}
catch ( const std : : exception & e )
{
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THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION ( tools : : error : : wallet_internal_error , std : : string ( tools : : wallet2 : : tr ( " failed to generate new wallet: " ) ) + e . what ( ) ) ;
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}
return true ;
} ;
if ( do_generate ( ) )
{
return wallet ;
}
return nullptr ;
}
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static void throw_on_rpc_response_error ( const boost : : optional < std : : string > & status , const char * method )
{
// no error
if ( ! status )
return ;
// empty string -> not connection
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( status - > empty ( ) , tools : : error : : no_connection_to_daemon , method ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( * status = = CORE_RPC_STATUS_BUSY , tools : : error : : daemon_busy , method ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( * status ! = CORE_RPC_STATUS_OK , tools : : error : : wallet_generic_rpc_error , method , * status ) ;
}
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std : : string strjoin ( const std : : vector < size_t > & V , const char * sep )
{
std : : stringstream ss ;
bool first = true ;
for ( const auto & v : V )
{
if ( ! first )
ss < < sep ;
ss < < std : : to_string ( v ) ;
first = false ;
}
return ss . str ( ) ;
}
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static void emplace_or_replace ( std : : unordered_multimap < crypto : : hash , tools : : wallet2 : : pool_payment_details > & container ,
const crypto : : hash & key , const tools : : wallet2 : : pool_payment_details & pd )
{
auto range = container . equal_range ( key ) ;
for ( auto i = range . first ; i ! = range . second ; + + i )
{
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if ( i - > second . m_pd . m_tx_hash = = pd . m_pd . m_tx_hash & & i - > second . m_pd . m_subaddr_index = = pd . m_pd . m_subaddr_index )
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{
i - > second = pd ;
return ;
}
}
container . emplace ( key , pd ) ;
}
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void drop_from_short_history ( std : : list < crypto : : hash > & short_chain_history , size_t N )
{
std : : list < crypto : : hash > : : iterator right ;
// drop early N off, skipping the genesis block
if ( short_chain_history . size ( ) > N ) {
right = short_chain_history . end ( ) ;
std : : advance ( right , - 1 ) ;
std : : list < crypto : : hash > : : iterator left = right ;
std : : advance ( left , - N ) ;
short_chain_history . erase ( left , right ) ;
}
}
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size_t estimate_rct_tx_size ( int n_inputs , int mixin , int n_outputs , size_t extra_size , bool bulletproof )
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{
size_t size = 0 ;
// tx prefix
// first few bytes
size + = 1 + 6 ;
// vin
size + = n_inputs * ( 1 + 6 + ( mixin + 1 ) * 2 + 32 ) ;
// vout
size + = n_outputs * ( 6 + 32 ) ;
// extra
size + = extra_size ;
// rct signatures
// type
size + = 1 ;
// rangeSigs
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if ( bulletproof )
size + = ( ( 2 * 6 + 4 + 5 ) * 32 + 3 ) * n_outputs ;
else
size + = ( 2 * 64 * 32 + 32 + 64 * 32 ) * n_outputs ;
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// MGs
size + = n_inputs * ( 64 * ( mixin + 1 ) + 32 ) ;
// mixRing - not serialized, can be reconstructed
/* size += 2 * 32 * (mixin+1) * n_inputs; */
// pseudoOuts
size + = 32 * n_inputs ;
// ecdhInfo
size + = 2 * 32 * n_outputs ;
// outPk - only commitment is saved
size + = 32 * n_outputs ;
// txnFee
size + = 4 ;
LOG_PRINT_L2 ( " estimated rct tx size for " < < n_inputs < < " with ring size " < < ( mixin + 1 ) < < " and " < < n_outputs < < " : " < < size < < " ( " < < ( ( 32 * n_inputs /*+1*/ ) + 2 * 32 * ( mixin + 1 ) * n_inputs + 32 * n_outputs ) < < " saved) " ) ;
return size ;
}
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size_t estimate_tx_size ( bool use_rct , int n_inputs , int mixin , int n_outputs , size_t extra_size , bool bulletproof )
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{
if ( use_rct )
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return estimate_rct_tx_size ( n_inputs , mixin , n_outputs + 1 , extra_size , bulletproof ) ;
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else
return n_inputs * ( mixin + 1 ) * APPROXIMATE_INPUT_BYTES + extra_size ;
}
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uint8_t get_bulletproof_fork ( bool testnet )
{
if ( testnet )
return 7 ;
else
return 255 ; // TODO
}
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing
Scheme by luigi1111:
Multisig for RingCT on Monero
2 of 2
User A (coordinator):
Spendkey b,B
Viewkey a,A (shared)
User B:
Spendkey c,C
Viewkey a,A (shared)
Public Address: C+B, A
Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a
A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants)
A and B watch for incoming outputs
B creates "half" key images for discovered output D:
I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D)
B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D),
and sending the pubkeys with I2_D.
A also creates "half" key images:
I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D)
Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D
Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction).
A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D
to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R).
At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r,
which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo).
B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well).
B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D
to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well.
NOTE:
A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively.
Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible:
A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B.
B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A.
The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time!
The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature).
2 of 3
User A (coordinator)
Shared viewkey a,A
"spendkey" j,J
User B
"spendkey" k,K
User C
"spendkey" m,M
A collects K and M from B and C
B collects J and M from A and C
C collects J and K from A and B
A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK)
A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM)
B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK)
B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate
Address: N+O+P, A
The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other
needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two.
Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties:
A gives j to B
B gives k to C
C gives m to A
Address: J+K+M, A
3 of 3
Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others.
The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it
or send it back to A.
N-1 of N
Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around
(using either the secure or insecure method).
For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up):
[4 of 5]
User: spendkey
A: a
B: b
C: c
D: d
E: e
a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A
Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with
the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys.
Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each.
Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning:
1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image)
2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator
must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use.
You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might
also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format.
You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc.
The process is somewhat cumbersome:
To create a N/N multisig wallet:
- each participant creates a normal wallet
- each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant
- each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N)
As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent:
- each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant
- each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants
Then, a transaction may be initiated:
- one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT"
- this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file
- the initiator sends this file to another participant
- that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx"
- the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again
- if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed
- the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
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crypto : : hash8 get_short_payment_id ( const tools : : wallet2 : : pending_tx & ptx )
{
crypto : : hash8 payment_id8 = null_hash8 ;
std : : vector < tx_extra_field > tx_extra_fields ;
if ( ! parse_tx_extra ( ptx . tx . extra , tx_extra_fields ) )
return payment_id8 ;
cryptonote : : tx_extra_nonce extra_nonce ;
if ( find_tx_extra_field_by_type ( tx_extra_fields , extra_nonce ) )
{
if ( get_encrypted_payment_id_from_tx_extra_nonce ( extra_nonce . nonce , payment_id8 ) )
{
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if ( ptx . dests . empty ( ) )
{
MWARNING ( " Encrypted payment id found, but no destinations public key, cannot decrypt " ) ;
return crypto : : null_hash8 ;
}
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing
Scheme by luigi1111:
Multisig for RingCT on Monero
2 of 2
User A (coordinator):
Spendkey b,B
Viewkey a,A (shared)
User B:
Spendkey c,C
Viewkey a,A (shared)
Public Address: C+B, A
Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a
A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants)
A and B watch for incoming outputs
B creates "half" key images for discovered output D:
I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D)
B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D),
and sending the pubkeys with I2_D.
A also creates "half" key images:
I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D)
Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D
Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction).
A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D
to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R).
At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r,
which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo).
B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well).
B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D
to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well.
NOTE:
A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively.
Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible:
A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B.
B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A.
The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time!
The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature).
2 of 3
User A (coordinator)
Shared viewkey a,A
"spendkey" j,J
User B
"spendkey" k,K
User C
"spendkey" m,M
A collects K and M from B and C
B collects J and M from A and C
C collects J and K from A and B
A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK)
A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM)
B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK)
B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate
Address: N+O+P, A
The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other
needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two.
Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties:
A gives j to B
B gives k to C
C gives m to A
Address: J+K+M, A
3 of 3
Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others.
The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it
or send it back to A.
N-1 of N
Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around
(using either the secure or insecure method).
For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up):
[4 of 5]
User: spendkey
A: a
B: b
C: c
D: d
E: e
a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A
Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with
the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys.
Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each.
Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning:
1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image)
2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator
must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use.
You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might
also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format.
You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc.
The process is somewhat cumbersome:
To create a N/N multisig wallet:
- each participant creates a normal wallet
- each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant
- each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N)
As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent:
- each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant
- each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants
Then, a transaction may be initiated:
- one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT"
- this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file
- the initiator sends this file to another participant
- that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx"
- the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again
- if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed
- the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
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decrypt_payment_id ( payment_id8 , ptx . dests [ 0 ] . addr . m_view_public_key , ptx . tx_key ) ;
}
}
return payment_id8 ;
}
tools : : wallet2 : : tx_construction_data get_construction_data_with_decrypted_short_payment_id ( const tools : : wallet2 : : pending_tx & ptx )
{
tools : : wallet2 : : tx_construction_data construction_data = ptx . construction_data ;
crypto : : hash8 payment_id = get_short_payment_id ( ptx ) ;
if ( payment_id ! = null_hash8 )
{
// Remove encrypted
remove_field_from_tx_extra ( construction_data . extra , typeid ( cryptonote : : tx_extra_nonce ) ) ;
// Add decrypted
std : : string extra_nonce ;
set_encrypted_payment_id_to_tx_extra_nonce ( extra_nonce , payment_id ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( ! add_extra_nonce_to_tx_extra ( construction_data . extra , extra_nonce ) ,
tools : : error : : wallet_internal_error , " Failed to add decrypted payment id to tx extra " ) ;
LOG_PRINT_L1 ( " Decrypted payment ID: " < < payment_id ) ;
}
return construction_data ;
}
//-----------------------------------------------------------------
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} //namespace
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namespace tools
{
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// for now, limit to 30 attempts. TODO: discuss a good number to limit to.
const size_t MAX_SPLIT_ATTEMPTS = 30 ;
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constexpr const std : : chrono : : seconds wallet2 : : rpc_timeout ;
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const char * wallet2 : : tr ( const char * str ) { return i18n_translate ( str , " tools::wallet2 " ) ; }
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wallet2 : : wallet2 ( bool testnet , bool restricted ) :
m_multisig_rescan_info ( NULL ) ,
m_multisig_rescan_k ( NULL ) ,
m_run ( true ) ,
m_callback ( 0 ) ,
m_testnet ( testnet ) ,
m_always_confirm_transfers ( true ) ,
m_print_ring_members ( false ) ,
m_store_tx_info ( true ) ,
m_default_mixin ( 0 ) ,
m_default_priority ( 0 ) ,
m_refresh_type ( RefreshOptimizeCoinbase ) ,
m_auto_refresh ( true ) ,
m_refresh_from_block_height ( 0 ) ,
m_confirm_missing_payment_id ( true ) ,
m_ask_password ( true ) ,
m_min_output_count ( 0 ) ,
m_min_output_value ( 0 ) ,
m_merge_destinations ( false ) ,
m_confirm_backlog ( true ) ,
m_is_initialized ( false ) ,
m_restricted ( restricted ) ,
is_old_file_format ( false ) ,
m_node_rpc_proxy ( m_http_client , m_daemon_rpc_mutex ) ,
m_subaddress_lookahead_major ( SUBADDRESS_LOOKAHEAD_MAJOR ) ,
m_subaddress_lookahead_minor ( SUBADDRESS_LOOKAHEAD_MINOR ) ,
m_light_wallet ( false ) ,
m_light_wallet_scanned_block_height ( 0 ) ,
m_light_wallet_blockchain_height ( 0 ) ,
m_light_wallet_connected ( false ) ,
m_light_wallet_balance ( 0 ) ,
m_light_wallet_unlocked_balance ( 0 )
{
}
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bool wallet2 : : has_testnet_option ( const boost : : program_options : : variables_map & vm )
{
return command_line : : get_arg ( vm , options ( ) . testnet ) ;
}
void wallet2 : : init_options ( boost : : program_options : : options_description & desc_params )
{
const options opts { } ;
command_line : : add_arg ( desc_params , opts . daemon_address ) ;
command_line : : add_arg ( desc_params , opts . daemon_host ) ;
command_line : : add_arg ( desc_params , opts . password ) ;
command_line : : add_arg ( desc_params , opts . password_file ) ;
command_line : : add_arg ( desc_params , opts . daemon_port ) ;
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command_line : : add_arg ( desc_params , opts . daemon_login ) ;
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command_line : : add_arg ( desc_params , opts . testnet ) ;
command_line : : add_arg ( desc_params , opts . restricted ) ;
}
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std : : unique_ptr < wallet2 > wallet2 : : make_from_json ( const boost : : program_options : : variables_map & vm , const std : : string & json_file , const std : : function < boost : : optional < tools : : password_container > ( const char * , bool ) > & password_prompter )
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{
const options opts { } ;
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return generate_from_json ( json_file , vm , opts , password_prompter ) ;
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}
std : : pair < std : : unique_ptr < wallet2 > , password_container > wallet2 : : make_from_file (
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const boost : : program_options : : variables_map & vm , const std : : string & wallet_file , const std : : function < boost : : optional < tools : : password_container > ( const char * , bool ) > & password_prompter )
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{
const options opts { } ;
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auto pwd = get_password ( vm , opts , password_prompter , false ) ;
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if ( ! pwd )
{
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return { nullptr , password_container { } } ;
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}
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auto wallet = make_basic ( vm , opts , password_prompter ) ;
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if ( wallet )
{
wallet - > load ( wallet_file , pwd - > password ( ) ) ;
}
return { std : : move ( wallet ) , std : : move ( * pwd ) } ;
}
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std : : pair < std : : unique_ptr < wallet2 > , password_container > wallet2 : : make_new ( const boost : : program_options : : variables_map & vm , const std : : function < boost : : optional < password_container > ( const char * , bool ) > & password_prompter )
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{
const options opts { } ;
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auto pwd = get_password ( vm , opts , password_prompter , true ) ;
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if ( ! pwd )
{
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return { nullptr , password_container { } } ;
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}
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return { make_basic ( vm , opts , password_prompter ) , std : : move ( * pwd ) } ;
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}
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std : : unique_ptr < wallet2 > wallet2 : : make_dummy ( const boost : : program_options : : variables_map & vm , const std : : function < boost : : optional < tools : : password_container > ( const char * , bool ) > & password_prompter )
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{
const options opts { } ;
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return make_basic ( vm , opts , password_prompter ) ;
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}
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//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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bool wallet2 : : init ( std : : string daemon_address , boost : : optional < epee : : net_utils : : http : : login > daemon_login , uint64_t upper_transaction_size_limit , bool ssl )
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{
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m_checkpoints . init_default_checkpoints ( m_testnet ) ;
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if ( m_http_client . is_connected ( ) )
m_http_client . disconnect ( ) ;
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m_is_initialized = true ;
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m_upper_transaction_size_limit = upper_transaction_size_limit ;
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m_daemon_address = std : : move ( daemon_address ) ;
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m_daemon_login = std : : move ( daemon_login ) ;
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// When switching from light wallet to full wallet, we need to reset the height we got from lw node.
if ( m_light_wallet )
m_local_bc_height = m_blockchain . size ( ) ;
return m_http_client . set_server ( get_daemon_address ( ) , get_daemon_login ( ) , ssl ) ;
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}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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bool wallet2 : : is_deterministic ( ) const
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{
crypto : : secret_key second ;
keccak ( ( uint8_t * ) & get_account ( ) . get_keys ( ) . m_spend_secret_key , sizeof ( crypto : : secret_key ) , ( uint8_t * ) & second , sizeof ( crypto : : secret_key ) ) ;
sc_reduce32 ( ( uint8_t * ) & second ) ;
bool keys_deterministic = memcmp ( second . data , get_account ( ) . get_keys ( ) . m_view_secret_key . data , sizeof ( crypto : : secret_key ) ) = = 0 ;
return keys_deterministic ;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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bool wallet2 : : get_seed ( std : : string & electrum_words , const epee : : wipeable_string & passphrase ) const
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{
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bool keys_deterministic = is_deterministic ( ) ;
if ( ! keys_deterministic )
{
std : : cout < < " This is not a deterministic wallet " < < std : : endl ;
return false ;
}
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if ( seed_language . empty ( ) )
{
std : : cout < < " seed_language not set " < < std : : endl ;
return false ;
}
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crypto : : secret_key key = get_account ( ) . get_keys ( ) . m_spend_secret_key ;
if ( ! passphrase . empty ( ) )
key = cryptonote : : encrypt_key ( key , passphrase ) ;
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if ( ! crypto : : ElectrumWords : : bytes_to_words ( key , electrum_words , seed_language ) )
{
std : : cout < < " Failed to create seed from key for language: " < < seed_language < < std : : endl ;
return false ;
}
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return true ;
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}
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/*!
* \ brief Gets the seed language
*/
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const std : : string & wallet2 : : get_seed_language ( ) const
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{
return seed_language ;
}
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/*!
* \ brief Sets the seed language
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* \ param language Seed language to set to
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*/
void wallet2 : : set_seed_language ( const std : : string & language )
{
seed_language = language ;
}
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//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
cryptonote : : account_public_address wallet2 : : get_subaddress ( const cryptonote : : subaddress_index & index ) const
{
const cryptonote : : account_keys & keys = m_account . get_keys ( ) ;
if ( index . is_zero ( ) )
return keys . m_account_address ;
crypto : : public_key D = get_subaddress_spend_public_key ( index ) ;
// C = a*D
crypto : : public_key C = rct : : rct2pk ( rct : : scalarmultKey ( rct : : pk2rct ( D ) , rct : : sk2rct ( keys . m_view_secret_key ) ) ) ; // could have defined secret_key_mult_public_key() under src/crypto
// result: (C, D)
cryptonote : : account_public_address address ;
address . m_view_public_key = C ;
address . m_spend_public_key = D ;
return address ;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
crypto : : public_key wallet2 : : get_subaddress_spend_public_key ( const cryptonote : : subaddress_index & index ) const
{
const cryptonote : : account_keys & keys = m_account . get_keys ( ) ;
if ( index . is_zero ( ) )
return keys . m_account_address . m_spend_public_key ;
// m = Hs(a || index_major || index_minor)
crypto : : secret_key m = cryptonote : : get_subaddress_secret_key ( keys . m_view_secret_key , index ) ;
// M = m*G
crypto : : public_key M ;
crypto : : secret_key_to_public_key ( m , M ) ;
// D = B + M
rct : : key D_rct ;
rct : : addKeys ( D_rct , rct : : pk2rct ( keys . m_account_address . m_spend_public_key ) , rct : : pk2rct ( M ) ) ; // could have defined add_public_key() under src/crypto
crypto : : public_key D = rct : : rct2pk ( D_rct ) ;
return D ;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
std : : string wallet2 : : get_subaddress_as_str ( const cryptonote : : subaddress_index & index ) const
{
cryptonote : : account_public_address address = get_subaddress ( index ) ;
return cryptonote : : get_account_address_as_str ( m_testnet , ! index . is_zero ( ) , address ) ;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
std : : string wallet2 : : get_integrated_address_as_str ( const crypto : : hash8 & payment_id ) const
{
return cryptonote : : get_account_integrated_address_as_str ( m_testnet , get_address ( ) , payment_id ) ;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
void wallet2 : : add_subaddress_account ( const std : : string & label )
{
uint32_t index_major = ( uint32_t ) get_num_subaddress_accounts ( ) ;
expand_subaddresses ( { index_major , 0 } ) ;
m_subaddress_labels [ index_major ] [ 0 ] = label ;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
void wallet2 : : add_subaddress ( uint32_t index_major , const std : : string & label )
{
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THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( index_major > = m_subaddress_labels . size ( ) , error : : account_index_outofbound ) ;
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uint32_t index_minor = ( uint32_t ) get_num_subaddresses ( index_major ) ;
expand_subaddresses ( { index_major , index_minor } ) ;
m_subaddress_labels [ index_major ] [ index_minor ] = label ;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
void wallet2 : : expand_subaddresses ( const cryptonote : : subaddress_index & index )
{
if ( m_subaddress_labels . size ( ) < = index . major )
{
// add new accounts
cryptonote : : subaddress_index index2 ;
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for ( index2 . major = m_subaddress_labels . size ( ) ; index2 . major < index . major + m_subaddress_lookahead_major ; + + index2 . major )
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{
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for ( index2 . minor = 0 ; index2 . minor < ( index2 . major = = index . major ? index . minor : 0 ) + m_subaddress_lookahead_minor ; + + index2 . minor )
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{
if ( m_subaddresses_inv . count ( index2 ) = = 0 )
{
crypto : : public_key D = get_subaddress_spend_public_key ( index2 ) ;
m_subaddresses [ D ] = index2 ;
m_subaddresses_inv [ index2 ] = D ;
}
}
}
m_subaddress_labels . resize ( index . major + 1 , { " Untitled account " } ) ;
m_subaddress_labels [ index . major ] . resize ( index . minor + 1 ) ;
}
else if ( m_subaddress_labels [ index . major ] . size ( ) < = index . minor )
{
// add new subaddresses
cryptonote : : subaddress_index index2 = index ;
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for ( index2 . minor = m_subaddress_labels [ index . major ] . size ( ) ; index2 . minor < index . minor + m_subaddress_lookahead_minor ; + + index2 . minor )
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{
if ( m_subaddresses_inv . count ( index2 ) = = 0 )
{
crypto : : public_key D = get_subaddress_spend_public_key ( index2 ) ;
m_subaddresses [ D ] = index2 ;
m_subaddresses_inv [ index2 ] = D ;
}
}
m_subaddress_labels [ index . major ] . resize ( index . minor + 1 ) ;
}
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
std : : string wallet2 : : get_subaddress_label ( const cryptonote : : subaddress_index & index ) const
{
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if ( index . major > = m_subaddress_labels . size ( ) | | index . minor > = m_subaddress_labels [ index . major ] . size ( ) )
{
MERROR ( " Subaddress label doesn't exist " ) ;
return " " ;
}
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return m_subaddress_labels [ index . major ] [ index . minor ] ;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
void wallet2 : : set_subaddress_label ( const cryptonote : : subaddress_index & index , const std : : string & label )
{
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THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( index . major > = m_subaddress_labels . size ( ) , error : : account_index_outofbound ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( index . minor > = m_subaddress_labels [ index . major ] . size ( ) , error : : address_index_outofbound ) ;
m_subaddress_labels [ index . major ] [ index . minor ] = label ;
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}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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void wallet2 : : set_subaddress_lookahead ( size_t major , size_t minor )
{
m_subaddress_lookahead_major = major ;
m_subaddress_lookahead_minor = minor ;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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/*!
* \ brief Tells if the wallet file is deprecated .
*/
bool wallet2 : : is_deprecated ( ) const
{
return is_old_file_format ;
}
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//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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void wallet2 : : set_spent ( size_t idx , uint64_t height )
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{
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transfer_details & td = m_transfers [ idx ] ;
2016-07-31 13:25:04 +00:00
LOG_PRINT_L2 ( " Setting SPENT at " < < height < < " : ki " < < td . m_key_image < < " , amount " < < print_money ( td . m_amount ) ) ;
td . m_spent = true ;
td . m_spent_height = height ;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2016-09-26 22:11:10 +00:00
void wallet2 : : set_unspent ( size_t idx )
2016-07-31 13:25:04 +00:00
{
2016-09-26 22:11:10 +00:00
transfer_details & td = m_transfers [ idx ] ;
2016-07-31 13:25:04 +00:00
LOG_PRINT_L2 ( " Setting UNSPENT: ki " < < td . m_key_image < < " , amount " < < print_money ( td . m_amount ) ) ;
td . m_spent = false ;
td . m_spent_height = 0 ;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2017-02-19 02:42:10 +00:00
void wallet2 : : check_acc_out_precomp ( const tx_out & o , const crypto : : key_derivation & derivation , const std : : vector < crypto : : key_derivation > & additional_derivations , size_t i , tx_scan_info_t & tx_scan_info ) const
2015-11-22 15:18:36 +00:00
{
if ( o . target . type ( ) ! = typeid ( txout_to_key ) )
{
2017-09-12 11:03:56 +00:00
tx_scan_info . error = true ;
2015-11-22 15:18:36 +00:00
LOG_ERROR ( " wrong type id in transaction out " ) ;
return ;
}
2017-02-19 02:42:10 +00:00
tx_scan_info . received = is_out_to_acc_precomp ( m_subaddresses , boost : : get < txout_to_key > ( o . target ) . key , derivation , additional_derivations , i ) ;
2017-09-12 11:03:56 +00:00
if ( tx_scan_info . received )
2015-11-22 15:18:36 +00:00
{
2017-09-12 11:03:56 +00:00
tx_scan_info . money_transfered = o . amount ; // may be 0 for ringct outputs
2015-11-22 15:18:36 +00:00
}
else
{
2017-09-12 11:03:56 +00:00
tx_scan_info . money_transfered = 0 ;
2015-11-22 15:18:36 +00:00
}
2017-09-12 11:03:56 +00:00
tx_scan_info . error = false ;
2015-11-22 15:18:36 +00:00
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2017-02-19 02:42:10 +00:00
static uint64_t decodeRct ( const rct : : rctSig & rv , const crypto : : key_derivation & derivation , unsigned int i , rct : : key & mask )
2016-07-10 11:57:22 +00:00
{
2016-08-10 11:48:20 +00:00
crypto : : secret_key scalar1 ;
crypto : : derivation_to_scalar ( derivation , i , scalar1 ) ;
2016-07-24 16:53:34 +00:00
try
{
2016-08-08 12:49:42 +00:00
switch ( rv . type )
{
case rct : : RCTTypeSimple :
2017-12-02 21:17:42 +00:00
case rct : : RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof :
2016-08-10 11:48:20 +00:00
return rct : : decodeRctSimple ( rv , rct : : sk2rct ( scalar1 ) , i , mask ) ;
2016-08-08 12:49:42 +00:00
case rct : : RCTTypeFull :
2017-12-02 21:17:42 +00:00
case rct : : RCTTypeFullBulletproof :
2016-08-10 11:48:20 +00:00
return rct : : decodeRct ( rv , rct : : sk2rct ( scalar1 ) , i , mask ) ;
2016-08-08 12:49:42 +00:00
default :
LOG_ERROR ( " Unsupported rct type: " < < rv . type ) ;
return 0 ;
}
2016-07-24 16:53:34 +00:00
}
catch ( const std : : exception & e )
{
LOG_ERROR ( " Failed to decode input " < < i ) ;
return 0 ;
}
2016-07-10 11:57:22 +00:00
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2017-02-19 02:42:10 +00:00
void wallet2 : : scan_output ( const cryptonote : : account_keys & keys , const cryptonote : : transaction & tx , const crypto : : public_key & tx_pub_key , size_t i , tx_scan_info_t & tx_scan_info , int & num_vouts_received , std : : unordered_map < cryptonote : : subaddress_index , uint64_t > & tx_money_got_in_outs , std : : vector < size_t > & outs )
2017-09-11 21:32:18 +00:00
{
2017-10-21 11:14:31 +00:00
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( i > = tx . vout . size ( ) , error : : wallet_internal_error , " Invalid vout index " ) ;
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing
Scheme by luigi1111:
Multisig for RingCT on Monero
2 of 2
User A (coordinator):
Spendkey b,B
Viewkey a,A (shared)
User B:
Spendkey c,C
Viewkey a,A (shared)
Public Address: C+B, A
Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a
A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants)
A and B watch for incoming outputs
B creates "half" key images for discovered output D:
I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D)
B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D),
and sending the pubkeys with I2_D.
A also creates "half" key images:
I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D)
Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D
Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction).
A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D
to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R).
At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r,
which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo).
B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well).
B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D
to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well.
NOTE:
A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively.
Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible:
A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B.
B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A.
The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time!
The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature).
2 of 3
User A (coordinator)
Shared viewkey a,A
"spendkey" j,J
User B
"spendkey" k,K
User C
"spendkey" m,M
A collects K and M from B and C
B collects J and M from A and C
C collects J and K from A and B
A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK)
A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM)
B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK)
B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate
Address: N+O+P, A
The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other
needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two.
Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties:
A gives j to B
B gives k to C
C gives m to A
Address: J+K+M, A
3 of 3
Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others.
The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it
or send it back to A.
N-1 of N
Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around
(using either the secure or insecure method).
For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up):
[4 of 5]
User: spendkey
A: a
B: b
C: c
D: d
E: e
a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A
Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with
the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys.
Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each.
Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning:
1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image)
2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator
must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use.
You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might
also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format.
You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc.
The process is somewhat cumbersome:
To create a N/N multisig wallet:
- each participant creates a normal wallet
- each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant
- each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N)
As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent:
- each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant
- each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants
Then, a transaction may be initiated:
- one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT"
- this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file
- the initiator sends this file to another participant
- that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx"
- the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again
- if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed
- the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 21:34:26 +00:00
if ( m_multisig )
{
2017-10-21 11:14:31 +00:00
tx_scan_info . in_ephemeral . pub = boost : : get < cryptonote : : txout_to_key > ( tx . vout [ i ] . target ) . key ;
tx_scan_info . in_ephemeral . sec = crypto : : null_skey ;
tx_scan_info . ki = rct : : rct2ki ( rct : : zero ( ) ) ;
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing
Scheme by luigi1111:
Multisig for RingCT on Monero
2 of 2
User A (coordinator):
Spendkey b,B
Viewkey a,A (shared)
User B:
Spendkey c,C
Viewkey a,A (shared)
Public Address: C+B, A
Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a
A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants)
A and B watch for incoming outputs
B creates "half" key images for discovered output D:
I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D)
B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D),
and sending the pubkeys with I2_D.
A also creates "half" key images:
I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D)
Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D
Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction).
A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D
to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R).
At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r,
which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo).
B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well).
B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D
to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well.
NOTE:
A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively.
Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible:
A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B.
B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A.
The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time!
The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature).
2 of 3
User A (coordinator)
Shared viewkey a,A
"spendkey" j,J
User B
"spendkey" k,K
User C
"spendkey" m,M
A collects K and M from B and C
B collects J and M from A and C
C collects J and K from A and B
A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK)
A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM)
B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK)
B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate
Address: N+O+P, A
The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other
needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two.
Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties:
A gives j to B
B gives k to C
C gives m to A
Address: J+K+M, A
3 of 3
Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others.
The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it
or send it back to A.
N-1 of N
Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around
(using either the secure or insecure method).
For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up):
[4 of 5]
User: spendkey
A: a
B: b
C: c
D: d
E: e
a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A
Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with
the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys.
Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each.
Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning:
1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image)
2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator
must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use.
You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might
also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format.
You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc.
The process is somewhat cumbersome:
To create a N/N multisig wallet:
- each participant creates a normal wallet
- each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant
- each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N)
As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent:
- each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant
- each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants
Then, a transaction may be initiated:
- one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT"
- this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file
- the initiator sends this file to another participant
- that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx"
- the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again
- if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed
- the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 21:34:26 +00:00
}
else
{
2017-10-21 11:14:31 +00:00
bool r = cryptonote : : generate_key_image_helper_precomp ( keys , boost : : get < cryptonote : : txout_to_key > ( tx . vout [ i ] . target ) . key , tx_scan_info . received - > derivation , i , tx_scan_info . received - > index , tx_scan_info . in_ephemeral , tx_scan_info . ki ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( ! r , error : : wallet_internal_error , " Failed to generate key image " ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( tx_scan_info . in_ephemeral . pub ! = boost : : get < cryptonote : : txout_to_key > ( tx . vout [ i ] . target ) . key ,
error : : wallet_internal_error , " key_image generated ephemeral public key not matched with output_key " ) ;
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing
Scheme by luigi1111:
Multisig for RingCT on Monero
2 of 2
User A (coordinator):
Spendkey b,B
Viewkey a,A (shared)
User B:
Spendkey c,C
Viewkey a,A (shared)
Public Address: C+B, A
Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a
A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants)
A and B watch for incoming outputs
B creates "half" key images for discovered output D:
I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D)
B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D),
and sending the pubkeys with I2_D.
A also creates "half" key images:
I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D)
Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D
Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction).
A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D
to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R).
At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r,
which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo).
B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well).
B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D
to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well.
NOTE:
A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively.
Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible:
A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B.
B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A.
The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time!
The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature).
2 of 3
User A (coordinator)
Shared viewkey a,A
"spendkey" j,J
User B
"spendkey" k,K
User C
"spendkey" m,M
A collects K and M from B and C
B collects J and M from A and C
C collects J and K from A and B
A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK)
A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM)
B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK)
B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate
Address: N+O+P, A
The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other
needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two.
Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties:
A gives j to B
B gives k to C
C gives m to A
Address: J+K+M, A
3 of 3
Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others.
The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it
or send it back to A.
N-1 of N
Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around
(using either the secure or insecure method).
For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up):
[4 of 5]
User: spendkey
A: a
B: b
C: c
D: d
E: e
a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A
Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with
the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys.
Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each.
Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning:
1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image)
2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator
must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use.
You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might
also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format.
You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc.
The process is somewhat cumbersome:
To create a N/N multisig wallet:
- each participant creates a normal wallet
- each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant
- each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N)
As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent:
- each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant
- each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants
Then, a transaction may be initiated:
- one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT"
- this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file
- the initiator sends this file to another participant
- that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx"
- the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again
- if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed
- the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 21:34:26 +00:00
}
2017-09-11 21:32:18 +00:00
outs . push_back ( i ) ;
2017-09-12 11:03:56 +00:00
if ( tx_scan_info . money_transfered = = 0 )
2017-09-11 21:32:18 +00:00
{
2017-02-19 02:42:10 +00:00
tx_scan_info . money_transfered = tools : : decodeRct ( tx . rct_signatures , tx_scan_info . received - > derivation , i , tx_scan_info . mask ) ;
2017-09-11 21:32:18 +00:00
}
2017-10-23 13:38:07 +00:00
tx_money_got_in_outs [ tx_scan_info . received - > index ] + = tx_scan_info . money_transfered ;
2017-09-12 11:03:56 +00:00
tx_scan_info . amount = tx_scan_info . money_transfered ;
2017-09-11 21:32:18 +00:00
+ + num_vouts_received ;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2017-09-22 12:57:20 +00:00
void wallet2 : : process_new_transaction ( const crypto : : hash & txid , const cryptonote : : transaction & tx , const std : : vector < uint64_t > & o_indices , uint64_t height , uint64_t ts , bool miner_tx , bool pool , bool double_spend_seen )
2014-03-03 22:07:58 +00:00
{
2017-02-27 20:26:17 +00:00
// In this function, tx (probably) only contains the base information
// (that is, the prunable stuff may or may not be included)
2016-08-06 18:19:25 +00:00
2017-02-19 02:42:10 +00:00
if ( ! miner_tx & & ! pool )
2017-02-27 20:26:17 +00:00
process_unconfirmed ( txid , tx , height ) ;
2014-03-03 22:07:58 +00:00
std : : vector < size_t > outs ;
2017-02-19 02:42:10 +00:00
std : : unordered_map < cryptonote : : subaddress_index , uint64_t > tx_money_got_in_outs ; // per receiving subaddress index
2015-08-03 20:15:10 +00:00
crypto : : public_key tx_pub_key = null_pkey ;
2014-05-03 16:19:43 +00:00
std : : vector < tx_extra_field > tx_extra_fields ;
if ( ! parse_tx_extra ( tx . extra , tx_extra_fields ) )
{
// Extra may only be partially parsed, it's OK if tx_extra_fields contains public key
2017-02-27 20:26:17 +00:00
LOG_PRINT_L0 ( " Transaction extra has unsupported format: " < < txid ) ;
2014-05-03 16:19:43 +00:00
}
2014-09-13 04:25:33 +00:00
// Don't try to extract tx public key if tx has no ouputs
2016-11-15 19:12:12 +00:00
size_t pk_index = 0 ;
2017-02-19 02:42:10 +00:00
std : : vector < tx_scan_info_t > tx_scan_info ( tx . vout . size ( ) ) ;
2016-11-15 19:12:12 +00:00
while ( ! tx . vout . empty ( ) )
2014-05-03 16:19:43 +00:00
{
2016-11-15 19:12:12 +00:00
// if tx.vout is not empty, we loop through all tx pubkeys
2014-09-13 04:25:33 +00:00
tx_extra_pub_key pub_key_field ;
2016-11-15 19:12:12 +00:00
if ( ! find_tx_extra_field_by_type ( tx_extra_fields , pub_key_field , pk_index + + ) )
2014-09-13 04:25:33 +00:00
{
2016-11-15 19:12:12 +00:00
if ( pk_index > 1 )
break ;
2017-02-27 20:26:17 +00:00
LOG_PRINT_L0 ( " Public key wasn't found in the transaction extra. Skipping transaction " < < txid ) ;
2014-09-13 04:25:33 +00:00
if ( 0 ! = m_callback )
2017-02-27 20:26:17 +00:00
m_callback - > on_skip_transaction ( height , txid , tx ) ;
2017-12-06 15:55:06 +00:00
break ;
2014-09-13 04:25:33 +00:00
}
2014-05-03 16:19:43 +00:00
2016-07-12 12:18:09 +00:00
int num_vouts_received = 0 ;
2015-08-03 20:15:10 +00:00
tx_pub_key = pub_key_field . pub_key ;
2017-09-14 03:39:37 +00:00
tools : : threadpool & tpool = tools : : threadpool : : getInstance ( ) ;
tools : : threadpool : : waiter waiter ;
2016-11-01 16:24:04 +00:00
const cryptonote : : account_keys & keys = m_account . get_keys ( ) ;
crypto : : key_derivation derivation ;
2017-11-15 22:27:30 +00:00
if ( ! generate_key_derivation ( tx_pub_key , keys . m_view_secret_key , derivation ) )
{
MWARNING ( " Failed to generate key derivation from tx pubkey, skipping " ) ;
static_assert ( sizeof ( derivation ) = = sizeof ( rct : : key ) , " Mismatched sizes of key_derivation and rct::key " ) ;
memcpy ( & derivation , rct : : identity ( ) . bytes , sizeof ( derivation ) ) ;
}
2017-02-19 02:42:10 +00:00
// additional tx pubkeys and derivations for multi-destination transfers involving one or more subaddresses
std : : vector < crypto : : public_key > additional_tx_pub_keys = get_additional_tx_pub_keys_from_extra ( tx ) ;
std : : vector < crypto : : key_derivation > additional_derivations ;
for ( size_t i = 0 ; i < additional_tx_pub_keys . size ( ) ; + + i )
{
additional_derivations . push_back ( { } ) ;
2017-11-15 22:27:30 +00:00
if ( ! generate_key_derivation ( additional_tx_pub_keys [ i ] , keys . m_view_secret_key , additional_derivations . back ( ) ) )
{
MWARNING ( " Failed to generate key derivation from tx pubkey, skipping " ) ;
additional_derivations . pop_back ( ) ;
}
2017-02-19 02:42:10 +00:00
}
2015-11-22 19:03:10 +00:00
if ( miner_tx & & m_refresh_type = = RefreshNoCoinbase )
{
// assume coinbase isn't for us
}
else if ( miner_tx & & m_refresh_type = = RefreshOptimizeCoinbase )
2015-11-22 17:52:31 +00:00
{
2017-02-19 02:42:10 +00:00
check_acc_out_precomp ( tx . vout [ 0 ] , derivation , additional_derivations , 0 , tx_scan_info [ 0 ] ) ;
2017-10-10 12:08:56 +00:00
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( tx_scan_info [ 0 ] . error , error : : acc_outs_lookup_error , tx , tx_pub_key , m_account . get_keys ( ) ) ;
// this assumes that the miner tx pays a single address
if ( tx_scan_info [ 0 ] . received )
2015-11-28 19:05:49 +00:00
{
2017-10-10 12:08:56 +00:00
// process the other outs from that tx
// the first one was already checked
for ( size_t i = 1 ; i < tx . vout . size ( ) ; + + i )
2015-11-22 17:52:31 +00:00
{
2017-10-10 12:08:56 +00:00
tpool . submit ( & waiter , boost : : bind ( & wallet2 : : check_acc_out_precomp , this , std : : cref ( tx . vout [ i ] ) , std : : cref ( derivation ) , std : : cref ( additional_derivations ) , i ,
std : : ref ( tx_scan_info [ i ] ) ) ) ;
}
waiter . wait ( ) ;
2015-11-28 19:05:49 +00:00
2017-10-10 12:08:56 +00:00
// then scan all outputs from 0
for ( size_t i = 0 ; i < tx . vout . size ( ) ; + + i )
{
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( tx_scan_info [ i ] . error , error : : acc_outs_lookup_error , tx , tx_pub_key , m_account . get_keys ( ) ) ;
if ( tx_scan_info [ i ] . received )
2015-11-28 19:05:49 +00:00
{
2017-10-10 12:08:56 +00:00
scan_output ( keys , tx , tx_pub_key , i , tx_scan_info [ i ] , num_vouts_received , tx_money_got_in_outs , outs ) ;
2015-11-28 19:05:49 +00:00
}
2015-11-22 17:52:31 +00:00
}
}
}
2017-09-12 11:03:56 +00:00
else if ( tx . vout . size ( ) > 1 & & tools : : threadpool : : getInstance ( ) . get_max_concurrency ( ) > 1 )
2015-11-22 15:18:36 +00:00
{
for ( size_t i = 0 ; i < tx . vout . size ( ) ; + + i )
{
2017-02-19 02:42:10 +00:00
tpool . submit ( & waiter , boost : : bind ( & wallet2 : : check_acc_out_precomp , this , std : : cref ( tx . vout [ i ] ) , std : : cref ( derivation ) , std : : cref ( additional_derivations ) , i ,
std : : ref ( tx_scan_info [ i ] ) ) ) ;
2015-11-22 15:18:36 +00:00
}
2017-09-14 03:39:37 +00:00
waiter . wait ( ) ;
2015-11-22 15:18:36 +00:00
for ( size_t i = 0 ; i < tx . vout . size ( ) ; + + i )
{
2017-10-10 12:08:56 +00:00
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( tx_scan_info [ i ] . error , error : : acc_outs_lookup_error , tx , tx_pub_key , m_account . get_keys ( ) ) ;
2017-09-12 11:03:56 +00:00
if ( tx_scan_info [ i ] . received )
2015-11-22 15:18:36 +00:00
{
2017-09-12 11:03:56 +00:00
scan_output ( keys , tx , tx_pub_key , i , tx_scan_info [ i ] , num_vouts_received , tx_money_got_in_outs , outs ) ;
2015-11-22 15:18:36 +00:00
}
}
}
else
{
2016-06-15 22:37:13 +00:00
for ( size_t i = 0 ; i < tx . vout . size ( ) ; + + i )
{
2017-02-19 02:42:10 +00:00
check_acc_out_precomp ( tx . vout [ i ] , derivation , additional_derivations , i , tx_scan_info [ i ] ) ;
2017-10-10 12:08:56 +00:00
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( tx_scan_info [ i ] . error , error : : acc_outs_lookup_error , tx , tx_pub_key , m_account . get_keys ( ) ) ;
2017-09-12 11:03:56 +00:00
if ( tx_scan_info [ i ] . received )
2016-06-15 22:37:13 +00:00
{
2017-09-12 11:03:56 +00:00
scan_output ( keys , tx , tx_pub_key , i , tx_scan_info [ i ] , num_vouts_received , tx_money_got_in_outs , outs ) ;
2016-06-15 22:37:13 +00:00
}
}
2015-11-22 15:18:36 +00:00
}
2014-04-02 16:00:17 +00:00
2016-07-12 12:18:09 +00:00
if ( ! outs . empty ( ) & & num_vouts_received > 0 )
2014-03-03 22:07:58 +00:00
{
2014-09-13 04:25:33 +00:00
//good news - got money! take care about it
//usually we have only one transfer for user in transaction
2016-05-23 20:40:12 +00:00
if ( ! pool )
{
2016-07-13 18:26:11 +00:00
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( tx . vout . size ( ) ! = o_indices . size ( ) , error : : wallet_internal_error ,
" transactions outputs size= " + std : : to_string ( tx . vout . size ( ) ) +
" not match with daemon response size= " + std : : to_string ( o_indices . size ( ) ) ) ;
2016-05-23 20:40:12 +00:00
}
2014-09-13 04:25:33 +00:00
2017-01-22 20:38:10 +00:00
for ( size_t o : outs )
2014-09-13 04:25:33 +00:00
{
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( tx . vout . size ( ) < = o , error : : wallet_internal_error , " wrong out in transaction: internal index= " +
std : : to_string ( o ) + " , total_outs= " + std : : to_string ( tx . vout . size ( ) ) ) ;
2017-09-12 11:03:56 +00:00
auto kit = m_pub_keys . find ( tx_scan_info [ o ] . in_ephemeral . pub ) ;
2016-11-07 18:50:05 +00:00
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( kit ! = m_pub_keys . end ( ) & & kit - > second > = m_transfers . size ( ) ,
error : : wallet_internal_error , std : : string ( " Unexpected transfer index from public key: " )
+ " got " + ( kit = = m_pub_keys . end ( ) ? " <none> " : boost : : lexical_cast < std : : string > ( kit - > second ) )
2016-01-31 16:23:54 +00:00
+ " , m_transfers.size() is " + boost : : lexical_cast < std : : string > ( m_transfers . size ( ) ) ) ;
2016-11-07 18:50:05 +00:00
if ( kit = = m_pub_keys . end ( ) )
2016-01-31 16:23:54 +00:00
{
2016-05-23 20:40:12 +00:00
if ( ! pool )
{
m_transfers . push_back ( boost : : value_initialized < transfer_details > ( ) ) ;
transfer_details & td = m_transfers . back ( ) ;
td . m_block_height = height ;
td . m_internal_output_index = o ;
2016-07-13 18:26:11 +00:00
td . m_global_output_index = o_indices [ o ] ;
2016-08-06 18:19:25 +00:00
td . m_tx = ( const cryptonote : : transaction_prefix & ) tx ;
2017-02-27 20:26:17 +00:00
td . m_txid = txid ;
2017-09-12 11:03:56 +00:00
td . m_key_image = tx_scan_info [ o ] . ki ;
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing
Scheme by luigi1111:
Multisig for RingCT on Monero
2 of 2
User A (coordinator):
Spendkey b,B
Viewkey a,A (shared)
User B:
Spendkey c,C
Viewkey a,A (shared)
Public Address: C+B, A
Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a
A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants)
A and B watch for incoming outputs
B creates "half" key images for discovered output D:
I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D)
B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D),
and sending the pubkeys with I2_D.
A also creates "half" key images:
I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D)
Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D
Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction).
A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D
to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R).
At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r,
which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo).
B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well).
B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D
to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well.
NOTE:
A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively.
Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible:
A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B.
B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A.
The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time!
The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature).
2 of 3
User A (coordinator)
Shared viewkey a,A
"spendkey" j,J
User B
"spendkey" k,K
User C
"spendkey" m,M
A collects K and M from B and C
B collects J and M from A and C
C collects J and K from A and B
A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK)
A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM)
B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK)
B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate
Address: N+O+P, A
The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other
needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two.
Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties:
A gives j to B
B gives k to C
C gives m to A
Address: J+K+M, A
3 of 3
Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others.
The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it
or send it back to A.
N-1 of N
Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around
(using either the secure or insecure method).
For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up):
[4 of 5]
User: spendkey
A: a
B: b
C: c
D: d
E: e
a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A
Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with
the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys.
Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each.
Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning:
1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image)
2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator
must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use.
You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might
also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format.
You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc.
The process is somewhat cumbersome:
To create a N/N multisig wallet:
- each participant creates a normal wallet
- each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant
- each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N)
As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent:
- each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant
- each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants
Then, a transaction may be initiated:
- one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT"
- this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file
- the initiator sends this file to another participant
- that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx"
- the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again
- if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed
- the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 21:34:26 +00:00
td . m_key_image_known = ! m_watch_only & & ! m_multisig ;
td . m_key_image_partial = m_multisig ;
2016-06-15 22:37:13 +00:00
td . m_amount = tx . vout [ o ] . amount ;
2016-12-09 18:21:21 +00:00
td . m_pk_index = pk_index - 1 ;
2017-02-19 02:42:10 +00:00
td . m_subaddr_index = tx_scan_info [ o ] . received - > index ;
expand_subaddresses ( tx_scan_info [ o ] . received - > index ) ;
2016-06-15 22:37:13 +00:00
if ( td . m_amount = = 0 )
{
2017-09-12 11:03:56 +00:00
td . m_mask = tx_scan_info [ o ] . mask ;
td . m_amount = tx_scan_info [ o ] . amount ;
2016-08-12 17:45:07 +00:00
td . m_rct = true ;
}
else if ( miner_tx & & tx . version = = 2 )
{
td . m_mask = rct : : identity ( ) ;
td . m_rct = true ;
2016-06-15 22:37:13 +00:00
}
else
{
td . m_mask = rct : : identity ( ) ;
2016-08-12 17:45:07 +00:00
td . m_rct = false ;
2016-06-15 22:37:13 +00:00
}
2016-09-26 22:11:10 +00:00
set_unspent ( m_transfers . size ( ) - 1 ) ;
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing
Scheme by luigi1111:
Multisig for RingCT on Monero
2 of 2
User A (coordinator):
Spendkey b,B
Viewkey a,A (shared)
User B:
Spendkey c,C
Viewkey a,A (shared)
Public Address: C+B, A
Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a
A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants)
A and B watch for incoming outputs
B creates "half" key images for discovered output D:
I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D)
B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D),
and sending the pubkeys with I2_D.
A also creates "half" key images:
I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D)
Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D
Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction).
A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D
to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R).
At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r,
which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo).
B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well).
B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D
to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well.
NOTE:
A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively.
Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible:
A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B.
B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A.
The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time!
The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature).
2 of 3
User A (coordinator)
Shared viewkey a,A
"spendkey" j,J
User B
"spendkey" k,K
User C
"spendkey" m,M
A collects K and M from B and C
B collects J and M from A and C
C collects J and K from A and B
A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK)
A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM)
B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK)
B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate
Address: N+O+P, A
The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other
needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two.
Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties:
A gives j to B
B gives k to C
C gives m to A
Address: J+K+M, A
3 of 3
Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others.
The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it
or send it back to A.
N-1 of N
Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around
(using either the secure or insecure method).
For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up):
[4 of 5]
User: spendkey
A: a
B: b
C: c
D: d
E: e
a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A
Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with
the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys.
Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each.
Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning:
1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image)
2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator
must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use.
You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might
also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format.
You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc.
The process is somewhat cumbersome:
To create a N/N multisig wallet:
- each participant creates a normal wallet
- each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant
- each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N)
As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent:
- each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant
- each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants
Then, a transaction may be initiated:
- one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT"
- this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file
- the initiator sends this file to another participant
- that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx"
- the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again
- if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed
- the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 21:34:26 +00:00
if ( ! m_multisig )
m_key_images [ td . m_key_image ] = m_transfers . size ( ) - 1 ;
2017-09-12 11:03:56 +00:00
m_pub_keys [ tx_scan_info [ o ] . in_ephemeral . pub ] = m_transfers . size ( ) - 1 ;
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing
Scheme by luigi1111:
Multisig for RingCT on Monero
2 of 2
User A (coordinator):
Spendkey b,B
Viewkey a,A (shared)
User B:
Spendkey c,C
Viewkey a,A (shared)
Public Address: C+B, A
Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a
A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants)
A and B watch for incoming outputs
B creates "half" key images for discovered output D:
I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D)
B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D),
and sending the pubkeys with I2_D.
A also creates "half" key images:
I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D)
Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D
Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction).
A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D
to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R).
At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r,
which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo).
B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well).
B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D
to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well.
NOTE:
A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively.
Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible:
A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B.
B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A.
The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time!
The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature).
2 of 3
User A (coordinator)
Shared viewkey a,A
"spendkey" j,J
User B
"spendkey" k,K
User C
"spendkey" m,M
A collects K and M from B and C
B collects J and M from A and C
C collects J and K from A and B
A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK)
A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM)
B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK)
B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate
Address: N+O+P, A
The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other
needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two.
Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties:
A gives j to B
B gives k to C
C gives m to A
Address: J+K+M, A
3 of 3
Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others.
The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it
or send it back to A.
N-1 of N
Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around
(using either the secure or insecure method).
For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up):
[4 of 5]
User: spendkey
A: a
B: b
C: c
D: d
E: e
a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A
Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with
the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys.
Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each.
Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning:
1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image)
2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator
must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use.
You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might
also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format.
You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc.
The process is somewhat cumbersome:
To create a N/N multisig wallet:
- each participant creates a normal wallet
- each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant
- each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N)
As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent:
- each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant
- each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants
Then, a transaction may be initiated:
- one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT"
- this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file
- the initiator sends this file to another participant
- that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx"
- the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again
- if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed
- the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 21:34:26 +00:00
if ( m_multisig )
{
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( ! m_multisig_rescan_k & & m_multisig_rescan_info ,
error : : wallet_internal_error , " NULL m_multisig_rescan_k " ) ;
if ( m_multisig_rescan_info & & m_multisig_rescan_info - > front ( ) . size ( ) > = m_transfers . size ( ) )
update_multisig_rescan_info ( * m_multisig_rescan_k , * m_multisig_rescan_info , m_transfers . size ( ) - 1 ) ;
}
2017-02-27 20:26:17 +00:00
LOG_PRINT_L0 ( " Received money: " < < print_money ( td . amount ( ) ) < < " , with tx: " < < txid ) ;
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if ( 0 ! = m_callback )
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m_callback - > on_money_received ( height , txid , tx , td . m_amount , td . m_subaddr_index ) ;
2016-05-23 20:40:12 +00:00
}
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}
else if ( m_transfers [ kit - > second ] . m_spent | | m_transfers [ kit - > second ] . amount ( ) > = tx . vout [ o ] . amount )
{
2016-11-07 18:50:05 +00:00
LOG_ERROR ( " Public key " < < epee : : string_tools : : pod_to_hex ( kit - > first )
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< < " from received " < < print_money ( tx . vout [ o ] . amount ) < < " output already exists with "
< < ( m_transfers [ kit - > second ] . m_spent ? " spent " : " unspent " ) < < " "
< < print_money ( m_transfers [ kit - > second ] . amount ( ) ) < < " , received output ignored " ) ;
}
else
{
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LOG_ERROR ( " Public key " < < epee : : string_tools : : pod_to_hex ( kit - > first )
2016-01-31 16:23:54 +00:00
< < " from received " < < print_money ( tx . vout [ o ] . amount ) < < " output already exists with "
< < print_money ( m_transfers [ kit - > second ] . amount ( ) ) < < " , replacing with new output " ) ;
// The new larger output replaced a previous smaller one
2017-02-19 02:42:10 +00:00
tx_money_got_in_outs [ tx_scan_info [ o ] . received - > index ] - = tx . vout [ o ] . amount ;
2016-01-31 16:23:54 +00:00
2016-05-23 20:40:12 +00:00
if ( ! pool )
{
transfer_details & td = m_transfers [ kit - > second ] ;
td . m_block_height = height ;
td . m_internal_output_index = o ;
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td . m_global_output_index = o_indices [ o ] ;
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td . m_tx = ( const cryptonote : : transaction_prefix & ) tx ;
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td . m_txid = txid ;
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td . m_amount = tx . vout [ o ] . amount ;
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td . m_pk_index = pk_index - 1 ;
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td . m_subaddr_index = tx_scan_info [ o ] . received - > index ;
expand_subaddresses ( tx_scan_info [ o ] . received - > index ) ;
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if ( td . m_amount = = 0 )
{
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td . m_mask = tx_scan_info [ o ] . mask ;
td . m_amount = tx_scan_info [ o ] . amount ;
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td . m_rct = true ;
}
else if ( miner_tx & & tx . version = = 2 )
{
td . m_mask = rct : : identity ( ) ;
td . m_rct = true ;
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}
else
{
td . m_mask = rct : : identity ( ) ;
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td . m_rct = false ;
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}
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing
Scheme by luigi1111:
Multisig for RingCT on Monero
2 of 2
User A (coordinator):
Spendkey b,B
Viewkey a,A (shared)
User B:
Spendkey c,C
Viewkey a,A (shared)
Public Address: C+B, A
Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a
A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants)
A and B watch for incoming outputs
B creates "half" key images for discovered output D:
I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D)
B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D),
and sending the pubkeys with I2_D.
A also creates "half" key images:
I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D)
Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D
Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction).
A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D
to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R).
At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r,
which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo).
B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well).
B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D
to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well.
NOTE:
A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively.
Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible:
A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B.
B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A.
The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time!
The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature).
2 of 3
User A (coordinator)
Shared viewkey a,A
"spendkey" j,J
User B
"spendkey" k,K
User C
"spendkey" m,M
A collects K and M from B and C
B collects J and M from A and C
C collects J and K from A and B
A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK)
A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM)
B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK)
B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate
Address: N+O+P, A
The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other
needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two.
Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties:
A gives j to B
B gives k to C
C gives m to A
Address: J+K+M, A
3 of 3
Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others.
The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it
or send it back to A.
N-1 of N
Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around
(using either the secure or insecure method).
For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up):
[4 of 5]
User: spendkey
A: a
B: b
C: c
D: d
E: e
a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A
Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with
the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys.
Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each.
Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning:
1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image)
2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator
must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use.
You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might
also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format.
You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc.
The process is somewhat cumbersome:
To create a N/N multisig wallet:
- each participant creates a normal wallet
- each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant
- each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N)
As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent:
- each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant
- each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants
Then, a transaction may be initiated:
- one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT"
- this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file
- the initiator sends this file to another participant
- that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx"
- the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again
- if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed
- the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 21:34:26 +00:00
if ( m_multisig )
{
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( ! m_multisig_rescan_k & & m_multisig_rescan_info ,
error : : wallet_internal_error , " NULL m_multisig_rescan_k " ) ;
if ( m_multisig_rescan_info & & m_multisig_rescan_info - > front ( ) . size ( ) > = m_transfers . size ( ) )
update_multisig_rescan_info ( * m_multisig_rescan_k , * m_multisig_rescan_info , m_transfers . size ( ) - 1 ) ;
}
2017-09-12 11:03:56 +00:00
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( td . get_public_key ( ) ! = tx_scan_info [ o ] . in_ephemeral . pub , error : : wallet_internal_error , " Inconsistent public keys " ) ;
2016-05-23 20:40:12 +00:00
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( td . m_spent , error : : wallet_internal_error , " Inconsistent spent status " ) ;
2017-02-27 20:26:17 +00:00
LOG_PRINT_L0 ( " Received money: " < < print_money ( td . amount ( ) ) < < " , with tx: " < < txid ) ;
2016-05-23 20:40:12 +00:00
if ( 0 ! = m_callback )
2017-02-19 02:42:10 +00:00
m_callback - > on_money_received ( height , txid , tx , td . m_amount , td . m_subaddr_index ) ;
2016-05-23 20:40:12 +00:00
}
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}
2014-09-13 04:25:33 +00:00
}
2014-03-03 22:07:58 +00:00
}
}
2014-05-03 16:19:43 +00:00
uint64_t tx_money_spent_in_ins = 0 ;
2017-11-14 08:45:43 +00:00
// The line below is equivalent to "boost::optional<uint32_t> subaddr_account;", but avoids the GCC warning: ‘ *((void*)& subaddr_account +4)’ may be used uninitialized in this function
// It's a GCC bug with boost::optional, see https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=47679
auto subaddr_account ( [ ] ( ) - > boost : : optional < uint32_t > { return boost : : none ; } ( ) ) ;
2017-02-19 02:42:10 +00:00
std : : set < uint32_t > subaddr_indices ;
2014-03-03 22:07:58 +00:00
// check all outputs for spending (compare key images)
2017-01-22 20:38:10 +00:00
for ( auto & in : tx . vin )
2014-03-03 22:07:58 +00:00
{
if ( in . type ( ) ! = typeid ( cryptonote : : txin_to_key ) )
continue ;
auto it = m_key_images . find ( boost : : get < cryptonote : : txin_to_key > ( in ) . k_image ) ;
if ( it ! = m_key_images . end ( ) )
{
2014-04-02 16:00:17 +00:00
transfer_details & td = m_transfers [ it - > second ] ;
2016-06-15 22:37:13 +00:00
uint64_t amount = boost : : get < cryptonote : : txin_to_key > ( in ) . amount ;
if ( amount > 0 )
{
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( amount ! = td . amount ( ) , error : : wallet_internal_error ,
std : : string ( " Inconsistent amount in tx input: got " ) + print_money ( amount ) +
std : : string ( " , expected " ) + print_money ( td . amount ( ) ) ) ;
}
amount = td . amount ( ) ;
tx_money_spent_in_ins + = amount ;
2017-02-19 02:42:10 +00:00
if ( subaddr_account & & * subaddr_account ! = td . m_subaddr_index . major )
LOG_ERROR ( " spent funds are from different subaddress accounts; count of incoming/outgoing payments will be incorrect " ) ;
subaddr_account = td . m_subaddr_index . major ;
subaddr_indices . insert ( td . m_subaddr_index . minor ) ;
2016-10-07 18:52:05 +00:00
if ( ! pool )
{
2017-02-27 20:26:17 +00:00
LOG_PRINT_L0 ( " Spent money: " < < print_money ( amount ) < < " , with tx: " < < txid ) ;
2016-10-07 18:52:05 +00:00
set_spent ( it - > second , height ) ;
if ( 0 ! = m_callback )
2017-02-19 02:42:10 +00:00
m_callback - > on_money_spent ( height , txid , tx , amount , tx , td . m_subaddr_index ) ;
2016-10-07 18:52:05 +00:00
}
2014-03-03 22:07:58 +00:00
}
}
2014-05-03 16:19:43 +00:00
2017-02-19 02:42:10 +00:00
if ( tx_money_spent_in_ins > 0 & & ! pool )
2014-05-03 16:19:43 +00:00
{
2017-02-19 02:42:10 +00:00
uint64_t self_received = std : : accumulate < decltype ( tx_money_got_in_outs . begin ( ) ) , uint64_t > ( tx_money_got_in_outs . begin ( ) , tx_money_got_in_outs . end ( ) , 0 ,
[ & subaddr_account ] ( uint64_t acc , const std : : pair < cryptonote : : subaddress_index , uint64_t > & p )
{
return acc + ( p . first . major = = * subaddr_account ? p . second : 0 ) ;
} ) ;
process_outgoing ( txid , tx , height , ts , tx_money_spent_in_ins , self_received , * subaddr_account , subaddr_indices ) ;
// if sending to yourself at the same subaddress account, set the outgoing payment amount to 0 so that it's less confusing
uint64_t fee = tx . version = = 1 ? tx_money_spent_in_ins - get_outs_money_amount ( tx ) : tx . rct_signatures . txnFee ;
if ( tx_money_spent_in_ins = = self_received + fee )
{
auto i = m_confirmed_txs . find ( txid ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( i = = m_confirmed_txs . end ( ) , error : : wallet_internal_error ,
" confirmed tx wasn't found: " + string_tools : : pod_to_hex ( txid ) ) ;
i - > second . m_change = self_received ;
}
}
// remove change sent to the spending subaddress account from the list of received funds
for ( auto i = tx_money_got_in_outs . begin ( ) ; i ! = tx_money_got_in_outs . end ( ) ; )
{
if ( subaddr_account & & i - > first . major = = * subaddr_account )
i = tx_money_got_in_outs . erase ( i ) ;
else
+ + i ;
2015-11-22 17:52:31 +00:00
}
2017-02-19 02:42:10 +00:00
// create payment_details for each incoming transfer to a subaddress index
if ( tx_money_got_in_outs . size ( ) > 0 )
2015-11-22 17:52:31 +00:00
{
tx_extra_nonce extra_nonce ;
crypto : : hash payment_id = null_hash ;
if ( find_tx_extra_field_by_type ( tx_extra_fields , extra_nonce ) )
2014-05-03 16:19:43 +00:00
{
2015-11-22 17:52:31 +00:00
crypto : : hash8 payment_id8 = null_hash8 ;
if ( get_encrypted_payment_id_from_tx_extra_nonce ( extra_nonce . nonce , payment_id8 ) )
2015-08-03 20:15:10 +00:00
{
2015-11-22 17:52:31 +00:00
// We got a payment ID to go with this tx
LOG_PRINT_L2 ( " Found encrypted payment ID: " < < payment_id8 ) ;
if ( tx_pub_key ! = null_pkey )
2015-08-03 20:15:10 +00:00
{
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if ( ! decrypt_payment_id ( payment_id8 , tx_pub_key , m_account . get_keys ( ) . m_view_secret_key ) )
{
LOG_PRINT_L0 ( " Failed to decrypt payment ID: " < < payment_id8 ) ;
}
else
{
LOG_PRINT_L2 ( " Decrypted payment ID: " < < payment_id8 ) ;
// put the 64 bit decrypted payment id in the first 8 bytes
memcpy ( payment_id . data , payment_id8 . data , 8 ) ;
// rest is already 0, but guard against code changes above
memset ( payment_id . data + 8 , 0 , 24 ) ;
}
2015-08-03 20:15:10 +00:00
}
else
{
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LOG_PRINT_L1 ( " No public key found in tx, unable to decrypt payment id " ) ;
2015-08-03 20:15:10 +00:00
}
}
2015-11-22 17:52:31 +00:00
else if ( get_payment_id_from_tx_extra_nonce ( extra_nonce . nonce , payment_id ) )
2015-08-03 20:15:10 +00:00
{
2015-11-22 17:52:31 +00:00
LOG_PRINT_L2 ( " Found unencrypted payment ID: " < < payment_id ) ;
2015-08-03 20:15:10 +00:00
}
2014-05-03 16:19:43 +00:00
}
2015-08-09 09:09:39 +00:00
else if ( get_payment_id_from_tx_extra_nonce ( extra_nonce . nonce , payment_id ) )
{
LOG_PRINT_L2 ( " Found unencrypted payment ID: " < < payment_id ) ;
}
2015-11-21 23:22:15 +00:00
2017-02-19 02:42:10 +00:00
for ( const auto & i : tx_money_got_in_outs )
{
payment_details payment ;
payment . m_tx_hash = txid ;
payment . m_amount = i . second ;
payment . m_block_height = height ;
payment . m_unlock_time = tx . unlock_time ;
payment . m_timestamp = ts ;
payment . m_subaddr_index = i . first ;
if ( pool ) {
2017-09-22 12:57:20 +00:00
emplace_or_replace ( m_unconfirmed_payments , payment_id , pool_payment_details { payment , double_spend_seen } ) ;
2017-02-19 02:42:10 +00:00
if ( 0 ! = m_callback )
m_callback - > on_unconfirmed_money_received ( height , txid , tx , payment . m_amount , payment . m_subaddr_index ) ;
}
else
m_payments . emplace ( payment_id , payment ) ;
LOG_PRINT_L2 ( " Payment found in " < < ( pool ? " pool " : " block " ) < < " : " < < payment_id < < " / " < < payment . m_tx_hash < < " / " < < payment . m_amount ) ;
2017-01-12 17:23:23 +00:00
}
2015-01-10 19:32:08 +00:00
}
2014-03-03 22:07:58 +00:00
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2017-02-27 20:26:17 +00:00
void wallet2 : : process_unconfirmed ( const crypto : : hash & txid , const cryptonote : : transaction & tx , uint64_t height )
2014-04-02 16:00:17 +00:00
{
2016-08-06 18:19:25 +00:00
if ( m_unconfirmed_txs . empty ( ) )
return ;
2015-11-15 21:59:40 +00:00
auto unconf_it = m_unconfirmed_txs . find ( txid ) ;
if ( unconf_it ! = m_unconfirmed_txs . end ( ) ) {
2015-11-22 12:26:27 +00:00
if ( store_tx_info ( ) ) {
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try {
m_confirmed_txs . insert ( std : : make_pair ( txid , confirmed_transfer_details ( unconf_it - > second , height ) ) ) ;
}
catch ( . . . ) {
// can fail if the tx has unexpected input types
LOG_PRINT_L0 ( " Failed to add outgoing transaction to confirmed transaction map " ) ;
}
}
2014-04-02 16:00:17 +00:00
m_unconfirmed_txs . erase ( unconf_it ) ;
2015-11-15 21:59:40 +00:00
}
2014-04-02 16:00:17 +00:00
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2017-02-19 02:42:10 +00:00
void wallet2 : : process_outgoing ( const crypto : : hash & txid , const cryptonote : : transaction & tx , uint64_t height , uint64_t ts , uint64_t spent , uint64_t received , uint32_t subaddr_account , const std : : set < uint32_t > & subaddr_indices )
2015-11-21 23:22:15 +00:00
{
2016-06-15 22:37:13 +00:00
std : : pair < std : : unordered_map < crypto : : hash , confirmed_transfer_details > : : iterator , bool > entry = m_confirmed_txs . insert ( std : : make_pair ( txid , confirmed_transfer_details ( ) ) ) ;
2015-11-21 23:22:15 +00:00
// fill with the info we know, some info might already be there
2016-06-15 22:37:13 +00:00
if ( entry . second )
{
// this case will happen if the tx is from our outputs, but was sent by another
// wallet (eg, we're a cold wallet and the hot wallet sent it). For RCT transactions,
// we only see 0 input amounts, so have to deduce amount out from other parameters.
entry . first - > second . m_amount_in = spent ;
if ( tx . version = = 1 )
entry . first - > second . m_amount_out = get_outs_money_amount ( tx ) ;
else
entry . first - > second . m_amount_out = spent - tx . rct_signatures . txnFee ;
entry . first - > second . m_change = received ;
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std : : vector < tx_extra_field > tx_extra_fields ;
if ( parse_tx_extra ( tx . extra , tx_extra_fields ) )
{
tx_extra_nonce extra_nonce ;
if ( find_tx_extra_field_by_type ( tx_extra_fields , extra_nonce ) )
{
// we do not care about failure here
get_payment_id_from_tx_extra_nonce ( extra_nonce . nonce , entry . first - > second . m_payment_id ) ;
}
}
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entry . first - > second . m_subaddr_account = subaddr_account ;
entry . first - > second . m_subaddr_indices = subaddr_indices ;
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}
entry . first - > second . m_block_height = height ;
entry . first - > second . m_timestamp = ts ;
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entry . first - > second . m_unlock_time = tx . unlock_time ;
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}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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void wallet2 : : process_new_blockchain_entry ( const cryptonote : : block & b , const cryptonote : : block_complete_entry & bche , const crypto : : hash & bl_id , uint64_t height , const cryptonote : : COMMAND_RPC_GET_BLOCKS_FAST : : block_output_indices & o_indices )
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{
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size_t txidx = 0 ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( bche . txs . size ( ) + 1 ! = o_indices . indices . size ( ) , error : : wallet_internal_error ,
" block transactions= " + std : : to_string ( bche . txs . size ( ) ) +
" not match with daemon response size= " + std : : to_string ( o_indices . indices . size ( ) ) ) ;
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//handle transactions from new block
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2014-03-03 22:07:58 +00:00
//optimization: seeking only for blocks that are not older then the wallet creation time plus 1 day. 1 day is for possible user incorrect time setup
wallet: add a --generate-from-json flag
It takes a filename containing JSON data to generate a wallet.
The following fields are valid:
version: integer, should be 1
filename: string, path/filename for the newly created wallet
scan_from_height: 64 bit unsigned integer, optional
password: string, optional
viewkey: string, hex representation
spendkey: string, hex representation
seed: string, optional, list of words separated by spaces
Either seed or private keys should be given. If using private
keys, the spend key may be omitted (the wallet will not be
able to spend, but will see incoming transactions).
If scan_from_height is given, blocks below this height will not
be checked for transactions as an optimization.
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if ( b . timestamp + 60 * 60 * 24 > m_account . get_createtime ( ) & & height > = m_refresh_from_block_height )
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{
TIME_MEASURE_START ( miner_tx_handle_time ) ;
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process_new_transaction ( get_transaction_hash ( b . miner_tx ) , b . miner_tx , o_indices . indices [ txidx + + ] . indices , height , b . timestamp , true , false , false ) ;
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TIME_MEASURE_FINISH ( miner_tx_handle_time ) ;
TIME_MEASURE_START ( txs_handle_time ) ;
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THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( bche . txs . size ( ) ! = b . tx_hashes . size ( ) , error : : wallet_internal_error , " Wrong amount of transactions for block " ) ;
size_t idx = 0 ;
for ( const auto & txblob : bche . txs )
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{
cryptonote : : transaction tx ;
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bool r = parse_and_validate_tx_base_from_blob ( txblob , tx ) ;
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THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( ! r , error : : tx_parse_error , txblob ) ;
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process_new_transaction ( b . tx_hashes [ idx ] , tx , o_indices . indices [ txidx + + ] . indices , height , b . timestamp , false , false , false ) ;
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+ + idx ;
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}
TIME_MEASURE_FINISH ( txs_handle_time ) ;
LOG_PRINT_L2 ( " Processed block: " < < bl_id < < " , height " < < height < < " , " < < miner_tx_handle_time + txs_handle_time < < " ( " < < miner_tx_handle_time < < " / " < < txs_handle_time < < " )ms " ) ;
} else
{
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if ( ! ( height % 100 ) )
LOG_PRINT_L2 ( " Skipped block by timestamp, height: " < < height < < " , block time " < < b . timestamp < < " , account time " < < m_account . get_createtime ( ) ) ;
2014-03-03 22:07:58 +00:00
}
m_blockchain . push_back ( bl_id ) ;
+ + m_local_bc_height ;
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if ( 0 ! = m_callback )
m_callback - > on_new_block ( height , b ) ;
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}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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void wallet2 : : get_short_chain_history ( std : : list < crypto : : hash > & ids ) const
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{
size_t i = 0 ;
size_t current_multiplier = 1 ;
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size_t sz = m_blockchain . size ( ) - m_blockchain . offset ( ) ;
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if ( ! sz )
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{
ids . push_back ( m_blockchain . genesis ( ) ) ;
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return ;
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}
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size_t current_back_offset = 1 ;
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bool base_included = false ;
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while ( current_back_offset < sz )
{
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ids . push_back ( m_blockchain [ m_blockchain . offset ( ) + sz - current_back_offset ] ) ;
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if ( sz - current_back_offset = = 0 )
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base_included = true ;
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if ( i < 10 )
{
+ + current_back_offset ;
} else
{
current_back_offset + = current_multiplier * = 2 ;
}
+ + i ;
}
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if ( ! base_included )
ids . push_back ( m_blockchain [ m_blockchain . offset ( ) ] ) ;
if ( m_blockchain . offset ( ) )
ids . push_back ( m_blockchain . genesis ( ) ) ;
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}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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void wallet2 : : parse_block_round ( const cryptonote : : blobdata & blob , cryptonote : : block & bl , crypto : : hash & bl_id , bool & error ) const
{
error = ! cryptonote : : parse_and_validate_block_from_blob ( blob , bl ) ;
if ( ! error )
bl_id = get_block_hash ( bl ) ;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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void wallet2 : : pull_blocks ( uint64_t start_height , uint64_t & blocks_start_height , const std : : list < crypto : : hash > & short_chain_history , std : : list < cryptonote : : block_complete_entry > & blocks , std : : vector < cryptonote : : COMMAND_RPC_GET_BLOCKS_FAST : : block_output_indices > & o_indices )
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{
cryptonote : : COMMAND_RPC_GET_BLOCKS_FAST : : request req = AUTO_VAL_INIT ( req ) ;
cryptonote : : COMMAND_RPC_GET_BLOCKS_FAST : : response res = AUTO_VAL_INIT ( res ) ;
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req . block_ids = short_chain_history ;
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uint32_t rpc_version ;
boost : : optional < std : : string > result = m_node_rpc_proxy . get_rpc_version ( rpc_version ) ;
// no error
if ( ! ! result )
{
// empty string -> not connection
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( result - > empty ( ) , tools : : error : : no_connection_to_daemon , " getversion " ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( * result = = CORE_RPC_STATUS_BUSY , tools : : error : : daemon_busy , " getversion " ) ;
if ( * result ! = CORE_RPC_STATUS_OK )
{
MDEBUG ( " Cannot determined daemon RPC version, not asking for pruned blocks " ) ;
req . prune = false ; // old daemon
}
}
else
{
if ( rpc_version > = MAKE_CORE_RPC_VERSION ( 1 , 7 ) )
{
MDEBUG ( " Daemon is recent enough, asking for pruned blocks " ) ;
req . prune = true ;
}
else
{
MDEBUG ( " Daemon is too old, not asking for pruned blocks " ) ;
req . prune = false ;
}
}
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req . start_height = start_height ;
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m_daemon_rpc_mutex . lock ( ) ;
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bool r = net_utils : : invoke_http_bin ( " /getblocks.bin " , req , res , m_http_client , rpc_timeout ) ;
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m_daemon_rpc_mutex . unlock ( ) ;
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THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( ! r , error : : no_connection_to_daemon , " getblocks.bin " ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( res . status = = CORE_RPC_STATUS_BUSY , error : : daemon_busy , " getblocks.bin " ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( res . status ! = CORE_RPC_STATUS_OK , error : : get_blocks_error , res . status ) ;
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THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( res . blocks . size ( ) ! = res . output_indices . size ( ) , error : : wallet_internal_error ,
" mismatched blocks ( " + boost : : lexical_cast < std : : string > ( res . blocks . size ( ) ) + " ) and output_indices ( " +
boost : : lexical_cast < std : : string > ( res . output_indices . size ( ) ) + " ) sizes from daemon " ) ;
2014-03-03 22:07:58 +00:00
2015-11-27 00:03:43 +00:00
blocks_start_height = res . start_height ;
blocks = res . blocks ;
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o_indices = res . output_indices ;
2015-11-27 00:03:43 +00:00
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2016-04-13 22:45:02 +00:00
void wallet2 : : pull_hashes ( uint64_t start_height , uint64_t & blocks_start_height , const std : : list < crypto : : hash > & short_chain_history , std : : list < crypto : : hash > & hashes )
{
cryptonote : : COMMAND_RPC_GET_HASHES_FAST : : request req = AUTO_VAL_INIT ( req ) ;
cryptonote : : COMMAND_RPC_GET_HASHES_FAST : : response res = AUTO_VAL_INIT ( res ) ;
req . block_ids = short_chain_history ;
req . start_height = start_height ;
m_daemon_rpc_mutex . lock ( ) ;
2017-01-25 05:16:05 +00:00
bool r = net_utils : : invoke_http_bin ( " /gethashes.bin " , req , res , m_http_client , rpc_timeout ) ;
2016-04-13 22:45:02 +00:00
m_daemon_rpc_mutex . unlock ( ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( ! r , error : : no_connection_to_daemon , " gethashes.bin " ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( res . status = = CORE_RPC_STATUS_BUSY , error : : daemon_busy , " gethashes.bin " ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( res . status ! = CORE_RPC_STATUS_OK , error : : get_hashes_error , res . status ) ;
blocks_start_height = res . start_height ;
hashes = res . m_block_ids ;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2016-07-13 18:26:11 +00:00
void wallet2 : : process_blocks ( uint64_t start_height , const std : : list < cryptonote : : block_complete_entry > & blocks , const std : : vector < cryptonote : : COMMAND_RPC_GET_BLOCKS_FAST : : block_output_indices > & o_indices , uint64_t & blocks_added )
2015-11-27 00:03:43 +00:00
{
size_t current_index = start_height ;
blocks_added = 0 ;
2016-07-13 18:26:11 +00:00
size_t tx_o_indices_idx = 0 ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( blocks . size ( ) ! = o_indices . size ( ) , error : : wallet_internal_error , " size mismatch " ) ;
2017-10-01 15:02:14 +00:00
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( ! m_blockchain . is_in_bounds ( current_index ) , error : : wallet_internal_error , " Index out of bounds of hashchain " ) ;
2015-11-22 15:18:36 +00:00
2017-09-14 03:39:37 +00:00
tools : : threadpool & tpool = tools : : threadpool : : getInstance ( ) ;
int threads = tpool . get_max_concurrency ( ) ;
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if ( threads > 1 )
{
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std : : vector < crypto : : hash > round_block_hashes ( threads ) ;
std : : vector < cryptonote : : block > round_blocks ( threads ) ;
std : : deque < bool > error ( threads ) ;
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size_t blocks_size = blocks . size ( ) ;
std : : list < block_complete_entry > : : const_iterator blocki = blocks . begin ( ) ;
for ( size_t b = 0 ; b < blocks_size ; b + = threads )
{
size_t round_size = std : : min ( ( size_t ) threads , blocks_size - b ) ;
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tools : : threadpool : : waiter waiter ;
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std : : list < block_complete_entry > : : const_iterator tmpblocki = blocki ;
for ( size_t i = 0 ; i < round_size ; + + i )
{
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tpool . submit ( & waiter , boost : : bind ( & wallet2 : : parse_block_round , this , std : : cref ( tmpblocki - > block ) ,
2015-11-22 15:18:36 +00:00
std : : ref ( round_blocks [ i ] ) , std : : ref ( round_block_hashes [ i ] ) , std : : ref ( error [ i ] ) ) ) ;
+ + tmpblocki ;
}
2017-09-14 03:39:37 +00:00
waiter . wait ( ) ;
2015-11-22 15:18:36 +00:00
tmpblocki = blocki ;
for ( size_t i = 0 ; i < round_size ; + + i )
{
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( error [ i ] , error : : block_parse_error , tmpblocki - > block ) ;
+ + tmpblocki ;
}
for ( size_t i = 0 ; i < round_size ; + + i )
{
const crypto : : hash & bl_id = round_block_hashes [ i ] ;
cryptonote : : block & bl = round_blocks [ i ] ;
if ( current_index > = m_blockchain . size ( ) )
{
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process_new_blockchain_entry ( bl , * blocki , bl_id , current_index , o_indices [ b + i ] ) ;
2015-11-22 15:18:36 +00:00
+ + blocks_added ;
}
else if ( bl_id ! = m_blockchain [ current_index ] )
{
//split detected here !!!
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( current_index = = start_height , error : : wallet_internal_error ,
" wrong daemon response: split starts from the first block in response " + string_tools : : pod_to_hex ( bl_id ) +
" (height " + std : : to_string ( start_height ) + " ), local block id at this height: " +
string_tools : : pod_to_hex ( m_blockchain [ current_index ] ) ) ;
detach_blockchain ( current_index ) ;
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process_new_blockchain_entry ( bl , * blocki , bl_id , current_index , o_indices [ b + i ] ) ;
2015-11-22 15:18:36 +00:00
}
else
{
LOG_PRINT_L2 ( " Block is already in blockchain: " < < string_tools : : pod_to_hex ( bl_id ) ) ;
}
+ + current_index ;
+ + blocki ;
}
}
}
else
{
2017-01-22 20:38:10 +00:00
for ( auto & bl_entry : blocks )
2014-03-03 22:07:58 +00:00
{
cryptonote : : block bl ;
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bool r = cryptonote : : parse_and_validate_block_from_blob ( bl_entry . block , bl ) ;
2014-04-07 15:02:15 +00:00
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( ! r , error : : block_parse_error , bl_entry . block ) ;
2014-04-02 16:00:17 +00:00
2014-03-03 22:07:58 +00:00
crypto : : hash bl_id = get_block_hash ( bl ) ;
if ( current_index > = m_blockchain . size ( ) )
{
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process_new_blockchain_entry ( bl , bl_entry , bl_id , current_index , o_indices [ tx_o_indices_idx ] ) ;
2014-03-03 22:07:58 +00:00
+ + blocks_added ;
2014-04-02 16:00:17 +00:00
}
else if ( bl_id ! = m_blockchain [ current_index ] )
2014-03-03 22:07:58 +00:00
{
2014-04-02 16:00:17 +00:00
//split detected here !!!
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THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( current_index = = start_height , error : : wallet_internal_error ,
2014-05-03 16:19:43 +00:00
" wrong daemon response: split starts from the first block in response " + string_tools : : pod_to_hex ( bl_id ) +
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" (height " + std : : to_string ( start_height ) + " ), local block id at this height: " +
2014-04-02 16:00:17 +00:00
string_tools : : pod_to_hex ( m_blockchain [ current_index ] ) ) ;
detach_blockchain ( current_index ) ;
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process_new_blockchain_entry ( bl , bl_entry , bl_id , current_index , o_indices [ tx_o_indices_idx ] ) ;
2014-03-03 22:07:58 +00:00
}
2014-04-02 16:00:17 +00:00
else
{
LOG_PRINT_L2 ( " Block is already in blockchain: " < < string_tools : : pod_to_hex ( bl_id ) ) ;
}
2014-03-03 22:07:58 +00:00
+ + current_index ;
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+ + tx_o_indices_idx ;
2014-03-03 22:07:58 +00:00
}
2015-11-22 15:18:36 +00:00
}
2014-03-03 22:07:58 +00:00
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2014-04-02 16:00:17 +00:00
void wallet2 : : refresh ( )
2014-03-03 22:07:58 +00:00
{
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uint64_t blocks_fetched = 0 ;
2014-08-01 08:17:50 +00:00
refresh ( 0 , blocks_fetched ) ;
2014-03-03 22:07:58 +00:00
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2015-10-27 09:05:07 +00:00
void wallet2 : : refresh ( uint64_t start_height , uint64_t & blocks_fetched )
2014-03-03 22:07:58 +00:00
{
bool received_money = false ;
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refresh ( start_height , blocks_fetched , received_money ) ;
2014-03-03 22:07:58 +00:00
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2016-07-13 18:26:11 +00:00
void wallet2 : : pull_next_blocks ( uint64_t start_height , uint64_t & blocks_start_height , std : : list < crypto : : hash > & short_chain_history , const std : : list < cryptonote : : block_complete_entry > & prev_blocks , std : : list < cryptonote : : block_complete_entry > & blocks , std : : vector < cryptonote : : COMMAND_RPC_GET_BLOCKS_FAST : : block_output_indices > & o_indices , bool & error )
2015-11-27 17:25:15 +00:00
{
2015-12-30 12:43:15 +00:00
error = false ;
try
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{
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drop_from_short_history ( short_chain_history , 3 ) ;
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// prepend the last 3 blocks, should be enough to guard against a block or two's reorg
cryptonote : : block bl ;
std : : list < cryptonote : : block_complete_entry > : : const_reverse_iterator i = prev_blocks . rbegin ( ) ;
for ( size_t n = 0 ; n < std : : min ( ( size_t ) 3 , prev_blocks . size ( ) ) ; + + n )
{
bool ok = cryptonote : : parse_and_validate_block_from_blob ( i - > block , bl ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( ! ok , error : : block_parse_error , i - > block ) ;
short_chain_history . push_front ( cryptonote : : get_block_hash ( bl ) ) ;
+ + i ;
}
2015-11-27 17:25:15 +00:00
2015-12-30 12:43:15 +00:00
// pull the new blocks
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pull_blocks ( start_height , blocks_start_height , short_chain_history , blocks , o_indices ) ;
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}
catch ( . . . )
{
error = true ;
}
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}
2017-08-04 20:38:37 +00:00
void wallet2 : : remove_obsolete_pool_txs ( const std : : vector < crypto : : hash > & tx_hashes )
{
// remove pool txes to us that aren't in the pool anymore
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std : : unordered_multimap < crypto : : hash , wallet2 : : pool_payment_details > : : iterator uit = m_unconfirmed_payments . begin ( ) ;
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while ( uit ! = m_unconfirmed_payments . end ( ) )
{
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const crypto : : hash & txid = uit - > second . m_pd . m_tx_hash ;
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bool found = false ;
for ( const auto & it2 : tx_hashes )
{
if ( it2 = = txid )
{
found = true ;
break ;
}
}
auto pit = uit + + ;
if ( ! found )
{
MDEBUG ( " Removing " < < txid < < " from unconfirmed payments, not found in pool " ) ;
m_unconfirmed_payments . erase ( pit ) ;
if ( 0 ! = m_callback )
m_callback - > on_pool_tx_removed ( txid ) ;
}
}
}
2015-11-27 17:25:15 +00:00
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2017-07-25 08:30:06 +00:00
void wallet2 : : update_pool_state ( bool refreshed )
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{
2017-03-21 10:30:25 +00:00
MDEBUG ( " update_pool_state start " ) ;
2016-05-23 20:40:12 +00:00
// get the pool state
2017-03-22 18:03:23 +00:00
cryptonote : : COMMAND_RPC_GET_TRANSACTION_POOL_HASHES : : request req ;
cryptonote : : COMMAND_RPC_GET_TRANSACTION_POOL_HASHES : : response res ;
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m_daemon_rpc_mutex . lock ( ) ;
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bool r = epee : : net_utils : : invoke_http_json ( " /get_transaction_pool_hashes.bin " , req , res , m_http_client , rpc_timeout ) ;
2016-01-29 19:44:48 +00:00
m_daemon_rpc_mutex . unlock ( ) ;
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THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( ! r , error : : no_connection_to_daemon , " get_transaction_pool_hashes.bin " ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( res . status = = CORE_RPC_STATUS_BUSY , error : : daemon_busy , " get_transaction_pool_hashes.bin " ) ;
2016-01-29 19:44:48 +00:00
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( res . status ! = CORE_RPC_STATUS_OK , error : : get_tx_pool_error ) ;
2017-03-21 10:30:25 +00:00
MDEBUG ( " update_pool_state got pool " ) ;
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// remove any pending tx that's not in the pool
std : : unordered_map < crypto : : hash , wallet2 : : unconfirmed_transfer_details > : : iterator it = m_unconfirmed_txs . begin ( ) ;
while ( it ! = m_unconfirmed_txs . end ( ) )
{
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const crypto : : hash & txid = it - > first ;
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bool found = false ;
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for ( const auto & it2 : res . tx_hashes )
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{
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if ( it2 = = txid )
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{
found = true ;
break ;
}
}
auto pit = it + + ;
if ( ! found )
{
// we want to avoid a false positive when we ask for the pool just after
// a tx is removed from the pool due to being found in a new block, but
// just before the block is visible by refresh. So we keep a boolean, so
// that the first time we don't see the tx, we set that boolean, and only
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// delete it the second time it is checked (but only when refreshed, so
// we're sure we've seen the blockchain state first)
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if ( pit - > second . m_state = = wallet2 : : unconfirmed_transfer_details : : pending )
{
LOG_PRINT_L1 ( " Pending txid " < < txid < < " not in pool, marking as not in pool " ) ;
pit - > second . m_state = wallet2 : : unconfirmed_transfer_details : : pending_not_in_pool ;
}
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else if ( pit - > second . m_state = = wallet2 : : unconfirmed_transfer_details : : pending_not_in_pool & & refreshed )
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{
LOG_PRINT_L1 ( " Pending txid " < < txid < < " not in pool, marking as failed " ) ;
pit - > second . m_state = wallet2 : : unconfirmed_transfer_details : : failed ;
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// the inputs aren't spent anymore, since the tx failed
for ( size_t vini = 0 ; vini < pit - > second . m_tx . vin . size ( ) ; + + vini )
{
if ( pit - > second . m_tx . vin [ vini ] . type ( ) = = typeid ( txin_to_key ) )
{
txin_to_key & tx_in_to_key = boost : : get < txin_to_key > ( pit - > second . m_tx . vin [ vini ] ) ;
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for ( size_t i = 0 ; i < m_transfers . size ( ) ; + + i )
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{
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const transfer_details & td = m_transfers [ i ] ;
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if ( td . m_key_image = = tx_in_to_key . k_image )
{
LOG_PRINT_L1 ( " Resetting spent status for output " < < vini < < " : " < < td . m_key_image ) ;
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set_unspent ( i ) ;
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break ;
}
}
}
}
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}
}
}
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MDEBUG ( " update_pool_state done first loop " ) ;
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// remove pool txes to us that aren't in the pool anymore
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// but only if we just refreshed, so that the tx can go in
// the in transfers list instead (or nowhere if it just
// disappeared without being mined)
if ( refreshed )
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remove_obsolete_pool_txs ( res . tx_hashes ) ;
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MDEBUG ( " update_pool_state done second loop " ) ;
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// gather txids of new pool txes to us
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std : : vector < std : : pair < crypto : : hash , bool > > txids ;
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for ( const auto & txid : res . tx_hashes )
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{
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bool txid_found_in_up = false ;
for ( const auto & up : m_unconfirmed_payments )
{
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if ( up . second . m_pd . m_tx_hash = = txid )
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{
txid_found_in_up = true ;
break ;
}
}
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if ( m_scanned_pool_txs [ 0 ] . find ( txid ) ! = m_scanned_pool_txs [ 0 ] . end ( ) | | m_scanned_pool_txs [ 1 ] . find ( txid ) ! = m_scanned_pool_txs [ 1 ] . end ( ) )
{
// if it's for us, we want to keep track of whether we saw a double spend, so don't bail out
if ( ! txid_found_in_up )
{
LOG_PRINT_L2 ( " Already seen " < < txid < < " , and not for us, skipped " ) ;
continue ;
}
}
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if ( ! txid_found_in_up )
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{
LOG_PRINT_L1 ( " Found new pool tx: " < < txid ) ;
bool found = false ;
for ( const auto & i : m_unconfirmed_txs )
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{
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if ( i . first = = txid )
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{
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found = true ;
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// if this is a payment to yourself at a different subaddress account, don't skip it
// so that you can see the incoming pool tx with 'show_transfers' on that receiving subaddress account
const unconfirmed_transfer_details & utd = i . second ;
for ( const auto & dst : utd . m_dests )
{
auto subaddr_index = m_subaddresses . find ( dst . addr . m_spend_public_key ) ;
if ( subaddr_index ! = m_subaddresses . end ( ) & & subaddr_index - > second . major ! = utd . m_subaddr_account )
{
found = false ;
break ;
}
}
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break ;
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}
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}
if ( ! found )
{
// not one of those we sent ourselves
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txids . push_back ( { txid , false } ) ;
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}
else
{
LOG_PRINT_L1 ( " We sent that one " ) ;
}
}
else
{
LOG_PRINT_L1 ( " Already saw that one, it's for us " ) ;
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txids . push_back ( { txid , true } ) ;
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}
}
// get those txes
if ( ! txids . empty ( ) )
{
cryptonote : : COMMAND_RPC_GET_TRANSACTIONS : : request req ;
cryptonote : : COMMAND_RPC_GET_TRANSACTIONS : : response res ;
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for ( const auto & p : txids )
req . txs_hashes . push_back ( epee : : string_tools : : pod_to_hex ( p . first ) ) ;
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MDEBUG ( " asking for " < < txids . size ( ) < < " transactions " ) ;
req . decode_as_json = false ;
m_daemon_rpc_mutex . lock ( ) ;
bool r = epee : : net_utils : : invoke_http_json ( " /gettransactions " , req , res , m_http_client , rpc_timeout ) ;
m_daemon_rpc_mutex . unlock ( ) ;
MDEBUG ( " Got " < < r < < " and " < < res . status ) ;
if ( r & & res . status = = CORE_RPC_STATUS_OK )
{
if ( res . txs . size ( ) = = txids . size ( ) )
{
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for ( const auto & tx_entry : res . txs )
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{
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if ( tx_entry . in_pool )
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{
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cryptonote : : transaction tx ;
cryptonote : : blobdata bd ;
crypto : : hash tx_hash , tx_prefix_hash ;
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if ( epee : : string_tools : : parse_hexstr_to_binbuff ( tx_entry . as_hex , bd ) )
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{
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if ( cryptonote : : parse_and_validate_tx_from_blob ( bd , tx , tx_hash , tx_prefix_hash ) )
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{
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const std : : vector < std : : pair < crypto : : hash , bool > > : : const_iterator i = std : : find_if ( txids . begin ( ) , txids . end ( ) ,
[ tx_hash ] ( const std : : pair < crypto : : hash , bool > & e ) { return e . first = = tx_hash ; } ) ;
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if ( i ! = txids . end ( ) )
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{
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process_new_transaction ( tx_hash , tx , std : : vector < uint64_t > ( ) , 0 , time ( NULL ) , false , true , tx_entry . double_spend_seen ) ;
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m_scanned_pool_txs [ 0 ] . insert ( tx_hash ) ;
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if ( m_scanned_pool_txs [ 0 ] . size ( ) > 5000 )
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{
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std : : swap ( m_scanned_pool_txs [ 0 ] , m_scanned_pool_txs [ 1 ] ) ;
m_scanned_pool_txs [ 0 ] . clear ( ) ;
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}
}
else
{
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MERROR ( " Got txid " < < tx_hash < < " which we did not ask for " ) ;
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}
}
else
{
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LOG_PRINT_L0 ( " failed to validate transaction from daemon " ) ;
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}
}
else
{
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LOG_PRINT_L0 ( " Failed to parse transaction from daemon " ) ;
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}
}
else
{
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LOG_PRINT_L1 ( " Transaction from daemon was in pool, but is no more " ) ;
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}
}
}
else
{
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LOG_PRINT_L0 ( " Expected " < < txids . size ( ) < < " tx(es), got " < < res . txs . size ( ) ) ;
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}
}
else
{
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LOG_PRINT_L0 ( " Error calling gettransactions daemon RPC: r " < < r < < " , status " < < res . status ) ;
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}
}
2017-03-21 10:30:25 +00:00
MDEBUG ( " update_pool_state end " ) ;
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}
2016-04-13 22:45:02 +00:00
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
void wallet2 : : fast_refresh ( uint64_t stop_height , uint64_t & blocks_start_height , std : : list < crypto : : hash > & short_chain_history )
{
std : : list < crypto : : hash > hashes ;
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2017-10-25 15:19:43 +00:00
const uint64_t checkpoint_height = m_checkpoints . get_max_height ( ) ;
if ( stop_height > checkpoint_height & & m_blockchain . size ( ) - 1 < checkpoint_height )
{
// we will drop all these, so don't bother getting them
uint64_t missing_blocks = m_checkpoints . get_max_height ( ) - m_blockchain . size ( ) ;
while ( missing_blocks - - > 0 )
m_blockchain . push_back ( crypto : : null_hash ) ; // maybe a bit suboptimal, but deque won't do huge reallocs like vector
m_blockchain . push_back ( m_checkpoints . get_points ( ) . at ( checkpoint_height ) ) ;
m_local_bc_height = m_blockchain . size ( ) ;
short_chain_history . clear ( ) ;
get_short_chain_history ( short_chain_history ) ;
}
size_t current_index = m_blockchain . size ( ) ;
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while ( m_run . load ( std : : memory_order_relaxed ) & & current_index < stop_height )
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{
pull_hashes ( 0 , blocks_start_height , short_chain_history , hashes ) ;
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if ( hashes . size ( ) < = 3 )
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return ;
if ( hashes . size ( ) + current_index < stop_height ) {
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drop_from_short_history ( short_chain_history , 3 ) ;
std : : list < crypto : : hash > : : iterator right = hashes . end ( ) ;
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// prepend 3 more
for ( int i = 0 ; i < 3 ; i + + ) {
right - - ;
short_chain_history . push_front ( * right ) ;
}
}
current_index = blocks_start_height ;
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for ( auto & bl_id : hashes )
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{
if ( current_index > = m_blockchain . size ( ) )
{
2016-04-29 15:50:51 +00:00
if ( ! ( current_index % 1000 ) )
LOG_PRINT_L2 ( " Skipped block by height: " < < current_index ) ;
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m_blockchain . push_back ( bl_id ) ;
+ + m_local_bc_height ;
if ( 0 ! = m_callback )
{ // FIXME: this isn't right, but simplewallet just logs that we got a block.
cryptonote : : block dummy ;
m_callback - > on_new_block ( current_index , dummy ) ;
}
}
else if ( bl_id ! = m_blockchain [ current_index ] )
{
//split detected here !!!
return ;
}
+ + current_index ;
if ( current_index > = stop_height )
return ;
}
}
}
2016-12-11 23:42:46 +00:00
2017-02-19 02:42:10 +00:00
bool wallet2 : : add_address_book_row ( const cryptonote : : account_public_address & address , const crypto : : hash & payment_id , const std : : string & description , bool is_subaddress )
2016-12-11 23:42:46 +00:00
{
wallet2 : : address_book_row a ;
a . m_address = address ;
a . m_payment_id = payment_id ;
a . m_description = description ;
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a . m_is_subaddress = is_subaddress ;
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2016-12-14 21:37:49 +00:00
auto old_size = m_address_book . size ( ) ;
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m_address_book . push_back ( a ) ;
if ( m_address_book . size ( ) = = old_size + 1 )
return true ;
return false ;
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}
2016-12-14 21:37:49 +00:00
bool wallet2 : : delete_address_book_row ( std : : size_t row_id ) {
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if ( m_address_book . size ( ) < = row_id )
return false ;
m_address_book . erase ( m_address_book . begin ( ) + row_id ) ;
return true ;
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}
2016-01-29 19:44:48 +00:00
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2015-10-27 09:05:07 +00:00
void wallet2 : : refresh ( uint64_t start_height , uint64_t & blocks_fetched , bool & received_money )
2014-03-03 22:07:58 +00:00
{
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if ( m_light_wallet ) {
// MyMonero get_address_info needs to be called occasionally to trigger wallet sync.
// This call is not really needed for other purposes and can be removed if mymonero changes their backend.
cryptonote : : COMMAND_RPC_GET_ADDRESS_INFO : : response res ;
// Get basic info
if ( light_wallet_get_address_info ( res ) ) {
// Last stored block height
uint64_t prev_height = m_light_wallet_blockchain_height ;
// Update lw heights
m_light_wallet_scanned_block_height = res . scanned_block_height ;
m_light_wallet_blockchain_height = res . blockchain_height ;
m_local_bc_height = res . blockchain_height ;
// If new height - call new_block callback
if ( m_light_wallet_blockchain_height ! = prev_height )
{
MDEBUG ( " new block since last time! " ) ;
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m_callback - > on_lw_new_block ( m_light_wallet_blockchain_height - 1 ) ;
2017-08-04 20:58:23 +00:00
}
m_light_wallet_connected = true ;
MDEBUG ( " lw scanned block height: " < < m_light_wallet_scanned_block_height ) ;
MDEBUG ( " lw blockchain height: " < < m_light_wallet_blockchain_height ) ;
MDEBUG ( m_light_wallet_blockchain_height - m_light_wallet_scanned_block_height < < " blocks behind " ) ;
// TODO: add wallet created block info
light_wallet_get_address_txs ( ) ;
} else
m_light_wallet_connected = false ;
// Lighwallet refresh done
return ;
}
2014-03-03 22:07:58 +00:00
received_money = false ;
blocks_fetched = 0 ;
2015-10-27 09:05:07 +00:00
uint64_t added_blocks = 0 ;
2014-03-03 22:07:58 +00:00
size_t try_count = 0 ;
2016-08-06 18:19:25 +00:00
crypto : : hash last_tx_hash_id = m_transfers . size ( ) ? m_transfers . back ( ) . m_txid : null_hash ;
2015-11-27 00:35:41 +00:00
std : : list < crypto : : hash > short_chain_history ;
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tools : : threadpool & tpool = tools : : threadpool : : getInstance ( ) ;
tools : : threadpool : : waiter waiter ;
2015-11-27 17:25:15 +00:00
uint64_t blocks_start_height ;
std : : list < cryptonote : : block_complete_entry > blocks ;
2016-07-13 18:26:11 +00:00
std : : vector < COMMAND_RPC_GET_BLOCKS_FAST : : block_output_indices > o_indices ;
2017-07-25 08:30:06 +00:00
bool refreshed = false ;
2014-03-03 22:07:58 +00:00
2015-11-27 17:25:15 +00:00
// pull the first set of blocks
2015-11-27 00:35:41 +00:00
get_short_chain_history ( short_chain_history ) ;
2016-04-29 05:21:08 +00:00
m_run . store ( true , std : : memory_order_relaxed ) ;
2016-04-13 22:45:02 +00:00
if ( start_height > m_blockchain . size ( ) | | m_refresh_from_block_height > m_blockchain . size ( ) ) {
2016-12-05 12:00:38 +00:00
if ( ! start_height )
start_height = m_refresh_from_block_height ;
2016-04-13 22:45:02 +00:00
// we can shortcut by only pulling hashes up to the start_height
fast_refresh ( start_height , blocks_start_height , short_chain_history ) ;
// regenerate the history now that we've got a full set of hashes
short_chain_history . clear ( ) ;
get_short_chain_history ( short_chain_history ) ;
start_height = 0 ;
// and then fall through to regular refresh processing
}
2016-12-27 18:12:18 +00:00
// If stop() is called during fast refresh we don't need to continue
if ( ! m_run . load ( std : : memory_order_relaxed ) )
return ;
2016-12-05 12:00:38 +00:00
pull_blocks ( start_height , blocks_start_height , short_chain_history , blocks , o_indices ) ;
// always reset start_height to 0 to force short_chain_ history to be used on
// subsequent pulls in this refresh.
start_height = 0 ;
2015-12-30 12:43:15 +00:00
2016-12-05 12:00:38 +00:00
while ( m_run . load ( std : : memory_order_relaxed ) )
{
try
2014-03-03 22:07:58 +00:00
{
2016-12-05 12:00:38 +00:00
// pull the next set of blocks while we're processing the current one
uint64_t next_blocks_start_height ;
std : : list < cryptonote : : block_complete_entry > next_blocks ;
std : : vector < cryptonote : : COMMAND_RPC_GET_BLOCKS_FAST : : block_output_indices > next_o_indices ;
bool error = false ;
2017-09-14 03:39:37 +00:00
tpool . submit ( & waiter , [ & ] { pull_next_blocks ( start_height , next_blocks_start_height , short_chain_history , blocks , next_blocks , next_o_indices , error ) ; } ) ;
2016-12-05 12:00:38 +00:00
process_blocks ( blocks_start_height , blocks , o_indices , added_blocks ) ;
blocks_fetched + = added_blocks ;
2017-09-14 03:39:37 +00:00
waiter . wait ( ) ;
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if ( blocks_start_height = = next_blocks_start_height )
2017-01-07 19:23:57 +00:00
{
m_node_rpc_proxy . set_height ( m_blockchain . size ( ) ) ;
2017-07-25 08:30:06 +00:00
refreshed = true ;
2016-12-05 12:00:38 +00:00
break ;
2017-01-07 19:23:57 +00:00
}
2016-10-07 20:19:33 +00:00
2016-12-05 12:00:38 +00:00
// switch to the new blocks from the daemon
blocks_start_height = next_blocks_start_height ;
blocks = next_blocks ;
o_indices = next_o_indices ;
2016-10-07 20:19:33 +00:00
2016-12-05 12:00:38 +00:00
// handle error from async fetching thread
if ( error )
{
throw std : : runtime_error ( " proxy exception in refresh thread " ) ;
2014-04-02 16:00:17 +00:00
}
2016-12-05 12:00:38 +00:00
}
catch ( const std : : exception & )
{
blocks_fetched + = added_blocks ;
2017-09-14 03:39:37 +00:00
waiter . wait ( ) ;
2016-12-05 12:00:38 +00:00
if ( try_count < 3 )
2014-03-03 22:07:58 +00:00
{
2016-12-05 12:00:38 +00:00
LOG_PRINT_L1 ( " Another try pull_blocks (try_count= " < < try_count < < " )... " ) ;
+ + try_count ;
}
else
{
LOG_ERROR ( " pull_blocks failed, try_count= " < < try_count ) ;
throw ;
2014-03-03 22:07:58 +00:00
}
}
}
2016-08-06 18:19:25 +00:00
if ( last_tx_hash_id ! = ( m_transfers . size ( ) ? m_transfers . back ( ) . m_txid : null_hash ) )
2014-03-03 22:07:58 +00:00
received_money = true ;
2016-01-29 19:44:48 +00:00
try
{
2016-12-27 18:12:18 +00:00
// If stop() is called we don't need to check pending transactions
if ( m_run . load ( std : : memory_order_relaxed ) )
2017-07-25 08:30:06 +00:00
update_pool_state ( refreshed ) ;
2016-01-29 19:44:48 +00:00
}
catch ( . . . )
{
LOG_PRINT_L1 ( " Failed to check pending transactions " ) ;
}
2017-02-19 02:42:10 +00:00
LOG_PRINT_L1 ( " Refresh done, blocks received: " < < blocks_fetched < < " , balance (all accounts): " < < print_money ( balance_all ( ) ) < < " , unlocked: " < < print_money ( unlocked_balance_all ( ) ) ) ;
2014-03-03 22:07:58 +00:00
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2015-10-27 09:05:07 +00:00
bool wallet2 : : refresh ( uint64_t & blocks_fetched , bool & received_money , bool & ok )
2014-04-02 16:00:17 +00:00
{
try
{
2014-08-01 08:17:50 +00:00
refresh ( 0 , blocks_fetched , received_money ) ;
2014-04-02 16:00:17 +00:00
ok = true ;
}
catch ( . . . )
{
ok = false ;
}
return ok ;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
void wallet2 : : detach_blockchain ( uint64_t height )
2014-03-03 22:07:58 +00:00
{
LOG_PRINT_L0 ( " Detaching blockchain on height " < < height ) ;
2017-09-11 13:38:37 +00:00
// size 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
// block 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
// C
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( height < = m_checkpoints . get_max_height ( ) & & m_blockchain . size ( ) > m_checkpoints . get_max_height ( ) ,
error : : wallet_internal_error , " Daemon claims reorg below last checkpoint " ) ;
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size_t transfers_detached = 0 ;
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for ( size_t i = 0 ; i < m_transfers . size ( ) ; + + i )
{
wallet2 : : transfer_details & td = m_transfers [ i ] ;
if ( td . m_spent & & td . m_spent_height > = height )
{
LOG_PRINT_L1 ( " Resetting spent status for output " < < i < < " : " < < td . m_key_image ) ;
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set_unspent ( i ) ;
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}
}
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auto it = std : : find_if ( m_transfers . begin ( ) , m_transfers . end ( ) , [ & ] ( const transfer_details & td ) { return td . m_block_height > = height ; } ) ;
size_t i_start = it - m_transfers . begin ( ) ;
for ( size_t i = i_start ; i ! = m_transfers . size ( ) ; i + + )
{
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing
Scheme by luigi1111:
Multisig for RingCT on Monero
2 of 2
User A (coordinator):
Spendkey b,B
Viewkey a,A (shared)
User B:
Spendkey c,C
Viewkey a,A (shared)
Public Address: C+B, A
Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a
A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants)
A and B watch for incoming outputs
B creates "half" key images for discovered output D:
I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D)
B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D),
and sending the pubkeys with I2_D.
A also creates "half" key images:
I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D)
Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D
Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction).
A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D
to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R).
At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r,
which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo).
B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well).
B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D
to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well.
NOTE:
A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively.
Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible:
A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B.
B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A.
The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time!
The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature).
2 of 3
User A (coordinator)
Shared viewkey a,A
"spendkey" j,J
User B
"spendkey" k,K
User C
"spendkey" m,M
A collects K and M from B and C
B collects J and M from A and C
C collects J and K from A and B
A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK)
A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM)
B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK)
B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate
Address: N+O+P, A
The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other
needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two.
Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties:
A gives j to B
B gives k to C
C gives m to A
Address: J+K+M, A
3 of 3
Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others.
The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it
or send it back to A.
N-1 of N
Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around
(using either the secure or insecure method).
For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up):
[4 of 5]
User: spendkey
A: a
B: b
C: c
D: d
E: e
a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A
Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with
the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys.
Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each.
Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning:
1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image)
2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator
must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use.
You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might
also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format.
You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc.
The process is somewhat cumbersome:
To create a N/N multisig wallet:
- each participant creates a normal wallet
- each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant
- each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N)
As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent:
- each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant
- each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants
Then, a transaction may be initiated:
- one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT"
- this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file
- the initiator sends this file to another participant
- that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx"
- the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again
- if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed
- the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 21:34:26 +00:00
if ( ! m_transfers [ i ] . m_key_image_known | | m_transfers [ i ] . m_key_image_partial )
continue ;
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auto it_ki = m_key_images . find ( m_transfers [ i ] . m_key_image ) ;
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing
Scheme by luigi1111:
Multisig for RingCT on Monero
2 of 2
User A (coordinator):
Spendkey b,B
Viewkey a,A (shared)
User B:
Spendkey c,C
Viewkey a,A (shared)
Public Address: C+B, A
Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a
A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants)
A and B watch for incoming outputs
B creates "half" key images for discovered output D:
I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D)
B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D),
and sending the pubkeys with I2_D.
A also creates "half" key images:
I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D)
Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D
Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction).
A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D
to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R).
At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r,
which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo).
B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well).
B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D
to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well.
NOTE:
A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively.
Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible:
A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B.
B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A.
The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time!
The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature).
2 of 3
User A (coordinator)
Shared viewkey a,A
"spendkey" j,J
User B
"spendkey" k,K
User C
"spendkey" m,M
A collects K and M from B and C
B collects J and M from A and C
C collects J and K from A and B
A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK)
A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM)
B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK)
B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate
Address: N+O+P, A
The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other
needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two.
Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties:
A gives j to B
B gives k to C
C gives m to A
Address: J+K+M, A
3 of 3
Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others.
The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it
or send it back to A.
N-1 of N
Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around
(using either the secure or insecure method).
For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up):
[4 of 5]
User: spendkey
A: a
B: b
C: c
D: d
E: e
a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A
Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with
the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys.
Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each.
Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning:
1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image)
2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator
must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use.
You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might
also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format.
You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc.
The process is somewhat cumbersome:
To create a N/N multisig wallet:
- each participant creates a normal wallet
- each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant
- each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N)
As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent:
- each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant
- each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants
Then, a transaction may be initiated:
- one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT"
- this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file
- the initiator sends this file to another participant
- that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx"
- the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again
- if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed
- the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 21:34:26 +00:00
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( it_ki = = m_key_images . end ( ) , error : : wallet_internal_error , " key image not found: index " + std : : to_string ( i ) + " , ki " + epee : : string_tools : : pod_to_hex ( m_transfers [ i ] . m_key_image ) + " , " + std : : to_string ( m_key_images . size ( ) ) + " key images known " ) ;
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m_key_images . erase ( it_ki ) ;
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}
for ( size_t i = i_start ; i ! = m_transfers . size ( ) ; i + + )
{
auto it_pk = m_pub_keys . find ( m_transfers [ i ] . get_public_key ( ) ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( it_pk = = m_pub_keys . end ( ) , error : : wallet_internal_error , " public key not found " ) ;
m_pub_keys . erase ( it_pk ) ;
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}
m_transfers . erase ( it , m_transfers . end ( ) ) ;
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size_t blocks_detached = m_blockchain . size ( ) - height ;
m_blockchain . crop ( height ) ;
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m_local_bc_height - = blocks_detached ;
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for ( auto it = m_payments . begin ( ) ; it ! = m_payments . end ( ) ; )
{
if ( height < = it - > second . m_block_height )
it = m_payments . erase ( it ) ;
else
+ + it ;
}
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for ( auto it = m_confirmed_txs . begin ( ) ; it ! = m_confirmed_txs . end ( ) ; )
{
if ( height < = it - > second . m_block_height )
it = m_confirmed_txs . erase ( it ) ;
else
+ + it ;
}
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LOG_PRINT_L0 ( " Detached blockchain on height " < < height < < " , transfers detached " < < transfers_detached < < " , blocks detached " < < blocks_detached ) ;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
bool wallet2 : : deinit ( )
{
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m_is_initialized = false ;
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return true ;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
bool wallet2 : : clear ( )
{
m_blockchain . clear ( ) ;
m_transfers . clear ( ) ;
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m_key_images . clear ( ) ;
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m_pub_keys . clear ( ) ;
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m_unconfirmed_txs . clear ( ) ;
m_payments . clear ( ) ;
m_tx_keys . clear ( ) ;
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m_additional_tx_keys . clear ( ) ;
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m_confirmed_txs . clear ( ) ;
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m_unconfirmed_payments . clear ( ) ;
m_scanned_pool_txs [ 0 ] . clear ( ) ;
m_scanned_pool_txs [ 1 ] . clear ( ) ;
m_address_book . clear ( ) ;
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m_local_bc_height = 1 ;
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m_subaddresses . clear ( ) ;
m_subaddresses_inv . clear ( ) ;
m_subaddress_labels . clear ( ) ;
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return true ;
}
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/*!
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* \ brief Stores wallet information to wallet file .
* \ param keys_file_name Name of wallet file
* \ param password Password of wallet file
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* \ param watch_only true to save only view key , false to save both spend and view keys
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* \ return Whether it was successful .
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*/
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bool wallet2 : : store_keys ( const std : : string & keys_file_name , const epee : : wipeable_string & password , bool watch_only )
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{
std : : string account_data ;
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std : : string multisig_signers ;
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cryptonote : : account_base account = m_account ;
if ( watch_only )
account . forget_spend_key ( ) ;
bool r = epee : : serialization : : store_t_to_binary ( account , account_data ) ;
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CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES ( r , false , " failed to serialize wallet keys " ) ;
wallet2 : : keys_file_data keys_file_data = boost : : value_initialized < wallet2 : : keys_file_data > ( ) ;
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// Create a JSON object with "key_data" and "seed_language" as keys.
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rapidjson : : Document json ;
json . SetObject ( ) ;
rapidjson : : Value value ( rapidjson : : kStringType ) ;
value . SetString ( account_data . c_str ( ) , account_data . length ( ) ) ;
json . AddMember ( " key_data " , value , json . GetAllocator ( ) ) ;
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if ( ! seed_language . empty ( ) )
{
value . SetString ( seed_language . c_str ( ) , seed_language . length ( ) ) ;
json . AddMember ( " seed_language " , value , json . GetAllocator ( ) ) ;
}
2014-10-18 17:31:43 +00:00
2015-05-31 14:34:55 +00:00
rapidjson : : Value value2 ( rapidjson : : kNumberType ) ;
value2 . SetInt ( watch_only ? 1 : 0 ) ; // WTF ? JSON has different true and false types, and not boolean ??
json . AddMember ( " watch_only " , value2 , json . GetAllocator ( ) ) ;
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value2 . SetInt ( m_multisig ? 1 : 0 ) ;
json . AddMember ( " multisig " , value2 , json . GetAllocator ( ) ) ;
value2 . SetUint ( m_multisig_threshold ) ;
json . AddMember ( " multisig_threshold " , value2 , json . GetAllocator ( ) ) ;
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if ( m_multisig )
{
bool r = : : serialization : : dump_binary ( m_multisig_signers , multisig_signers ) ;
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES ( r , false , " failed to serialize wallet multisig signers " ) ;
value . SetString ( multisig_signers . c_str ( ) , multisig_signers . length ( ) ) ;
json . AddMember ( " multisig_signers " , value , json . GetAllocator ( ) ) ;
}
2017-05-28 11:18:51 +00:00
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value2 . SetInt ( m_always_confirm_transfers ? 1 : 0 ) ;
json . AddMember ( " always_confirm_transfers " , value2 , json . GetAllocator ( ) ) ;
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value2 . SetInt ( m_print_ring_members ? 1 : 0 ) ;
json . AddMember ( " print_ring_members " , value2 , json . GetAllocator ( ) ) ;
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value2 . SetInt ( m_store_tx_info ? 1 : 0 ) ;
json . AddMember ( " store_tx_info " , value2 , json . GetAllocator ( ) ) ;
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value2 . SetUint ( m_default_mixin ) ;
json . AddMember ( " default_mixin " , value2 , json . GetAllocator ( ) ) ;
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value2 . SetUint ( m_default_priority ) ;
json . AddMember ( " default_priority " , value2 , json . GetAllocator ( ) ) ;
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value2 . SetInt ( m_auto_refresh ? 1 : 0 ) ;
json . AddMember ( " auto_refresh " , value2 , json . GetAllocator ( ) ) ;
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value2 . SetInt ( m_refresh_type ) ;
json . AddMember ( " refresh_type " , value2 , json . GetAllocator ( ) ) ;
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value2 . SetUint64 ( m_refresh_from_block_height ) ;
json . AddMember ( " refresh_height " , value2 , json . GetAllocator ( ) ) ;
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value2 . SetInt ( m_confirm_missing_payment_id ? 1 : 0 ) ;
json . AddMember ( " confirm_missing_payment_id " , value2 , json . GetAllocator ( ) ) ;
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value2 . SetInt ( m_ask_password ? 1 : 0 ) ;
json . AddMember ( " ask_password " , value2 , json . GetAllocator ( ) ) ;
wallet: try to save large outputs when using an unneeded second input
When a single input is enough to satisfy a transfer, the code would
previously try to add a second input, to match the "canonical" makeup
of a transaction with two inputs and two outputs. This would cause
wallets to slowly merge outputs till all the monero ends up in a
single output, which causes trouble when making two transactions
one after the other, since change is locked for 10 blocks, and an
increasing portion of the remaining balance would end up locked on
each transaction.
There are two new settings (min-output-count and min-output-value)
which can control when to stop adding such unneeded second outputs.
The idea is that small "dust" outputs will still get added, but
larger ones will not.
Enable with, eg:
set min-output-count 10
set min-output-value 30
to avoid using an unneeded second output of 30 monero or more, if
there would be less than 10 such outputs left.
This does not invalidate any other reason why such outputs would
be used (ie, when they're really needed to satisfy a transfer, or
when randomly picked in the normal course of selection). This may
be improved in the future.
2017-03-24 20:58:02 +00:00
value2 . SetUint ( m_min_output_count ) ;
json . AddMember ( " min_output_count " , value2 , json . GetAllocator ( ) ) ;
value2 . SetUint64 ( m_min_output_value ) ;
json . AddMember ( " min_output_value " , value2 , json . GetAllocator ( ) ) ;
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value2 . SetInt ( cryptonote : : get_default_decimal_point ( ) ) ;
json . AddMember ( " default_decimal_point " , value2 , json . GetAllocator ( ) ) ;
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value2 . SetInt ( m_merge_destinations ? 1 : 0 ) ;
json . AddMember ( " merge_destinations " , value2 , json . GetAllocator ( ) ) ;
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value2 . SetInt ( m_confirm_backlog ? 1 : 0 ) ;
json . AddMember ( " confirm_backlog " , value2 , json . GetAllocator ( ) ) ;
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value2 . SetUint ( m_confirm_backlog_threshold ) ;
json . AddMember ( " confirm_backlog_threshold " , value2 , json . GetAllocator ( ) ) ;
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value2 . SetInt ( m_testnet ? 1 : 0 ) ;
json . AddMember ( " testnet " , value2 , json . GetAllocator ( ) ) ;
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// Serialize the JSON object
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rapidjson : : StringBuffer buffer ;
rapidjson : : Writer < rapidjson : : StringBuffer > writer ( buffer ) ;
json . Accept ( writer ) ;
account_data = buffer . GetString ( ) ;
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// Encrypt the entire JSON object.
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crypto : : chacha8_key key ;
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crypto : : generate_chacha8_key ( password . data ( ) , password . size ( ) , key ) ;
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std : : string cipher ;
cipher . resize ( account_data . size ( ) ) ;
keys_file_data . iv = crypto : : rand < crypto : : chacha8_iv > ( ) ;
crypto : : chacha8 ( account_data . data ( ) , account_data . size ( ) , key , keys_file_data . iv , & cipher [ 0 ] ) ;
keys_file_data . account_data = cipher ;
std : : string buf ;
r = : : serialization : : dump_binary ( keys_file_data , buf ) ;
r = r & & epee : : file_io_utils : : save_string_to_file ( keys_file_name , buf ) ; //and never touch wallet_keys_file again, only read
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES ( r , false , " failed to generate wallet keys file " < < keys_file_name ) ;
return true ;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
namespace
{
bool verify_keys ( const crypto : : secret_key & sec , const crypto : : public_key & expected_pub )
{
crypto : : public_key pub ;
bool r = crypto : : secret_key_to_public_key ( sec , pub ) ;
return r & & expected_pub = = pub ;
}
}
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/*!
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* \ brief Load wallet information from wallet file .
* \ param keys_file_name Name of wallet file
* \ param password Password of wallet file
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*/
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bool wallet2 : : load_keys ( const std : : string & keys_file_name , const epee : : wipeable_string & password )
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{
wallet2 : : keys_file_data keys_file_data ;
std : : string buf ;
bool r = epee : : file_io_utils : : load_file_to_string ( keys_file_name , buf ) ;
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THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( ! r , error : : file_read_error , keys_file_name ) ;
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// Decrypt the contents
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r = : : serialization : : parse_binary ( buf , keys_file_data ) ;
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THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( ! r , error : : wallet_internal_error , " internal error: failed to deserialize \" " + keys_file_name + ' \" ' ) ;
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crypto : : chacha8_key key ;
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crypto : : generate_chacha8_key ( password . data ( ) , password . size ( ) , key ) ;
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std : : string account_data ;
account_data . resize ( keys_file_data . account_data . size ( ) ) ;
crypto : : chacha8 ( keys_file_data . account_data . data ( ) , keys_file_data . account_data . size ( ) , key , keys_file_data . iv , & account_data [ 0 ] ) ;
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// The contents should be JSON if the wallet follows the new format.
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rapidjson : : Document json ;
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if ( json . Parse ( account_data . c_str ( ) ) . HasParseError ( ) )
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{
is_old_file_format = true ;
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m_watch_only = false ;
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m_multisig = false ;
m_multisig_threshold = 0 ;
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m_multisig_signers . clear ( ) ;
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m_always_confirm_transfers = false ;
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m_print_ring_members = false ;
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m_default_mixin = 0 ;
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m_default_priority = 0 ;
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m_auto_refresh = true ;
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m_refresh_type = RefreshType : : RefreshDefault ;
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m_confirm_missing_payment_id = true ;
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m_ask_password = true ;
wallet: try to save large outputs when using an unneeded second input
When a single input is enough to satisfy a transfer, the code would
previously try to add a second input, to match the "canonical" makeup
of a transaction with two inputs and two outputs. This would cause
wallets to slowly merge outputs till all the monero ends up in a
single output, which causes trouble when making two transactions
one after the other, since change is locked for 10 blocks, and an
increasing portion of the remaining balance would end up locked on
each transaction.
There are two new settings (min-output-count and min-output-value)
which can control when to stop adding such unneeded second outputs.
The idea is that small "dust" outputs will still get added, but
larger ones will not.
Enable with, eg:
set min-output-count 10
set min-output-value 30
to avoid using an unneeded second output of 30 monero or more, if
there would be less than 10 such outputs left.
This does not invalidate any other reason why such outputs would
be used (ie, when they're really needed to satisfy a transfer, or
when randomly picked in the normal course of selection). This may
be improved in the future.
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m_min_output_count = 0 ;
m_min_output_value = 0 ;
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m_merge_destinations = false ;
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m_confirm_backlog = true ;
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m_confirm_backlog_threshold = 0 ;
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}
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else if ( json . IsObject ( ) )
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{
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if ( ! json . HasMember ( " key_data " ) )
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{
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LOG_ERROR ( " Field key_data not found in JSON " ) ;
return false ;
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}
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if ( ! json [ " key_data " ] . IsString ( ) )
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{
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LOG_ERROR ( " Field key_data found in JSON, but not String " ) ;
return false ;
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}
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const char * field_key_data = json [ " key_data " ] . GetString ( ) ;
account_data = std : : string ( field_key_data , field_key_data + json [ " key_data " ] . GetStringLength ( ) ) ;
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GET_FIELD_FROM_JSON_RETURN_ON_ERROR ( json , seed_language , std : : string , String , false , std : : string ( ) ) ;
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if ( field_seed_language_found )
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{
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set_seed_language ( field_seed_language ) ;
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}
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GET_FIELD_FROM_JSON_RETURN_ON_ERROR ( json , watch_only , int , Int , false , false ) ;
m_watch_only = field_watch_only ;
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GET_FIELD_FROM_JSON_RETURN_ON_ERROR ( json , multisig , int , Int , false , false ) ;
m_multisig = field_multisig ;
GET_FIELD_FROM_JSON_RETURN_ON_ERROR ( json , multisig_threshold , unsigned int , Uint , m_multisig , 0 ) ;
m_multisig_threshold = field_multisig_threshold ;
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if ( m_multisig )
{
if ( ! json . HasMember ( " multisig_signers " ) )
{
LOG_ERROR ( " Field multisig_signers not found in JSON " ) ;
return false ;
}
if ( ! json [ " multisig_signers " ] . IsString ( ) )
{
LOG_ERROR ( " Field multisig_signers found in JSON, but not String " ) ;
return false ;
}
const char * field_multisig_signers = json [ " multisig_signers " ] . GetString ( ) ;
std : : string multisig_signers = std : : string ( field_multisig_signers , field_multisig_signers + json [ " multisig_signers " ] . GetStringLength ( ) ) ;
r = : : serialization : : parse_binary ( multisig_signers , m_multisig_signers ) ;
if ( ! r )
{
LOG_ERROR ( " Field multisig_signers found in JSON, but failed to parse " ) ;
return false ;
}
}
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GET_FIELD_FROM_JSON_RETURN_ON_ERROR ( json , always_confirm_transfers , int , Int , false , true ) ;
m_always_confirm_transfers = field_always_confirm_transfers ;
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GET_FIELD_FROM_JSON_RETURN_ON_ERROR ( json , print_ring_members , int , Int , false , true ) ;
m_print_ring_members = field_print_ring_members ;
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GET_FIELD_FROM_JSON_RETURN_ON_ERROR ( json , store_tx_keys , int , Int , false , true ) ;
GET_FIELD_FROM_JSON_RETURN_ON_ERROR ( json , store_tx_info , int , Int , false , true ) ;
m_store_tx_info = ( ( field_store_tx_keys ! = 0 ) | | ( field_store_tx_info ! = 0 ) ) ;
GET_FIELD_FROM_JSON_RETURN_ON_ERROR ( json , default_mixin , unsigned int , Uint , false , 0 ) ;
m_default_mixin = field_default_mixin ;
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GET_FIELD_FROM_JSON_RETURN_ON_ERROR ( json , default_priority , unsigned int , Uint , false , 0 ) ;
if ( field_default_priority_found )
{
m_default_priority = field_default_priority ;
}
else
{
GET_FIELD_FROM_JSON_RETURN_ON_ERROR ( json , default_fee_multiplier , unsigned int , Uint , false , 0 ) ;
if ( field_default_fee_multiplier_found )
m_default_priority = field_default_fee_multiplier ;
else
m_default_priority = 0 ;
}
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GET_FIELD_FROM_JSON_RETURN_ON_ERROR ( json , auto_refresh , int , Int , false , true ) ;
m_auto_refresh = field_auto_refresh ;
GET_FIELD_FROM_JSON_RETURN_ON_ERROR ( json , refresh_type , int , Int , false , RefreshType : : RefreshDefault ) ;
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m_refresh_type = RefreshType : : RefreshDefault ;
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if ( field_refresh_type_found )
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{
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if ( field_refresh_type = = RefreshFull | | field_refresh_type = = RefreshOptimizeCoinbase | | field_refresh_type = = RefreshNoCoinbase )
m_refresh_type = ( RefreshType ) field_refresh_type ;
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else
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LOG_PRINT_L0 ( " Unknown refresh-type value ( " < < field_refresh_type < < " ), using default " ) ;
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}
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GET_FIELD_FROM_JSON_RETURN_ON_ERROR ( json , refresh_height , uint64_t , Uint64 , false , 0 ) ;
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m_refresh_from_block_height = field_refresh_height ;
GET_FIELD_FROM_JSON_RETURN_ON_ERROR ( json , confirm_missing_payment_id , int , Int , false , true ) ;
m_confirm_missing_payment_id = field_confirm_missing_payment_id ;
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GET_FIELD_FROM_JSON_RETURN_ON_ERROR ( json , ask_password , int , Int , false , true ) ;
m_ask_password = field_ask_password ;
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GET_FIELD_FROM_JSON_RETURN_ON_ERROR ( json , default_decimal_point , int , Int , false , CRYPTONOTE_DISPLAY_DECIMAL_POINT ) ;
cryptonote : : set_default_decimal_point ( field_default_decimal_point ) ;
wallet: try to save large outputs when using an unneeded second input
When a single input is enough to satisfy a transfer, the code would
previously try to add a second input, to match the "canonical" makeup
of a transaction with two inputs and two outputs. This would cause
wallets to slowly merge outputs till all the monero ends up in a
single output, which causes trouble when making two transactions
one after the other, since change is locked for 10 blocks, and an
increasing portion of the remaining balance would end up locked on
each transaction.
There are two new settings (min-output-count and min-output-value)
which can control when to stop adding such unneeded second outputs.
The idea is that small "dust" outputs will still get added, but
larger ones will not.
Enable with, eg:
set min-output-count 10
set min-output-value 30
to avoid using an unneeded second output of 30 monero or more, if
there would be less than 10 such outputs left.
This does not invalidate any other reason why such outputs would
be used (ie, when they're really needed to satisfy a transfer, or
when randomly picked in the normal course of selection). This may
be improved in the future.
2017-03-24 20:58:02 +00:00
GET_FIELD_FROM_JSON_RETURN_ON_ERROR ( json , min_output_count , uint32_t , Uint , false , 0 ) ;
m_min_output_count = field_min_output_count ;
GET_FIELD_FROM_JSON_RETURN_ON_ERROR ( json , min_output_value , uint64_t , Uint64 , false , 0 ) ;
m_min_output_value = field_min_output_value ;
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GET_FIELD_FROM_JSON_RETURN_ON_ERROR ( json , merge_destinations , int , Int , false , false ) ;
m_merge_destinations = field_merge_destinations ;
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GET_FIELD_FROM_JSON_RETURN_ON_ERROR ( json , confirm_backlog , int , Int , false , true ) ;
m_confirm_backlog = field_confirm_backlog ;
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GET_FIELD_FROM_JSON_RETURN_ON_ERROR ( json , confirm_backlog_threshold , uint32_t , Uint , false , 0 ) ;
m_confirm_backlog_threshold = field_confirm_backlog_threshold ;
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GET_FIELD_FROM_JSON_RETURN_ON_ERROR ( json , testnet , int , Int , false , m_testnet ) ;
// Wallet is being opened with testnet flag, but is saved as a mainnet wallet
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( m_testnet & & ! field_testnet , error : : wallet_internal_error , " Mainnet wallet can not be opened as testnet wallet " ) ;
// Wallet is being opened without testnet flag but is saved as a testnet wallet.
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( ! m_testnet & & field_testnet , error : : wallet_internal_error , " Testnet wallet can not be opened as mainnet wallet " ) ;
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}
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else
{
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION ( error : : wallet_internal_error , " invalid password " ) ;
return false ;
}
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const cryptonote : : account_keys & keys = m_account . get_keys ( ) ;
r = epee : : serialization : : load_t_from_binary ( m_account , account_data ) ;
r = r & & verify_keys ( keys . m_view_secret_key , keys . m_account_address . m_view_public_key ) ;
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if ( ! m_watch_only & & ! m_multisig )
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r = r & & verify_keys ( keys . m_spend_secret_key , keys . m_account_address . m_spend_public_key ) ;
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THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( ! r , error : : invalid_password ) ;
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return true ;
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}
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/*!
* \ brief verify password for default wallet keys file .
* \ param password Password to verify
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* \ return true if password is correct
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*
* for verification only
* should not mutate state , unlike load_keys ( )
* can be used prior to rewriting wallet keys file , to ensure user has entered the correct password
*
*/
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bool wallet2 : : verify_password ( const epee : : wipeable_string & password ) const
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{
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return verify_password ( m_keys_file , password , m_watch_only | | m_multisig ) ;
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}
/*!
* \ brief verify password for specified wallet keys file .
* \ param keys_file_name Keys file to verify password for
* \ param password Password to verify
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing
Scheme by luigi1111:
Multisig for RingCT on Monero
2 of 2
User A (coordinator):
Spendkey b,B
Viewkey a,A (shared)
User B:
Spendkey c,C
Viewkey a,A (shared)
Public Address: C+B, A
Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a
A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants)
A and B watch for incoming outputs
B creates "half" key images for discovered output D:
I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D)
B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D),
and sending the pubkeys with I2_D.
A also creates "half" key images:
I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D)
Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D
Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction).
A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D
to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R).
At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r,
which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo).
B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well).
B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D
to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well.
NOTE:
A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively.
Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible:
A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B.
B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A.
The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time!
The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature).
2 of 3
User A (coordinator)
Shared viewkey a,A
"spendkey" j,J
User B
"spendkey" k,K
User C
"spendkey" m,M
A collects K and M from B and C
B collects J and M from A and C
C collects J and K from A and B
A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK)
A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM)
B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK)
B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate
Address: N+O+P, A
The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other
needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two.
Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties:
A gives j to B
B gives k to C
C gives m to A
Address: J+K+M, A
3 of 3
Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others.
The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it
or send it back to A.
N-1 of N
Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around
(using either the secure or insecure method).
For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up):
[4 of 5]
User: spendkey
A: a
B: b
C: c
D: d
E: e
a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A
Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with
the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys.
Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each.
Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning:
1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image)
2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator
must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use.
You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might
also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format.
You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc.
The process is somewhat cumbersome:
To create a N/N multisig wallet:
- each participant creates a normal wallet
- each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant
- each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N)
As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent:
- each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant
- each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants
Then, a transaction may be initiated:
- one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT"
- this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file
- the initiator sends this file to another participant
- that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx"
- the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again
- if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed
- the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
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* \ param no_spend_key If set = only verify view keys , otherwise also spend keys
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* \ return true if password is correct
*
* for verification only
* should not mutate state , unlike load_keys ( )
* can be used prior to rewriting wallet keys file , to ensure user has entered the correct password
*
*/
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bool wallet2 : : verify_password ( const std : : string & keys_file_name , const epee : : wipeable_string & password , bool no_spend_key )
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{
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wallet2 : : keys_file_data keys_file_data ;
std : : string buf ;
bool r = epee : : file_io_utils : : load_file_to_string ( keys_file_name , buf ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( ! r , error : : file_read_error , keys_file_name ) ;
// Decrypt the contents
r = : : serialization : : parse_binary ( buf , keys_file_data ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( ! r , error : : wallet_internal_error , " internal error: failed to deserialize \" " + keys_file_name + ' \" ' ) ;
crypto : : chacha8_key key ;
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crypto : : generate_chacha8_key ( password . data ( ) , password . size ( ) , key ) ;
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std : : string account_data ;
account_data . resize ( keys_file_data . account_data . size ( ) ) ;
crypto : : chacha8 ( keys_file_data . account_data . data ( ) , keys_file_data . account_data . size ( ) , key , keys_file_data . iv , & account_data [ 0 ] ) ;
// The contents should be JSON if the wallet follows the new format.
rapidjson : : Document json ;
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if ( json . Parse ( account_data . c_str ( ) ) . HasParseError ( ) )
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{
// old format before JSON wallet key file format
}
else
{
account_data = std : : string ( json [ " key_data " ] . GetString ( ) , json [ " key_data " ] . GetString ( ) +
json [ " key_data " ] . GetStringLength ( ) ) ;
}
cryptonote : : account_base account_data_check ;
r = epee : : serialization : : load_t_from_binary ( account_data_check , account_data ) ;
const cryptonote : : account_keys & keys = account_data_check . get_keys ( ) ;
r = r & & verify_keys ( keys . m_view_secret_key , keys . m_account_address . m_view_public_key ) ;
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if ( ! no_spend_key )
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r = r & & verify_keys ( keys . m_spend_secret_key , keys . m_account_address . m_spend_public_key ) ;
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return r ;
}
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/*!
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* \ brief Generates a wallet or restores one .
* \ param wallet_ Name of wallet file
* \ param password Password of wallet file
* \ param recovery_param If it is a restore , the recovery key
* \ param recover Whether it is a restore
* \ param two_random Whether it is a non - deterministic wallet
* \ return The secret key of the generated wallet
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*/
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crypto : : secret_key wallet2 : : generate ( const std : : string & wallet_ , const epee : : wipeable_string & password ,
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const crypto : : secret_key & recovery_param , bool recover , bool two_random )
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{
clear ( ) ;
prepare_file_names ( wallet_ ) ;
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if ( ! wallet_ . empty ( ) )
{
boost : : system : : error_code ignored_ec ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( boost : : filesystem : : exists ( m_wallet_file , ignored_ec ) , error : : file_exists , m_wallet_file ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( boost : : filesystem : : exists ( m_keys_file , ignored_ec ) , error : : file_exists , m_keys_file ) ;
}
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crypto : : secret_key retval = m_account . generate ( recovery_param , recover , two_random ) ;
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m_account_public_address = m_account . get_keys ( ) . m_account_address ;
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m_watch_only = false ;
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m_multisig = false ;
m_multisig_threshold = 0 ;
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m_multisig_signers . clear ( ) ;
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// -1 month for fluctuations in block time and machine date/time setup.
// avg seconds per block
const int seconds_per_block = DIFFICULTY_TARGET_V2 ;
// ~num blocks per month
const uint64_t blocks_per_month = 60 * 60 * 24 * 30 / seconds_per_block ;
// try asking the daemon first
if ( m_refresh_from_block_height = = 0 & & ! recover ) {
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uint64_t height = estimate_blockchain_height ( ) ;
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m_refresh_from_block_height = height > = blocks_per_month ? height - blocks_per_month : 0 ;
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}
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if ( ! wallet_ . empty ( ) )
{
bool r = store_keys ( m_keys_file , password , false ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( ! r , error : : file_save_error , m_keys_file ) ;
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r = file_io_utils : : save_string_to_file ( m_wallet_file + " .address.txt " , m_account . get_public_address_str ( m_testnet ) ) ;
if ( ! r ) MERROR ( " String with address text not saved " ) ;
}
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cryptonote : : block b ;
generate_genesis ( b ) ;
m_blockchain . push_back ( get_block_hash ( b ) ) ;
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add_subaddress_account ( tr ( " Primary account " ) ) ;
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if ( ! wallet_ . empty ( ) )
store ( ) ;
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return retval ;
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}
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uint64_t wallet2 : : estimate_blockchain_height ( )
{
// -1 month for fluctuations in block time and machine date/time setup.
// avg seconds per block
const int seconds_per_block = DIFFICULTY_TARGET_V2 ;
// ~num blocks per month
const uint64_t blocks_per_month = 60 * 60 * 24 * 30 / seconds_per_block ;
// try asking the daemon first
std : : string err ;
uint64_t height = 0 ;
// we get the max of approximated height and known height
// approximated height is the least of daemon target height
// (the max of what the other daemons are claiming is their
// height) and the theoretical height based on the local
// clock. This will be wrong only if both the local clock
// is bad *and* a peer daemon claims a highest height than
// the real chain.
// known height is the height the local daemon is currently
// synced to, it will be lower than the real chain height if
// the daemon is currently syncing.
height = get_approximate_blockchain_height ( ) ;
uint64_t target_height = get_daemon_blockchain_target_height ( err ) ;
if ( err . empty ( ) & & target_height < height )
height = target_height ;
uint64_t local_height = get_daemon_blockchain_height ( err ) ;
if ( err . empty ( ) & & local_height > height )
height = local_height ;
return height ;
}
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/*!
* \ brief Creates a watch only wallet from a public address and a view secret key .
* \ param wallet_ Name of wallet file
* \ param password Password of wallet file
* \ param viewkey view secret key
*/
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void wallet2 : : generate ( const std : : string & wallet_ , const epee : : wipeable_string & password ,
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const cryptonote : : account_public_address & account_public_address ,
const crypto : : secret_key & viewkey )
{
clear ( ) ;
prepare_file_names ( wallet_ ) ;
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if ( ! wallet_ . empty ( ) )
{
boost : : system : : error_code ignored_ec ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( boost : : filesystem : : exists ( m_wallet_file , ignored_ec ) , error : : file_exists , m_wallet_file ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( boost : : filesystem : : exists ( m_keys_file , ignored_ec ) , error : : file_exists , m_keys_file ) ;
}
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m_account . create_from_viewkey ( account_public_address , viewkey ) ;
m_account_public_address = account_public_address ;
m_watch_only = true ;
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m_multisig = false ;
m_multisig_threshold = 0 ;
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m_multisig_signers . clear ( ) ;
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if ( ! wallet_ . empty ( ) )
{
bool r = store_keys ( m_keys_file , password , true ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( ! r , error : : file_save_error , m_keys_file ) ;
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r = file_io_utils : : save_string_to_file ( m_wallet_file + " .address.txt " , m_account . get_public_address_str ( m_testnet ) ) ;
if ( ! r ) MERROR ( " String with address text not saved " ) ;
}
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cryptonote : : block b ;
generate_genesis ( b ) ;
m_blockchain . push_back ( get_block_hash ( b ) ) ;
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add_subaddress_account ( tr ( " Primary account " ) ) ;
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if ( ! wallet_ . empty ( ) )
store ( ) ;
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}
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/*!
* \ brief Creates a wallet from a public address and a spend / view secret key pair .
* \ param wallet_ Name of wallet file
* \ param password Password of wallet file
* \ param spendkey spend secret key
* \ param viewkey view secret key
*/
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void wallet2 : : generate ( const std : : string & wallet_ , const epee : : wipeable_string & password ,
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const cryptonote : : account_public_address & account_public_address ,
const crypto : : secret_key & spendkey , const crypto : : secret_key & viewkey )
{
clear ( ) ;
prepare_file_names ( wallet_ ) ;
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if ( ! wallet_ . empty ( ) )
{
boost : : system : : error_code ignored_ec ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( boost : : filesystem : : exists ( m_wallet_file , ignored_ec ) , error : : file_exists , m_wallet_file ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( boost : : filesystem : : exists ( m_keys_file , ignored_ec ) , error : : file_exists , m_keys_file ) ;
}
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m_account . create_from_keys ( account_public_address , spendkey , viewkey ) ;
m_account_public_address = account_public_address ;
m_watch_only = false ;
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m_multisig = false ;
m_multisig_threshold = 0 ;
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m_multisig_signers . clear ( ) ;
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if ( ! wallet_ . empty ( ) )
{
bool r = store_keys ( m_keys_file , password , false ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( ! r , error : : file_save_error , m_keys_file ) ;
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r = file_io_utils : : save_string_to_file ( m_wallet_file + " .address.txt " , m_account . get_public_address_str ( m_testnet ) ) ;
if ( ! r ) MERROR ( " String with address text not saved " ) ;
}
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cryptonote : : block b ;
generate_genesis ( b ) ;
m_blockchain . push_back ( get_block_hash ( b ) ) ;
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if ( ! wallet_ . empty ( ) )
store ( ) ;
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}
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std : : string wallet2 : : make_multisig ( const epee : : wipeable_string & password ,
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const std : : vector < crypto : : secret_key > & view_keys ,
const std : : vector < crypto : : public_key > & spend_keys ,
uint32_t threshold )
{
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES ( ! view_keys . empty ( ) , " empty view keys " ) ;
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES ( view_keys . size ( ) = = spend_keys . size ( ) , " Mismatched view/spend key sizes " ) ;
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing
Scheme by luigi1111:
Multisig for RingCT on Monero
2 of 2
User A (coordinator):
Spendkey b,B
Viewkey a,A (shared)
User B:
Spendkey c,C
Viewkey a,A (shared)
Public Address: C+B, A
Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a
A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants)
A and B watch for incoming outputs
B creates "half" key images for discovered output D:
I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D)
B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D),
and sending the pubkeys with I2_D.
A also creates "half" key images:
I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D)
Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D
Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction).
A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D
to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R).
At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r,
which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo).
B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well).
B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D
to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well.
NOTE:
A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively.
Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible:
A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B.
B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A.
The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time!
The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature).
2 of 3
User A (coordinator)
Shared viewkey a,A
"spendkey" j,J
User B
"spendkey" k,K
User C
"spendkey" m,M
A collects K and M from B and C
B collects J and M from A and C
C collects J and K from A and B
A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK)
A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM)
B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK)
B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate
Address: N+O+P, A
The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other
needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two.
Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties:
A gives j to B
B gives k to C
C gives m to A
Address: J+K+M, A
3 of 3
Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others.
The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it
or send it back to A.
N-1 of N
Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around
(using either the secure or insecure method).
For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up):
[4 of 5]
User: spendkey
A: a
B: b
C: c
D: d
E: e
a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A
Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with
the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys.
Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each.
Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning:
1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image)
2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator
must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use.
You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might
also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format.
You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc.
The process is somewhat cumbersome:
To create a N/N multisig wallet:
- each participant creates a normal wallet
- each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant
- each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N)
As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent:
- each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant
- each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants
Then, a transaction may be initiated:
- one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT"
- this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file
- the initiator sends this file to another participant
- that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx"
- the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again
- if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed
- the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
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CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES ( threshold > 1 & & threshold < = spend_keys . size ( ) + 1 , " Invalid threshold " ) ;
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CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES ( threshold = = spend_keys . size ( ) | | threshold = = spend_keys . size ( ) + 1 , " Unsupported threshold case " ) ;
std : : string extra_multisig_info ;
crypto : : hash hash ;
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clear ( ) ;
MINFO ( " Creating spend key... " ) ;
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std : : vector < crypto : : secret_key > multisig_keys ;
rct : : key spend_pkey , spend_skey ;
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if ( threshold = = spend_keys . size ( ) + 1 )
{
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cryptonote : : generate_multisig_N_N ( get_account ( ) . get_keys ( ) , spend_keys , multisig_keys , spend_skey , spend_pkey ) ;
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}
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else if ( threshold = = spend_keys . size ( ) )
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{
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cryptonote : : generate_multisig_N1_N ( get_account ( ) . get_keys ( ) , spend_keys , multisig_keys , spend_skey , spend_pkey ) ;
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// We need an extra step, so we package all the composite public keys
// we know about, and make a signed string out of them
std : : string data ;
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crypto : : public_key signer ;
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES ( crypto : : secret_key_to_public_key ( rct : : rct2sk ( spend_skey ) , signer ) , " Failed to derive public spend key " ) ;
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data + = std : : string ( ( const char * ) & signer , sizeof ( crypto : : public_key ) ) ;
for ( const auto & msk : multisig_keys )
{
rct : : key pmsk = rct : : scalarmultBase ( rct : : sk2rct ( msk ) ) ;
data + = std : : string ( ( const char * ) & pmsk , sizeof ( crypto : : public_key ) ) ;
}
data . resize ( data . size ( ) + sizeof ( crypto : : signature ) ) ;
crypto : : cn_fast_hash ( data . data ( ) , data . size ( ) - sizeof ( signature ) , hash ) ;
crypto : : signature & signature = * ( crypto : : signature * ) & data [ data . size ( ) - sizeof ( crypto : : signature ) ] ;
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crypto : : generate_signature ( hash , signer , rct : : rct2sk ( spend_skey ) , signature ) ;
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extra_multisig_info = std : : string ( " MultisigxV1 " ) + tools : : base58 : : encode ( data ) ;
}
else
{
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES ( false , " Unsupported threshold case " ) ;
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}
// the multisig view key is shared by all, make one all can derive
MINFO ( " Creating view key... " ) ;
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crypto : : secret_key view_skey = cryptonote : : generate_multisig_view_secret_key ( get_account ( ) . get_keys ( ) . m_view_secret_key , view_keys ) ;
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MINFO ( " Creating multisig address... " ) ;
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CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES ( m_account . make_multisig ( view_skey , rct : : rct2sk ( spend_skey ) , rct : : rct2pk ( spend_pkey ) , multisig_keys ) ,
2017-05-28 11:18:51 +00:00
" Failed to create multisig wallet due to bad keys " ) ;
m_account_public_address = m_account . get_keys ( ) . m_account_address ;
m_watch_only = false ;
m_multisig = true ;
m_multisig_threshold = threshold ;
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if ( threshold = = spend_keys . size ( ) + 1 )
{
m_multisig_signers = spend_keys ;
m_multisig_signers . push_back ( get_multisig_signer_public_key ( ) ) ;
}
else
{
m_multisig_signers = std : : vector < crypto : : public_key > ( spend_keys . size ( ) + 1 , crypto : : null_pkey ) ;
}
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if ( ! m_wallet_file . empty ( ) )
{
bool r = store_keys ( m_keys_file , password , false ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( ! r , error : : file_save_error , m_keys_file ) ;
2016-02-22 22:10:55 +00:00
2017-06-30 11:12:28 +00:00
r = file_io_utils : : save_string_to_file ( m_wallet_file + " .address.txt " , m_account . get_public_address_str ( m_testnet ) ) ;
if ( ! r ) MERROR ( " String with address text not saved " ) ;
}
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cryptonote : : block b ;
generate_genesis ( b ) ;
m_blockchain . push_back ( get_block_hash ( b ) ) ;
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add_subaddress_account ( tr ( " Primary account " ) ) ;
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if ( ! m_wallet_file . empty ( ) )
store ( ) ;
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return extra_multisig_info ;
}
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std : : string wallet2 : : make_multisig ( const epee : : wipeable_string & password ,
const std : : vector < std : : string > & info ,
uint32_t threshold )
{
// parse all multisig info
std : : vector < crypto : : secret_key > secret_keys ( info . size ( ) ) ;
std : : vector < crypto : : public_key > public_keys ( info . size ( ) ) ;
for ( size_t i = 0 ; i < info . size ( ) ; + + i )
{
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( ! verify_multisig_info ( info [ i ] , secret_keys [ i ] , public_keys [ i ] ) ,
error : : wallet_internal_error , " Bad multisig info: " + info [ i ] ) ;
}
// remove duplicates
for ( size_t i = 0 ; i < secret_keys . size ( ) ; + + i )
{
for ( size_t j = i + 1 ; j < secret_keys . size ( ) ; + + j )
{
if ( rct : : sk2rct ( secret_keys [ i ] ) = = rct : : sk2rct ( secret_keys [ j ] ) )
{
MDEBUG ( " Duplicate key found, ignoring " ) ;
secret_keys [ j ] = secret_keys . back ( ) ;
public_keys [ j ] = public_keys . back ( ) ;
secret_keys . pop_back ( ) ;
public_keys . pop_back ( ) ;
- - j ;
}
}
}
// people may include their own, weed it out
const crypto : : secret_key local_skey = cryptonote : : get_multisig_blinded_secret_key ( get_account ( ) . get_keys ( ) . m_view_secret_key ) ;
const crypto : : public_key local_pkey = get_multisig_signer_public_key ( get_account ( ) . get_keys ( ) . m_spend_secret_key ) ;
for ( size_t i = 0 ; i < secret_keys . size ( ) ; + + i )
{
if ( secret_keys [ i ] = = local_skey )
{
MDEBUG ( " Local key is present, ignoring " ) ;
secret_keys [ i ] = secret_keys . back ( ) ;
public_keys [ i ] = public_keys . back ( ) ;
secret_keys . pop_back ( ) ;
public_keys . pop_back ( ) ;
- - i ;
}
else
{
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( public_keys [ i ] = = local_pkey , error : : wallet_internal_error ,
" Found local spend public key, but not local view secret key - something very weird " ) ;
}
}
return make_multisig ( password , secret_keys , public_keys , threshold ) ;
}
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bool wallet2 : : finalize_multisig ( const epee : : wipeable_string & password , std : : unordered_set < crypto : : public_key > pkeys , std : : vector < crypto : : public_key > signers )
{
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES ( ! pkeys . empty ( ) , " empty pkeys " ) ;
// add ours if not included
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crypto : : public_key local_signer ;
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES ( crypto : : secret_key_to_public_key ( get_account ( ) . get_keys ( ) . m_spend_secret_key , local_signer ) ,
" Failed to derive public spend key " ) ;
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if ( std : : find ( signers . begin ( ) , signers . end ( ) , local_signer ) = = signers . end ( ) )
{
signers . push_back ( local_signer ) ;
for ( const auto & msk : get_account ( ) . get_multisig_keys ( ) )
{
pkeys . insert ( rct : : rct2pk ( rct : : scalarmultBase ( rct : : sk2rct ( msk ) ) ) ) ;
}
}
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES ( signers . size ( ) = = m_multisig_signers . size ( ) , " Bad signers size " ) ;
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crypto : : public_key spend_public_key = cryptonote : : generate_multisig_N1_N_spend_public_key ( std : : vector < crypto : : public_key > ( pkeys . begin ( ) , pkeys . end ( ) ) ) ;
m_account_public_address . m_spend_public_key = spend_public_key ;
m_account . finalize_multisig ( spend_public_key ) ;
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m_multisig_signers = signers ;
std : : sort ( m_multisig_signers . begin ( ) , m_multisig_signers . end ( ) , [ ] ( const crypto : : public_key & e0 , const crypto : : public_key & e1 ) { return memcmp ( & e0 , & e1 , sizeof ( e0 ) ) ; } ) ;
if ( ! m_wallet_file . empty ( ) )
{
bool r = store_keys ( m_keys_file , password , false ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( ! r , error : : file_save_error , m_keys_file ) ;
r = file_io_utils : : save_string_to_file ( m_wallet_file + " .address.txt " , m_account . get_public_address_str ( m_testnet ) ) ;
if ( ! r ) MERROR ( " String with address text not saved " ) ;
}
m_subaddresses . clear ( ) ;
m_subaddresses_inv . clear ( ) ;
m_subaddress_labels . clear ( ) ;
add_subaddress_account ( tr ( " Primary account " ) ) ;
if ( ! m_wallet_file . empty ( ) )
store ( ) ;
return true ;
}
2017-09-26 22:16:25 +00:00
bool wallet2 : : finalize_multisig ( const epee : : wipeable_string & password , const std : : vector < std : : string > & info )
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{
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// parse all multisig info
std : : unordered_set < crypto : : public_key > public_keys ;
std : : vector < crypto : : public_key > signers ( info . size ( ) , crypto : : null_pkey ) ;
for ( size_t i = 0 ; i < info . size ( ) ; + + i )
{
if ( ! verify_extra_multisig_info ( info [ i ] , public_keys , signers [ i ] ) )
{
MERROR ( " Bad multisig info " ) ;
return false ;
}
}
return finalize_multisig ( password , public_keys , signers ) ;
2016-02-22 22:10:55 +00:00
}
2017-05-28 11:18:51 +00:00
std : : string wallet2 : : get_multisig_info ( ) const
{
// It's a signed package of private view key and public spend key
2017-11-04 10:39:17 +00:00
const crypto : : secret_key skey = cryptonote : : get_multisig_blinded_secret_key ( get_account ( ) . get_keys ( ) . m_view_secret_key ) ;
const crypto : : public_key pkey = get_multisig_signer_public_key ( get_account ( ) . get_keys ( ) . m_spend_secret_key ) ;
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing
Scheme by luigi1111:
Multisig for RingCT on Monero
2 of 2
User A (coordinator):
Spendkey b,B
Viewkey a,A (shared)
User B:
Spendkey c,C
Viewkey a,A (shared)
Public Address: C+B, A
Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a
A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants)
A and B watch for incoming outputs
B creates "half" key images for discovered output D:
I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D)
B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D),
and sending the pubkeys with I2_D.
A also creates "half" key images:
I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D)
Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D
Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction).
A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D
to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R).
At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r,
which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo).
B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well).
B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D
to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well.
NOTE:
A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively.
Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible:
A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B.
B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A.
The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time!
The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature).
2 of 3
User A (coordinator)
Shared viewkey a,A
"spendkey" j,J
User B
"spendkey" k,K
User C
"spendkey" m,M
A collects K and M from B and C
B collects J and M from A and C
C collects J and K from A and B
A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK)
A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM)
B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK)
B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate
Address: N+O+P, A
The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other
needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two.
Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties:
A gives j to B
B gives k to C
C gives m to A
Address: J+K+M, A
3 of 3
Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others.
The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it
or send it back to A.
N-1 of N
Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around
(using either the secure or insecure method).
For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up):
[4 of 5]
User: spendkey
A: a
B: b
C: c
D: d
E: e
a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A
Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with
the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys.
Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each.
Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning:
1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image)
2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator
must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use.
You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might
also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format.
You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc.
The process is somewhat cumbersome:
To create a N/N multisig wallet:
- each participant creates a normal wallet
- each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant
- each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N)
As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent:
- each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant
- each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants
Then, a transaction may be initiated:
- one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT"
- this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file
- the initiator sends this file to another participant
- that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx"
- the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again
- if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed
- the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 21:34:26 +00:00
crypto : : hash hash ;
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std : : string data ;
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data + = std : : string ( ( const char * ) & skey , sizeof ( crypto : : secret_key ) ) ;
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data + = std : : string ( ( const char * ) & pkey , sizeof ( crypto : : public_key ) ) ;
data . resize ( data . size ( ) + sizeof ( crypto : : signature ) ) ;
crypto : : cn_fast_hash ( data . data ( ) , data . size ( ) - sizeof ( signature ) , hash ) ;
crypto : : signature & signature = * ( crypto : : signature * ) & data [ data . size ( ) - sizeof ( crypto : : signature ) ] ;
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crypto : : generate_signature ( hash , pkey , get_multisig_blinded_secret_key ( get_account ( ) . get_keys ( ) . m_spend_secret_key ) , signature ) ;
2017-05-28 11:18:51 +00:00
return std : : string ( " MultisigV1 " ) + tools : : base58 : : encode ( data ) ;
}
bool wallet2 : : verify_multisig_info ( const std : : string & data , crypto : : secret_key & skey , crypto : : public_key & pkey )
{
const size_t header_len = strlen ( " MultisigV1 " ) ;
if ( data . size ( ) < header_len | | data . substr ( 0 , header_len ) ! = " MultisigV1 " )
{
MERROR ( " Multisig info header check error " ) ;
return false ;
}
std : : string decoded ;
if ( ! tools : : base58 : : decode ( data . substr ( header_len ) , decoded ) )
{
MERROR ( " Multisig info decoding error " ) ;
return false ;
}
if ( decoded . size ( ) ! = sizeof ( crypto : : secret_key ) + sizeof ( crypto : : public_key ) + sizeof ( crypto : : signature ) )
{
MERROR ( " Multisig info is corrupt " ) ;
return false ;
}
size_t offset = 0 ;
skey = * ( const crypto : : secret_key * ) ( decoded . data ( ) + offset ) ;
offset + = sizeof ( skey ) ;
pkey = * ( const crypto : : public_key * ) ( decoded . data ( ) + offset ) ;
offset + = sizeof ( pkey ) ;
const crypto : : signature & signature = * ( const crypto : : signature * ) ( decoded . data ( ) + offset ) ;
crypto : : hash hash ;
crypto : : cn_fast_hash ( decoded . data ( ) , decoded . size ( ) - sizeof ( signature ) , hash ) ;
if ( ! crypto : : check_signature ( hash , pkey , signature ) )
{
MERROR ( " Multisig info signature is invalid " ) ;
return false ;
}
return true ;
}
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bool wallet2 : : verify_extra_multisig_info ( const std : : string & data , std : : unordered_set < crypto : : public_key > & pkeys , crypto : : public_key & signer )
{
const size_t header_len = strlen ( " MultisigxV1 " ) ;
if ( data . size ( ) < header_len | | data . substr ( 0 , header_len ) ! = " MultisigxV1 " )
{
MERROR ( " Multisig info header check error " ) ;
return false ;
}
std : : string decoded ;
if ( ! tools : : base58 : : decode ( data . substr ( header_len ) , decoded ) )
{
MERROR ( " Multisig info decoding error " ) ;
return false ;
}
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if ( decoded . size ( ) < sizeof ( crypto : : public_key ) + sizeof ( crypto : : signature ) )
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{
MERROR ( " Multisig info is corrupt " ) ;
return false ;
}
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if ( ( decoded . size ( ) - ( sizeof ( crypto : : public_key ) + sizeof ( crypto : : signature ) ) ) % sizeof ( crypto : : public_key ) )
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{
MERROR ( " Multisig info is corrupt " ) ;
return false ;
}
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const size_t n_keys = ( decoded . size ( ) - ( sizeof ( crypto : : public_key ) + sizeof ( crypto : : signature ) ) ) / sizeof ( crypto : : public_key ) ;
2017-08-13 14:29:31 +00:00
size_t offset = 0 ;
signer = * ( const crypto : : public_key * ) ( decoded . data ( ) + offset ) ;
offset + = sizeof ( signer ) ;
const crypto : : signature & signature = * ( const crypto : : signature * ) ( decoded . data ( ) + offset + n_keys * sizeof ( crypto : : public_key ) ) ;
crypto : : hash hash ;
crypto : : cn_fast_hash ( decoded . data ( ) , decoded . size ( ) - sizeof ( signature ) , hash ) ;
2017-11-04 10:39:17 +00:00
if ( ! crypto : : check_signature ( hash , signer , signature ) )
2017-08-13 14:29:31 +00:00
{
MERROR ( " Multisig info signature is invalid " ) ;
return false ;
}
for ( size_t n = 0 ; n < n_keys ; + + n )
{
crypto : : public_key mspk = * ( const crypto : : public_key * ) ( decoded . data ( ) + offset ) ;
pkeys . insert ( mspk ) ;
offset + = sizeof ( mspk ) ;
}
return true ;
}
2017-10-01 13:06:54 +00:00
bool wallet2 : : multisig ( bool * ready , uint32_t * threshold , uint32_t * total ) const
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{
if ( ! m_multisig )
return false ;
if ( threshold )
* threshold = m_multisig_threshold ;
if ( total )
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* total = m_multisig_signers . size ( ) ;
2017-10-01 13:06:54 +00:00
if ( ready )
* ready = ! ( get_account ( ) . get_keys ( ) . m_account_address . m_spend_public_key = = rct : : rct2pk ( rct : : identity ( ) ) ) ;
2017-05-28 11:18:51 +00:00
return true ;
}
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing
Scheme by luigi1111:
Multisig for RingCT on Monero
2 of 2
User A (coordinator):
Spendkey b,B
Viewkey a,A (shared)
User B:
Spendkey c,C
Viewkey a,A (shared)
Public Address: C+B, A
Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a
A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants)
A and B watch for incoming outputs
B creates "half" key images for discovered output D:
I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D)
B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D),
and sending the pubkeys with I2_D.
A also creates "half" key images:
I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D)
Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D
Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction).
A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D
to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R).
At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r,
which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo).
B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well).
B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D
to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well.
NOTE:
A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively.
Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible:
A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B.
B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A.
The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time!
The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature).
2 of 3
User A (coordinator)
Shared viewkey a,A
"spendkey" j,J
User B
"spendkey" k,K
User C
"spendkey" m,M
A collects K and M from B and C
B collects J and M from A and C
C collects J and K from A and B
A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK)
A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM)
B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK)
B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate
Address: N+O+P, A
The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other
needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two.
Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties:
A gives j to B
B gives k to C
C gives m to A
Address: J+K+M, A
3 of 3
Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others.
The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it
or send it back to A.
N-1 of N
Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around
(using either the secure or insecure method).
For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up):
[4 of 5]
User: spendkey
A: a
B: b
C: c
D: d
E: e
a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A
Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with
the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys.
Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each.
Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning:
1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image)
2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator
must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use.
You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might
also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format.
You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc.
The process is somewhat cumbersome:
To create a N/N multisig wallet:
- each participant creates a normal wallet
- each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant
- each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N)
As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent:
- each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant
- each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants
Then, a transaction may be initiated:
- one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT"
- this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file
- the initiator sends this file to another participant
- that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx"
- the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again
- if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed
- the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 21:34:26 +00:00
bool wallet2 : : has_multisig_partial_key_images ( ) const
{
if ( ! m_multisig )
return false ;
for ( const auto & td : m_transfers )
if ( td . m_key_image_partial )
return true ;
return false ;
}
2014-10-18 19:38:21 +00:00
/*!
* \ brief Rewrites to the wallet file for wallet upgrade ( doesn ' t generate key , assumes it ' s already there )
* \ param wallet_name Name of wallet file ( should exist )
* \ param password Password for wallet file
*/
2017-11-25 14:50:15 +00:00
void wallet2 : : rewrite ( const std : : string & wallet_name , const epee : : wipeable_string & password )
2014-10-18 19:30:18 +00:00
{
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if ( wallet_name . empty ( ) )
return ;
2014-10-18 19:30:18 +00:00
prepare_file_names ( wallet_name ) ;
boost : : system : : error_code ignored_ec ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( ! boost : : filesystem : : exists ( m_keys_file , ignored_ec ) , error : : file_not_found , m_keys_file ) ;
2016-12-26 09:33:24 +00:00
bool r = store_keys ( m_keys_file , password , m_watch_only ) ;
2014-10-18 19:30:18 +00:00
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( ! r , error : : file_save_error , m_keys_file ) ;
}
2015-05-31 14:34:55 +00:00
/*!
2015-06-20 11:30:11 +00:00
* \ brief Writes to a file named based on the normal wallet ( doesn ' t generate key , assumes it ' s already there )
* \ param wallet_name Base name of wallet file
2015-05-31 14:34:55 +00:00
* \ param password Password for wallet file
*/
2017-11-25 14:50:15 +00:00
void wallet2 : : write_watch_only_wallet ( const std : : string & wallet_name , const epee : : wipeable_string & password )
2015-05-31 14:34:55 +00:00
{
prepare_file_names ( wallet_name ) ;
boost : : system : : error_code ignored_ec ;
std : : string filename = m_keys_file + " -watchonly " ;
bool watch_only_keys_file_exists = boost : : filesystem : : exists ( filename , ignored_ec ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( watch_only_keys_file_exists , error : : file_save_error , filename ) ;
bool r = store_keys ( filename , password , true ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( ! r , error : : file_save_error , filename ) ;
}
2014-03-03 22:07:58 +00:00
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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void wallet2 : : wallet_exists ( const std : : string & file_path , bool & keys_file_exists , bool & wallet_file_exists )
2014-05-03 16:19:43 +00:00
{
std : : string keys_file , wallet_file ;
do_prepare_file_names ( file_path , keys_file , wallet_file ) ;
boost : : system : : error_code ignore ;
keys_file_exists = boost : : filesystem : : exists ( keys_file , ignore ) ;
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wallet_file_exists = boost : : filesystem : : exists ( wallet_file , ignore ) ;
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}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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bool wallet2 : : wallet_valid_path_format ( const std : : string & file_path )
{
return ! file_path . empty ( ) ;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2015-08-09 09:09:39 +00:00
bool wallet2 : : parse_long_payment_id ( const std : : string & payment_id_str , crypto : : hash & payment_id )
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{
cryptonote : : blobdata payment_id_data ;
if ( ! epee : : string_tools : : parse_hexstr_to_binbuff ( payment_id_str , payment_id_data ) )
return false ;
if ( sizeof ( crypto : : hash ) ! = payment_id_data . size ( ) )
return false ;
payment_id = * reinterpret_cast < const crypto : : hash * > ( payment_id_data . data ( ) ) ;
return true ;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2015-08-09 09:09:39 +00:00
bool wallet2 : : parse_short_payment_id ( const std : : string & payment_id_str , crypto : : hash8 & payment_id )
{
cryptonote : : blobdata payment_id_data ;
if ( ! epee : : string_tools : : parse_hexstr_to_binbuff ( payment_id_str , payment_id_data ) )
return false ;
if ( sizeof ( crypto : : hash8 ) ! = payment_id_data . size ( ) )
return false ;
payment_id = * reinterpret_cast < const crypto : : hash8 * > ( payment_id_data . data ( ) ) ;
return true ;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
bool wallet2 : : parse_payment_id ( const std : : string & payment_id_str , crypto : : hash & payment_id )
{
if ( parse_long_payment_id ( payment_id_str , payment_id ) )
return true ;
crypto : : hash8 payment_id8 ;
if ( parse_short_payment_id ( payment_id_str , payment_id8 ) )
{
memcpy ( payment_id . data , payment_id8 . data , 8 ) ;
memset ( payment_id . data + 8 , 0 , 24 ) ;
return true ;
}
return false ;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2017-03-01 22:27:27 +00:00
void wallet2 : : set_default_decimal_point ( unsigned int decimal_point )
{
cryptonote : : set_default_decimal_point ( decimal_point ) ;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
unsigned int wallet2 : : get_default_decimal_point ( ) const
{
return cryptonote : : get_default_decimal_point ( ) ;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2014-03-03 22:07:58 +00:00
bool wallet2 : : prepare_file_names ( const std : : string & file_path )
{
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do_prepare_file_names ( file_path , m_keys_file , m_wallet_file ) ;
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return true ;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2017-01-14 13:41:56 +00:00
bool wallet2 : : check_connection ( uint32_t * version , uint32_t timeout )
2014-03-03 22:07:58 +00:00
{
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THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( ! m_is_initialized , error : : wallet_not_initialized ) ;
2016-03-11 12:25:28 +00:00
boost : : lock_guard < boost : : mutex > lock ( m_daemon_rpc_mutex ) ;
2015-11-27 17:25:15 +00:00
2017-08-04 21:00:25 +00:00
// TODO: Add light wallet version check.
if ( m_light_wallet ) {
version = 0 ;
return m_light_wallet_connected ;
}
2016-07-10 15:49:40 +00:00
if ( ! m_http_client . is_connected ( ) )
{
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m_node_rpc_proxy . invalidate ( ) ;
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if ( ! m_http_client . connect ( std : : chrono : : milliseconds ( timeout ) ) )
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return false ;
}
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if ( version )
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{
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epee : : json_rpc : : request < cryptonote : : COMMAND_RPC_GET_VERSION : : request > req_t = AUTO_VAL_INIT ( req_t ) ;
epee : : json_rpc : : response < cryptonote : : COMMAND_RPC_GET_VERSION : : response , std : : string > resp_t = AUTO_VAL_INIT ( resp_t ) ;
req_t . jsonrpc = " 2.0 " ;
req_t . id = epee : : serialization : : storage_entry ( 0 ) ;
req_t . method = " get_version " ;
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bool r = net_utils : : invoke_http_json ( " /json_rpc " , req_t , resp_t , m_http_client ) ;
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if ( ! r ) {
* version = 0 ;
return false ;
}
if ( resp_t . result . status ! = CORE_RPC_STATUS_OK )
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* version = 0 ;
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else
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* version = resp_t . result . version ;
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}
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return true ;
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}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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bool wallet2 : : generate_chacha8_key_from_secret_keys ( crypto : : chacha8_key & key ) const
{
const account_keys & keys = m_account . get_keys ( ) ;
const crypto : : secret_key & view_key = keys . m_view_secret_key ;
const crypto : : secret_key & spend_key = keys . m_spend_secret_key ;
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tools : : scrubbed_arr < char , sizeof ( view_key ) + sizeof ( spend_key ) + 1 > data ;
memcpy ( data . data ( ) , & view_key , sizeof ( view_key ) ) ;
memcpy ( data . data ( ) + sizeof ( view_key ) , & spend_key , sizeof ( spend_key ) ) ;
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data [ sizeof ( data ) - 1 ] = CHACHA8_KEY_TAIL ;
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crypto : : generate_chacha8_key ( data . data ( ) , sizeof ( data ) , key ) ;
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return true ;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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void wallet2 : : load ( const std : : string & wallet_ , const epee : : wipeable_string & password )
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{
clear ( ) ;
prepare_file_names ( wallet_ ) ;
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boost : : system : : error_code e ;
bool exists = boost : : filesystem : : exists ( m_keys_file , e ) ;
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THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( e | | ! exists , error : : file_not_found , m_keys_file ) ;
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if ( ! load_keys ( m_keys_file , password ) )
{
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( true , error : : file_read_error , m_keys_file ) ;
}
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LOG_PRINT_L0 ( " Loaded wallet keys file, with public address: " < < m_account . get_public_address_str ( m_testnet ) ) ;
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//keys loaded ok!
//try to load wallet file. but even if we failed, it is not big problem
if ( ! boost : : filesystem : : exists ( m_wallet_file , e ) | | e )
{
LOG_PRINT_L0 ( " file not found: " < < m_wallet_file < < " , starting with empty blockchain " ) ;
m_account_public_address = m_account . get_keys ( ) . m_account_address ;
}
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else
{
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wallet2 : : cache_file_data cache_file_data ;
std : : string buf ;
bool r = epee : : file_io_utils : : load_file_to_string ( m_wallet_file , buf ) ;
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THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( ! r , error : : file_read_error , m_wallet_file ) ;
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// try to read it as an encrypted cache
try
{
LOG_PRINT_L1 ( " Trying to decrypt cache data " ) ;
r = : : serialization : : parse_binary ( buf , cache_file_data ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( ! r , error : : wallet_internal_error , " internal error: failed to deserialize \" " + m_wallet_file + ' \" ' ) ;
crypto : : chacha8_key key ;
generate_chacha8_key_from_secret_keys ( key ) ;
std : : string cache_data ;
cache_data . resize ( cache_file_data . cache_data . size ( ) ) ;
crypto : : chacha8 ( cache_file_data . cache_data . data ( ) , cache_file_data . cache_data . size ( ) , key , cache_file_data . iv , & cache_data [ 0 ] ) ;
std : : stringstream iss ;
iss < < cache_data ;
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try {
boost : : archive : : portable_binary_iarchive ar ( iss ) ;
ar > > * this ;
}
catch ( . . . )
{
LOG_PRINT_L0 ( " Failed to open portable binary, trying unportable " ) ;
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boost : : filesystem : : copy_file ( m_wallet_file , m_wallet_file + " .unportable " , boost : : filesystem : : copy_option : : overwrite_if_exists ) ;
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iss . str ( " " ) ;
iss < < cache_data ;
boost : : archive : : binary_iarchive ar ( iss ) ;
ar > > * this ;
}
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}
catch ( . . . )
{
LOG_PRINT_L1 ( " Failed to load encrypted cache, trying unencrypted " ) ;
std : : stringstream iss ;
iss < < buf ;
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try {
boost : : archive : : portable_binary_iarchive ar ( iss ) ;
ar > > * this ;
}
catch ( . . . )
{
LOG_PRINT_L0 ( " Failed to open portable binary, trying unportable " ) ;
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boost : : filesystem : : copy_file ( m_wallet_file , m_wallet_file + " .unportable " , boost : : filesystem : : copy_option : : overwrite_if_exists ) ;
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iss . str ( " " ) ;
iss < < buf ;
boost : : archive : : binary_iarchive ar ( iss ) ;
ar > > * this ;
}
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}
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THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF (
m_account_public_address . m_spend_public_key ! = m_account . get_keys ( ) . m_account_address . m_spend_public_key | |
m_account_public_address . m_view_public_key ! = m_account . get_keys ( ) . m_account_address . m_view_public_key ,
error : : wallet_files_doesnt_correspond , m_keys_file , m_wallet_file ) ;
}
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cryptonote : : block genesis ;
generate_genesis ( genesis ) ;
crypto : : hash genesis_hash = get_block_hash ( genesis ) ;
if ( m_blockchain . empty ( ) )
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{
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m_blockchain . push_back ( genesis_hash ) ;
}
else
{
check_genesis ( genesis_hash ) ;
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}
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trim_hashchain ( ) ;
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if ( get_num_subaddress_accounts ( ) = = 0 )
add_subaddress_account ( tr ( " Primary account " ) ) ;
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m_local_bc_height = m_blockchain . size ( ) ;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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void wallet2 : : trim_hashchain ( )
{
uint64_t height = m_checkpoints . get_max_height ( ) ;
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if ( ! m_blockchain . empty ( ) & & m_blockchain . size ( ) = = m_blockchain . offset ( ) )
{
MINFO ( " Fixing empty hashchain " ) ;
epee : : json_rpc : : request < cryptonote : : COMMAND_RPC_GET_BLOCK_HEADER_BY_HEIGHT : : request > req = AUTO_VAL_INIT ( req ) ;
epee : : json_rpc : : response < cryptonote : : COMMAND_RPC_GET_BLOCK_HEADER_BY_HEIGHT : : response , std : : string > res = AUTO_VAL_INIT ( res ) ;
m_daemon_rpc_mutex . lock ( ) ;
req . jsonrpc = " 2.0 " ;
req . id = epee : : serialization : : storage_entry ( 0 ) ;
req . method = " getblockheaderbyheight " ;
req . params . height = m_blockchain . size ( ) - 1 ;
bool r = net_utils : : invoke_http_json ( " /json_rpc " , req , res , m_http_client , rpc_timeout ) ;
m_daemon_rpc_mutex . unlock ( ) ;
if ( r & & res . result . status = = CORE_RPC_STATUS_OK )
{
crypto : : hash hash ;
epee : : string_tools : : hex_to_pod ( res . result . block_header . hash , hash ) ;
m_blockchain . refill ( hash ) ;
}
else
{
MERROR ( " Failed to request block header from daemon, hash chain may be unable to sync till the wallet is loaded with a usable daemon " ) ;
}
}
if ( height > 0 & & m_blockchain . size ( ) > height )
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{
- - height ;
MDEBUG ( " trimming to " < < height < < " , offset " < < m_blockchain . offset ( ) ) ;
m_blockchain . trim ( height ) ;
}
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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void wallet2 : : check_genesis ( const crypto : : hash & genesis_hash ) const {
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std : : string what ( " Genesis block mismatch. You probably use wallet without testnet flag with blockchain from test network or vice versa " ) ;
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THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( genesis_hash ! = m_blockchain . genesis ( ) , error : : wallet_internal_error , what ) ;
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}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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std : : string wallet2 : : path ( ) const
{
return m_wallet_file ;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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void wallet2 : : store ( )
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{
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store_to ( " " , epee : : wipeable_string ( ) ) ;
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}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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void wallet2 : : store_to ( const std : : string & path , const epee : : wipeable_string & password )
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{
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trim_hashchain ( ) ;
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// if file is the same, we do:
// 1. save wallet to the *.new file
// 2. remove old wallet file
// 3. rename *.new to wallet_name
// handle if we want just store wallet state to current files (ex store() replacement);
bool same_file = true ;
if ( ! path . empty ( ) )
{
std : : string canonical_path = boost : : filesystem : : canonical ( m_wallet_file ) . string ( ) ;
size_t pos = canonical_path . find ( path ) ;
same_file = pos ! = std : : string : : npos ;
}
if ( ! same_file )
{
// check if we want to store to directory which doesn't exists yet
boost : : filesystem : : path parent_path = boost : : filesystem : : path ( path ) . parent_path ( ) ;
// if path is not exists, try to create it
if ( ! parent_path . empty ( ) & & ! boost : : filesystem : : exists ( parent_path ) )
{
boost : : system : : error_code ec ;
if ( ! boost : : filesystem : : create_directories ( parent_path , ec ) )
{
throw std : : logic_error ( ec . message ( ) ) ;
}
}
}
// preparing wallet data
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std : : stringstream oss ;
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boost : : archive : : portable_binary_oarchive ar ( oss ) ;
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ar < < * this ;
wallet2 : : cache_file_data cache_file_data = boost : : value_initialized < wallet2 : : cache_file_data > ( ) ;
cache_file_data . cache_data = oss . str ( ) ;
crypto : : chacha8_key key ;
generate_chacha8_key_from_secret_keys ( key ) ;
std : : string cipher ;
cipher . resize ( cache_file_data . cache_data . size ( ) ) ;
cache_file_data . iv = crypto : : rand < crypto : : chacha8_iv > ( ) ;
crypto : : chacha8 ( cache_file_data . cache_data . data ( ) , cache_file_data . cache_data . size ( ) , key , cache_file_data . iv , & cipher [ 0 ] ) ;
cache_file_data . cache_data = cipher ;
2016-03-21 13:17:03 +00:00
const std : : string new_file = same_file ? m_wallet_file + " .new " : path ;
const std : : string old_file = m_wallet_file ;
const std : : string old_keys_file = m_keys_file ;
const std : : string old_address_file = m_wallet_file + " .address.txt " ;
2015-12-29 15:46:37 +00:00
2016-03-21 13:17:03 +00:00
// save keys to the new file
// if we here, main wallet file is saved and we only need to save keys and address files
if ( ! same_file ) {
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prepare_file_names ( path ) ;
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bool r = store_keys ( m_keys_file , password , false ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( ! r , error : : file_save_error , m_keys_file ) ;
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// save address to the new file
const std : : string address_file = m_wallet_file + " .address.txt " ;
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r = file_io_utils : : save_string_to_file ( address_file , m_account . get_public_address_str ( m_testnet ) ) ;
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THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( ! r , error : : file_save_error , m_wallet_file ) ;
// remove old wallet file
r = boost : : filesystem : : remove ( old_file ) ;
if ( ! r ) {
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LOG_ERROR ( " error removing file: " < < old_file ) ;
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}
// remove old keys file
r = boost : : filesystem : : remove ( old_keys_file ) ;
if ( ! r ) {
2016-03-21 13:17:03 +00:00
LOG_ERROR ( " error removing file: " < < old_keys_file ) ;
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}
// remove old address file
r = boost : : filesystem : : remove ( old_address_file ) ;
if ( ! r ) {
2016-03-21 13:17:03 +00:00
LOG_ERROR ( " error removing file: " < < old_address_file ) ;
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}
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} else {
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// save to new file
std : : ofstream ostr ;
ostr . open ( new_file , std : : ios_base : : binary | std : : ios_base : : out | std : : ios_base : : trunc ) ;
binary_archive < true > oar ( ostr ) ;
bool success = : : serialization : : serialize ( oar , cache_file_data ) ;
ostr . close ( ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( ! success | | ! ostr . good ( ) , error : : file_save_error , new_file ) ;
2016-03-21 13:17:03 +00:00
// here we have "*.new" file, we need to rename it to be without ".new"
std : : error_code e = tools : : replace_file ( new_file , m_wallet_file ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( e , error : : file_save_error , m_wallet_file , e ) ;
}
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}
2014-03-03 22:07:58 +00:00
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2017-02-19 02:42:10 +00:00
uint64_t wallet2 : : balance ( uint32_t index_major ) const
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{
uint64_t amount = 0 ;
2017-08-04 21:00:25 +00:00
if ( m_light_wallet )
return m_light_wallet_unlocked_balance ;
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for ( const auto & i : balance_per_subaddress ( index_major ) )
amount + = i . second ;
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return amount ;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2017-02-19 02:42:10 +00:00
uint64_t wallet2 : : unlocked_balance ( uint32_t index_major ) const
2014-03-03 22:07:58 +00:00
{
uint64_t amount = 0 ;
2017-08-04 21:00:25 +00:00
if ( m_light_wallet )
return m_light_wallet_balance ;
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for ( const auto & i : unlocked_balance_per_subaddress ( index_major ) )
amount + = i . second ;
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return amount ;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2017-02-19 02:42:10 +00:00
std : : map < uint32_t , uint64_t > wallet2 : : balance_per_subaddress ( uint32_t index_major ) const
{
std : : map < uint32_t , uint64_t > amount_per_subaddr ;
for ( const auto & td : m_transfers )
{
if ( td . m_subaddr_index . major = = index_major & & ! td . m_spent )
{
auto found = amount_per_subaddr . find ( td . m_subaddr_index . minor ) ;
if ( found = = amount_per_subaddr . end ( ) )
amount_per_subaddr [ td . m_subaddr_index . minor ] = td . amount ( ) ;
else
found - > second + = td . amount ( ) ;
}
}
for ( const auto & utx : m_unconfirmed_txs )
{
if ( utx . second . m_subaddr_account = = index_major & & utx . second . m_state ! = wallet2 : : unconfirmed_transfer_details : : failed )
{
// all changes go to 0-th subaddress (in the current subaddress account)
auto found = amount_per_subaddr . find ( 0 ) ;
if ( found = = amount_per_subaddr . end ( ) )
amount_per_subaddr [ 0 ] = utx . second . m_change ;
else
found - > second + = utx . second . m_change ;
}
}
return amount_per_subaddr ;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
std : : map < uint32_t , uint64_t > wallet2 : : unlocked_balance_per_subaddress ( uint32_t index_major ) const
{
std : : map < uint32_t , uint64_t > amount_per_subaddr ;
for ( const transfer_details & td : m_transfers )
{
if ( td . m_subaddr_index . major = = index_major & & ! td . m_spent & & is_transfer_unlocked ( td ) )
{
auto found = amount_per_subaddr . find ( td . m_subaddr_index . minor ) ;
if ( found = = amount_per_subaddr . end ( ) )
amount_per_subaddr [ td . m_subaddr_index . minor ] = td . amount ( ) ;
else
found - > second + = td . amount ( ) ;
}
}
return amount_per_subaddr ;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
uint64_t wallet2 : : balance_all ( ) const
{
uint64_t r = 0 ;
for ( uint32_t index_major = 0 ; index_major < get_num_subaddress_accounts ( ) ; + + index_major )
r + = balance ( index_major ) ;
return r ;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
uint64_t wallet2 : : unlocked_balance_all ( ) const
{
uint64_t r = 0 ;
for ( uint32_t index_major = 0 ; index_major < get_num_subaddress_accounts ( ) ; + + index_major )
r + = unlocked_balance ( index_major ) ;
return r ;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2014-04-02 16:00:17 +00:00
void wallet2 : : get_transfers ( wallet2 : : transfer_container & incoming_transfers ) const
2014-03-03 22:07:58 +00:00
{
incoming_transfers = m_transfers ;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2017-02-19 02:42:10 +00:00
void wallet2 : : get_payments ( const crypto : : hash & payment_id , std : : list < wallet2 : : payment_details > & payments , uint64_t min_height , const boost : : optional < uint32_t > & subaddr_account , const std : : set < uint32_t > & subaddr_indices ) const
2014-05-03 16:19:43 +00:00
{
auto range = m_payments . equal_range ( payment_id ) ;
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std : : for_each ( range . first , range . second , [ & payments , & min_height , & subaddr_account , & subaddr_indices ] ( const payment_container : : value_type & x ) {
if ( min_height < x . second . m_block_height & &
( ! subaddr_account | | * subaddr_account = = x . second . m_subaddr_index . major ) & &
( subaddr_indices . empty ( ) | | subaddr_indices . count ( x . second . m_subaddr_index . minor ) = = 1 ) )
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{
payments . push_back ( x . second ) ;
}
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} ) ;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2017-02-19 02:42:10 +00:00
void wallet2 : : get_payments ( std : : list < std : : pair < crypto : : hash , wallet2 : : payment_details > > & payments , uint64_t min_height , uint64_t max_height , const boost : : optional < uint32_t > & subaddr_account , const std : : set < uint32_t > & subaddr_indices ) const
2015-01-10 19:32:08 +00:00
{
auto range = std : : make_pair ( m_payments . begin ( ) , m_payments . end ( ) ) ;
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std : : for_each ( range . first , range . second , [ & payments , & min_height , & max_height , & subaddr_account , & subaddr_indices ] ( const payment_container : : value_type & x ) {
if ( min_height < x . second . m_block_height & & max_height > = x . second . m_block_height & &
( ! subaddr_account | | * subaddr_account = = x . second . m_subaddr_index . major ) & &
( subaddr_indices . empty ( ) | | subaddr_indices . count ( x . second . m_subaddr_index . minor ) = = 1 ) )
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{
payments . push_back ( x ) ;
}
} ) ;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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void wallet2 : : get_payments_out ( std : : list < std : : pair < crypto : : hash , wallet2 : : confirmed_transfer_details > > & confirmed_payments ,
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uint64_t min_height , uint64_t max_height , const boost : : optional < uint32_t > & subaddr_account , const std : : set < uint32_t > & subaddr_indices ) const
2015-11-15 21:59:40 +00:00
{
for ( auto i = m_confirmed_txs . begin ( ) ; i ! = m_confirmed_txs . end ( ) ; + + i ) {
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if ( i - > second . m_block_height < = min_height | | i - > second . m_block_height > max_height )
continue ;
if ( subaddr_account & & * subaddr_account ! = i - > second . m_subaddr_account )
continue ;
if ( ! subaddr_indices . empty ( ) & & std : : count_if ( i - > second . m_subaddr_indices . begin ( ) , i - > second . m_subaddr_indices . end ( ) , [ & subaddr_indices ] ( uint32_t index ) { return subaddr_indices . count ( index ) = = 1 ; } ) = = 0 )
continue ;
confirmed_payments . push_back ( * i ) ;
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}
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2017-02-19 02:42:10 +00:00
void wallet2 : : get_unconfirmed_payments_out ( std : : list < std : : pair < crypto : : hash , wallet2 : : unconfirmed_transfer_details > > & unconfirmed_payments , const boost : : optional < uint32_t > & subaddr_account , const std : : set < uint32_t > & subaddr_indices ) const
2015-11-15 21:59:40 +00:00
{
for ( auto i = m_unconfirmed_txs . begin ( ) ; i ! = m_unconfirmed_txs . end ( ) ; + + i ) {
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if ( subaddr_account & & * subaddr_account ! = i - > second . m_subaddr_account )
continue ;
if ( ! subaddr_indices . empty ( ) & & std : : count_if ( i - > second . m_subaddr_indices . begin ( ) , i - > second . m_subaddr_indices . end ( ) , [ & subaddr_indices ] ( uint32_t index ) { return subaddr_indices . count ( index ) = = 1 ; } ) = = 0 )
continue ;
2015-11-15 21:59:40 +00:00
unconfirmed_payments . push_back ( * i ) ;
}
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2017-09-22 12:57:20 +00:00
void wallet2 : : get_unconfirmed_payments ( std : : list < std : : pair < crypto : : hash , wallet2 : : pool_payment_details > > & unconfirmed_payments , const boost : : optional < uint32_t > & subaddr_account , const std : : set < uint32_t > & subaddr_indices ) const
2016-05-23 20:40:12 +00:00
{
for ( auto i = m_unconfirmed_payments . begin ( ) ; i ! = m_unconfirmed_payments . end ( ) ; + + i ) {
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if ( ( ! subaddr_account | | * subaddr_account = = i - > second . m_pd . m_subaddr_index . major ) & &
( subaddr_indices . empty ( ) | | subaddr_indices . count ( i - > second . m_pd . m_subaddr_index . minor ) = = 1 ) )
2016-05-23 20:40:12 +00:00
unconfirmed_payments . push_back ( * i ) ;
}
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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void wallet2 : : rescan_spent ( )
{
2017-03-18 12:46:09 +00:00
// This is RPC call that can take a long time if there are many outputs,
// so we call it several times, in stripes, so we don't time out spuriously
std : : vector < int > spent_status ;
spent_status . reserve ( m_transfers . size ( ) ) ;
const size_t chunk_size = 1000 ;
for ( size_t start_offset = 0 ; start_offset < m_transfers . size ( ) ; start_offset + = chunk_size )
{
const size_t n_outputs = std : : min < size_t > ( chunk_size , m_transfers . size ( ) - start_offset ) ;
MDEBUG ( " Calling is_key_image_spent on " < < start_offset < < " - " < < ( start_offset + n_outputs - 1 ) < < " , out of " < < m_transfers . size ( ) ) ;
COMMAND_RPC_IS_KEY_IMAGE_SPENT : : request req = AUTO_VAL_INIT ( req ) ;
COMMAND_RPC_IS_KEY_IMAGE_SPENT : : response daemon_resp = AUTO_VAL_INIT ( daemon_resp ) ;
for ( size_t n = start_offset ; n < start_offset + n_outputs ; + + n )
req . key_images . push_back ( string_tools : : pod_to_hex ( m_transfers [ n ] . m_key_image ) ) ;
m_daemon_rpc_mutex . lock ( ) ;
bool r = epee : : net_utils : : invoke_http_json ( " /is_key_image_spent " , req , daemon_resp , m_http_client , rpc_timeout ) ;
m_daemon_rpc_mutex . unlock ( ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( ! r , error : : no_connection_to_daemon , " is_key_image_spent " ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( daemon_resp . status = = CORE_RPC_STATUS_BUSY , error : : daemon_busy , " is_key_image_spent " ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( daemon_resp . status ! = CORE_RPC_STATUS_OK , error : : is_key_image_spent_error , daemon_resp . status ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( daemon_resp . spent_status . size ( ) ! = n_outputs , error : : wallet_internal_error ,
" daemon returned wrong response for is_key_image_spent, wrong amounts count = " +
std : : to_string ( daemon_resp . spent_status . size ( ) ) + " , expected " + std : : to_string ( n_outputs ) ) ;
std : : copy ( daemon_resp . spent_status . begin ( ) , daemon_resp . spent_status . end ( ) , std : : back_inserter ( spent_status ) ) ;
2015-08-11 14:14:44 +00:00
}
// update spent status
for ( size_t i = 0 ; i < m_transfers . size ( ) ; + + i )
{
transfer_details & td = m_transfers [ i ] ;
2016-10-30 12:14:33 +00:00
// a view wallet may not know about key images
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing
Scheme by luigi1111:
Multisig for RingCT on Monero
2 of 2
User A (coordinator):
Spendkey b,B
Viewkey a,A (shared)
User B:
Spendkey c,C
Viewkey a,A (shared)
Public Address: C+B, A
Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a
A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants)
A and B watch for incoming outputs
B creates "half" key images for discovered output D:
I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D)
B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D),
and sending the pubkeys with I2_D.
A also creates "half" key images:
I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D)
Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D
Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction).
A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D
to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R).
At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r,
which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo).
B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well).
B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D
to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well.
NOTE:
A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively.
Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible:
A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B.
B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A.
The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time!
The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature).
2 of 3
User A (coordinator)
Shared viewkey a,A
"spendkey" j,J
User B
"spendkey" k,K
User C
"spendkey" m,M
A collects K and M from B and C
B collects J and M from A and C
C collects J and K from A and B
A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK)
A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM)
B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK)
B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate
Address: N+O+P, A
The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other
needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two.
Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties:
A gives j to B
B gives k to C
C gives m to A
Address: J+K+M, A
3 of 3
Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others.
The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it
or send it back to A.
N-1 of N
Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around
(using either the secure or insecure method).
For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up):
[4 of 5]
User: spendkey
A: a
B: b
C: c
D: d
E: e
a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A
Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with
the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys.
Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each.
Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning:
1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image)
2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator
must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use.
You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might
also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format.
You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc.
The process is somewhat cumbersome:
To create a N/N multisig wallet:
- each participant creates a normal wallet
- each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant
- each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N)
As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent:
- each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant
- each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants
Then, a transaction may be initiated:
- one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT"
- this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file
- the initiator sends this file to another participant
- that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx"
- the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again
- if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed
- the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 21:34:26 +00:00
if ( ! td . m_key_image_known | | td . m_key_image_partial )
2016-10-30 12:14:33 +00:00
continue ;
2017-03-18 12:46:09 +00:00
if ( td . m_spent ! = ( spent_status [ i ] ! = COMMAND_RPC_IS_KEY_IMAGE_SPENT : : UNSPENT ) )
2015-08-11 14:14:44 +00:00
{
if ( td . m_spent )
{
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LOG_PRINT_L0 ( " Marking output " < < i < < " ( " < < td . m_key_image < < " ) as unspent, it was marked as spent " ) ;
2016-09-26 22:11:10 +00:00
set_unspent ( i ) ;
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td . m_spent_height = 0 ;
2015-08-11 14:14:44 +00:00
}
else
{
2016-01-05 21:57:43 +00:00
LOG_PRINT_L0 ( " Marking output " < < i < < " ( " < < td . m_key_image < < " ) as spent, it was marked as unspent " ) ;
2016-09-26 22:11:10 +00:00
set_spent ( i , td . m_spent_height ) ;
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// unknown height, if this gets reorged, it might still be missed
2015-08-11 14:14:44 +00:00
}
}
}
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2015-12-30 12:58:15 +00:00
void wallet2 : : rescan_blockchain ( bool refresh )
{
clear ( ) ;
cryptonote : : block genesis ;
generate_genesis ( genesis ) ;
crypto : : hash genesis_hash = get_block_hash ( genesis ) ;
m_blockchain . push_back ( genesis_hash ) ;
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add_subaddress_account ( tr ( " Primary account " ) ) ;
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m_local_bc_height = 1 ;
if ( refresh )
this - > refresh ( ) ;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2014-03-03 22:07:58 +00:00
bool wallet2 : : is_transfer_unlocked ( const transfer_details & td ) const
{
2017-08-04 21:05:02 +00:00
return is_transfer_unlocked ( td . m_tx . unlock_time , td . m_block_height ) ;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
bool wallet2 : : is_transfer_unlocked ( uint64_t unlock_time , uint64_t block_height ) const
{
if ( ! is_tx_spendtime_unlocked ( unlock_time , block_height ) )
2014-03-03 22:07:58 +00:00
return false ;
2017-08-04 21:05:02 +00:00
if ( block_height + CRYPTONOTE_DEFAULT_TX_SPENDABLE_AGE > m_local_bc_height )
2014-03-03 22:07:58 +00:00
return false ;
return true ;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2016-01-29 15:09:17 +00:00
bool wallet2 : : is_tx_spendtime_unlocked ( uint64_t unlock_time , uint64_t block_height ) const
2014-03-03 22:07:58 +00:00
{
if ( unlock_time < CRYPTONOTE_MAX_BLOCK_NUMBER )
{
//interpret as block index
2017-08-04 21:05:02 +00:00
if ( m_local_bc_height - 1 + CRYPTONOTE_LOCKED_TX_ALLOWED_DELTA_BLOCKS > = unlock_time )
2014-03-03 22:07:58 +00:00
return true ;
else
return false ;
} else
{
//interpret as time
uint64_t current_time = static_cast < uint64_t > ( time ( NULL ) ) ;
2016-01-29 15:09:17 +00:00
// XXX: this needs to be fast, so we'd need to get the starting heights
// from the daemon to be correct once voting kicks in
uint64_t v2height = m_testnet ? 624634 : 1009827 ;
uint64_t leeway = block_height < v2height ? CRYPTONOTE_LOCKED_TX_ALLOWED_DELTA_SECONDS_V1 : CRYPTONOTE_LOCKED_TX_ALLOWED_DELTA_SECONDS_V2 ;
if ( current_time + leeway > = unlock_time )
2014-03-03 22:07:58 +00:00
return true ;
else
return false ;
}
return false ;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
namespace
{
template < typename T >
2015-07-19 22:47:13 +00:00
T pop_index ( std : : vector < T > & vec , size_t idx )
2014-03-03 22:07:58 +00:00
{
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES ( ! vec . empty ( ) , T ( ) , " Vector must be non-empty " ) ;
2016-07-12 21:00:43 +00:00
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES ( idx < vec . size ( ) , T ( ) , " idx out of bounds " ) ;
2014-03-03 22:07:58 +00:00
T res = vec [ idx ] ;
if ( idx + 1 ! = vec . size ( ) )
{
vec [ idx ] = vec . back ( ) ;
}
vec . resize ( vec . size ( ) - 1 ) ;
return res ;
}
2015-07-19 22:47:13 +00:00
template < typename T >
T pop_random_value ( std : : vector < T > & vec )
{
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES ( ! vec . empty ( ) , T ( ) , " Vector must be non-empty " ) ;
size_t idx = crypto : : rand < size_t > ( ) % vec . size ( ) ;
return pop_index ( vec , idx ) ;
}
2016-07-02 16:37:39 +00:00
template < typename T >
T pop_back ( std : : vector < T > & vec )
{
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES ( ! vec . empty ( ) , T ( ) , " Vector must be non-empty " ) ;
T res = vec . back ( ) ;
vec . pop_back ( ) ;
return res ;
}
2017-01-22 15:12:13 +00:00
template < typename T >
void pop_if_present ( std : : vector < T > & vec , T e )
{
for ( size_t i = 0 ; i < vec . size ( ) ; + + i )
{
if ( e = = vec [ i ] )
{
pop_index ( vec , i ) ;
return ;
}
}
}
2014-03-03 22:07:58 +00:00
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2016-07-12 21:00:43 +00:00
// This returns a handwavy estimation of how much two outputs are related
// If they're from the same tx, then they're fully related. From close block
// heights, they're kinda related. The actual values don't matter, just
// their ordering, but it could become more murky if we add scores later.
float wallet2 : : get_output_relatedness ( const transfer_details & td0 , const transfer_details & td1 ) const
{
int dh ;
// expensive test, and same tx will fall onto the same block height below
2016-08-06 18:19:25 +00:00
if ( td0 . m_txid = = td1 . m_txid )
2016-07-12 21:00:43 +00:00
return 1.0f ;
// same block height -> possibly tx burst, or same tx (since above is disabled)
dh = td0 . m_block_height > td1 . m_block_height ? td0 . m_block_height - td1 . m_block_height : td1 . m_block_height - td0 . m_block_height ;
if ( dh = = 0 )
return 0.9f ;
// adjacent blocks -> possibly tx burst
if ( dh = = 1 )
return 0.8f ;
// could extract the payment id, and compare them, but this is a bit expensive too
// similar block heights
if ( dh < 10 )
return 0.2f ;
// don't think these are particularly related
return 0.0f ;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2017-10-22 08:54:07 +00:00
size_t wallet2 : : pop_best_value_from ( const transfer_container & transfers , std : : vector < size_t > & unused_indices , const std : : vector < size_t > & selected_transfers , bool smallest ) const
2016-07-12 21:00:43 +00:00
{
std : : vector < size_t > candidates ;
float best_relatedness = 1.0f ;
for ( size_t n = 0 ; n < unused_indices . size ( ) ; + + n )
{
const transfer_details & candidate = transfers [ unused_indices [ n ] ] ;
float relatedness = 0.0f ;
2017-10-22 08:54:07 +00:00
for ( std : : vector < size_t > : : const_iterator i = selected_transfers . begin ( ) ; i ! = selected_transfers . end ( ) ; + + i )
2016-07-12 21:00:43 +00:00
{
2016-10-15 15:32:08 +00:00
float r = get_output_relatedness ( candidate , transfers [ * i ] ) ;
2016-07-12 21:00:43 +00:00
if ( r > relatedness )
{
relatedness = r ;
if ( relatedness = = 1.0f )
break ;
}
}
if ( relatedness < best_relatedness )
{
best_relatedness = relatedness ;
candidates . clear ( ) ;
}
if ( relatedness = = best_relatedness )
candidates . push_back ( n ) ;
}
2017-01-14 17:18:14 +00:00
// we have all the least related outputs in candidates, so we can pick either
// the smallest, or a random one, depending on request
size_t idx ;
if ( smallest )
{
idx = 0 ;
for ( size_t n = 0 ; n < candidates . size ( ) ; + + n )
{
const transfer_details & td = transfers [ unused_indices [ candidates [ n ] ] ] ;
if ( td . amount ( ) < transfers [ unused_indices [ candidates [ idx ] ] ] . amount ( ) )
idx = n ;
}
}
else
{
idx = crypto : : rand < size_t > ( ) % candidates . size ( ) ;
}
2016-07-12 21:00:43 +00:00
return pop_index ( unused_indices , candidates [ idx ] ) ;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2017-10-22 08:54:07 +00:00
size_t wallet2 : : pop_best_value ( std : : vector < size_t > & unused_indices , const std : : vector < size_t > & selected_transfers , bool smallest ) const
2016-07-12 21:00:43 +00:00
{
2017-01-14 17:18:14 +00:00
return pop_best_value_from ( m_transfers , unused_indices , selected_transfers , smallest ) ;
2016-07-12 21:00:43 +00:00
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2014-06-13 18:05:15 +00:00
// Select random input sources for transaction.
// returns:
// direct return: amount of money found
// modified reference: selected_transfers, a list of iterators/indices of input sources
2017-10-22 08:54:07 +00:00
uint64_t wallet2 : : select_transfers ( uint64_t needed_money , std : : vector < size_t > unused_transfers_indices , std : : vector < size_t > & selected_transfers , bool trusted_daemon )
2014-03-03 22:07:58 +00:00
{
uint64_t found_money = 0 ;
2017-10-22 08:54:07 +00:00
selected_transfers . reserve ( unused_transfers_indices . size ( ) ) ;
2016-04-02 12:06:39 +00:00
while ( found_money < needed_money & & ! unused_transfers_indices . empty ( ) )
2014-03-03 22:07:58 +00:00
{
2016-07-12 21:00:43 +00:00
size_t idx = pop_best_value ( unused_transfers_indices , selected_transfers ) ;
2014-03-03 22:07:58 +00:00
transfer_container : : iterator it = m_transfers . begin ( ) + idx ;
2016-09-26 22:11:10 +00:00
selected_transfers . push_back ( idx ) ;
2014-03-03 22:07:58 +00:00
found_money + = it - > amount ( ) ;
}
return found_money ;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2017-02-19 02:42:10 +00:00
void wallet2 : : add_unconfirmed_tx ( const cryptonote : : transaction & tx , uint64_t amount_in , const std : : vector < cryptonote : : tx_destination_entry > & dests , const crypto : : hash & payment_id , uint64_t change_amount , uint32_t subaddr_account , const std : : set < uint32_t > & subaddr_indices )
2014-03-03 22:07:58 +00:00
{
2014-04-02 16:00:17 +00:00
unconfirmed_transfer_details & utd = m_unconfirmed_txs [ cryptonote : : get_transaction_hash ( tx ) ] ;
2016-06-15 22:37:13 +00:00
utd . m_amount_in = amount_in ;
utd . m_amount_out = 0 ;
for ( const auto & d : dests )
utd . m_amount_out + = d . amount ;
2016-11-23 20:10:34 +00:00
utd . m_amount_out + = change_amount ; // dests does not contain change
2014-04-02 16:00:17 +00:00
utd . m_change = change_amount ;
utd . m_sent_time = time ( NULL ) ;
2016-08-06 18:19:25 +00:00
utd . m_tx = ( const cryptonote : : transaction_prefix & ) tx ;
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utd . m_dests = dests ;
utd . m_payment_id = payment_id ;
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utd . m_state = wallet2 : : unconfirmed_transfer_details : : pending ;
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utd . m_timestamp = time ( NULL ) ;
2017-02-19 02:42:10 +00:00
utd . m_subaddr_account = subaddr_account ;
utd . m_subaddr_indices = subaddr_indices ;
2014-03-03 22:07:58 +00:00
}
2014-09-17 21:26:51 +00:00
2014-03-03 22:07:58 +00:00
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2016-04-02 12:06:39 +00:00
void wallet2 : : transfer ( const std : : vector < cryptonote : : tx_destination_entry > & dsts , const size_t fake_outs_count , const std : : vector < size_t > & unused_transfers_indices ,
uint64_t unlock_time , uint64_t fee , const std : : vector < uint8_t > & extra , cryptonote : : transaction & tx , pending_tx & ptx , bool trusted_daemon )
2014-03-03 22:07:58 +00:00
{
2016-04-02 12:06:39 +00:00
transfer ( dsts , fake_outs_count , unused_transfers_indices , unlock_time , fee , extra , detail : : digit_split_strategy , tx_dust_policy ( : : config : : DEFAULT_DUST_THRESHOLD ) , tx , ptx , trusted_daemon ) ;
2014-03-03 22:07:58 +00:00
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2016-04-02 12:06:39 +00:00
void wallet2 : : transfer ( const std : : vector < cryptonote : : tx_destination_entry > & dsts , const size_t fake_outs_count , const std : : vector < size_t > & unused_transfers_indices ,
uint64_t unlock_time , uint64_t fee , const std : : vector < uint8_t > & extra , bool trusted_daemon )
2014-03-03 22:07:58 +00:00
{
cryptonote : : transaction tx ;
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pending_tx ptx ;
2016-04-02 12:06:39 +00:00
transfer ( dsts , fake_outs_count , unused_transfers_indices , unlock_time , fee , extra , tx , ptx , trusted_daemon ) ;
2014-03-03 22:07:58 +00:00
}
2014-06-17 22:15:21 +00:00
namespace {
// split_amounts(vector<cryptonote::tx_destination_entry> dsts, size_t num_splits)
//
// split amount for each dst in dsts into num_splits parts
// and make num_splits new vector<crypt...> instances to hold these new amounts
std : : vector < std : : vector < cryptonote : : tx_destination_entry > > split_amounts (
std : : vector < cryptonote : : tx_destination_entry > dsts , size_t num_splits )
{
std : : vector < std : : vector < cryptonote : : tx_destination_entry > > retVal ;
if ( num_splits < = 1 )
{
retVal . push_back ( dsts ) ;
return retVal ;
}
// for each split required
for ( size_t i = 0 ; i < num_splits ; i + + )
{
std : : vector < cryptonote : : tx_destination_entry > new_dsts ;
// for each destination
for ( size_t j = 0 ; j < dsts . size ( ) ; j + + )
{
cryptonote : : tx_destination_entry de ;
uint64_t amount ;
amount = dsts [ j ] . amount ;
amount = amount / num_splits ;
// if last split, add remainder
if ( i + 1 = = num_splits )
{
amount + = dsts [ j ] . amount % num_splits ;
}
de . addr = dsts [ j ] . addr ;
de . amount = amount ;
new_dsts . push_back ( de ) ;
}
retVal . push_back ( new_dsts ) ;
}
return retVal ;
}
} // anonymous namespace
2014-09-17 21:26:51 +00:00
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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crypto : : hash wallet2 : : get_payment_id ( const pending_tx & ptx ) const
{
std : : vector < tx_extra_field > tx_extra_fields ;
if ( ! parse_tx_extra ( ptx . tx . extra , tx_extra_fields ) )
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return crypto : : null_hash ;
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tx_extra_nonce extra_nonce ;
crypto : : hash payment_id = null_hash ;
if ( find_tx_extra_field_by_type ( tx_extra_fields , extra_nonce ) )
{
crypto : : hash8 payment_id8 = null_hash8 ;
if ( get_encrypted_payment_id_from_tx_extra_nonce ( extra_nonce . nonce , payment_id8 ) )
{
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if ( ptx . dests . empty ( ) )
{
MWARNING ( " Encrypted payment id found, but no destinations public key, cannot decrypt " ) ;
return crypto : : null_hash ;
}
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if ( decrypt_payment_id ( payment_id8 , ptx . dests [ 0 ] . addr . m_view_public_key , ptx . tx_key ) )
{
memcpy ( payment_id . data , payment_id8 . data , 8 ) ;
}
}
else if ( ! get_payment_id_from_tx_extra_nonce ( extra_nonce . nonce , payment_id ) )
{
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payment_id = crypto : : null_hash ;
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}
}
return payment_id ;
}
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2014-03-03 22:07:58 +00:00
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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// take a pending tx and actually send it to the daemon
void wallet2 : : commit_tx ( pending_tx & ptx )
{
using namespace cryptonote ;
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if ( m_light_wallet )
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{
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cryptonote : : COMMAND_RPC_SUBMIT_RAW_TX : : request oreq ;
cryptonote : : COMMAND_RPC_SUBMIT_RAW_TX : : response ores ;
oreq . address = get_account ( ) . get_public_address_str ( m_testnet ) ;
oreq . view_key = string_tools : : pod_to_hex ( get_account ( ) . get_keys ( ) . m_view_secret_key ) ;
oreq . tx = epee : : string_tools : : buff_to_hex_nodelimer ( tx_to_blob ( ptx . tx ) ) ;
m_daemon_rpc_mutex . lock ( ) ;
bool r = epee : : net_utils : : invoke_http_json ( " /submit_raw_tx " , oreq , ores , m_http_client , rpc_timeout , " POST " ) ;
m_daemon_rpc_mutex . unlock ( ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( ! r , error : : no_connection_to_daemon , " submit_raw_tx " ) ;
// MyMonero and OpenMonero use different status strings
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( ores . status ! = " OK " & & ores . status ! = " success " , error : : tx_rejected , ptx . tx , ores . status , ores . error ) ;
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}
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else
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{
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// Normal submit
COMMAND_RPC_SEND_RAW_TX : : request req ;
req . tx_as_hex = epee : : string_tools : : buff_to_hex_nodelimer ( tx_to_blob ( ptx . tx ) ) ;
req . do_not_relay = false ;
COMMAND_RPC_SEND_RAW_TX : : response daemon_send_resp ;
m_daemon_rpc_mutex . lock ( ) ;
bool r = epee : : net_utils : : invoke_http_json ( " /sendrawtransaction " , req , daemon_send_resp , m_http_client , rpc_timeout ) ;
m_daemon_rpc_mutex . unlock ( ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( ! r , error : : no_connection_to_daemon , " sendrawtransaction " ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( daemon_send_resp . status = = CORE_RPC_STATUS_BUSY , error : : daemon_busy , " sendrawtransaction " ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( daemon_send_resp . status ! = CORE_RPC_STATUS_OK , error : : tx_rejected , ptx . tx , daemon_send_resp . status , daemon_send_resp . reason ) ;
// sanity checks
for ( size_t idx : ptx . selected_transfers )
{
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( idx > = m_transfers . size ( ) , error : : wallet_internal_error ,
" Bad output index in selected transfers: " + boost : : lexical_cast < std : : string > ( idx ) ) ;
}
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}
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crypto : : hash txid ;
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txid = get_transaction_hash ( ptx . tx ) ;
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crypto : : hash payment_id = crypto : : null_hash ;
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std : : vector < cryptonote : : tx_destination_entry > dests ;
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uint64_t amount_in = 0 ;
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if ( store_tx_info ( ) )
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{
payment_id = get_payment_id ( ptx ) ;
dests = ptx . dests ;
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for ( size_t idx : ptx . selected_transfers )
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amount_in + = m_transfers [ idx ] . amount ( ) ;
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}
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add_unconfirmed_tx ( ptx . tx , amount_in , dests , payment_id , ptx . change_dts . amount , ptx . construction_data . subaddr_account , ptx . construction_data . subaddr_indices ) ;
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if ( store_tx_info ( ) )
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{
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m_tx_keys . insert ( std : : make_pair ( txid , ptx . tx_key ) ) ;
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m_additional_tx_keys . insert ( std : : make_pair ( txid , ptx . additional_tx_keys ) ) ;
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}
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2015-08-19 19:59:44 +00:00
LOG_PRINT_L2 ( " transaction " < < txid < < " generated ok and sent to daemon, key_images: [ " < < ptx . key_images < < " ] " ) ;
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for ( size_t idx : ptx . selected_transfers )
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{
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set_spent ( idx , 0 ) ;
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}
2014-06-16 00:36:44 +00:00
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing
Scheme by luigi1111:
Multisig for RingCT on Monero
2 of 2
User A (coordinator):
Spendkey b,B
Viewkey a,A (shared)
User B:
Spendkey c,C
Viewkey a,A (shared)
Public Address: C+B, A
Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a
A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants)
A and B watch for incoming outputs
B creates "half" key images for discovered output D:
I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D)
B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D),
and sending the pubkeys with I2_D.
A also creates "half" key images:
I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D)
Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D
Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction).
A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D
to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R).
At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r,
which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo).
B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well).
B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D
to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well.
NOTE:
A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively.
Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible:
A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B.
B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A.
The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time!
The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature).
2 of 3
User A (coordinator)
Shared viewkey a,A
"spendkey" j,J
User B
"spendkey" k,K
User C
"spendkey" m,M
A collects K and M from B and C
B collects J and M from A and C
C collects J and K from A and B
A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK)
A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM)
B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK)
B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate
Address: N+O+P, A
The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other
needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two.
Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties:
A gives j to B
B gives k to C
C gives m to A
Address: J+K+M, A
3 of 3
Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others.
The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it
or send it back to A.
N-1 of N
Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around
(using either the secure or insecure method).
For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up):
[4 of 5]
User: spendkey
A: a
B: b
C: c
D: d
E: e
a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A
Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with
the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys.
Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each.
Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning:
1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image)
2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator
must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use.
You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might
also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format.
You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc.
The process is somewhat cumbersome:
To create a N/N multisig wallet:
- each participant creates a normal wallet
- each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant
- each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N)
As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent:
- each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant
- each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants
Then, a transaction may be initiated:
- one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT"
- this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file
- the initiator sends this file to another participant
- that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx"
- the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again
- if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed
- the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 21:34:26 +00:00
// tx generated, get rid of used k values
for ( size_t idx : ptx . selected_transfers )
2017-08-13 14:29:31 +00:00
m_transfers [ idx ] . m_multisig_k . clear ( ) ;
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing
Scheme by luigi1111:
Multisig for RingCT on Monero
2 of 2
User A (coordinator):
Spendkey b,B
Viewkey a,A (shared)
User B:
Spendkey c,C
Viewkey a,A (shared)
Public Address: C+B, A
Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a
A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants)
A and B watch for incoming outputs
B creates "half" key images for discovered output D:
I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D)
B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D),
and sending the pubkeys with I2_D.
A also creates "half" key images:
I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D)
Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D
Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction).
A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D
to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R).
At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r,
which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo).
B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well).
B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D
to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well.
NOTE:
A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively.
Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible:
A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B.
B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A.
The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time!
The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature).
2 of 3
User A (coordinator)
Shared viewkey a,A
"spendkey" j,J
User B
"spendkey" k,K
User C
"spendkey" m,M
A collects K and M from B and C
B collects J and M from A and C
C collects J and K from A and B
A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK)
A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM)
B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK)
B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate
Address: N+O+P, A
The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other
needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two.
Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties:
A gives j to B
B gives k to C
C gives m to A
Address: J+K+M, A
3 of 3
Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others.
The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it
or send it back to A.
N-1 of N
Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around
(using either the secure or insecure method).
For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up):
[4 of 5]
User: spendkey
A: a
B: b
C: c
D: d
E: e
a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A
Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with
the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys.
Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each.
Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning:
1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image)
2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator
must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use.
You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might
also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format.
You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc.
The process is somewhat cumbersome:
To create a N/N multisig wallet:
- each participant creates a normal wallet
- each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant
- each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N)
As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent:
- each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant
- each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants
Then, a transaction may be initiated:
- one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT"
- this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file
- the initiator sends this file to another participant
- that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx"
- the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again
- if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed
- the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 21:34:26 +00:00
2016-04-18 08:20:31 +00:00
//fee includes dust if dust policy specified it.
2017-01-30 03:24:51 +00:00
LOG_PRINT_L1 ( " Transaction successfully sent. < " < < txid < < " > " < < ENDL
2016-04-18 08:20:31 +00:00
< < " Commission: " < < print_money ( ptx . fee ) < < " (dust sent to dust addr: " < < print_money ( ( ptx . dust_added_to_fee ? 0 : ptx . dust ) ) < < " ) " < < ENDL
2017-02-19 02:42:10 +00:00
< < " Balance: " < < print_money ( balance ( ptx . construction_data . subaddr_account ) ) < < ENDL
< < " Unlocked: " < < print_money ( unlocked_balance ( ptx . construction_data . subaddr_account ) ) < < ENDL
2014-06-17 22:15:21 +00:00
< < " Please, wait for confirmation for your balance to be unlocked. " ) ;
}
void wallet2 : : commit_tx ( std : : vector < pending_tx > & ptx_vector )
{
for ( auto & ptx : ptx_vector )
{
commit_tx ( ptx ) ;
}
2014-06-16 00:36:44 +00:00
}
2016-09-26 22:11:10 +00:00
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
bool wallet2 : : save_tx ( const std : : vector < pending_tx > & ptx_vector , const std : : string & filename )
{
LOG_PRINT_L0 ( " saving " < < ptx_vector . size ( ) < < " transactions " ) ;
unsigned_tx_set txs ;
for ( auto & tx : ptx_vector )
2017-01-08 19:17:36 +00:00
{
// Short payment id is encrypted with tx_key.
// Since sign_tx() generates new tx_keys and encrypts the payment id, we need to save the decrypted payment ID
// Save tx construction_data to unsigned_tx_set
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing
Scheme by luigi1111:
Multisig for RingCT on Monero
2 of 2
User A (coordinator):
Spendkey b,B
Viewkey a,A (shared)
User B:
Spendkey c,C
Viewkey a,A (shared)
Public Address: C+B, A
Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a
A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants)
A and B watch for incoming outputs
B creates "half" key images for discovered output D:
I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D)
B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D),
and sending the pubkeys with I2_D.
A also creates "half" key images:
I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D)
Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D
Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction).
A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D
to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R).
At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r,
which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo).
B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well).
B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D
to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well.
NOTE:
A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively.
Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible:
A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B.
B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A.
The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time!
The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature).
2 of 3
User A (coordinator)
Shared viewkey a,A
"spendkey" j,J
User B
"spendkey" k,K
User C
"spendkey" m,M
A collects K and M from B and C
B collects J and M from A and C
C collects J and K from A and B
A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK)
A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM)
B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK)
B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate
Address: N+O+P, A
The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other
needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two.
Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties:
A gives j to B
B gives k to C
C gives m to A
Address: J+K+M, A
3 of 3
Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others.
The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it
or send it back to A.
N-1 of N
Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around
(using either the secure or insecure method).
For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up):
[4 of 5]
User: spendkey
A: a
B: b
C: c
D: d
E: e
a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A
Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with
the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys.
Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each.
Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning:
1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image)
2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator
must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use.
You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might
also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format.
You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc.
The process is somewhat cumbersome:
To create a N/N multisig wallet:
- each participant creates a normal wallet
- each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant
- each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N)
As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent:
- each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant
- each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants
Then, a transaction may be initiated:
- one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT"
- this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file
- the initiator sends this file to another participant
- that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx"
- the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again
- if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed
- the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 21:34:26 +00:00
txs . txes . push_back ( get_construction_data_with_decrypted_short_payment_id ( tx ) ) ;
2017-01-08 19:17:36 +00:00
}
2016-11-15 21:22:04 +00:00
txs . transfers = m_transfers ;
2016-12-30 13:51:43 +00:00
// save as binary
std : : ostringstream oss ;
boost : : archive : : portable_binary_oarchive ar ( oss ) ;
try
{
ar < < txs ;
}
catch ( . . . )
{
2016-09-26 22:11:10 +00:00
return false ;
2016-12-30 13:51:43 +00:00
}
LOG_PRINT_L2 ( " Saving unsigned tx data: " < < oss . str ( ) ) ;
2017-09-30 04:28:17 +00:00
std : : string ciphertext = encrypt_with_view_secret_key ( oss . str ( ) ) ;
return epee : : file_io_utils : : save_string_to_file ( filename , std : : string ( UNSIGNED_TX_PREFIX ) + ciphertext ) ;
2016-09-26 22:11:10 +00:00
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2017-01-08 12:17:09 +00:00
bool wallet2 : : load_unsigned_tx ( const std : : string & unsigned_filename , unsigned_tx_set & exported_txs )
2016-09-26 22:11:10 +00:00
{
std : : string s ;
boost : : system : : error_code errcode ;
if ( ! boost : : filesystem : : exists ( unsigned_filename , errcode ) )
{
LOG_PRINT_L0 ( " File " < < unsigned_filename < < " does not exist: " < < errcode ) ;
return false ;
}
if ( ! epee : : file_io_utils : : load_file_to_string ( unsigned_filename . c_str ( ) , s ) )
{
LOG_PRINT_L0 ( " Failed to load from " < < unsigned_filename ) ;
return false ;
}
2017-09-30 04:28:17 +00:00
const size_t magiclen = strlen ( UNSIGNED_TX_PREFIX ) - 1 ;
2016-09-26 22:11:10 +00:00
if ( strncmp ( s . c_str ( ) , UNSIGNED_TX_PREFIX , magiclen ) )
{
LOG_PRINT_L0 ( " Bad magic from " < < unsigned_filename ) ;
return false ;
}
2016-12-30 13:51:43 +00:00
s = s . substr ( magiclen ) ;
2017-09-30 04:28:17 +00:00
const char version = s [ 0 ] ;
s = s . substr ( 1 ) ;
if ( version = = ' \003 ' )
2016-12-30 13:51:43 +00:00
{
2017-09-30 04:28:17 +00:00
try
{
std : : istringstream iss ( s ) ;
boost : : archive : : portable_binary_iarchive ar ( iss ) ;
ar > > exported_txs ;
}
catch ( . . . )
{
LOG_PRINT_L0 ( " Failed to parse data from " < < unsigned_filename ) ;
return false ;
}
}
else if ( version = = ' \004 ' )
{
try
{
s = decrypt_with_view_secret_key ( s ) ;
try
{
std : : istringstream iss ( s ) ;
boost : : archive : : portable_binary_iarchive ar ( iss ) ;
ar > > exported_txs ;
}
catch ( . . . )
{
LOG_PRINT_L0 ( " Failed to parse data from " < < unsigned_filename ) ;
return false ;
}
}
catch ( const std : : exception & e )
{
LOG_PRINT_L0 ( " Failed to decrypt " < < unsigned_filename < < " : " < < e . what ( ) ) ;
return false ;
}
2016-12-30 13:51:43 +00:00
}
2017-09-30 04:28:17 +00:00
else
2016-09-26 22:11:10 +00:00
{
2017-09-30 04:28:17 +00:00
LOG_PRINT_L0 ( " Unsupported version in " < < unsigned_filename ) ;
2016-09-26 22:11:10 +00:00
return false ;
}
LOG_PRINT_L1 ( " Loaded tx unsigned data from binary: " < < exported_txs . txes . size ( ) < < " transactions " ) ;
2017-01-08 12:17:09 +00:00
return true ;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2017-09-30 04:28:17 +00:00
bool wallet2 : : sign_tx ( const std : : string & unsigned_filename , const std : : string & signed_filename , std : : vector < wallet2 : : pending_tx > & txs , std : : function < bool ( const unsigned_tx_set & ) > accept_func , bool export_raw )
2017-01-08 12:17:09 +00:00
{
unsigned_tx_set exported_txs ;
if ( ! load_unsigned_tx ( unsigned_filename , exported_txs ) )
return false ;
2016-09-26 22:11:10 +00:00
if ( accept_func & & ! accept_func ( exported_txs ) )
{
LOG_PRINT_L1 ( " Transactions rejected by callback " ) ;
return false ;
}
2017-09-30 04:28:17 +00:00
return sign_tx ( exported_txs , signed_filename , txs , export_raw ) ;
2017-01-08 12:17:09 +00:00
}
2016-09-26 22:11:10 +00:00
2017-01-08 12:17:09 +00:00
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2017-09-30 04:28:17 +00:00
bool wallet2 : : sign_tx ( unsigned_tx_set & exported_txs , const std : : string & signed_filename , std : : vector < wallet2 : : pending_tx > & txs , bool export_raw )
2017-01-08 12:17:09 +00:00
{
2016-11-15 21:22:04 +00:00
import_outputs ( exported_txs . transfers ) ;
2016-09-26 22:11:10 +00:00
// sign the transactions
signed_tx_set signed_txes ;
for ( size_t n = 0 ; n < exported_txs . txes . size ( ) ; + + n )
{
2017-09-26 08:45:30 +00:00
tools : : wallet2 : : tx_construction_data & sd = exported_txs . txes [ n ] ;
2017-12-12 11:08:11 +00:00
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( sd . sources . empty ( ) , error : : wallet_internal_error , " Empty sources " ) ;
2017-07-31 06:50:41 +00:00
LOG_PRINT_L1 ( " " < < ( n + 1 ) < < " : " < < sd . sources . size ( ) < < " inputs, ring size " < < sd . sources [ 0 ] . outputs . size ( ) ) ;
2016-09-26 22:11:10 +00:00
signed_txes . ptx . push_back ( pending_tx ( ) ) ;
tools : : wallet2 : : pending_tx & ptx = signed_txes . ptx . back ( ) ;
2017-12-02 21:17:42 +00:00
bool bulletproof = sd . use_rct & & ! ptx . tx . rct_signatures . p . bulletproofs . empty ( ) ;
2016-09-26 22:11:10 +00:00
crypto : : secret_key tx_key ;
2017-02-19 02:42:10 +00:00
std : : vector < crypto : : secret_key > additional_tx_keys ;
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing
Scheme by luigi1111:
Multisig for RingCT on Monero
2 of 2
User A (coordinator):
Spendkey b,B
Viewkey a,A (shared)
User B:
Spendkey c,C
Viewkey a,A (shared)
Public Address: C+B, A
Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a
A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants)
A and B watch for incoming outputs
B creates "half" key images for discovered output D:
I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D)
B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D),
and sending the pubkeys with I2_D.
A also creates "half" key images:
I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D)
Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D
Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction).
A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D
to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R).
At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r,
which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo).
B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well).
B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D
to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well.
NOTE:
A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively.
Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible:
A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B.
B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A.
The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time!
The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature).
2 of 3
User A (coordinator)
Shared viewkey a,A
"spendkey" j,J
User B
"spendkey" k,K
User C
"spendkey" m,M
A collects K and M from B and C
B collects J and M from A and C
C collects J and K from A and B
A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK)
A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM)
B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK)
B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate
Address: N+O+P, A
The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other
needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two.
Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties:
A gives j to B
B gives k to C
C gives m to A
Address: J+K+M, A
3 of 3
Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others.
The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it
or send it back to A.
N-1 of N
Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around
(using either the secure or insecure method).
For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up):
[4 of 5]
User: spendkey
A: a
B: b
C: c
D: d
E: e
a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A
Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with
the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys.
Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each.
Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning:
1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image)
2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator
must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use.
You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might
also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format.
You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc.
The process is somewhat cumbersome:
To create a N/N multisig wallet:
- each participant creates a normal wallet
- each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant
- each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N)
As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent:
- each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant
- each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants
Then, a transaction may be initiated:
- one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT"
- this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file
- the initiator sends this file to another participant
- that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx"
- the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again
- if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed
- the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 21:34:26 +00:00
rct : : multisig_out msout ;
bool r = cryptonote : : construct_tx_and_get_tx_key ( m_account . get_keys ( ) , m_subaddresses , sd . sources , sd . splitted_dsts , sd . change_dts . addr , sd . extra , ptx . tx , sd . unlock_time , tx_key , additional_tx_keys , sd . use_rct , bulletproof , m_multisig ? & msout : NULL ) ;
2016-10-25 20:19:47 +00:00
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( ! r , error : : tx_not_constructed , sd . sources , sd . splitted_dsts , sd . unlock_time , m_testnet ) ;
2016-09-26 22:11:10 +00:00
// we don't test tx size, because we don't know the current limit, due to not having a blockchain,
// and it's a bit pointless to fail there anyway, since it'd be a (good) guess only. We sign anyway,
// and if we really go over limit, the daemon will reject when it gets submitted. Chances are it's
// OK anyway since it was generated in the first place, and rerolling should be within a few bytes.
// normally, the tx keys are saved in commit_tx, when the tx is actually sent to the daemon.
// we can't do that here since the tx will be sent from the compromised wallet, which we don't want
// to see that info, so we save it here
if ( store_tx_info ( ) )
{
const crypto : : hash txid = get_transaction_hash ( ptx . tx ) ;
m_tx_keys . insert ( std : : make_pair ( txid , tx_key ) ) ;
2017-02-19 02:42:10 +00:00
m_additional_tx_keys . insert ( std : : make_pair ( txid , additional_tx_keys ) ) ;
2016-09-26 22:11:10 +00:00
}
std : : string key_images ;
bool all_are_txin_to_key = std : : all_of ( ptx . tx . vin . begin ( ) , ptx . tx . vin . end ( ) , [ & ] ( const txin_v & s_e ) - > bool
{
CHECKED_GET_SPECIFIC_VARIANT ( s_e , const txin_to_key , in , false ) ;
key_images + = boost : : to_string ( in . k_image ) + " " ;
return true ;
} ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( ! all_are_txin_to_key , error : : unexpected_txin_type , ptx . tx ) ;
ptx . key_images = key_images ;
ptx . fee = 0 ;
for ( const auto & i : sd . sources ) ptx . fee + = i . amount ;
2016-10-25 20:19:47 +00:00
for ( const auto & i : sd . splitted_dsts ) ptx . fee - = i . amount ;
2016-09-26 22:11:10 +00:00
ptx . dust = 0 ;
ptx . dust_added_to_fee = false ;
ptx . change_dts = sd . change_dts ;
2016-10-25 20:19:47 +00:00
ptx . selected_transfers = sd . selected_transfers ;
2016-09-26 22:11:10 +00:00
ptx . tx_key = rct : : rct2sk ( rct : : identity ( ) ) ; // don't send it back to the untrusted view wallet
2016-11-23 20:10:34 +00:00
ptx . dests = sd . dests ;
2016-09-26 22:11:10 +00:00
ptx . construction_data = sd ;
2016-11-15 21:22:04 +00:00
txs . push_back ( ptx ) ;
}
// add key images
signed_txes . key_images . resize ( m_transfers . size ( ) ) ;
for ( size_t i = 0 ; i < m_transfers . size ( ) ; + + i )
{
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing
Scheme by luigi1111:
Multisig for RingCT on Monero
2 of 2
User A (coordinator):
Spendkey b,B
Viewkey a,A (shared)
User B:
Spendkey c,C
Viewkey a,A (shared)
Public Address: C+B, A
Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a
A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants)
A and B watch for incoming outputs
B creates "half" key images for discovered output D:
I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D)
B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D),
and sending the pubkeys with I2_D.
A also creates "half" key images:
I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D)
Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D
Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction).
A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D
to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R).
At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r,
which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo).
B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well).
B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D
to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well.
NOTE:
A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively.
Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible:
A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B.
B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A.
The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time!
The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature).
2 of 3
User A (coordinator)
Shared viewkey a,A
"spendkey" j,J
User B
"spendkey" k,K
User C
"spendkey" m,M
A collects K and M from B and C
B collects J and M from A and C
C collects J and K from A and B
A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK)
A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM)
B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK)
B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate
Address: N+O+P, A
The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other
needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two.
Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties:
A gives j to B
B gives k to C
C gives m to A
Address: J+K+M, A
3 of 3
Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others.
The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it
or send it back to A.
N-1 of N
Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around
(using either the secure or insecure method).
For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up):
[4 of 5]
User: spendkey
A: a
B: b
C: c
D: d
E: e
a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A
Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with
the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys.
Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each.
Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning:
1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image)
2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator
must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use.
You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might
also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format.
You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc.
The process is somewhat cumbersome:
To create a N/N multisig wallet:
- each participant creates a normal wallet
- each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant
- each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N)
As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent:
- each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant
- each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants
Then, a transaction may be initiated:
- one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT"
- this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file
- the initiator sends this file to another participant
- that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx"
- the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again
- if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed
- the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 21:34:26 +00:00
if ( ! m_transfers [ i ] . m_key_image_known | | m_transfers [ i ] . m_key_image_partial )
2016-11-15 21:22:04 +00:00
LOG_PRINT_L0 ( " WARNING: key image not known in signing wallet at index " < < i ) ;
signed_txes . key_images [ i ] = m_transfers [ i ] . m_key_image ;
2016-09-26 22:11:10 +00:00
}
2016-12-30 13:51:43 +00:00
// save as binary
std : : ostringstream oss ;
boost : : archive : : portable_binary_oarchive ar ( oss ) ;
try
{
ar < < signed_txes ;
}
catch ( . . . )
{
2016-09-26 22:11:10 +00:00
return false ;
2016-12-30 13:51:43 +00:00
}
2017-09-30 04:28:17 +00:00
LOG_PRINT_L3 ( " Saving signed tx data (with encryption): " < < oss . str ( ) ) ;
std : : string ciphertext = encrypt_with_view_secret_key ( oss . str ( ) ) ;
if ( ! epee : : file_io_utils : : save_string_to_file ( signed_filename , std : : string ( SIGNED_TX_PREFIX ) + ciphertext ) )
{
LOG_PRINT_L0 ( " Failed to save file to " < < signed_filename ) ;
return false ;
}
// export signed raw tx without encryption
if ( export_raw )
{
for ( size_t i = 0 ; i < signed_txes . ptx . size ( ) ; + + i )
{
std : : string tx_as_hex = epee : : string_tools : : buff_to_hex_nodelimer ( tx_to_blob ( signed_txes . ptx [ i ] . tx ) ) ;
std : : string raw_filename = signed_filename + " _raw " + ( signed_txes . ptx . size ( ) = = 1 ? " " : ( " _ " + std : : to_string ( i ) ) ) ;
if ( ! epee : : file_io_utils : : save_string_to_file ( raw_filename , tx_as_hex ) )
{
LOG_PRINT_L0 ( " Failed to save file to " < < raw_filename ) ;
return false ;
}
}
}
return true ;
2016-09-26 22:11:10 +00:00
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2016-10-30 10:49:22 +00:00
bool wallet2 : : load_tx ( const std : : string & signed_filename , std : : vector < tools : : wallet2 : : pending_tx > & ptx , std : : function < bool ( const signed_tx_set & ) > accept_func )
2016-09-26 22:11:10 +00:00
{
std : : string s ;
boost : : system : : error_code errcode ;
signed_tx_set signed_txs ;
if ( ! boost : : filesystem : : exists ( signed_filename , errcode ) )
{
LOG_PRINT_L0 ( " File " < < signed_filename < < " does not exist: " < < errcode ) ;
return false ;
}
if ( ! epee : : file_io_utils : : load_file_to_string ( signed_filename . c_str ( ) , s ) )
{
LOG_PRINT_L0 ( " Failed to load from " < < signed_filename ) ;
return false ;
}
2017-09-30 04:28:17 +00:00
const size_t magiclen = strlen ( SIGNED_TX_PREFIX ) - 1 ;
2016-09-26 22:11:10 +00:00
if ( strncmp ( s . c_str ( ) , SIGNED_TX_PREFIX , magiclen ) )
{
LOG_PRINT_L0 ( " Bad magic from " < < signed_filename ) ;
return false ;
}
2016-12-30 13:51:43 +00:00
s = s . substr ( magiclen ) ;
2017-09-30 04:28:17 +00:00
const char version = s [ 0 ] ;
s = s . substr ( 1 ) ;
if ( version = = ' \003 ' )
2016-12-30 13:51:43 +00:00
{
2017-09-30 04:28:17 +00:00
try
{
std : : istringstream iss ( s ) ;
boost : : archive : : portable_binary_iarchive ar ( iss ) ;
ar > > signed_txs ;
}
catch ( . . . )
{
LOG_PRINT_L0 ( " Failed to parse data from " < < signed_filename ) ;
return false ;
}
2016-12-30 13:51:43 +00:00
}
2017-09-30 04:28:17 +00:00
else if ( version = = ' \004 ' )
{
try
{
s = decrypt_with_view_secret_key ( s ) ;
try
{
std : : istringstream iss ( s ) ;
boost : : archive : : portable_binary_iarchive ar ( iss ) ;
ar > > signed_txs ;
}
catch ( . . . )
{
LOG_PRINT_L0 ( " Failed to parse decrypted data from " < < signed_filename ) ;
return false ;
}
}
catch ( const std : : exception & e )
{
LOG_PRINT_L0 ( " Failed to decrypt " < < signed_filename < < " : " < < e . what ( ) ) ;
return false ;
}
}
else
2016-09-26 22:11:10 +00:00
{
2017-09-30 04:28:17 +00:00
LOG_PRINT_L0 ( " Unsupported version in " < < signed_filename ) ;
2016-09-26 22:11:10 +00:00
return false ;
}
2016-10-25 22:23:59 +00:00
LOG_PRINT_L0 ( " Loaded signed tx data from binary: " < < signed_txs . ptx . size ( ) < < " transactions " ) ;
for ( auto & ptx : signed_txs . ptx ) LOG_PRINT_L0 ( cryptonote : : obj_to_json_str ( ptx . tx ) ) ;
2014-06-16 00:36:44 +00:00
2016-10-30 10:49:22 +00:00
if ( accept_func & & ! accept_func ( signed_txs ) )
{
LOG_PRINT_L1 ( " Transactions rejected by callback " ) ;
return false ;
}
2016-11-15 21:22:04 +00:00
// import key images
if ( signed_txs . key_images . size ( ) > m_transfers . size ( ) )
{
LOG_PRINT_L1 ( " More key images returned that we know outputs for " ) ;
return false ;
}
for ( size_t i = 0 ; i < signed_txs . key_images . size ( ) ; + + i )
{
transfer_details & td = m_transfers [ i ] ;
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing
Scheme by luigi1111:
Multisig for RingCT on Monero
2 of 2
User A (coordinator):
Spendkey b,B
Viewkey a,A (shared)
User B:
Spendkey c,C
Viewkey a,A (shared)
Public Address: C+B, A
Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a
A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants)
A and B watch for incoming outputs
B creates "half" key images for discovered output D:
I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D)
B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D),
and sending the pubkeys with I2_D.
A also creates "half" key images:
I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D)
Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D
Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction).
A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D
to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R).
At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r,
which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo).
B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well).
B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D
to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well.
NOTE:
A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively.
Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible:
A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B.
B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A.
The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time!
The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature).
2 of 3
User A (coordinator)
Shared viewkey a,A
"spendkey" j,J
User B
"spendkey" k,K
User C
"spendkey" m,M
A collects K and M from B and C
B collects J and M from A and C
C collects J and K from A and B
A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK)
A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM)
B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK)
B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate
Address: N+O+P, A
The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other
needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two.
Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties:
A gives j to B
B gives k to C
C gives m to A
Address: J+K+M, A
3 of 3
Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others.
The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it
or send it back to A.
N-1 of N
Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around
(using either the secure or insecure method).
For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up):
[4 of 5]
User: spendkey
A: a
B: b
C: c
D: d
E: e
a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A
Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with
the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys.
Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each.
Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning:
1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image)
2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator
must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use.
You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might
also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format.
You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc.
The process is somewhat cumbersome:
To create a N/N multisig wallet:
- each participant creates a normal wallet
- each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant
- each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N)
As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent:
- each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant
- each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants
Then, a transaction may be initiated:
- one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT"
- this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file
- the initiator sends this file to another participant
- that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx"
- the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again
- if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed
- the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 21:34:26 +00:00
if ( td . m_key_image_known & & ! td . m_key_image_partial & & td . m_key_image ! = signed_txs . key_images [ i ] )
2016-11-15 21:22:04 +00:00
LOG_PRINT_L0 ( " WARNING: imported key image differs from previously known key image at index " < < i < < " : trusting imported one " ) ;
td . m_key_image = signed_txs . key_images [ i ] ;
m_key_images [ m_transfers [ i ] . m_key_image ] = i ;
td . m_key_image_known = true ;
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing
Scheme by luigi1111:
Multisig for RingCT on Monero
2 of 2
User A (coordinator):
Spendkey b,B
Viewkey a,A (shared)
User B:
Spendkey c,C
Viewkey a,A (shared)
Public Address: C+B, A
Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a
A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants)
A and B watch for incoming outputs
B creates "half" key images for discovered output D:
I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D)
B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D),
and sending the pubkeys with I2_D.
A also creates "half" key images:
I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D)
Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D
Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction).
A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D
to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R).
At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r,
which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo).
B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well).
B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D
to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well.
NOTE:
A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively.
Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible:
A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B.
B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A.
The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time!
The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature).
2 of 3
User A (coordinator)
Shared viewkey a,A
"spendkey" j,J
User B
"spendkey" k,K
User C
"spendkey" m,M
A collects K and M from B and C
B collects J and M from A and C
C collects J and K from A and B
A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK)
A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM)
B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK)
B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate
Address: N+O+P, A
The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other
needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two.
Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties:
A gives j to B
B gives k to C
C gives m to A
Address: J+K+M, A
3 of 3
Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others.
The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it
or send it back to A.
N-1 of N
Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around
(using either the secure or insecure method).
For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up):
[4 of 5]
User: spendkey
A: a
B: b
C: c
D: d
E: e
a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A
Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with
the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys.
Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each.
Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning:
1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image)
2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator
must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use.
You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might
also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format.
You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc.
The process is somewhat cumbersome:
To create a N/N multisig wallet:
- each participant creates a normal wallet
- each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant
- each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N)
As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent:
- each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant
- each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants
Then, a transaction may be initiated:
- one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT"
- this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file
- the initiator sends this file to another participant
- that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx"
- the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again
- if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed
- the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 21:34:26 +00:00
td . m_key_image_partial = false ;
2016-11-15 21:22:04 +00:00
m_pub_keys [ m_transfers [ i ] . get_public_key ( ) ] = i ;
}
2016-09-26 22:11:10 +00:00
ptx = signed_txs . ptx ;
return true ;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2017-11-27 20:09:04 +00:00
std : : string wallet2 : : save_multisig_tx ( multisig_tx_set txs )
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing
Scheme by luigi1111:
Multisig for RingCT on Monero
2 of 2
User A (coordinator):
Spendkey b,B
Viewkey a,A (shared)
User B:
Spendkey c,C
Viewkey a,A (shared)
Public Address: C+B, A
Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a
A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants)
A and B watch for incoming outputs
B creates "half" key images for discovered output D:
I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D)
B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D),
and sending the pubkeys with I2_D.
A also creates "half" key images:
I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D)
Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D
Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction).
A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D
to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R).
At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r,
which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo).
B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well).
B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D
to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well.
NOTE:
A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively.
Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible:
A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B.
B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A.
The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time!
The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature).
2 of 3
User A (coordinator)
Shared viewkey a,A
"spendkey" j,J
User B
"spendkey" k,K
User C
"spendkey" m,M
A collects K and M from B and C
B collects J and M from A and C
C collects J and K from A and B
A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK)
A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM)
B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK)
B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate
Address: N+O+P, A
The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other
needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two.
Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties:
A gives j to B
B gives k to C
C gives m to A
Address: J+K+M, A
3 of 3
Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others.
The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it
or send it back to A.
N-1 of N
Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around
(using either the secure or insecure method).
For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up):
[4 of 5]
User: spendkey
A: a
B: b
C: c
D: d
E: e
a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A
Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with
the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys.
Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each.
Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning:
1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image)
2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator
must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use.
You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might
also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format.
You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc.
The process is somewhat cumbersome:
To create a N/N multisig wallet:
- each participant creates a normal wallet
- each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant
- each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N)
As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent:
- each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant
- each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants
Then, a transaction may be initiated:
- one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT"
- this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file
- the initiator sends this file to another participant
- that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx"
- the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again
- if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed
- the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 21:34:26 +00:00
{
LOG_PRINT_L0 ( " saving " < < txs . m_ptx . size ( ) < < " multisig transactions " ) ;
// txes generated, get rid of used k values
for ( size_t n = 0 ; n < txs . m_ptx . size ( ) ; + + n )
for ( size_t idx : txs . m_ptx [ n ] . construction_data . selected_transfers )
2017-08-13 14:29:31 +00:00
m_transfers [ idx ] . m_multisig_k . clear ( ) ;
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing
Scheme by luigi1111:
Multisig for RingCT on Monero
2 of 2
User A (coordinator):
Spendkey b,B
Viewkey a,A (shared)
User B:
Spendkey c,C
Viewkey a,A (shared)
Public Address: C+B, A
Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a
A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants)
A and B watch for incoming outputs
B creates "half" key images for discovered output D:
I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D)
B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D),
and sending the pubkeys with I2_D.
A also creates "half" key images:
I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D)
Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D
Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction).
A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D
to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R).
At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r,
which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo).
B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well).
B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D
to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well.
NOTE:
A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively.
Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible:
A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B.
B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A.
The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time!
The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature).
2 of 3
User A (coordinator)
Shared viewkey a,A
"spendkey" j,J
User B
"spendkey" k,K
User C
"spendkey" m,M
A collects K and M from B and C
B collects J and M from A and C
C collects J and K from A and B
A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK)
A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM)
B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK)
B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate
Address: N+O+P, A
The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other
needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two.
Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties:
A gives j to B
B gives k to C
C gives m to A
Address: J+K+M, A
3 of 3
Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others.
The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it
or send it back to A.
N-1 of N
Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around
(using either the secure or insecure method).
For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up):
[4 of 5]
User: spendkey
A: a
B: b
C: c
D: d
E: e
a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A
Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with
the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys.
Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each.
Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning:
1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image)
2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator
must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use.
You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might
also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format.
You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc.
The process is somewhat cumbersome:
To create a N/N multisig wallet:
- each participant creates a normal wallet
- each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant
- each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N)
As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent:
- each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant
- each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants
Then, a transaction may be initiated:
- one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT"
- this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file
- the initiator sends this file to another participant
- that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx"
- the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again
- if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed
- the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 21:34:26 +00:00
// zero out some data we don't want to share
for ( auto & ptx : txs . m_ptx )
{
for ( auto & e : ptx . construction_data . sources )
e . multisig_kLRki . k = rct : : zero ( ) ;
}
for ( auto & ptx : txs . m_ptx )
{
// Get decrypted payment id from pending_tx
ptx . construction_data = get_construction_data_with_decrypted_short_payment_id ( ptx ) ;
}
// save as binary
std : : ostringstream oss ;
boost : : archive : : portable_binary_oarchive ar ( oss ) ;
try
{
ar < < txs ;
}
catch ( . . . )
{
2017-11-27 20:09:04 +00:00
return std : : string ( ) ;
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing
Scheme by luigi1111:
Multisig for RingCT on Monero
2 of 2
User A (coordinator):
Spendkey b,B
Viewkey a,A (shared)
User B:
Spendkey c,C
Viewkey a,A (shared)
Public Address: C+B, A
Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a
A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants)
A and B watch for incoming outputs
B creates "half" key images for discovered output D:
I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D)
B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D),
and sending the pubkeys with I2_D.
A also creates "half" key images:
I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D)
Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D
Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction).
A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D
to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R).
At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r,
which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo).
B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well).
B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D
to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well.
NOTE:
A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively.
Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible:
A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B.
B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A.
The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time!
The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature).
2 of 3
User A (coordinator)
Shared viewkey a,A
"spendkey" j,J
User B
"spendkey" k,K
User C
"spendkey" m,M
A collects K and M from B and C
B collects J and M from A and C
C collects J and K from A and B
A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK)
A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM)
B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK)
B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate
Address: N+O+P, A
The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other
needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two.
Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties:
A gives j to B
B gives k to C
C gives m to A
Address: J+K+M, A
3 of 3
Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others.
The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it
or send it back to A.
N-1 of N
Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around
(using either the secure or insecure method).
For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up):
[4 of 5]
User: spendkey
A: a
B: b
C: c
D: d
E: e
a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A
Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with
the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys.
Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each.
Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning:
1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image)
2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator
must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use.
You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might
also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format.
You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc.
The process is somewhat cumbersome:
To create a N/N multisig wallet:
- each participant creates a normal wallet
- each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant
- each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N)
As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent:
- each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant
- each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants
Then, a transaction may be initiated:
- one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT"
- this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file
- the initiator sends this file to another participant
- that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx"
- the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again
- if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed
- the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 21:34:26 +00:00
}
LOG_PRINT_L2 ( " Saving multisig unsigned tx data: " < < oss . str ( ) ) ;
std : : string ciphertext = encrypt_with_view_secret_key ( oss . str ( ) ) ;
2017-11-27 20:09:04 +00:00
return std : : string ( MULTISIG_UNSIGNED_TX_PREFIX ) + ciphertext ;
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing
Scheme by luigi1111:
Multisig for RingCT on Monero
2 of 2
User A (coordinator):
Spendkey b,B
Viewkey a,A (shared)
User B:
Spendkey c,C
Viewkey a,A (shared)
Public Address: C+B, A
Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a
A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants)
A and B watch for incoming outputs
B creates "half" key images for discovered output D:
I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D)
B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D),
and sending the pubkeys with I2_D.
A also creates "half" key images:
I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D)
Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D
Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction).
A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D
to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R).
At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r,
which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo).
B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well).
B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D
to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well.
NOTE:
A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively.
Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible:
A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B.
B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A.
The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time!
The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature).
2 of 3
User A (coordinator)
Shared viewkey a,A
"spendkey" j,J
User B
"spendkey" k,K
User C
"spendkey" m,M
A collects K and M from B and C
B collects J and M from A and C
C collects J and K from A and B
A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK)
A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM)
B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK)
B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate
Address: N+O+P, A
The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other
needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two.
Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties:
A gives j to B
B gives k to C
C gives m to A
Address: J+K+M, A
3 of 3
Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others.
The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it
or send it back to A.
N-1 of N
Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around
(using either the secure or insecure method).
For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up):
[4 of 5]
User: spendkey
A: a
B: b
C: c
D: d
E: e
a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A
Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with
the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys.
Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each.
Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning:
1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image)
2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator
must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use.
You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might
also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format.
You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc.
The process is somewhat cumbersome:
To create a N/N multisig wallet:
- each participant creates a normal wallet
- each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant
- each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N)
As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent:
- each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant
- each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants
Then, a transaction may be initiated:
- one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT"
- this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file
- the initiator sends this file to another participant
- that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx"
- the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again
- if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed
- the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 21:34:26 +00:00
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2017-11-27 20:09:04 +00:00
bool wallet2 : : save_multisig_tx ( const multisig_tx_set & txs , const std : : string & filename )
{
std : : string ciphertext = save_multisig_tx ( txs ) ;
if ( ciphertext . empty ( ) )
return false ;
return epee : : file_io_utils : : save_string_to_file ( filename , ciphertext ) ;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
std : : string wallet2 : : save_multisig_tx ( const std : : vector < pending_tx > & ptx_vector )
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing
Scheme by luigi1111:
Multisig for RingCT on Monero
2 of 2
User A (coordinator):
Spendkey b,B
Viewkey a,A (shared)
User B:
Spendkey c,C
Viewkey a,A (shared)
Public Address: C+B, A
Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a
A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants)
A and B watch for incoming outputs
B creates "half" key images for discovered output D:
I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D)
B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D),
and sending the pubkeys with I2_D.
A also creates "half" key images:
I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D)
Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D
Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction).
A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D
to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R).
At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r,
which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo).
B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well).
B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D
to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well.
NOTE:
A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively.
Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible:
A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B.
B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A.
The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time!
The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature).
2 of 3
User A (coordinator)
Shared viewkey a,A
"spendkey" j,J
User B
"spendkey" k,K
User C
"spendkey" m,M
A collects K and M from B and C
B collects J and M from A and C
C collects J and K from A and B
A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK)
A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM)
B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK)
B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate
Address: N+O+P, A
The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other
needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two.
Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties:
A gives j to B
B gives k to C
C gives m to A
Address: J+K+M, A
3 of 3
Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others.
The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it
or send it back to A.
N-1 of N
Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around
(using either the secure or insecure method).
For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up):
[4 of 5]
User: spendkey
A: a
B: b
C: c
D: d
E: e
a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A
Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with
the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys.
Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each.
Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning:
1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image)
2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator
must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use.
You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might
also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format.
You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc.
The process is somewhat cumbersome:
To create a N/N multisig wallet:
- each participant creates a normal wallet
- each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant
- each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N)
As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent:
- each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant
- each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants
Then, a transaction may be initiated:
- one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT"
- this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file
- the initiator sends this file to another participant
- that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx"
- the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again
- if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed
- the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 21:34:26 +00:00
{
multisig_tx_set txs ;
txs . m_ptx = ptx_vector ;
2017-08-13 14:29:31 +00:00
for ( const auto & msk : get_account ( ) . get_multisig_keys ( ) )
{
crypto : : public_key pkey = get_multisig_signing_public_key ( msk ) ;
for ( auto & ptx : txs . m_ptx ) for ( auto & sig : ptx . multisig_sigs ) sig . signing_keys . insert ( pkey ) ;
}
txs . m_signers . insert ( get_multisig_signer_public_key ( ) ) ;
2017-11-27 20:09:04 +00:00
return save_multisig_tx ( txs ) ;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
bool wallet2 : : save_multisig_tx ( const std : : vector < pending_tx > & ptx_vector , const std : : string & filename )
{
std : : string ciphertext = save_multisig_tx ( ptx_vector ) ;
if ( ciphertext . empty ( ) )
return false ;
return epee : : file_io_utils : : save_string_to_file ( filename , ciphertext ) ;
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing
Scheme by luigi1111:
Multisig for RingCT on Monero
2 of 2
User A (coordinator):
Spendkey b,B
Viewkey a,A (shared)
User B:
Spendkey c,C
Viewkey a,A (shared)
Public Address: C+B, A
Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a
A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants)
A and B watch for incoming outputs
B creates "half" key images for discovered output D:
I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D)
B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D),
and sending the pubkeys with I2_D.
A also creates "half" key images:
I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D)
Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D
Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction).
A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D
to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R).
At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r,
which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo).
B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well).
B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D
to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well.
NOTE:
A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively.
Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible:
A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B.
B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A.
The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time!
The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature).
2 of 3
User A (coordinator)
Shared viewkey a,A
"spendkey" j,J
User B
"spendkey" k,K
User C
"spendkey" m,M
A collects K and M from B and C
B collects J and M from A and C
C collects J and K from A and B
A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK)
A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM)
B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK)
B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate
Address: N+O+P, A
The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other
needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two.
Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties:
A gives j to B
B gives k to C
C gives m to A
Address: J+K+M, A
3 of 3
Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others.
The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it
or send it back to A.
N-1 of N
Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around
(using either the secure or insecure method).
For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up):
[4 of 5]
User: spendkey
A: a
B: b
C: c
D: d
E: e
a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A
Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with
the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys.
Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each.
Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning:
1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image)
2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator
must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use.
You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might
also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format.
You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc.
The process is somewhat cumbersome:
To create a N/N multisig wallet:
- each participant creates a normal wallet
- each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant
- each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N)
As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent:
- each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant
- each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants
Then, a transaction may be initiated:
- one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT"
- this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file
- the initiator sends this file to another participant
- that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx"
- the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again
- if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed
- the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 21:34:26 +00:00
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2017-11-27 20:09:16 +00:00
bool wallet2 : : load_multisig_tx ( cryptonote : : blobdata s , multisig_tx_set & exported_txs , std : : function < bool ( const multisig_tx_set & ) > accept_func )
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing
Scheme by luigi1111:
Multisig for RingCT on Monero
2 of 2
User A (coordinator):
Spendkey b,B
Viewkey a,A (shared)
User B:
Spendkey c,C
Viewkey a,A (shared)
Public Address: C+B, A
Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a
A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants)
A and B watch for incoming outputs
B creates "half" key images for discovered output D:
I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D)
B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D),
and sending the pubkeys with I2_D.
A also creates "half" key images:
I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D)
Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D
Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction).
A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D
to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R).
At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r,
which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo).
B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well).
B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D
to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well.
NOTE:
A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively.
Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible:
A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B.
B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A.
The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time!
The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature).
2 of 3
User A (coordinator)
Shared viewkey a,A
"spendkey" j,J
User B
"spendkey" k,K
User C
"spendkey" m,M
A collects K and M from B and C
B collects J and M from A and C
C collects J and K from A and B
A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK)
A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM)
B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK)
B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate
Address: N+O+P, A
The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other
needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two.
Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties:
A gives j to B
B gives k to C
C gives m to A
Address: J+K+M, A
3 of 3
Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others.
The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it
or send it back to A.
N-1 of N
Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around
(using either the secure or insecure method).
For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up):
[4 of 5]
User: spendkey
A: a
B: b
C: c
D: d
E: e
a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A
Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with
the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys.
Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each.
Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning:
1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image)
2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator
must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use.
You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might
also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format.
You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc.
The process is somewhat cumbersome:
To create a N/N multisig wallet:
- each participant creates a normal wallet
- each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant
- each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N)
As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent:
- each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant
- each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants
Then, a transaction may be initiated:
- one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT"
- this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file
- the initiator sends this file to another participant
- that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx"
- the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again
- if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed
- the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 21:34:26 +00:00
{
const size_t magiclen = strlen ( MULTISIG_UNSIGNED_TX_PREFIX ) ;
if ( strncmp ( s . c_str ( ) , MULTISIG_UNSIGNED_TX_PREFIX , magiclen ) )
{
2017-11-27 20:09:16 +00:00
LOG_PRINT_L0 ( " Bad magic from multisig tx data " ) ;
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing
Scheme by luigi1111:
Multisig for RingCT on Monero
2 of 2
User A (coordinator):
Spendkey b,B
Viewkey a,A (shared)
User B:
Spendkey c,C
Viewkey a,A (shared)
Public Address: C+B, A
Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a
A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants)
A and B watch for incoming outputs
B creates "half" key images for discovered output D:
I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D)
B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D),
and sending the pubkeys with I2_D.
A also creates "half" key images:
I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D)
Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D
Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction).
A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D
to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R).
At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r,
which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo).
B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well).
B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D
to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well.
NOTE:
A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively.
Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible:
A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B.
B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A.
The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time!
The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature).
2 of 3
User A (coordinator)
Shared viewkey a,A
"spendkey" j,J
User B
"spendkey" k,K
User C
"spendkey" m,M
A collects K and M from B and C
B collects J and M from A and C
C collects J and K from A and B
A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK)
A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM)
B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK)
B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate
Address: N+O+P, A
The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other
needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two.
Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties:
A gives j to B
B gives k to C
C gives m to A
Address: J+K+M, A
3 of 3
Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others.
The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it
or send it back to A.
N-1 of N
Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around
(using either the secure or insecure method).
For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up):
[4 of 5]
User: spendkey
A: a
B: b
C: c
D: d
E: e
a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A
Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with
the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys.
Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each.
Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning:
1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image)
2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator
must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use.
You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might
also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format.
You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc.
The process is somewhat cumbersome:
To create a N/N multisig wallet:
- each participant creates a normal wallet
- each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant
- each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N)
As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent:
- each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant
- each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants
Then, a transaction may be initiated:
- one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT"
- this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file
- the initiator sends this file to another participant
- that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx"
- the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again
- if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed
- the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 21:34:26 +00:00
return false ;
}
try
{
s = decrypt_with_view_secret_key ( std : : string ( s , magiclen ) ) ;
}
catch ( const std : : exception & e )
{
2017-11-27 20:09:16 +00:00
LOG_PRINT_L0 ( " Failed to decrypt multisig tx data: " < < e . what ( ) ) ;
return false ;
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing
Scheme by luigi1111:
Multisig for RingCT on Monero
2 of 2
User A (coordinator):
Spendkey b,B
Viewkey a,A (shared)
User B:
Spendkey c,C
Viewkey a,A (shared)
Public Address: C+B, A
Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a
A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants)
A and B watch for incoming outputs
B creates "half" key images for discovered output D:
I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D)
B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D),
and sending the pubkeys with I2_D.
A also creates "half" key images:
I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D)
Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D
Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction).
A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D
to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R).
At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r,
which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo).
B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well).
B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D
to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well.
NOTE:
A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively.
Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible:
A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B.
B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A.
The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time!
The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature).
2 of 3
User A (coordinator)
Shared viewkey a,A
"spendkey" j,J
User B
"spendkey" k,K
User C
"spendkey" m,M
A collects K and M from B and C
B collects J and M from A and C
C collects J and K from A and B
A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK)
A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM)
B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK)
B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate
Address: N+O+P, A
The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other
needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two.
Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties:
A gives j to B
B gives k to C
C gives m to A
Address: J+K+M, A
3 of 3
Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others.
The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it
or send it back to A.
N-1 of N
Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around
(using either the secure or insecure method).
For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up):
[4 of 5]
User: spendkey
A: a
B: b
C: c
D: d
E: e
a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A
Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with
the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys.
Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each.
Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning:
1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image)
2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator
must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use.
You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might
also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format.
You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc.
The process is somewhat cumbersome:
To create a N/N multisig wallet:
- each participant creates a normal wallet
- each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant
- each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N)
As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent:
- each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant
- each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants
Then, a transaction may be initiated:
- one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT"
- this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file
- the initiator sends this file to another participant
- that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx"
- the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again
- if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed
- the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 21:34:26 +00:00
}
try
{
std : : istringstream iss ( s ) ;
boost : : archive : : portable_binary_iarchive ar ( iss ) ;
ar > > exported_txs ;
}
catch ( . . . )
{
2017-11-27 20:09:16 +00:00
LOG_PRINT_L0 ( " Failed to parse multisig tx data " ) ;
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing
Scheme by luigi1111:
Multisig for RingCT on Monero
2 of 2
User A (coordinator):
Spendkey b,B
Viewkey a,A (shared)
User B:
Spendkey c,C
Viewkey a,A (shared)
Public Address: C+B, A
Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a
A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants)
A and B watch for incoming outputs
B creates "half" key images for discovered output D:
I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D)
B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D),
and sending the pubkeys with I2_D.
A also creates "half" key images:
I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D)
Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D
Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction).
A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D
to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R).
At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r,
which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo).
B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well).
B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D
to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well.
NOTE:
A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively.
Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible:
A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B.
B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A.
The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time!
The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature).
2 of 3
User A (coordinator)
Shared viewkey a,A
"spendkey" j,J
User B
"spendkey" k,K
User C
"spendkey" m,M
A collects K and M from B and C
B collects J and M from A and C
C collects J and K from A and B
A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK)
A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM)
B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK)
B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate
Address: N+O+P, A
The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other
needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two.
Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties:
A gives j to B
B gives k to C
C gives m to A
Address: J+K+M, A
3 of 3
Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others.
The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it
or send it back to A.
N-1 of N
Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around
(using either the secure or insecure method).
For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up):
[4 of 5]
User: spendkey
A: a
B: b
C: c
D: d
E: e
a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A
Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with
the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys.
Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each.
Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning:
1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image)
2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator
must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use.
You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might
also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format.
You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc.
The process is somewhat cumbersome:
To create a N/N multisig wallet:
- each participant creates a normal wallet
- each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant
- each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N)
As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent:
- each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant
- each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants
Then, a transaction may be initiated:
- one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT"
- this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file
- the initiator sends this file to another participant
- that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx"
- the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again
- if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed
- the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 21:34:26 +00:00
return false ;
}
// sanity checks
for ( const auto & ptx : exported_txs . m_ptx )
{
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES ( ptx . selected_transfers . size ( ) = = ptx . tx . vin . size ( ) , false , " Mismatched selected_transfers/vin sizes " ) ;
for ( size_t idx : ptx . selected_transfers )
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES ( idx < m_transfers . size ( ) , false , " Transfer index out of range " ) ;
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES ( ptx . construction_data . selected_transfers . size ( ) = = ptx . tx . vin . size ( ) , false , " Mismatched cd selected_transfers/vin sizes " ) ;
for ( size_t idx : ptx . construction_data . selected_transfers )
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES ( idx < m_transfers . size ( ) , false , " Transfer index out of range " ) ;
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES ( ptx . construction_data . sources . size ( ) = = ptx . tx . vin . size ( ) , false , " Mismatched sources/vin sizes " ) ;
}
LOG_PRINT_L1 ( " Loaded multisig tx unsigned data from binary: " < < exported_txs . m_ptx . size ( ) < < " transactions " ) ;
for ( auto & ptx : exported_txs . m_ptx ) LOG_PRINT_L0 ( cryptonote : : obj_to_json_str ( ptx . tx ) ) ;
if ( accept_func & & ! accept_func ( exported_txs ) )
{
LOG_PRINT_L1 ( " Transactions rejected by callback " ) ;
return false ;
}
const bool is_signed = exported_txs . m_signers . size ( ) > = m_multisig_threshold ;
if ( is_signed )
{
for ( const auto & ptx : exported_txs . m_ptx )
{
const crypto : : hash txid = get_transaction_hash ( ptx . tx ) ;
if ( store_tx_info ( ) )
{
m_tx_keys . insert ( std : : make_pair ( txid , ptx . tx_key ) ) ;
m_additional_tx_keys . insert ( std : : make_pair ( txid , ptx . additional_tx_keys ) ) ;
}
}
}
return true ;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2017-11-27 20:09:16 +00:00
bool wallet2 : : load_multisig_tx_from_file ( const std : : string & filename , multisig_tx_set & exported_txs , std : : function < bool ( const multisig_tx_set & ) > accept_func )
{
std : : string s ;
boost : : system : : error_code errcode ;
if ( ! boost : : filesystem : : exists ( filename , errcode ) )
{
LOG_PRINT_L0 ( " File " < < filename < < " does not exist: " < < errcode ) ;
return false ;
}
if ( ! epee : : file_io_utils : : load_file_to_string ( filename . c_str ( ) , s ) )
{
LOG_PRINT_L0 ( " Failed to load from " < < filename ) ;
return false ;
}
if ( ! load_multisig_tx ( s , exported_txs , accept_func ) )
{
LOG_PRINT_L0 ( " Failed to parse multisig tx data from " < < filename ) ;
return false ;
}
return true ;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2017-08-13 14:29:31 +00:00
bool wallet2 : : sign_multisig_tx ( multisig_tx_set & exported_txs , std : : vector < crypto : : hash > & txids )
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing
Scheme by luigi1111:
Multisig for RingCT on Monero
2 of 2
User A (coordinator):
Spendkey b,B
Viewkey a,A (shared)
User B:
Spendkey c,C
Viewkey a,A (shared)
Public Address: C+B, A
Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a
A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants)
A and B watch for incoming outputs
B creates "half" key images for discovered output D:
I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D)
B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D),
and sending the pubkeys with I2_D.
A also creates "half" key images:
I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D)
Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D
Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction).
A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D
to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R).
At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r,
which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo).
B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well).
B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D
to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well.
NOTE:
A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively.
Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible:
A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B.
B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A.
The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time!
The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature).
2 of 3
User A (coordinator)
Shared viewkey a,A
"spendkey" j,J
User B
"spendkey" k,K
User C
"spendkey" m,M
A collects K and M from B and C
B collects J and M from A and C
C collects J and K from A and B
A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK)
A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM)
B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK)
B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate
Address: N+O+P, A
The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other
needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two.
Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties:
A gives j to B
B gives k to C
C gives m to A
Address: J+K+M, A
3 of 3
Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others.
The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it
or send it back to A.
N-1 of N
Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around
(using either the secure or insecure method).
For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up):
[4 of 5]
User: spendkey
A: a
B: b
C: c
D: d
E: e
a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A
Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with
the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys.
Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each.
Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning:
1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image)
2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator
must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use.
You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might
also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format.
You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc.
The process is somewhat cumbersome:
To create a N/N multisig wallet:
- each participant creates a normal wallet
- each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant
- each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N)
As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent:
- each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant
- each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants
Then, a transaction may be initiated:
- one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT"
- this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file
- the initiator sends this file to another participant
- that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx"
- the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again
- if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed
- the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 21:34:26 +00:00
{
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( exported_txs . m_ptx . empty ( ) , error : : wallet_internal_error , " No tx found " ) ;
2017-08-13 14:29:31 +00:00
const crypto : : public_key local_signer = get_multisig_signer_public_key ( ) ;
2017-11-27 20:09:16 +00:00
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( exported_txs . m_signers . find ( local_signer ) ! = exported_txs . m_signers . end ( ) ,
error : : wallet_internal_error , " Transaction already signed by this private key " ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( exported_txs . m_signers . size ( ) > m_multisig_threshold ,
error : : wallet_internal_error , " Transaction was signed by too many signers " ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( exported_txs . m_signers . size ( ) = = m_multisig_threshold ,
error : : wallet_internal_error , " Transaction is already fully signed " ) ;
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing
Scheme by luigi1111:
Multisig for RingCT on Monero
2 of 2
User A (coordinator):
Spendkey b,B
Viewkey a,A (shared)
User B:
Spendkey c,C
Viewkey a,A (shared)
Public Address: C+B, A
Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a
A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants)
A and B watch for incoming outputs
B creates "half" key images for discovered output D:
I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D)
B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D),
and sending the pubkeys with I2_D.
A also creates "half" key images:
I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D)
Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D
Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction).
A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D
to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R).
At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r,
which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo).
B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well).
B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D
to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well.
NOTE:
A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively.
Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible:
A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B.
B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A.
The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time!
The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature).
2 of 3
User A (coordinator)
Shared viewkey a,A
"spendkey" j,J
User B
"spendkey" k,K
User C
"spendkey" m,M
A collects K and M from B and C
B collects J and M from A and C
C collects J and K from A and B
A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK)
A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM)
B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK)
B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate
Address: N+O+P, A
The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other
needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two.
Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties:
A gives j to B
B gives k to C
C gives m to A
Address: J+K+M, A
3 of 3
Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others.
The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it
or send it back to A.
N-1 of N
Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around
(using either the secure or insecure method).
For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up):
[4 of 5]
User: spendkey
A: a
B: b
C: c
D: d
E: e
a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A
Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with
the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys.
Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each.
Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning:
1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image)
2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator
must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use.
You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might
also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format.
You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc.
The process is somewhat cumbersome:
To create a N/N multisig wallet:
- each participant creates a normal wallet
- each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant
- each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N)
As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent:
- each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant
- each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants
Then, a transaction may be initiated:
- one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT"
- this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file
- the initiator sends this file to another participant
- that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx"
- the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again
- if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed
- the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 21:34:26 +00:00
txids . clear ( ) ;
// sign the transactions
for ( size_t n = 0 ; n < exported_txs . m_ptx . size ( ) ; + + n )
{
tools : : wallet2 : : pending_tx & ptx = exported_txs . m_ptx [ n ] ;
2017-08-13 14:29:31 +00:00
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( ptx . multisig_sigs . empty ( ) , error : : wallet_internal_error , " No signatures found in multisig tx " ) ;
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing
Scheme by luigi1111:
Multisig for RingCT on Monero
2 of 2
User A (coordinator):
Spendkey b,B
Viewkey a,A (shared)
User B:
Spendkey c,C
Viewkey a,A (shared)
Public Address: C+B, A
Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a
A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants)
A and B watch for incoming outputs
B creates "half" key images for discovered output D:
I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D)
B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D),
and sending the pubkeys with I2_D.
A also creates "half" key images:
I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D)
Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D
Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction).
A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D
to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R).
At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r,
which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo).
B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well).
B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D
to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well.
NOTE:
A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively.
Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible:
A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B.
B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A.
The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time!
The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature).
2 of 3
User A (coordinator)
Shared viewkey a,A
"spendkey" j,J
User B
"spendkey" k,K
User C
"spendkey" m,M
A collects K and M from B and C
B collects J and M from A and C
C collects J and K from A and B
A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK)
A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM)
B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK)
B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate
Address: N+O+P, A
The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other
needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two.
Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties:
A gives j to B
B gives k to C
C gives m to A
Address: J+K+M, A
3 of 3
Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others.
The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it
or send it back to A.
N-1 of N
Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around
(using either the secure or insecure method).
For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up):
[4 of 5]
User: spendkey
A: a
B: b
C: c
D: d
E: e
a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A
Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with
the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys.
Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each.
Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning:
1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image)
2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator
must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use.
You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might
also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format.
You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc.
The process is somewhat cumbersome:
To create a N/N multisig wallet:
- each participant creates a normal wallet
- each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant
- each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N)
As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent:
- each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant
- each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants
Then, a transaction may be initiated:
- one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT"
- this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file
- the initiator sends this file to another participant
- that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx"
- the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again
- if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed
- the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 21:34:26 +00:00
tools : : wallet2 : : tx_construction_data & sd = ptx . construction_data ;
LOG_PRINT_L1 ( " " < < ( n + 1 ) < < " : " < < sd . sources . size ( ) < < " inputs, mixin " < < ( sd . sources [ 0 ] . outputs . size ( ) - 1 ) < <
" , signed by " < < exported_txs . m_signers . size ( ) < < " / " < < m_multisig_threshold ) ;
cryptonote : : transaction tx ;
2017-08-13 14:29:31 +00:00
rct : : multisig_out msout = ptx . multisig_sigs . front ( ) . msout ;
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing
Scheme by luigi1111:
Multisig for RingCT on Monero
2 of 2
User A (coordinator):
Spendkey b,B
Viewkey a,A (shared)
User B:
Spendkey c,C
Viewkey a,A (shared)
Public Address: C+B, A
Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a
A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants)
A and B watch for incoming outputs
B creates "half" key images for discovered output D:
I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D)
B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D),
and sending the pubkeys with I2_D.
A also creates "half" key images:
I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D)
Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D
Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction).
A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D
to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R).
At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r,
which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo).
B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well).
B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D
to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well.
NOTE:
A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively.
Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible:
A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B.
B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A.
The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time!
The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature).
2 of 3
User A (coordinator)
Shared viewkey a,A
"spendkey" j,J
User B
"spendkey" k,K
User C
"spendkey" m,M
A collects K and M from B and C
B collects J and M from A and C
C collects J and K from A and B
A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK)
A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM)
B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK)
B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate
Address: N+O+P, A
The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other
needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two.
Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties:
A gives j to B
B gives k to C
C gives m to A
Address: J+K+M, A
3 of 3
Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others.
The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it
or send it back to A.
N-1 of N
Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around
(using either the secure or insecure method).
For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up):
[4 of 5]
User: spendkey
A: a
B: b
C: c
D: d
E: e
a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A
Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with
the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys.
Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each.
Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning:
1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image)
2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator
must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use.
You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might
also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format.
You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc.
The process is somewhat cumbersome:
To create a N/N multisig wallet:
- each participant creates a normal wallet
- each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant
- each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N)
As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent:
- each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant
- each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants
Then, a transaction may be initiated:
- one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT"
- this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file
- the initiator sends this file to another participant
- that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx"
- the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again
- if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed
- the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 21:34:26 +00:00
auto sources = sd . sources ;
const bool bulletproof = sd . use_rct & & ( ptx . tx . rct_signatures . type = = rct : : RCTTypeFullBulletproof | | ptx . tx . rct_signatures . type = = rct : : RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof ) ;
bool r = cryptonote : : construct_tx_with_tx_key ( m_account . get_keys ( ) , m_subaddresses , sources , sd . splitted_dsts , ptx . change_dts . addr , sd . extra , tx , sd . unlock_time , ptx . tx_key , ptx . additional_tx_keys , sd . use_rct , bulletproof , & msout ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( ! r , error : : tx_not_constructed , sd . sources , sd . splitted_dsts , sd . unlock_time , m_testnet ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( get_transaction_prefix_hash ( tx ) ! = get_transaction_prefix_hash ( ptx . tx ) ,
error : : wallet_internal_error , " Transaction prefix does not match data " ) ;
// Tests passed, sign
std : : vector < unsigned int > indices ;
for ( const auto & source : sources )
indices . push_back ( source . real_output ) ;
2017-08-13 14:29:31 +00:00
for ( auto & sig : ptx . multisig_sigs )
{
if ( sig . ignore ! = local_signer )
{
ptx . tx . rct_signatures = sig . sigs ;
rct : : keyV k ;
for ( size_t idx : sd . selected_transfers )
k . push_back ( get_multisig_k ( idx , sig . used_L ) ) ;
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing
Scheme by luigi1111:
Multisig for RingCT on Monero
2 of 2
User A (coordinator):
Spendkey b,B
Viewkey a,A (shared)
User B:
Spendkey c,C
Viewkey a,A (shared)
Public Address: C+B, A
Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a
A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants)
A and B watch for incoming outputs
B creates "half" key images for discovered output D:
I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D)
B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D),
and sending the pubkeys with I2_D.
A also creates "half" key images:
I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D)
Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D
Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction).
A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D
to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R).
At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r,
which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo).
B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well).
B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D
to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well.
NOTE:
A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively.
Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible:
A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B.
B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A.
The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time!
The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature).
2 of 3
User A (coordinator)
Shared viewkey a,A
"spendkey" j,J
User B
"spendkey" k,K
User C
"spendkey" m,M
A collects K and M from B and C
B collects J and M from A and C
C collects J and K from A and B
A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK)
A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM)
B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK)
B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate
Address: N+O+P, A
The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other
needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two.
Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties:
A gives j to B
B gives k to C
C gives m to A
Address: J+K+M, A
3 of 3
Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others.
The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it
or send it back to A.
N-1 of N
Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around
(using either the secure or insecure method).
For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up):
[4 of 5]
User: spendkey
A: a
B: b
C: c
D: d
E: e
a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A
Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with
the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys.
Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each.
Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning:
1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image)
2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator
must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use.
You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might
also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format.
You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc.
The process is somewhat cumbersome:
To create a N/N multisig wallet:
- each participant creates a normal wallet
- each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant
- each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N)
As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent:
- each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant
- each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants
Then, a transaction may be initiated:
- one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT"
- this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file
- the initiator sends this file to another participant
- that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx"
- the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again
- if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed
- the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 21:34:26 +00:00
2017-08-13 14:29:31 +00:00
rct : : key skey = rct : : zero ( ) ;
for ( const auto & msk : get_account ( ) . get_multisig_keys ( ) )
{
crypto : : public_key pmsk = get_multisig_signing_public_key ( msk ) ;
if ( sig . signing_keys . find ( pmsk ) = = sig . signing_keys . end ( ) )
{
sc_add ( skey . bytes , skey . bytes , rct : : sk2rct ( msk ) . bytes ) ;
sig . signing_keys . insert ( pmsk ) ;
}
}
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( ! rct : : signMultisig ( ptx . tx . rct_signatures , indices , k , sig . msout , skey ) ,
error : : wallet_internal_error , " Failed signing, transaction likely malformed " ) ;
sig . sigs = ptx . tx . rct_signatures ;
}
}
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing
Scheme by luigi1111:
Multisig for RingCT on Monero
2 of 2
User A (coordinator):
Spendkey b,B
Viewkey a,A (shared)
User B:
Spendkey c,C
Viewkey a,A (shared)
Public Address: C+B, A
Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a
A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants)
A and B watch for incoming outputs
B creates "half" key images for discovered output D:
I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D)
B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D),
and sending the pubkeys with I2_D.
A also creates "half" key images:
I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D)
Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D
Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction).
A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D
to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R).
At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r,
which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo).
B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well).
B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D
to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well.
NOTE:
A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively.
Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible:
A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B.
B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A.
The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time!
The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature).
2 of 3
User A (coordinator)
Shared viewkey a,A
"spendkey" j,J
User B
"spendkey" k,K
User C
"spendkey" m,M
A collects K and M from B and C
B collects J and M from A and C
C collects J and K from A and B
A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK)
A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM)
B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK)
B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate
Address: N+O+P, A
The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other
needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two.
Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties:
A gives j to B
B gives k to C
C gives m to A
Address: J+K+M, A
3 of 3
Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others.
The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it
or send it back to A.
N-1 of N
Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around
(using either the secure or insecure method).
For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up):
[4 of 5]
User: spendkey
A: a
B: b
C: c
D: d
E: e
a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A
Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with
the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys.
Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each.
Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning:
1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image)
2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator
must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use.
You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might
also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format.
You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc.
The process is somewhat cumbersome:
To create a N/N multisig wallet:
- each participant creates a normal wallet
- each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant
- each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N)
As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent:
- each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant
- each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants
Then, a transaction may be initiated:
- one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT"
- this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file
- the initiator sends this file to another participant
- that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx"
- the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again
- if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed
- the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 21:34:26 +00:00
const bool is_last = exported_txs . m_signers . size ( ) + 1 > = m_multisig_threshold ;
if ( is_last )
{
2017-08-13 14:29:31 +00:00
// when the last signature on a multisig tx is made, we select the right
// signature to plug into the final tx
bool found = false ;
for ( const auto & sig : ptx . multisig_sigs )
{
if ( sig . ignore ! = local_signer & & exported_txs . m_signers . find ( sig . ignore ) = = exported_txs . m_signers . end ( ) )
{
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( found , error : : wallet_internal_error , " More than one transaction is final " ) ;
ptx . tx . rct_signatures = sig . sigs ;
found = true ;
}
}
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( ! found , error : : wallet_internal_error ,
" Final signed transaction not found: this transaction was likely made without our export data, so we cannot sign it " ) ;
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing
Scheme by luigi1111:
Multisig for RingCT on Monero
2 of 2
User A (coordinator):
Spendkey b,B
Viewkey a,A (shared)
User B:
Spendkey c,C
Viewkey a,A (shared)
Public Address: C+B, A
Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a
A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants)
A and B watch for incoming outputs
B creates "half" key images for discovered output D:
I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D)
B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D),
and sending the pubkeys with I2_D.
A also creates "half" key images:
I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D)
Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D
Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction).
A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D
to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R).
At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r,
which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo).
B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well).
B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D
to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well.
NOTE:
A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively.
Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible:
A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B.
B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A.
The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time!
The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature).
2 of 3
User A (coordinator)
Shared viewkey a,A
"spendkey" j,J
User B
"spendkey" k,K
User C
"spendkey" m,M
A collects K and M from B and C
B collects J and M from A and C
C collects J and K from A and B
A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK)
A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM)
B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK)
B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate
Address: N+O+P, A
The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other
needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two.
Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties:
A gives j to B
B gives k to C
C gives m to A
Address: J+K+M, A
3 of 3
Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others.
The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it
or send it back to A.
N-1 of N
Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around
(using either the secure or insecure method).
For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up):
[4 of 5]
User: spendkey
A: a
B: b
C: c
D: d
E: e
a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A
Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with
the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys.
Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each.
Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning:
1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image)
2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator
must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use.
You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might
also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format.
You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc.
The process is somewhat cumbersome:
To create a N/N multisig wallet:
- each participant creates a normal wallet
- each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant
- each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N)
As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent:
- each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant
- each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants
Then, a transaction may be initiated:
- one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT"
- this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file
- the initiator sends this file to another participant
- that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx"
- the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again
- if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed
- the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 21:34:26 +00:00
const crypto : : hash txid = get_transaction_hash ( ptx . tx ) ;
if ( store_tx_info ( ) )
{
m_tx_keys . insert ( std : : make_pair ( txid , ptx . tx_key ) ) ;
m_additional_tx_keys . insert ( std : : make_pair ( txid , ptx . additional_tx_keys ) ) ;
}
txids . push_back ( txid ) ;
}
}
// txes generated, get rid of used k values
for ( size_t n = 0 ; n < exported_txs . m_ptx . size ( ) ; + + n )
for ( size_t idx : exported_txs . m_ptx [ n ] . construction_data . selected_transfers )
2017-08-13 14:29:31 +00:00
m_transfers [ idx ] . m_multisig_k . clear ( ) ;
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing
Scheme by luigi1111:
Multisig for RingCT on Monero
2 of 2
User A (coordinator):
Spendkey b,B
Viewkey a,A (shared)
User B:
Spendkey c,C
Viewkey a,A (shared)
Public Address: C+B, A
Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a
A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants)
A and B watch for incoming outputs
B creates "half" key images for discovered output D:
I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D)
B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D),
and sending the pubkeys with I2_D.
A also creates "half" key images:
I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D)
Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D
Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction).
A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D
to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R).
At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r,
which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo).
B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well).
B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D
to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well.
NOTE:
A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively.
Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible:
A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B.
B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A.
The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time!
The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature).
2 of 3
User A (coordinator)
Shared viewkey a,A
"spendkey" j,J
User B
"spendkey" k,K
User C
"spendkey" m,M
A collects K and M from B and C
B collects J and M from A and C
C collects J and K from A and B
A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK)
A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM)
B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK)
B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate
Address: N+O+P, A
The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other
needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two.
Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties:
A gives j to B
B gives k to C
C gives m to A
Address: J+K+M, A
3 of 3
Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others.
The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it
or send it back to A.
N-1 of N
Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around
(using either the secure or insecure method).
For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up):
[4 of 5]
User: spendkey
A: a
B: b
C: c
D: d
E: e
a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A
Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with
the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys.
Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each.
Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning:
1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image)
2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator
must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use.
You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might
also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format.
You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc.
The process is somewhat cumbersome:
To create a N/N multisig wallet:
- each participant creates a normal wallet
- each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant
- each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N)
As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent:
- each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant
- each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants
Then, a transaction may be initiated:
- one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT"
- this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file
- the initiator sends this file to another participant
- that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx"
- the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again
- if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed
- the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 21:34:26 +00:00
2017-08-13 14:29:31 +00:00
exported_txs . m_signers . insert ( get_multisig_signer_public_key ( ) ) ;
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing
Scheme by luigi1111:
Multisig for RingCT on Monero
2 of 2
User A (coordinator):
Spendkey b,B
Viewkey a,A (shared)
User B:
Spendkey c,C
Viewkey a,A (shared)
Public Address: C+B, A
Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a
A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants)
A and B watch for incoming outputs
B creates "half" key images for discovered output D:
I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D)
B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D),
and sending the pubkeys with I2_D.
A also creates "half" key images:
I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D)
Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D
Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction).
A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D
to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R).
At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r,
which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo).
B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well).
B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D
to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well.
NOTE:
A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively.
Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible:
A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B.
B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A.
The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time!
The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature).
2 of 3
User A (coordinator)
Shared viewkey a,A
"spendkey" j,J
User B
"spendkey" k,K
User C
"spendkey" m,M
A collects K and M from B and C
B collects J and M from A and C
C collects J and K from A and B
A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK)
A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM)
B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK)
B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate
Address: N+O+P, A
The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other
needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two.
Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties:
A gives j to B
B gives k to C
C gives m to A
Address: J+K+M, A
3 of 3
Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others.
The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it
or send it back to A.
N-1 of N
Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around
(using either the secure or insecure method).
For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up):
[4 of 5]
User: spendkey
A: a
B: b
C: c
D: d
E: e
a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A
Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with
the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys.
Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each.
Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning:
1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image)
2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator
must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use.
You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might
also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format.
You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc.
The process is somewhat cumbersome:
To create a N/N multisig wallet:
- each participant creates a normal wallet
- each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant
- each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N)
As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent:
- each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant
- each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants
Then, a transaction may be initiated:
- one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT"
- this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file
- the initiator sends this file to another participant
- that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx"
- the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again
- if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed
- the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 21:34:26 +00:00
2017-08-13 14:29:31 +00:00
return true ;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2017-09-26 22:16:25 +00:00
bool wallet2 : : sign_multisig_tx_to_file ( multisig_tx_set & exported_txs , const std : : string & filename , std : : vector < crypto : : hash > & txids )
2017-08-13 14:29:31 +00:00
{
bool r = sign_multisig_tx ( exported_txs , txids ) ;
if ( ! r )
return false ;
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing
Scheme by luigi1111:
Multisig for RingCT on Monero
2 of 2
User A (coordinator):
Spendkey b,B
Viewkey a,A (shared)
User B:
Spendkey c,C
Viewkey a,A (shared)
Public Address: C+B, A
Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a
A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants)
A and B watch for incoming outputs
B creates "half" key images for discovered output D:
I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D)
B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D),
and sending the pubkeys with I2_D.
A also creates "half" key images:
I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D)
Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D
Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction).
A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D
to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R).
At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r,
which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo).
B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well).
B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D
to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well.
NOTE:
A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively.
Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible:
A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B.
B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A.
The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time!
The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature).
2 of 3
User A (coordinator)
Shared viewkey a,A
"spendkey" j,J
User B
"spendkey" k,K
User C
"spendkey" m,M
A collects K and M from B and C
B collects J and M from A and C
C collects J and K from A and B
A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK)
A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM)
B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK)
B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate
Address: N+O+P, A
The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other
needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two.
Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties:
A gives j to B
B gives k to C
C gives m to A
Address: J+K+M, A
3 of 3
Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others.
The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it
or send it back to A.
N-1 of N
Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around
(using either the secure or insecure method).
For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up):
[4 of 5]
User: spendkey
A: a
B: b
C: c
D: d
E: e
a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A
Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with
the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys.
Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each.
Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning:
1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image)
2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator
must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use.
You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might
also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format.
You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc.
The process is somewhat cumbersome:
To create a N/N multisig wallet:
- each participant creates a normal wallet
- each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant
- each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N)
As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent:
- each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant
- each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants
Then, a transaction may be initiated:
- one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT"
- this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file
- the initiator sends this file to another participant
- that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx"
- the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again
- if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed
- the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 21:34:26 +00:00
return save_multisig_tx ( exported_txs , filename ) ;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
bool wallet2 : : sign_multisig_tx_from_file ( const std : : string & filename , std : : vector < crypto : : hash > & txids , std : : function < bool ( const multisig_tx_set & ) > accept_func )
{
multisig_tx_set exported_txs ;
if ( ! load_multisig_tx_from_file ( filename , exported_txs ) )
return false ;
if ( accept_func & & ! accept_func ( exported_txs ) )
{
LOG_PRINT_L1 ( " Transactions rejected by callback " ) ;
return false ;
}
2017-09-26 22:16:25 +00:00
return sign_multisig_tx_to_file ( exported_txs , filename , txids ) ;
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing
Scheme by luigi1111:
Multisig for RingCT on Monero
2 of 2
User A (coordinator):
Spendkey b,B
Viewkey a,A (shared)
User B:
Spendkey c,C
Viewkey a,A (shared)
Public Address: C+B, A
Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a
A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants)
A and B watch for incoming outputs
B creates "half" key images for discovered output D:
I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D)
B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D),
and sending the pubkeys with I2_D.
A also creates "half" key images:
I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D)
Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D
Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction).
A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D
to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R).
At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r,
which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo).
B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well).
B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D
to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well.
NOTE:
A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively.
Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible:
A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B.
B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A.
The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time!
The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature).
2 of 3
User A (coordinator)
Shared viewkey a,A
"spendkey" j,J
User B
"spendkey" k,K
User C
"spendkey" m,M
A collects K and M from B and C
B collects J and M from A and C
C collects J and K from A and B
A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK)
A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM)
B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK)
B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate
Address: N+O+P, A
The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other
needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two.
Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties:
A gives j to B
B gives k to C
C gives m to A
Address: J+K+M, A
3 of 3
Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others.
The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it
or send it back to A.
N-1 of N
Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around
(using either the secure or insecure method).
For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up):
[4 of 5]
User: spendkey
A: a
B: b
C: c
D: d
E: e
a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A
Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with
the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys.
Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each.
Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning:
1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image)
2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator
must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use.
You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might
also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format.
You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc.
The process is somewhat cumbersome:
To create a N/N multisig wallet:
- each participant creates a normal wallet
- each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant
- each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N)
As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent:
- each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant
- each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants
Then, a transaction may be initiated:
- one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT"
- this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file
- the initiator sends this file to another participant
- that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx"
- the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again
- if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed
- the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 21:34:26 +00:00
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2017-08-27 20:04:56 +00:00
uint64_t wallet2 : : get_fee_multiplier ( uint32_t priority , int fee_algorithm )
2016-06-22 21:21:30 +00:00
{
2016-09-16 10:50:52 +00:00
static const uint64_t old_multipliers [ 3 ] = { 1 , 2 , 3 } ;
static const uint64_t new_multipliers [ 3 ] = { 1 , 20 , 166 } ;
2017-03-14 19:28:38 +00:00
static const uint64_t newer_multipliers [ 4 ] = { 1 , 4 , 20 , 166 } ;
2016-09-16 10:50:52 +00:00
2017-08-27 20:04:56 +00:00
if ( fee_algorithm = = - 1 )
fee_algorithm = get_fee_algorithm ( ) ;
2017-03-14 19:28:38 +00:00
// 0 -> default (here, x1 till fee algorithm 2, x4 from it)
2016-09-16 10:50:52 +00:00
if ( priority = = 0 )
priority = m_default_priority ;
if ( priority = = 0 )
2017-03-14 19:28:38 +00:00
{
if ( fee_algorithm > = 2 )
priority = 2 ;
else
priority = 1 ;
}
2016-09-16 10:50:52 +00:00
2017-03-14 19:28:38 +00:00
// 1 to 3/4 are allowed as priorities
uint32_t max_priority = ( fee_algorithm > = 2 ) ? 4 : 3 ;
if ( priority > = 1 & & priority < = max_priority )
{
switch ( fee_algorithm )
{
case 0 : return old_multipliers [ priority - 1 ] ;
case 1 : return new_multipliers [ priority - 1 ] ;
case 2 : return newer_multipliers [ priority - 1 ] ;
default : THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( true , error : : invalid_priority ) ;
}
}
2016-09-16 10:50:52 +00:00
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( false , error : : invalid_priority ) ;
2016-06-22 21:21:30 +00:00
return 1 ;
}
2014-06-17 22:15:21 +00:00
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2016-10-28 20:41:41 +00:00
uint64_t wallet2 : : get_dynamic_per_kb_fee_estimate ( )
{
2017-01-07 19:23:57 +00:00
uint64_t fee ;
boost : : optional < std : : string > result = m_node_rpc_proxy . get_dynamic_per_kb_fee_estimate ( FEE_ESTIMATE_GRACE_BLOCKS , fee ) ;
if ( ! result )
return fee ;
LOG_PRINT_L1 ( " Failed to query per kB fee, using " < < print_money ( FEE_PER_KB ) ) ;
return FEE_PER_KB ;
2016-10-28 20:41:41 +00:00
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
uint64_t wallet2 : : get_per_kb_fee ( )
{
2017-08-04 21:00:25 +00:00
if ( m_light_wallet )
return m_light_wallet_per_kb_fee ;
2016-12-10 15:39:26 +00:00
bool use_dyn_fee = use_fork_rules ( HF_VERSION_DYNAMIC_FEE , - 720 * 1 ) ;
2016-10-28 20:41:41 +00:00
if ( ! use_dyn_fee )
return FEE_PER_KB ;
2017-01-07 19:23:57 +00:00
return get_dynamic_per_kb_fee_estimate ( ) ;
2016-10-28 20:41:41 +00:00
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2017-03-14 19:28:38 +00:00
int wallet2 : : get_fee_algorithm ( )
{
// changes at v3 and v5
2017-03-20 18:03:11 +00:00
if ( use_fork_rules ( 5 , 0 ) )
2017-03-14 19:28:38 +00:00
return 2 ;
if ( use_fork_rules ( 3 , - 720 * 14 ) )
return 1 ;
return 0 ;
}
2017-10-10 09:33:17 +00:00
//------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
uint64_t wallet2 : : adjust_mixin ( uint64_t mixin )
{
if ( mixin < 4 & & use_fork_rules ( 6 , 10 ) ) {
MWARNING ( " Requested ring size " < < ( mixin + 1 ) < < " too low for hard fork 6, using 5 " ) ;
mixin = 4 ;
}
else if ( mixin < 2 & & use_fork_rules ( 2 , 10 ) ) {
MWARNING ( " Requested ring size " < < ( mixin + 1 ) < < " too low for hard fork 2, using 3 " ) ;
mixin = 2 ;
}
return mixin ;
}
2017-03-14 19:28:38 +00:00
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2014-06-17 22:15:21 +00:00
// separated the call(s) to wallet2::transfer into their own function
//
// this function will make multiple calls to wallet2::transfer if multiple
// transactions will be required
2017-02-19 02:42:10 +00:00
std : : vector < wallet2 : : pending_tx > wallet2 : : create_transactions ( std : : vector < cryptonote : : tx_destination_entry > dsts , const size_t fake_outs_count , const uint64_t unlock_time , uint32_t priority , const std : : vector < uint8_t > & extra , bool trusted_daemon )
2014-06-17 22:15:21 +00:00
{
2017-02-05 21:30:14 +00:00
const std : : vector < size_t > unused_transfers_indices = select_available_outputs_from_histogram ( fake_outs_count + 1 , true , true , true , trusted_daemon ) ;
2014-06-17 22:15:21 +00:00
2016-10-28 20:41:41 +00:00
const uint64_t fee_per_kb = get_per_kb_fee ( ) ;
2017-03-14 19:28:38 +00:00
const uint64_t fee_multiplier = get_fee_multiplier ( priority , get_fee_algorithm ( ) ) ;
2016-06-22 21:21:30 +00:00
2014-06-17 22:15:21 +00:00
// failsafe split attempt counter
size_t attempt_count = 0 ;
for ( attempt_count = 1 ; ; attempt_count + + )
{
2015-06-17 21:00:04 +00:00
size_t num_tx = 0.5 + pow ( 1.7 , attempt_count - 1 ) ;
auto split_values = split_amounts ( dsts , num_tx ) ;
2014-06-17 22:15:21 +00:00
// Throw if split_amounts comes back with a vector of size different than it should
2015-06-17 21:00:04 +00:00
if ( split_values . size ( ) ! = num_tx )
2014-06-17 22:15:21 +00:00
{
2016-03-21 10:12:12 +00:00
throw std : : runtime_error ( " Splitting transactions returned a number of potential tx not equal to what was requested " ) ;
2014-06-17 22:15:21 +00:00
}
std : : vector < pending_tx > ptx_vector ;
try
{
// for each new destination vector (i.e. for each new tx)
for ( auto & dst_vector : split_values )
{
cryptonote : : transaction tx ;
pending_tx ptx ;
2014-10-02 20:44:55 +00:00
// loop until fee is met without increasing tx size to next KB boundary.
2017-12-02 08:32:39 +00:00
const size_t estimated_tx_size = estimate_tx_size ( false , unused_transfers_indices . size ( ) , fake_outs_count , dst_vector . size ( ) , extra . size ( ) , false ) ;
2017-11-13 21:50:37 +00:00
uint64_t needed_fee = calculate_fee ( fee_per_kb , estimated_tx_size , fee_multiplier ) ;
2014-10-02 20:44:55 +00:00
do
{
2016-04-02 12:06:39 +00:00
transfer ( dst_vector , fake_outs_count , unused_transfers_indices , unlock_time , needed_fee , extra , tx , ptx , trusted_daemon ) ;
2014-10-02 20:44:55 +00:00
auto txBlob = t_serializable_object_to_blob ( ptx . tx ) ;
2016-09-14 22:54:01 +00:00
needed_fee = calculate_fee ( fee_per_kb , txBlob , fee_multiplier ) ;
2014-10-02 20:44:55 +00:00
} while ( ptx . fee < needed_fee ) ;
2014-06-17 22:15:21 +00:00
ptx_vector . push_back ( ptx ) ;
// mark transfers to be used as "spent"
2017-01-22 20:38:10 +00:00
for ( size_t idx : ptx . selected_transfers )
2016-06-16 22:58:54 +00:00
{
2016-09-26 22:11:10 +00:00
set_spent ( idx , 0 ) ;
2016-06-16 22:58:54 +00:00
}
2014-06-17 22:15:21 +00:00
}
// if we made it this far, we've selected our transactions. committing them will mark them spent,
// so this is a failsafe in case they don't go through
// unmark pending tx transfers as spent
for ( auto & ptx : ptx_vector )
{
// mark transfers to be used as not spent
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for ( size_t idx2 : ptx . selected_transfers )
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{
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set_unspent ( idx2 ) ;
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}
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}
// if we made it this far, we're OK to actually send the transactions
return ptx_vector ;
}
// only catch this here, other exceptions need to pass through to the calling function
catch ( const tools : : error : : tx_too_big & e )
{
// unmark pending tx transfers as spent
for ( auto & ptx : ptx_vector )
{
// mark transfers to be used as not spent
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for ( size_t idx2 : ptx . selected_transfers )
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{
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set_unspent ( idx2 ) ;
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}
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}
if ( attempt_count > = MAX_SPLIT_ATTEMPTS )
{
throw ;
}
}
catch ( . . . )
{
// in case of some other exception, make sure any tx in queue are marked unspent again
// unmark pending tx transfers as spent
for ( auto & ptx : ptx_vector )
{
// mark transfers to be used as not spent
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for ( size_t idx2 : ptx . selected_transfers )
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{
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set_unspent ( idx2 ) ;
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}
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}
throw ;
}
}
}
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bool wallet2 : : tx_add_fake_output ( std : : vector < std : : vector < tools : : wallet2 : : get_outs_entry > > & outs , uint64_t global_index , const crypto : : public_key & tx_public_key , const rct : : key & mask , uint64_t real_index , bool unlocked ) const
{
if ( ! unlocked ) // don't add locked outs
return false ;
if ( global_index = = real_index ) // don't re-add real one
return false ;
auto item = std : : make_tuple ( global_index , tx_public_key , mask ) ;
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CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES ( ! outs . empty ( ) , false , " internal error: outs is empty " ) ;
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if ( std : : find ( outs . back ( ) . begin ( ) , outs . back ( ) . end ( ) , item ) ! = outs . back ( ) . end ( ) ) // don't add duplicates
return false ;
outs . back ( ) . push_back ( item ) ;
return true ;
}
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void wallet2 : : light_wallet_get_outs ( std : : vector < std : : vector < tools : : wallet2 : : get_outs_entry > > & outs , const std : : vector < size_t > & selected_transfers , size_t fake_outputs_count ) {
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MDEBUG ( " LIGHTWALLET - Getting random outs " ) ;
cryptonote : : COMMAND_RPC_GET_RANDOM_OUTS : : request oreq ;
cryptonote : : COMMAND_RPC_GET_RANDOM_OUTS : : response ores ;
size_t light_wallet_requested_outputs_count = ( size_t ) ( ( fake_outputs_count + 1 ) * 1.5 + 1 ) ;
// Amounts to ask for
// MyMonero api handle amounts and fees as strings
for ( size_t idx : selected_transfers ) {
const uint64_t ask_amount = m_transfers [ idx ] . is_rct ( ) ? 0 : m_transfers [ idx ] . amount ( ) ;
std : : ostringstream amount_ss ;
amount_ss < < ask_amount ;
oreq . amounts . push_back ( amount_ss . str ( ) ) ;
}
oreq . count = light_wallet_requested_outputs_count ;
m_daemon_rpc_mutex . lock ( ) ;
bool r = epee : : net_utils : : invoke_http_json ( " /get_random_outs " , oreq , ores , m_http_client , rpc_timeout , " POST " ) ;
m_daemon_rpc_mutex . unlock ( ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( ! r , error : : no_connection_to_daemon , " get_random_outs " ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( ores . amount_outs . empty ( ) , error : : wallet_internal_error , " No outputs recieved from light wallet node. Error: " + ores . Error ) ;
// Check if we got enough outputs for each amount
for ( auto & out : ores . amount_outs ) {
const uint64_t out_amount = boost : : lexical_cast < uint64_t > ( out . amount ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( out . outputs . size ( ) < light_wallet_requested_outputs_count , error : : wallet_internal_error , " Not enough outputs for amount: " + boost : : lexical_cast < std : : string > ( out . amount ) ) ;
MDEBUG ( out . outputs . size ( ) < < " outputs for amount " + boost : : lexical_cast < std : : string > ( out . amount ) + " received from light wallet node " ) ;
}
MDEBUG ( " selected transfers size: " < < selected_transfers . size ( ) ) ;
for ( size_t idx : selected_transfers )
{
// Create new index
outs . push_back ( std : : vector < get_outs_entry > ( ) ) ;
outs . back ( ) . reserve ( fake_outputs_count + 1 ) ;
// add real output first
const transfer_details & td = m_transfers [ idx ] ;
const uint64_t amount = td . is_rct ( ) ? 0 : td . amount ( ) ;
outs . back ( ) . push_back ( std : : make_tuple ( td . m_global_output_index , td . get_public_key ( ) , rct : : commit ( td . amount ( ) , td . m_mask ) ) ) ;
MDEBUG ( " added real output " < < string_tools : : pod_to_hex ( td . get_public_key ( ) ) ) ;
// Even if the lightwallet server returns random outputs, we pick them randomly.
std : : vector < size_t > order ;
order . resize ( light_wallet_requested_outputs_count ) ;
for ( size_t n = 0 ; n < order . size ( ) ; + + n )
order [ n ] = n ;
std : : shuffle ( order . begin ( ) , order . end ( ) , std : : default_random_engine ( crypto : : rand < unsigned > ( ) ) ) ;
LOG_PRINT_L2 ( " Looking for " < < ( fake_outputs_count + 1 ) < < " outputs with amounts " < < print_money ( td . is_rct ( ) ? 0 : td . amount ( ) ) ) ;
MDEBUG ( " OUTS SIZE: " < < outs . back ( ) . size ( ) ) ;
for ( size_t o = 0 ; o < light_wallet_requested_outputs_count & & outs . back ( ) . size ( ) < fake_outputs_count + 1 ; + + o )
{
// Random pick
size_t i = order [ o ] ;
// Find which random output key to use
bool found_amount = false ;
size_t amount_key ;
for ( amount_key = 0 ; amount_key < ores . amount_outs . size ( ) ; + + amount_key )
{
if ( boost : : lexical_cast < uint64_t > ( ores . amount_outs [ amount_key ] . amount ) = = amount ) {
found_amount = true ;
break ;
}
}
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( ! found_amount , error : : wallet_internal_error , " Outputs for amount " + boost : : lexical_cast < std : : string > ( ores . amount_outs [ amount_key ] . amount ) + " not found " ) ;
LOG_PRINT_L2 ( " Index " < < i < < " / " < < light_wallet_requested_outputs_count < < " : idx " < < ores . amount_outs [ amount_key ] . outputs [ i ] . global_index < < " (real " < < td . m_global_output_index < < " ), unlocked " < < " (always in light) " < < " , key " < < ores . amount_outs [ 0 ] . outputs [ i ] . public_key ) ;
// Convert light wallet string data to proper data structures
crypto : : public_key tx_public_key ;
rct : : key mask = AUTO_VAL_INIT ( mask ) ; // decrypted mask - not used here
rct : : key rct_commit = AUTO_VAL_INIT ( rct_commit ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( string_tools : : validate_hex ( 64 , ores . amount_outs [ amount_key ] . outputs [ i ] . public_key ) , error : : wallet_internal_error , " Invalid public_key " ) ;
string_tools : : hex_to_pod ( ores . amount_outs [ amount_key ] . outputs [ i ] . public_key , tx_public_key ) ;
const uint64_t global_index = ores . amount_outs [ amount_key ] . outputs [ i ] . global_index ;
if ( ! light_wallet_parse_rct_str ( ores . amount_outs [ amount_key ] . outputs [ i ] . rct , tx_public_key , 0 , mask , rct_commit , false ) )
rct_commit = rct : : zeroCommit ( td . amount ( ) ) ;
if ( tx_add_fake_output ( outs , global_index , tx_public_key , rct_commit , td . m_global_output_index , true ) ) {
MDEBUG ( " added fake output " < < ores . amount_outs [ amount_key ] . outputs [ i ] . public_key ) ;
MDEBUG ( " index " < < global_index ) ;
}
}
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( outs . back ( ) . size ( ) < fake_outputs_count + 1 , error : : wallet_internal_error , " Not enough fake outputs found " ) ;
// Real output is the first. Shuffle outputs
MTRACE ( outs . back ( ) . size ( ) < < " outputs added. Sorting outputs by index: " ) ;
std : : sort ( outs . back ( ) . begin ( ) , outs . back ( ) . end ( ) , [ ] ( const get_outs_entry & a , const get_outs_entry & b ) { return std : : get < 0 > ( a ) < std : : get < 0 > ( b ) ; } ) ;
// Print output order
for ( auto added_out : outs . back ( ) )
MTRACE ( std : : get < 0 > ( added_out ) ) ;
}
}
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void wallet2 : : get_outs ( std : : vector < std : : vector < tools : : wallet2 : : get_outs_entry > > & outs , const std : : vector < size_t > & selected_transfers , size_t fake_outputs_count )
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{
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LOG_PRINT_L2 ( " fake_outputs_count: " < < fake_outputs_count ) ;
outs . clear ( ) ;
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if ( m_light_wallet & & fake_outputs_count > 0 ) {
light_wallet_get_outs ( outs , selected_transfers , fake_outputs_count ) ;
return ;
}
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if ( fake_outputs_count > 0 )
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{
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// get histogram for the amounts we need
epee : : json_rpc : : request < cryptonote : : COMMAND_RPC_GET_OUTPUT_HISTOGRAM : : request > req_t = AUTO_VAL_INIT ( req_t ) ;
epee : : json_rpc : : response < cryptonote : : COMMAND_RPC_GET_OUTPUT_HISTOGRAM : : response , std : : string > resp_t = AUTO_VAL_INIT ( resp_t ) ;
m_daemon_rpc_mutex . lock ( ) ;
req_t . jsonrpc = " 2.0 " ;
req_t . id = epee : : serialization : : storage_entry ( 0 ) ;
req_t . method = " get_output_histogram " ;
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for ( size_t idx : selected_transfers )
req_t . params . amounts . push_back ( m_transfers [ idx ] . is_rct ( ) ? 0 : m_transfers [ idx ] . amount ( ) ) ;
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std : : sort ( req_t . params . amounts . begin ( ) , req_t . params . amounts . end ( ) ) ;
auto end = std : : unique ( req_t . params . amounts . begin ( ) , req_t . params . amounts . end ( ) ) ;
req_t . params . amounts . resize ( std : : distance ( req_t . params . amounts . begin ( ) , end ) ) ;
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req_t . params . unlocked = true ;
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req_t . params . recent_cutoff = time ( NULL ) - RECENT_OUTPUT_ZONE ;
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bool r = net_utils : : invoke_http_json ( " /json_rpc " , req_t , resp_t , m_http_client , rpc_timeout ) ;
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m_daemon_rpc_mutex . unlock ( ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( ! r , error : : no_connection_to_daemon , " transfer_selected " ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( resp_t . result . status = = CORE_RPC_STATUS_BUSY , error : : daemon_busy , " get_output_histogram " ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( resp_t . result . status ! = CORE_RPC_STATUS_OK , error : : get_histogram_error , resp_t . result . status ) ;
// we ask for more, to have spares if some outputs are still locked
2016-08-29 19:49:18 +00:00
size_t base_requested_outputs_count = ( size_t ) ( ( fake_outputs_count + 1 ) * 1.5 + 1 ) ;
LOG_PRINT_L2 ( " base_requested_outputs_count: " < < base_requested_outputs_count ) ;
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// generate output indices to request
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COMMAND_RPC_GET_OUTPUTS_BIN : : request req = AUTO_VAL_INIT ( req ) ;
COMMAND_RPC_GET_OUTPUTS_BIN : : response daemon_resp = AUTO_VAL_INIT ( daemon_resp ) ;
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size_t num_selected_transfers = 0 ;
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for ( size_t idx : selected_transfers )
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{
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+ + num_selected_transfers ;
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const transfer_details & td = m_transfers [ idx ] ;
const uint64_t amount = td . is_rct ( ) ? 0 : td . amount ( ) ;
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std : : unordered_set < uint64_t > seen_indices ;
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// request more for rct in base recent (locked) coinbases are picked, since they're locked for longer
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size_t requested_outputs_count = base_requested_outputs_count + ( td . is_rct ( ) ? CRYPTONOTE_MINED_MONEY_UNLOCK_WINDOW - CRYPTONOTE_DEFAULT_TX_SPENDABLE_AGE : 0 ) ;
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size_t start = req . outputs . size ( ) ;
// if there are just enough outputs to mix with, use all of them.
// Eventually this should become impossible.
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uint64_t num_outs = 0 , num_recent_outs = 0 ;
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for ( const auto & he : resp_t . result . histogram )
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{
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if ( he . amount = = amount )
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{
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LOG_PRINT_L2 ( " Found " < < print_money ( amount ) < < " : " < < he . total_instances < < " total, "
< < he . unlocked_instances < < " unlocked, " < < he . recent_instances < < " recent " ) ;
num_outs = he . unlocked_instances ;
num_recent_outs = he . recent_instances ;
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break ;
}
}
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LOG_PRINT_L1 ( " " < < num_outs < < " unlocked outputs of size " < < print_money ( amount ) ) ;
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THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( num_outs = = 0 , error : : wallet_internal_error ,
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" histogram reports no unlocked outputs for " + boost : : lexical_cast < std : : string > ( amount ) + " , not even ours " ) ;
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THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( num_recent_outs > num_outs , error : : wallet_internal_error ,
" histogram reports more recent outs than outs for " + boost : : lexical_cast < std : : string > ( amount ) ) ;
// X% of those outs are to be taken from recent outputs
size_t recent_outputs_count = requested_outputs_count * RECENT_OUTPUT_RATIO ;
if ( recent_outputs_count = = 0 )
recent_outputs_count = 1 ; // ensure we have at least one, if possible
if ( recent_outputs_count > num_recent_outs )
recent_outputs_count = num_recent_outs ;
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if ( td . m_global_output_index > = num_outs - num_recent_outs & & recent_outputs_count > 0 )
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- - recent_outputs_count ; // if the real out is recent, pick one less recent fake out
LOG_PRINT_L1 ( " Using " < < recent_outputs_count < < " recent outputs " ) ;
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2016-08-02 20:48:09 +00:00
if ( num_outs < = requested_outputs_count )
{
for ( uint64_t i = 0 ; i < num_outs ; i + + )
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req . outputs . push_back ( { amount , i } ) ;
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// duplicate to make up shortfall: this will be caught after the RPC call,
// so we can also output the amounts for which we can't reach the required
// mixin after checking the actual unlockedness
for ( uint64_t i = num_outs ; i < requested_outputs_count ; + + i )
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req . outputs . push_back ( { amount , num_outs - 1 } ) ;
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}
else
{
// start with real one
uint64_t num_found = 1 ;
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seen_indices . emplace ( td . m_global_output_index ) ;
req . outputs . push_back ( { amount , td . m_global_output_index } ) ;
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LOG_PRINT_L1 ( " Selecting real output: " < < td . m_global_output_index < < " for " < < print_money ( amount ) ) ;
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// while we still need more mixins
while ( num_found < requested_outputs_count )
{
// if we've gone through every possible output, we've gotten all we can
if ( seen_indices . size ( ) = = num_outs )
break ;
// get a random output index from the DB. If we've already seen it,
// return to the top of the loop and try again, otherwise add it to the
// list of output indices we've seen.
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uint64_t i ;
if ( num_found - 1 < recent_outputs_count ) // -1 to account for the real one we seeded with
{
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// triangular distribution over [a,b) with a=0, mode c=b=up_index_limit
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uint64_t r = crypto : : rand < uint64_t > ( ) % ( ( uint64_t ) 1 < < 53 ) ;
double frac = std : : sqrt ( ( double ) r / ( ( uint64_t ) 1 < < 53 ) ) ;
i = ( uint64_t ) ( frac * num_recent_outs ) + num_outs - num_recent_outs ;
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// just in case rounding up to 1 occurs after calc
if ( i = = num_outs )
- - i ;
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LOG_PRINT_L2 ( " picking " < < i < < " as recent " ) ;
}
else
{
// triangular distribution over [a,b) with a=0, mode c=b=up_index_limit
uint64_t r = crypto : : rand < uint64_t > ( ) % ( ( uint64_t ) 1 < < 53 ) ;
double frac = std : : sqrt ( ( double ) r / ( ( uint64_t ) 1 < < 53 ) ) ;
i = ( uint64_t ) ( frac * num_outs ) ;
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// just in case rounding up to 1 occurs after calc
if ( i = = num_outs )
- - i ;
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LOG_PRINT_L2 ( " picking " < < i < < " as triangular " ) ;
}
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if ( seen_indices . count ( i ) )
continue ;
seen_indices . emplace ( i ) ;
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req . outputs . push_back ( { amount , i } ) ;
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+ + num_found ;
}
}
// sort the subsection, to ensure the daemon doesn't know wich output is ours
std : : sort ( req . outputs . begin ( ) + start , req . outputs . end ( ) ,
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[ ] ( const get_outputs_out & a , const get_outputs_out & b ) { return a . index < b . index ; } ) ;
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}
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for ( auto i : req . outputs )
LOG_PRINT_L1 ( " asking for output " < < i . index < < " for " < < print_money ( i . amount ) ) ;
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// get the keys for those
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m_daemon_rpc_mutex . lock ( ) ;
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r = epee : : net_utils : : invoke_http_bin ( " /get_outs.bin " , req , daemon_resp , m_http_client , rpc_timeout ) ;
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m_daemon_rpc_mutex . unlock ( ) ;
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THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( ! r , error : : no_connection_to_daemon , " get_outs.bin " ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( daemon_resp . status = = CORE_RPC_STATUS_BUSY , error : : daemon_busy , " get_outs.bin " ) ;
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THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( daemon_resp . status ! = CORE_RPC_STATUS_OK , error : : get_random_outs_error , daemon_resp . status ) ;
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THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( daemon_resp . outs . size ( ) ! = req . outputs . size ( ) , error : : wallet_internal_error ,
" daemon returned wrong response for get_outs.bin, wrong amounts count = " +
std : : to_string ( daemon_resp . outs . size ( ) ) + " , expected " + std : : to_string ( req . outputs . size ( ) ) ) ;
std : : unordered_map < uint64_t , uint64_t > scanty_outs ;
size_t base = 0 ;
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outs . reserve ( num_selected_transfers ) ;
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for ( size_t idx : selected_transfers )
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{
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const transfer_details & td = m_transfers [ idx ] ;
size_t requested_outputs_count = base_requested_outputs_count + ( td . is_rct ( ) ? CRYPTONOTE_MINED_MONEY_UNLOCK_WINDOW - CRYPTONOTE_DEFAULT_TX_SPENDABLE_AGE : 0 ) ;
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outs . push_back ( std : : vector < get_outs_entry > ( ) ) ;
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outs . back ( ) . reserve ( fake_outputs_count + 1 ) ;
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const rct : : key mask = td . is_rct ( ) ? rct : : commit ( td . amount ( ) , td . m_mask ) : rct : : zeroCommit ( td . amount ( ) ) ;
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// make sure the real outputs we asked for are really included, along
// with the correct key and mask: this guards against an active attack
// where the node sends dummy data for all outputs, and we then send
// the real one, which the node can then tell from the fake outputs,
// as it has different data than the dummy data it had sent earlier
bool real_out_found = false ;
for ( size_t n = 0 ; n < requested_outputs_count ; + + n )
{
size_t i = base + n ;
if ( req . outputs [ i ] . index = = td . m_global_output_index )
if ( daemon_resp . outs [ i ] . key = = boost : : get < txout_to_key > ( td . m_tx . vout [ td . m_internal_output_index ] . target ) . key )
if ( daemon_resp . outs [ i ] . mask = = mask )
real_out_found = true ;
}
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( ! real_out_found , error : : wallet_internal_error ,
" Daemon response did not include the requested real output " ) ;
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// pick real out first (it will be sorted when done)
2016-09-26 22:11:10 +00:00
outs . back ( ) . push_back ( std : : make_tuple ( td . m_global_output_index , boost : : get < txout_to_key > ( td . m_tx . vout [ td . m_internal_output_index ] . target ) . key , mask ) ) ;
2016-08-02 20:48:09 +00:00
// then pick others in random order till we reach the required number
// since we use an equiprobable pick here, we don't upset the triangular distribution
std : : vector < size_t > order ;
order . resize ( requested_outputs_count ) ;
for ( size_t n = 0 ; n < order . size ( ) ; + + n )
order [ n ] = n ;
std : : shuffle ( order . begin ( ) , order . end ( ) , std : : default_random_engine ( crypto : : rand < unsigned > ( ) ) ) ;
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LOG_PRINT_L2 ( " Looking for " < < ( fake_outputs_count + 1 ) < < " outputs of size " < < print_money ( td . is_rct ( ) ? 0 : td . amount ( ) ) ) ;
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for ( size_t o = 0 ; o < requested_outputs_count & & outs . back ( ) . size ( ) < fake_outputs_count + 1 ; + + o )
{
size_t i = base + order [ o ] ;
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LOG_PRINT_L2 ( " Index " < < i < < " / " < < requested_outputs_count < < " : idx " < < req . outputs [ i ] . index < < " (real " < < td . m_global_output_index < < " ), unlocked " < < daemon_resp . outs [ i ] . unlocked < < " , key " < < daemon_resp . outs [ i ] . key ) ;
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tx_add_fake_output ( outs , req . outputs [ i ] . index , daemon_resp . outs [ i ] . key , daemon_resp . outs [ i ] . mask , td . m_global_output_index , daemon_resp . outs [ i ] . unlocked ) ;
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}
if ( outs . back ( ) . size ( ) < fake_outputs_count + 1 )
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{
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scanty_outs [ td . is_rct ( ) ? 0 : td . amount ( ) ] = outs . back ( ) . size ( ) ;
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}
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else
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{
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// sort the subsection, so any spares are reset in order
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std : : sort ( outs . back ( ) . begin ( ) , outs . back ( ) . end ( ) , [ ] ( const get_outs_entry & a , const get_outs_entry & b ) { return std : : get < 0 > ( a ) < std : : get < 0 > ( b ) ; } ) ;
2015-07-19 22:47:13 +00:00
}
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base + = requested_outputs_count ;
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}
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( ! scanty_outs . empty ( ) , error : : not_enough_outs_to_mix , scanty_outs , fake_outputs_count ) ;
}
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else
{
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for ( size_t idx : selected_transfers )
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{
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const transfer_details & td = m_transfers [ idx ] ;
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std : : vector < get_outs_entry > v ;
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const rct : : key mask = td . is_rct ( ) ? rct : : commit ( td . amount ( ) , td . m_mask ) : rct : : zeroCommit ( td . amount ( ) ) ;
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v . push_back ( std : : make_tuple ( td . m_global_output_index , td . get_public_key ( ) , mask ) ) ;
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outs . push_back ( v ) ;
}
}
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}
template < typename T >
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void wallet2 : : transfer_selected ( const std : : vector < cryptonote : : tx_destination_entry > & dsts , const std : : vector < size_t > & selected_transfers , size_t fake_outputs_count ,
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std : : vector < std : : vector < tools : : wallet2 : : get_outs_entry > > & outs ,
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uint64_t unlock_time , uint64_t fee , const std : : vector < uint8_t > & extra , T destination_split_strategy , const tx_dust_policy & dust_policy , cryptonote : : transaction & tx , pending_tx & ptx )
{
using namespace cryptonote ;
// throw if attempting a transaction with no destinations
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( dsts . empty ( ) , error : : zero_destination ) ;
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THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( m_multisig , error : : wallet_internal_error , " Multisig wallets cannot spend non rct outputs " ) ;
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uint64_t upper_transaction_size_limit = get_upper_transaction_size_limit ( ) ;
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uint64_t needed_money = fee ;
LOG_PRINT_L2 ( " transfer: starting with fee " < < print_money ( needed_money ) ) ;
// calculate total amount being sent to all destinations
// throw if total amount overflows uint64_t
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for ( auto & dt : dsts )
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{
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( 0 = = dt . amount , error : : zero_destination ) ;
needed_money + = dt . amount ;
LOG_PRINT_L2 ( " transfer: adding " < < print_money ( dt . amount ) < < " , for a total of " < < print_money ( needed_money ) ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( needed_money < dt . amount , error : : tx_sum_overflow , dsts , fee , m_testnet ) ;
}
uint64_t found_money = 0 ;
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for ( size_t idx : selected_transfers )
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{
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found_money + = m_transfers [ idx ] . amount ( ) ;
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}
LOG_PRINT_L2 ( " wanted " < < print_money ( needed_money ) < < " , found " < < print_money ( found_money ) < < " , fee " < < print_money ( fee ) ) ;
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THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( found_money < needed_money , error : : not_enough_unlocked_money , found_money , needed_money - fee , fee ) ;
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2017-02-19 02:42:10 +00:00
uint32_t subaddr_account = m_transfers [ * selected_transfers . begin ( ) ] . m_subaddr_index . major ;
for ( auto i = + + selected_transfers . begin ( ) ; i ! = selected_transfers . end ( ) ; + + i )
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( subaddr_account ! = m_transfers [ * i ] . m_subaddr_index . major , error : : wallet_internal_error , " the tx uses funds from multiple accounts " ) ;
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if ( outs . empty ( ) )
get_outs ( outs , selected_transfers , fake_outputs_count ) ; // may throw
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//prepare inputs
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LOG_PRINT_L2 ( " preparing outputs " ) ;
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typedef cryptonote : : tx_source_entry : : output_entry tx_output_entry ;
size_t i = 0 , out_index = 0 ;
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std : : vector < cryptonote : : tx_source_entry > sources ;
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for ( size_t idx : selected_transfers )
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{
sources . resize ( sources . size ( ) + 1 ) ;
cryptonote : : tx_source_entry & src = sources . back ( ) ;
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const transfer_details & td = m_transfers [ idx ] ;
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src . amount = td . amount ( ) ;
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src . rct = td . is_rct ( ) ;
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//paste keys (fake and real)
for ( size_t n = 0 ; n < fake_outputs_count + 1 ; + + n )
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{
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tx_output_entry oe ;
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oe . first = std : : get < 0 > ( outs [ out_index ] [ n ] ) ;
oe . second . dest = rct : : pk2rct ( std : : get < 1 > ( outs [ out_index ] [ n ] ) ) ;
oe . second . mask = std : : get < 2 > ( outs [ out_index ] [ n ] ) ;
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src . outputs . push_back ( oe ) ;
+ + i ;
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}
//paste real transaction to the random index
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auto it_to_replace = std : : find_if ( src . outputs . begin ( ) , src . outputs . end ( ) , [ & ] ( const tx_output_entry & a )
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{
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return a . first = = td . m_global_output_index ;
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} ) ;
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THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( it_to_replace = = src . outputs . end ( ) , error : : wallet_internal_error ,
" real output not found " ) ;
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tx_output_entry real_oe ;
real_oe . first = td . m_global_output_index ;
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real_oe . second . dest = rct : : pk2rct ( boost : : get < txout_to_key > ( td . m_tx . vout [ td . m_internal_output_index ] . target ) . key ) ;
real_oe . second . mask = rct : : commit ( td . amount ( ) , td . m_mask ) ;
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* it_to_replace = real_oe ;
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src . real_out_tx_key = get_tx_pub_key_from_extra ( td . m_tx , td . m_pk_index ) ;
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src . real_out_additional_tx_keys = get_additional_tx_pub_keys_from_extra ( td . m_tx ) ;
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src . real_output = it_to_replace - src . outputs . begin ( ) ;
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src . real_output_in_tx_index = td . m_internal_output_index ;
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src . multisig_kLRki = rct : : multisig_kLRki ( { rct : : zero ( ) , rct : : zero ( ) , rct : : zero ( ) , rct : : zero ( ) } ) ;
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detail : : print_source_entry ( src ) ;
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+ + out_index ;
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}
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LOG_PRINT_L2 ( " outputs prepared " ) ;
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cryptonote : : tx_destination_entry change_dts = AUTO_VAL_INIT ( change_dts ) ;
if ( needed_money < found_money )
{
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change_dts . addr = get_subaddress ( { subaddr_account , 0 } ) ;
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change_dts . amount = found_money - needed_money ;
}
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std : : vector < cryptonote : : tx_destination_entry > splitted_dsts , dust_dsts ;
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uint64_t dust = 0 ;
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destination_split_strategy ( dsts , change_dts , dust_policy . dust_threshold , splitted_dsts , dust_dsts ) ;
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for ( auto & d : dust_dsts ) {
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THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( dust_policy . dust_threshold < d . amount , error : : wallet_internal_error , " invalid dust value: dust = " +
std : : to_string ( d . amount ) + " , dust_threshold = " + std : : to_string ( dust_policy . dust_threshold ) ) ;
}
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for ( auto & d : dust_dsts ) {
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if ( ! dust_policy . add_to_fee )
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splitted_dsts . push_back ( cryptonote : : tx_destination_entry ( d . amount , dust_policy . addr_for_dust , d . is_subaddress ) ) ;
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dust + = d . amount ;
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}
2015-08-19 19:59:44 +00:00
crypto : : secret_key tx_key ;
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std : : vector < crypto : : secret_key > additional_tx_keys ;
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing
Scheme by luigi1111:
Multisig for RingCT on Monero
2 of 2
User A (coordinator):
Spendkey b,B
Viewkey a,A (shared)
User B:
Spendkey c,C
Viewkey a,A (shared)
Public Address: C+B, A
Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a
A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants)
A and B watch for incoming outputs
B creates "half" key images for discovered output D:
I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D)
B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D),
and sending the pubkeys with I2_D.
A also creates "half" key images:
I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D)
Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D
Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction).
A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D
to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R).
At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r,
which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo).
B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well).
B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D
to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well.
NOTE:
A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively.
Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible:
A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B.
B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A.
The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time!
The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature).
2 of 3
User A (coordinator)
Shared viewkey a,A
"spendkey" j,J
User B
"spendkey" k,K
User C
"spendkey" m,M
A collects K and M from B and C
B collects J and M from A and C
C collects J and K from A and B
A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK)
A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM)
B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK)
B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate
Address: N+O+P, A
The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other
needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two.
Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties:
A gives j to B
B gives k to C
C gives m to A
Address: J+K+M, A
3 of 3
Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others.
The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it
or send it back to A.
N-1 of N
Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around
(using either the secure or insecure method).
For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up):
[4 of 5]
User: spendkey
A: a
B: b
C: c
D: d
E: e
a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A
Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with
the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys.
Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each.
Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning:
1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image)
2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator
must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use.
You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might
also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format.
You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc.
The process is somewhat cumbersome:
To create a N/N multisig wallet:
- each participant creates a normal wallet
- each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant
- each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N)
As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent:
- each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant
- each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants
Then, a transaction may be initiated:
- one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT"
- this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file
- the initiator sends this file to another participant
- that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx"
- the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again
- if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed
- the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 21:34:26 +00:00
rct : : multisig_out msout ;
2017-01-07 16:06:07 +00:00
LOG_PRINT_L2 ( " constructing tx " ) ;
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing
Scheme by luigi1111:
Multisig for RingCT on Monero
2 of 2
User A (coordinator):
Spendkey b,B
Viewkey a,A (shared)
User B:
Spendkey c,C
Viewkey a,A (shared)
Public Address: C+B, A
Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a
A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants)
A and B watch for incoming outputs
B creates "half" key images for discovered output D:
I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D)
B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D),
and sending the pubkeys with I2_D.
A also creates "half" key images:
I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D)
Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D
Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction).
A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D
to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R).
At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r,
which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo).
B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well).
B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D
to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well.
NOTE:
A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively.
Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible:
A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B.
B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A.
The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time!
The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature).
2 of 3
User A (coordinator)
Shared viewkey a,A
"spendkey" j,J
User B
"spendkey" k,K
User C
"spendkey" m,M
A collects K and M from B and C
B collects J and M from A and C
C collects J and K from A and B
A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK)
A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM)
B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK)
B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate
Address: N+O+P, A
The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other
needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two.
Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties:
A gives j to B
B gives k to C
C gives m to A
Address: J+K+M, A
3 of 3
Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others.
The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it
or send it back to A.
N-1 of N
Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around
(using either the secure or insecure method).
For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up):
[4 of 5]
User: spendkey
A: a
B: b
C: c
D: d
E: e
a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A
Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with
the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys.
Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each.
Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning:
1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image)
2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator
must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use.
You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might
also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format.
You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc.
The process is somewhat cumbersome:
To create a N/N multisig wallet:
- each participant creates a normal wallet
- each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant
- each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N)
As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent:
- each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant
- each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants
Then, a transaction may be initiated:
- one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT"
- this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file
- the initiator sends this file to another participant
- that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx"
- the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again
- if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed
- the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 21:34:26 +00:00
bool r = cryptonote : : construct_tx_and_get_tx_key ( m_account . get_keys ( ) , m_subaddresses , sources , splitted_dsts , change_dts . addr , extra , tx , unlock_time , tx_key , additional_tx_keys , false , false , m_multisig ? & msout : NULL ) ;
2017-01-07 16:06:07 +00:00
LOG_PRINT_L2 ( " constructed tx, r= " < < r ) ;
2015-07-19 22:47:13 +00:00
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( ! r , error : : tx_not_constructed , sources , splitted_dsts , unlock_time , m_testnet ) ;
2016-01-10 11:56:13 +00:00
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( upper_transaction_size_limit < = get_object_blobsize ( tx ) , error : : tx_too_big , tx , upper_transaction_size_limit ) ;
2015-07-19 22:47:13 +00:00
std : : string key_images ;
bool all_are_txin_to_key = std : : all_of ( tx . vin . begin ( ) , tx . vin . end ( ) , [ & ] ( const txin_v & s_e ) - > bool
{
CHECKED_GET_SPECIFIC_VARIANT ( s_e , const txin_to_key , in , false ) ;
key_images + = boost : : to_string ( in . k_image ) + " " ;
return true ;
} ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( ! all_are_txin_to_key , error : : unexpected_txin_type , tx ) ;
2016-04-18 02:57:47 +00:00
bool dust_sent_elsewhere = ( dust_policy . addr_for_dust . m_view_public_key ! = change_dts . addr . m_view_public_key
| | dust_policy . addr_for_dust . m_spend_public_key ! = change_dts . addr . m_spend_public_key ) ;
2016-04-18 08:20:31 +00:00
if ( dust_policy . add_to_fee | | dust_sent_elsewhere ) change_dts . amount - = dust ;
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ptx . key_images = key_images ;
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ptx . fee = ( dust_policy . add_to_fee ? fee + dust : fee ) ;
ptx . dust = ( ( dust_policy . add_to_fee | | dust_sent_elsewhere ) ? dust : 0 ) ;
ptx . dust_added_to_fee = dust_policy . add_to_fee ;
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ptx . tx = tx ;
ptx . change_dts = change_dts ;
ptx . selected_transfers = selected_transfers ;
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ptx . tx_key = tx_key ;
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ptx . additional_tx_keys = additional_tx_keys ;
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ptx . dests = dsts ;
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ptx . construction_data . sources = sources ;
ptx . construction_data . change_dts = change_dts ;
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ptx . construction_data . splitted_dsts = splitted_dsts ;
ptx . construction_data . selected_transfers = selected_transfers ;
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ptx . construction_data . extra = tx . extra ;
ptx . construction_data . unlock_time = unlock_time ;
ptx . construction_data . use_rct = false ;
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ptx . construction_data . dests = dsts ;
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// record which subaddress indices are being used as inputs
ptx . construction_data . subaddr_account = subaddr_account ;
ptx . construction_data . subaddr_indices . clear ( ) ;
for ( size_t idx : selected_transfers )
ptx . construction_data . subaddr_indices . insert ( m_transfers [ idx ] . m_subaddr_index . minor ) ;
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LOG_PRINT_L2 ( " transfer_selected done " ) ;
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}
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void wallet2 : : transfer_selected_rct ( std : : vector < cryptonote : : tx_destination_entry > dsts , const std : : vector < size_t > & selected_transfers , size_t fake_outputs_count ,
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std : : vector < std : : vector < tools : : wallet2 : : get_outs_entry > > & outs ,
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uint64_t unlock_time , uint64_t fee , const std : : vector < uint8_t > & extra , cryptonote : : transaction & tx , pending_tx & ptx , bool bulletproof )
2016-06-15 22:37:13 +00:00
{
using namespace cryptonote ;
// throw if attempting a transaction with no destinations
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( dsts . empty ( ) , error : : zero_destination ) ;
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uint64_t upper_transaction_size_limit = get_upper_transaction_size_limit ( ) ;
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uint64_t needed_money = fee ;
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LOG_PRINT_L2 ( " transfer_selected_rct: starting with fee " < < print_money ( needed_money ) ) ;
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LOG_PRINT_L2 ( " selected transfers: " < < strjoin ( selected_transfers , " " ) ) ;
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// calculate total amount being sent to all destinations
// throw if total amount overflows uint64_t
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for ( auto & dt : dsts )
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{
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( 0 = = dt . amount , error : : zero_destination ) ;
needed_money + = dt . amount ;
LOG_PRINT_L2 ( " transfer: adding " < < print_money ( dt . amount ) < < " , for a total of " < < print_money ( needed_money ) ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( needed_money < dt . amount , error : : tx_sum_overflow , dsts , fee , m_testnet ) ;
}
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// if this is a multisig wallet, create a list of multisig signers we can use
std : : deque < crypto : : public_key > multisig_signers ;
size_t n_multisig_txes = 0 ;
if ( m_multisig & & ! m_transfers . empty ( ) )
{
const crypto : : public_key local_signer = get_multisig_signer_public_key ( ) ;
size_t n_available_signers = 1 ;
for ( const crypto : : public_key & signer : m_multisig_signers )
{
if ( signer = = local_signer )
continue ;
multisig_signers . push_front ( signer ) ;
for ( const auto & i : m_transfers [ 0 ] . m_multisig_info )
{
if ( i . m_signer = = signer )
{
multisig_signers . pop_front ( ) ;
multisig_signers . push_back ( signer ) ;
+ + n_available_signers ;
break ;
}
}
}
multisig_signers . push_back ( local_signer ) ;
MDEBUG ( " We can use " < < n_available_signers < < " / " < < m_multisig_signers . size ( ) < < " other signers " ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( n_available_signers + 1 < m_multisig_threshold , error : : multisig_import_needed ) ;
n_multisig_txes = n_available_signers = = m_multisig_signers . size ( ) ? m_multisig_threshold : 1 ;
MDEBUG ( " We will create " < < n_multisig_txes < < " txes " ) ;
}
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uint64_t found_money = 0 ;
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for ( size_t idx : selected_transfers )
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{
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found_money + = m_transfers [ idx ] . amount ( ) ;
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}
LOG_PRINT_L2 ( " wanted " < < print_money ( needed_money ) < < " , found " < < print_money ( found_money ) < < " , fee " < < print_money ( fee ) ) ;
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THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( found_money < needed_money , error : : not_enough_unlocked_money , found_money , needed_money - fee , fee ) ;
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2017-02-19 02:42:10 +00:00
uint32_t subaddr_account = m_transfers [ * selected_transfers . begin ( ) ] . m_subaddr_index . major ;
for ( auto i = + + selected_transfers . begin ( ) ; i ! = selected_transfers . end ( ) ; + + i )
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( subaddr_account ! = m_transfers [ * i ] . m_subaddr_index . major , error : : wallet_internal_error , " the tx uses funds from multiple accounts " ) ;
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if ( outs . empty ( ) )
get_outs ( outs , selected_transfers , fake_outputs_count ) ; // may throw
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//prepare inputs
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LOG_PRINT_L2 ( " preparing outputs " ) ;
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size_t i = 0 , out_index = 0 ;
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std : : vector < cryptonote : : tx_source_entry > sources ;
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std : : unordered_set < rct : : key > used_L ;
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for ( size_t idx : selected_transfers )
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{
sources . resize ( sources . size ( ) + 1 ) ;
cryptonote : : tx_source_entry & src = sources . back ( ) ;
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const transfer_details & td = m_transfers [ idx ] ;
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src . amount = td . amount ( ) ;
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src . rct = td . is_rct ( ) ;
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//paste mixin transaction
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THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( outs . size ( ) < out_index + 1 , error : : wallet_internal_error , " outs.size() < out_index + 1 " ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( outs [ out_index ] . size ( ) < fake_outputs_count , error : : wallet_internal_error , " fake_outputs_count > random outputs found " ) ;
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typedef cryptonote : : tx_source_entry : : output_entry tx_output_entry ;
for ( size_t n = 0 ; n < fake_outputs_count + 1 ; + + n )
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{
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tx_output_entry oe ;
oe . first = std : : get < 0 > ( outs [ out_index ] [ n ] ) ;
oe . second . dest = rct : : pk2rct ( std : : get < 1 > ( outs [ out_index ] [ n ] ) ) ;
oe . second . mask = std : : get < 2 > ( outs [ out_index ] [ n ] ) ;
src . outputs . push_back ( oe ) ;
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}
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+ + i ;
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//paste real transaction to the random index
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auto it_to_replace = std : : find_if ( src . outputs . begin ( ) , src . outputs . end ( ) , [ & ] ( const tx_output_entry & a )
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{
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return a . first = = td . m_global_output_index ;
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} ) ;
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THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( it_to_replace = = src . outputs . end ( ) , error : : wallet_internal_error ,
" real output not found " ) ;
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tx_output_entry real_oe ;
real_oe . first = td . m_global_output_index ;
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real_oe . second . dest = rct : : pk2rct ( td . get_public_key ( ) ) ;
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real_oe . second . mask = rct : : commit ( td . amount ( ) , td . m_mask ) ;
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* it_to_replace = real_oe ;
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src . real_out_tx_key = get_tx_pub_key_from_extra ( td . m_tx , td . m_pk_index ) ;
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src . real_out_additional_tx_keys = get_additional_tx_pub_keys_from_extra ( td . m_tx ) ;
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src . real_output = it_to_replace - src . outputs . begin ( ) ;
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src . real_output_in_tx_index = td . m_internal_output_index ;
src . mask = td . m_mask ;
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing
Scheme by luigi1111:
Multisig for RingCT on Monero
2 of 2
User A (coordinator):
Spendkey b,B
Viewkey a,A (shared)
User B:
Spendkey c,C
Viewkey a,A (shared)
Public Address: C+B, A
Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a
A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants)
A and B watch for incoming outputs
B creates "half" key images for discovered output D:
I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D)
B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D),
and sending the pubkeys with I2_D.
A also creates "half" key images:
I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D)
Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D
Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction).
A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D
to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R).
At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r,
which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo).
B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well).
B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D
to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well.
NOTE:
A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively.
Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible:
A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B.
B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A.
The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time!
The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature).
2 of 3
User A (coordinator)
Shared viewkey a,A
"spendkey" j,J
User B
"spendkey" k,K
User C
"spendkey" m,M
A collects K and M from B and C
B collects J and M from A and C
C collects J and K from A and B
A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK)
A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM)
B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK)
B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate
Address: N+O+P, A
The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other
needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two.
Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties:
A gives j to B
B gives k to C
C gives m to A
Address: J+K+M, A
3 of 3
Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others.
The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it
or send it back to A.
N-1 of N
Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around
(using either the secure or insecure method).
For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up):
[4 of 5]
User: spendkey
A: a
B: b
C: c
D: d
E: e
a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A
Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with
the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys.
Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each.
Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning:
1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image)
2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator
must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use.
You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might
also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format.
You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc.
The process is somewhat cumbersome:
To create a N/N multisig wallet:
- each participant creates a normal wallet
- each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant
- each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N)
As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent:
- each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant
- each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants
Then, a transaction may be initiated:
- one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT"
- this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file
- the initiator sends this file to another participant
- that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx"
- the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again
- if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed
- the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 21:34:26 +00:00
if ( m_multisig )
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{
crypto : : public_key ignore = m_multisig_threshold = = m_multisig_signers . size ( ) ? crypto : : null_pkey : multisig_signers . front ( ) ;
src . multisig_kLRki = get_multisig_composite_kLRki ( idx , ignore , used_L , used_L ) ;
}
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing
Scheme by luigi1111:
Multisig for RingCT on Monero
2 of 2
User A (coordinator):
Spendkey b,B
Viewkey a,A (shared)
User B:
Spendkey c,C
Viewkey a,A (shared)
Public Address: C+B, A
Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a
A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants)
A and B watch for incoming outputs
B creates "half" key images for discovered output D:
I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D)
B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D),
and sending the pubkeys with I2_D.
A also creates "half" key images:
I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D)
Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D
Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction).
A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D
to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R).
At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r,
which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo).
B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well).
B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D
to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well.
NOTE:
A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively.
Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible:
A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B.
B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A.
The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time!
The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature).
2 of 3
User A (coordinator)
Shared viewkey a,A
"spendkey" j,J
User B
"spendkey" k,K
User C
"spendkey" m,M
A collects K and M from B and C
B collects J and M from A and C
C collects J and K from A and B
A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK)
A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM)
B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK)
B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate
Address: N+O+P, A
The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other
needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two.
Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties:
A gives j to B
B gives k to C
C gives m to A
Address: J+K+M, A
3 of 3
Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others.
The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it
or send it back to A.
N-1 of N
Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around
(using either the secure or insecure method).
For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up):
[4 of 5]
User: spendkey
A: a
B: b
C: c
D: d
E: e
a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A
Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with
the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys.
Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each.
Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning:
1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image)
2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator
must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use.
You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might
also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format.
You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc.
The process is somewhat cumbersome:
To create a N/N multisig wallet:
- each participant creates a normal wallet
- each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant
- each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N)
As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent:
- each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant
- each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants
Then, a transaction may be initiated:
- one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT"
- this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file
- the initiator sends this file to another participant
- that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx"
- the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again
- if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed
- the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 21:34:26 +00:00
else
src . multisig_kLRki = rct : : multisig_kLRki ( { rct : : zero ( ) , rct : : zero ( ) , rct : : zero ( ) , rct : : zero ( ) } ) ;
2016-06-15 22:37:13 +00:00
detail : : print_source_entry ( src ) ;
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+ + out_index ;
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}
2017-01-07 16:06:07 +00:00
LOG_PRINT_L2 ( " outputs prepared " ) ;
2016-06-15 22:37:13 +00:00
2016-09-18 11:04:23 +00:00
// we still keep a copy, since we want to keep dsts free of change for user feedback purposes
std : : vector < cryptonote : : tx_destination_entry > splitted_dsts = dsts ;
2016-06-15 22:37:13 +00:00
cryptonote : : tx_destination_entry change_dts = AUTO_VAL_INIT ( change_dts ) ;
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change_dts . amount = found_money - needed_money ;
if ( change_dts . amount = = 0 )
{
2017-11-13 14:08:10 +00:00
if ( splitted_dsts . size ( ) = = 1 )
{
// If the change is 0, send it to a random address, to avoid confusing
// the sender with a 0 amount output. We send a 0 amount in order to avoid
// letting the destination be able to work out which of the inputs is the
// real one in our rings
LOG_PRINT_L2 ( " generating dummy address for 0 change " ) ;
cryptonote : : account_base dummy ;
dummy . generate ( ) ;
change_dts . addr = dummy . get_keys ( ) . m_account_address ;
LOG_PRINT_L2 ( " generated dummy address for 0 change " ) ;
splitted_dsts . push_back ( change_dts ) ;
}
2016-12-07 21:05:50 +00:00
}
else
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{
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change_dts . addr = get_subaddress ( { subaddr_account , 0 } ) ;
2017-11-13 14:08:10 +00:00
splitted_dsts . push_back ( change_dts ) ;
2016-08-27 09:41:25 +00:00
}
2016-06-15 22:37:13 +00:00
crypto : : secret_key tx_key ;
2017-02-19 02:42:10 +00:00
std : : vector < crypto : : secret_key > additional_tx_keys ;
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing
Scheme by luigi1111:
Multisig for RingCT on Monero
2 of 2
User A (coordinator):
Spendkey b,B
Viewkey a,A (shared)
User B:
Spendkey c,C
Viewkey a,A (shared)
Public Address: C+B, A
Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a
A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants)
A and B watch for incoming outputs
B creates "half" key images for discovered output D:
I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D)
B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D),
and sending the pubkeys with I2_D.
A also creates "half" key images:
I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D)
Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D
Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction).
A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D
to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R).
At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r,
which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo).
B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well).
B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D
to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well.
NOTE:
A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively.
Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible:
A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B.
B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A.
The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time!
The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature).
2 of 3
User A (coordinator)
Shared viewkey a,A
"spendkey" j,J
User B
"spendkey" k,K
User C
"spendkey" m,M
A collects K and M from B and C
B collects J and M from A and C
C collects J and K from A and B
A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK)
A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM)
B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK)
B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate
Address: N+O+P, A
The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other
needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two.
Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties:
A gives j to B
B gives k to C
C gives m to A
Address: J+K+M, A
3 of 3
Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others.
The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it
or send it back to A.
N-1 of N
Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around
(using either the secure or insecure method).
For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up):
[4 of 5]
User: spendkey
A: a
B: b
C: c
D: d
E: e
a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A
Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with
the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys.
Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each.
Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning:
1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image)
2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator
must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use.
You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might
also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format.
You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc.
The process is somewhat cumbersome:
To create a N/N multisig wallet:
- each participant creates a normal wallet
- each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant
- each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N)
As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent:
- each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant
- each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants
Then, a transaction may be initiated:
- one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT"
- this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file
- the initiator sends this file to another participant
- that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx"
- the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again
- if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed
- the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 21:34:26 +00:00
rct : : multisig_out msout ;
2017-01-07 16:06:07 +00:00
LOG_PRINT_L2 ( " constructing tx " ) ;
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing
Scheme by luigi1111:
Multisig for RingCT on Monero
2 of 2
User A (coordinator):
Spendkey b,B
Viewkey a,A (shared)
User B:
Spendkey c,C
Viewkey a,A (shared)
Public Address: C+B, A
Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a
A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants)
A and B watch for incoming outputs
B creates "half" key images for discovered output D:
I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D)
B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D),
and sending the pubkeys with I2_D.
A also creates "half" key images:
I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D)
Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D
Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction).
A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D
to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R).
At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r,
which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo).
B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well).
B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D
to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well.
NOTE:
A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively.
Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible:
A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B.
B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A.
The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time!
The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature).
2 of 3
User A (coordinator)
Shared viewkey a,A
"spendkey" j,J
User B
"spendkey" k,K
User C
"spendkey" m,M
A collects K and M from B and C
B collects J and M from A and C
C collects J and K from A and B
A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK)
A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM)
B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK)
B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate
Address: N+O+P, A
The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other
needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two.
Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties:
A gives j to B
B gives k to C
C gives m to A
Address: J+K+M, A
3 of 3
Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others.
The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it
or send it back to A.
N-1 of N
Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around
(using either the secure or insecure method).
For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up):
[4 of 5]
User: spendkey
A: a
B: b
C: c
D: d
E: e
a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A
Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with
the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys.
Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each.
Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning:
1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image)
2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator
must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use.
You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might
also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format.
You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc.
The process is somewhat cumbersome:
To create a N/N multisig wallet:
- each participant creates a normal wallet
- each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant
- each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N)
As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent:
- each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant
- each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants
Then, a transaction may be initiated:
- one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT"
- this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file
- the initiator sends this file to another participant
- that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx"
- the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again
- if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed
- the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 21:34:26 +00:00
auto sources_copy = sources ;
bool r = cryptonote : : construct_tx_and_get_tx_key ( m_account . get_keys ( ) , m_subaddresses , sources , splitted_dsts , change_dts . addr , extra , tx , unlock_time , tx_key , additional_tx_keys , true , bulletproof , m_multisig ? & msout : NULL ) ;
2017-01-07 16:06:07 +00:00
LOG_PRINT_L2 ( " constructed tx, r= " < < r ) ;
2016-06-15 22:37:13 +00:00
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( ! r , error : : tx_not_constructed , sources , dsts , unlock_time , m_testnet ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( upper_transaction_size_limit < = get_object_blobsize ( tx ) , error : : tx_too_big , tx , upper_transaction_size_limit ) ;
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing
Scheme by luigi1111:
Multisig for RingCT on Monero
2 of 2
User A (coordinator):
Spendkey b,B
Viewkey a,A (shared)
User B:
Spendkey c,C
Viewkey a,A (shared)
Public Address: C+B, A
Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a
A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants)
A and B watch for incoming outputs
B creates "half" key images for discovered output D:
I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D)
B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D),
and sending the pubkeys with I2_D.
A also creates "half" key images:
I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D)
Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D
Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction).
A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D
to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R).
At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r,
which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo).
B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well).
B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D
to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well.
NOTE:
A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively.
Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible:
A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B.
B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A.
The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time!
The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature).
2 of 3
User A (coordinator)
Shared viewkey a,A
"spendkey" j,J
User B
"spendkey" k,K
User C
"spendkey" m,M
A collects K and M from B and C
B collects J and M from A and C
C collects J and K from A and B
A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK)
A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM)
B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK)
B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate
Address: N+O+P, A
The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other
needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two.
Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties:
A gives j to B
B gives k to C
C gives m to A
Address: J+K+M, A
3 of 3
Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others.
The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it
or send it back to A.
N-1 of N
Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around
(using either the secure or insecure method).
For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up):
[4 of 5]
User: spendkey
A: a
B: b
C: c
D: d
E: e
a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A
Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with
the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys.
Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each.
Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning:
1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image)
2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator
must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use.
You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might
also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format.
You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc.
The process is somewhat cumbersome:
To create a N/N multisig wallet:
- each participant creates a normal wallet
- each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant
- each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N)
As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent:
- each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant
- each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants
Then, a transaction may be initiated:
- one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT"
- this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file
- the initiator sends this file to another participant
- that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx"
- the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again
- if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed
- the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 21:34:26 +00:00
// work out the permutation done on sources
std : : vector < size_t > ins_order ;
for ( size_t n = 0 ; n < sources . size ( ) ; + + n )
{
for ( size_t idx = 0 ; idx < sources_copy . size ( ) ; + + idx )
{
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( ( size_t ) sources_copy [ idx ] . real_output > = sources_copy [ idx ] . outputs . size ( ) ,
error : : wallet_internal_error , " Invalid real_output " ) ;
if ( sources_copy [ idx ] . outputs [ sources_copy [ idx ] . real_output ] . second . dest = = sources [ n ] . outputs [ sources [ n ] . real_output ] . second . dest )
ins_order . push_back ( idx ) ;
}
}
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( ins_order . size ( ) ! = sources . size ( ) , error : : wallet_internal_error , " Failed to work out sources permutation " ) ;
2017-08-13 14:29:31 +00:00
std : : vector < tools : : wallet2 : : multisig_sig > multisig_sigs ;
if ( m_multisig )
{
crypto : : public_key ignore = m_multisig_threshold = = m_multisig_signers . size ( ) ? crypto : : null_pkey : multisig_signers . front ( ) ;
multisig_sigs . push_back ( { tx . rct_signatures , ignore , used_L , { } , msout } ) ;
if ( m_multisig_threshold < m_multisig_signers . size ( ) )
{
const crypto : : hash prefix_hash = cryptonote : : get_transaction_prefix_hash ( tx ) ;
// create the other versions, one for every other participant (the first one's already done above)
for ( size_t signer_index = 1 ; signer_index < n_multisig_txes ; + + signer_index )
{
std : : unordered_set < rct : : key > new_used_L ;
size_t src_idx = 0 ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( selected_transfers . size ( ) ! = sources . size ( ) , error : : wallet_internal_error , " mismatched selected_transfers and sources sixes " ) ;
for ( size_t idx : selected_transfers )
{
cryptonote : : tx_source_entry & src = sources [ src_idx ] ;
src . multisig_kLRki = get_multisig_composite_kLRki ( idx , multisig_signers [ signer_index ] , used_L , new_used_L ) ;
+ + src_idx ;
}
LOG_PRINT_L2 ( " Creating supplementary multisig transaction " ) ;
cryptonote : : transaction ms_tx ;
auto sources_copy_copy = sources_copy ;
2017-09-26 22:16:25 +00:00
bool r = cryptonote : : construct_tx_with_tx_key ( m_account . get_keys ( ) , m_subaddresses , sources_copy_copy , splitted_dsts , change_dts . addr , extra , ms_tx , unlock_time , tx_key , additional_tx_keys , true , bulletproof , & msout ) ;
2017-08-13 14:29:31 +00:00
LOG_PRINT_L2 ( " constructed tx, r= " < < r ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( ! r , error : : tx_not_constructed , sources , splitted_dsts , unlock_time , m_testnet ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( upper_transaction_size_limit < = get_object_blobsize ( tx ) , error : : tx_too_big , tx , upper_transaction_size_limit ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( cryptonote : : get_transaction_prefix_hash ( ms_tx ) ! = prefix_hash , error : : wallet_internal_error , " Multisig txes do not share prefix " ) ;
multisig_sigs . push_back ( { ms_tx . rct_signatures , multisig_signers [ signer_index ] , new_used_L , { } , msout } ) ;
ms_tx . rct_signatures = tx . rct_signatures ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( cryptonote : : get_transaction_hash ( ms_tx ) ! = cryptonote : : get_transaction_hash ( tx ) , error : : wallet_internal_error , " Multisig txes differ by more than the signatures " ) ;
}
}
}
2017-01-07 16:06:07 +00:00
LOG_PRINT_L2 ( " gathering key images " ) ;
2016-06-15 22:37:13 +00:00
std : : string key_images ;
bool all_are_txin_to_key = std : : all_of ( tx . vin . begin ( ) , tx . vin . end ( ) , [ & ] ( const txin_v & s_e ) - > bool
{
CHECKED_GET_SPECIFIC_VARIANT ( s_e , const txin_to_key , in , false ) ;
key_images + = boost : : to_string ( in . k_image ) + " " ;
return true ;
} ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( ! all_are_txin_to_key , error : : unexpected_txin_type , tx ) ;
2017-01-07 16:06:07 +00:00
LOG_PRINT_L2 ( " gathered key images " ) ;
2016-06-15 22:37:13 +00:00
ptx . key_images = key_images ;
ptx . fee = fee ;
ptx . dust = 0 ;
ptx . dust_added_to_fee = false ;
ptx . tx = tx ;
ptx . change_dts = change_dts ;
ptx . selected_transfers = selected_transfers ;
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing
Scheme by luigi1111:
Multisig for RingCT on Monero
2 of 2
User A (coordinator):
Spendkey b,B
Viewkey a,A (shared)
User B:
Spendkey c,C
Viewkey a,A (shared)
Public Address: C+B, A
Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a
A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants)
A and B watch for incoming outputs
B creates "half" key images for discovered output D:
I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D)
B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D),
and sending the pubkeys with I2_D.
A also creates "half" key images:
I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D)
Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D
Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction).
A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D
to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R).
At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r,
which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo).
B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well).
B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D
to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well.
NOTE:
A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively.
Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible:
A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B.
B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A.
The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time!
The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature).
2 of 3
User A (coordinator)
Shared viewkey a,A
"spendkey" j,J
User B
"spendkey" k,K
User C
"spendkey" m,M
A collects K and M from B and C
B collects J and M from A and C
C collects J and K from A and B
A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK)
A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM)
B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK)
B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate
Address: N+O+P, A
The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other
needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two.
Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties:
A gives j to B
B gives k to C
C gives m to A
Address: J+K+M, A
3 of 3
Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others.
The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it
or send it back to A.
N-1 of N
Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around
(using either the secure or insecure method).
For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up):
[4 of 5]
User: spendkey
A: a
B: b
C: c
D: d
E: e
a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A
Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with
the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys.
Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each.
Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning:
1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image)
2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator
must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use.
You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might
also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format.
You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc.
The process is somewhat cumbersome:
To create a N/N multisig wallet:
- each participant creates a normal wallet
- each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant
- each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N)
As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent:
- each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant
- each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants
Then, a transaction may be initiated:
- one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT"
- this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file
- the initiator sends this file to another participant
- that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx"
- the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again
- if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed
- the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 21:34:26 +00:00
tools : : apply_permutation ( ins_order , ptx . selected_transfers ) ;
2016-06-15 22:37:13 +00:00
ptx . tx_key = tx_key ;
2017-02-19 02:42:10 +00:00
ptx . additional_tx_keys = additional_tx_keys ;
2016-06-15 22:37:13 +00:00
ptx . dests = dsts ;
2017-08-13 14:29:31 +00:00
ptx . multisig_sigs = multisig_sigs ;
ptx . construction_data . sources = sources_copy ;
2016-09-26 22:11:10 +00:00
ptx . construction_data . change_dts = change_dts ;
2016-10-25 20:19:47 +00:00
ptx . construction_data . splitted_dsts = splitted_dsts ;
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing
Scheme by luigi1111:
Multisig for RingCT on Monero
2 of 2
User A (coordinator):
Spendkey b,B
Viewkey a,A (shared)
User B:
Spendkey c,C
Viewkey a,A (shared)
Public Address: C+B, A
Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a
A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants)
A and B watch for incoming outputs
B creates "half" key images for discovered output D:
I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D)
B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D),
and sending the pubkeys with I2_D.
A also creates "half" key images:
I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D)
Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D
Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction).
A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D
to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R).
At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r,
which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo).
B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well).
B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D
to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well.
NOTE:
A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively.
Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible:
A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B.
B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A.
The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time!
The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature).
2 of 3
User A (coordinator)
Shared viewkey a,A
"spendkey" j,J
User B
"spendkey" k,K
User C
"spendkey" m,M
A collects K and M from B and C
B collects J and M from A and C
C collects J and K from A and B
A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK)
A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM)
B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK)
B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate
Address: N+O+P, A
The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other
needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two.
Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties:
A gives j to B
B gives k to C
C gives m to A
Address: J+K+M, A
3 of 3
Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others.
The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it
or send it back to A.
N-1 of N
Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around
(using either the secure or insecure method).
For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up):
[4 of 5]
User: spendkey
A: a
B: b
C: c
D: d
E: e
a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A
Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with
the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys.
Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each.
Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning:
1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image)
2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator
must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use.
You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might
also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format.
You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc.
The process is somewhat cumbersome:
To create a N/N multisig wallet:
- each participant creates a normal wallet
- each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant
- each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N)
As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent:
- each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant
- each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants
Then, a transaction may be initiated:
- one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT"
- this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file
- the initiator sends this file to another participant
- that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx"
- the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again
- if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed
- the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 21:34:26 +00:00
ptx . construction_data . selected_transfers = ptx . selected_transfers ;
2016-09-26 22:11:10 +00:00
ptx . construction_data . extra = tx . extra ;
ptx . construction_data . unlock_time = unlock_time ;
ptx . construction_data . use_rct = true ;
2016-11-23 20:10:34 +00:00
ptx . construction_data . dests = dsts ;
2017-02-19 02:42:10 +00:00
// record which subaddress indices are being used as inputs
ptx . construction_data . subaddr_account = subaddr_account ;
ptx . construction_data . subaddr_indices . clear ( ) ;
for ( size_t idx : selected_transfers )
ptx . construction_data . subaddr_indices . insert ( m_transfers [ idx ] . m_subaddr_index . minor ) ;
2017-01-07 16:06:07 +00:00
LOG_PRINT_L2 ( " transfer_selected_rct done " ) ;
2016-06-15 22:37:13 +00:00
}
2017-02-19 02:42:10 +00:00
std : : vector < size_t > wallet2 : : pick_preferred_rct_inputs ( uint64_t needed_money , uint32_t subaddr_account , const std : : set < uint32_t > & subaddr_indices ) const
2016-07-02 16:37:39 +00:00
{
std : : vector < size_t > picks ;
float current_output_relatdness = 1.0f ;
2016-12-04 13:13:54 +00:00
LOG_PRINT_L2 ( " pick_preferred_rct_inputs: needed_money " < < print_money ( needed_money ) ) ;
2016-07-02 16:37:39 +00:00
2017-11-13 21:50:37 +00:00
// try to find two outputs
2016-07-02 16:37:39 +00:00
// this could be made better by picking one of the outputs to be a small one, since those
// are less useful since often below the needed money, so if one can be used in a pair,
// it gets rid of it for the future
for ( size_t i = 0 ; i < m_transfers . size ( ) ; + + i )
{
const transfer_details & td = m_transfers [ i ] ;
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing
Scheme by luigi1111:
Multisig for RingCT on Monero
2 of 2
User A (coordinator):
Spendkey b,B
Viewkey a,A (shared)
User B:
Spendkey c,C
Viewkey a,A (shared)
Public Address: C+B, A
Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a
A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants)
A and B watch for incoming outputs
B creates "half" key images for discovered output D:
I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D)
B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D),
and sending the pubkeys with I2_D.
A also creates "half" key images:
I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D)
Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D
Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction).
A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D
to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R).
At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r,
which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo).
B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well).
B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D
to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well.
NOTE:
A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively.
Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible:
A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B.
B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A.
The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time!
The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature).
2 of 3
User A (coordinator)
Shared viewkey a,A
"spendkey" j,J
User B
"spendkey" k,K
User C
"spendkey" m,M
A collects K and M from B and C
B collects J and M from A and C
C collects J and K from A and B
A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK)
A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM)
B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK)
B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate
Address: N+O+P, A
The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other
needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two.
Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties:
A gives j to B
B gives k to C
C gives m to A
Address: J+K+M, A
3 of 3
Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others.
The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it
or send it back to A.
N-1 of N
Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around
(using either the secure or insecure method).
For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up):
[4 of 5]
User: spendkey
A: a
B: b
C: c
D: d
E: e
a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A
Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with
the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys.
Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each.
Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning:
1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image)
2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator
must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use.
You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might
also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format.
You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc.
The process is somewhat cumbersome:
To create a N/N multisig wallet:
- each participant creates a normal wallet
- each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant
- each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N)
As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent:
- each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant
- each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants
Then, a transaction may be initiated:
- one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT"
- this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file
- the initiator sends this file to another participant
- that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx"
- the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again
- if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed
- the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 21:34:26 +00:00
if ( ! td . m_spent & & ! td . m_key_image_partial & & td . is_rct ( ) & & is_transfer_unlocked ( td ) & & td . m_subaddr_index . major = = subaddr_account & & subaddr_indices . count ( td . m_subaddr_index . minor ) = = 1 )
2016-07-02 16:37:39 +00:00
{
LOG_PRINT_L2 ( " Considering input " < < i < < " , " < < print_money ( td . amount ( ) ) ) ;
for ( size_t j = i + 1 ; j < m_transfers . size ( ) ; + + j )
{
const transfer_details & td2 = m_transfers [ j ] ;
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing
Scheme by luigi1111:
Multisig for RingCT on Monero
2 of 2
User A (coordinator):
Spendkey b,B
Viewkey a,A (shared)
User B:
Spendkey c,C
Viewkey a,A (shared)
Public Address: C+B, A
Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a
A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants)
A and B watch for incoming outputs
B creates "half" key images for discovered output D:
I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D)
B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D),
and sending the pubkeys with I2_D.
A also creates "half" key images:
I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D)
Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D
Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction).
A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D
to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R).
At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r,
which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo).
B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well).
B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D
to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well.
NOTE:
A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively.
Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible:
A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B.
B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A.
The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time!
The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature).
2 of 3
User A (coordinator)
Shared viewkey a,A
"spendkey" j,J
User B
"spendkey" k,K
User C
"spendkey" m,M
A collects K and M from B and C
B collects J and M from A and C
C collects J and K from A and B
A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK)
A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM)
B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK)
B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate
Address: N+O+P, A
The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other
needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two.
Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties:
A gives j to B
B gives k to C
C gives m to A
Address: J+K+M, A
3 of 3
Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others.
The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it
or send it back to A.
N-1 of N
Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around
(using either the secure or insecure method).
For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up):
[4 of 5]
User: spendkey
A: a
B: b
C: c
D: d
E: e
a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A
Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with
the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys.
Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each.
Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning:
1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image)
2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator
must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use.
You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might
also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format.
You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc.
The process is somewhat cumbersome:
To create a N/N multisig wallet:
- each participant creates a normal wallet
- each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant
- each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N)
As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent:
- each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant
- each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants
Then, a transaction may be initiated:
- one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT"
- this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file
- the initiator sends this file to another participant
- that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx"
- the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again
- if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed
- the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 21:34:26 +00:00
if ( ! td2 . m_spent & & ! td . m_key_image_partial & & td2 . is_rct ( ) & & td . amount ( ) + td2 . amount ( ) > = needed_money & & is_transfer_unlocked ( td2 ) & & td2 . m_subaddr_index = = td . m_subaddr_index )
2016-07-02 16:37:39 +00:00
{
// update our picks if those outputs are less related than any we
// already found. If the same, don't update, and oldest suitable outputs
// will be used in preference.
float relatedness = get_output_relatedness ( td , td2 ) ;
LOG_PRINT_L2 ( " with input " < < j < < " , " < < print_money ( td2 . amount ( ) ) < < " , relatedness " < < relatedness ) ;
if ( relatedness < current_output_relatdness )
{
// reset the current picks with those, and return them directly
// if they're unrelated. If they are related, we'll end up returning
// them if we find nothing better
picks . clear ( ) ;
picks . push_back ( i ) ;
picks . push_back ( j ) ;
LOG_PRINT_L0 ( " we could use " < < i < < " and " < < j ) ;
if ( relatedness = = 0.0f )
return picks ;
current_output_relatdness = relatedness ;
}
}
}
}
}
return picks ;
}
2017-03-20 08:44:28 +00:00
bool wallet2 : : should_pick_a_second_output ( bool use_rct , size_t n_transfers , const std : : vector < size_t > & unused_transfers_indices , const std : : vector < size_t > & unused_dust_indices ) const
2017-01-22 15:12:13 +00:00
{
if ( ! use_rct )
return false ;
if ( n_transfers > 1 )
return false ;
if ( unused_dust_indices . empty ( ) & & unused_transfers_indices . empty ( ) )
return false ;
2017-03-20 08:44:28 +00:00
// we want at least one free rct output to avoid a corner case where
// we'd choose a non rct output which doesn't have enough "siblings"
// value-wise on the chain, and thus can't be mixed
bool found = false ;
for ( auto i : unused_dust_indices )
{
if ( m_transfers [ i ] . is_rct ( ) )
{
found = true ;
break ;
}
}
if ( ! found ) for ( auto i : unused_transfers_indices )
{
if ( m_transfers [ i ] . is_rct ( ) )
{
found = true ;
break ;
}
}
if ( ! found )
return false ;
2017-01-22 15:12:13 +00:00
return true ;
}
2017-03-20 08:44:28 +00:00
std : : vector < size_t > wallet2 : : get_only_rct ( const std : : vector < size_t > & unused_dust_indices , const std : : vector < size_t > & unused_transfers_indices ) const
{
std : : vector < size_t > indices ;
for ( size_t n : unused_dust_indices )
if ( m_transfers [ n ] . is_rct ( ) )
indices . push_back ( n ) ;
for ( size_t n : unused_transfers_indices )
if ( m_transfers [ n ] . is_rct ( ) )
indices . push_back ( n ) ;
return indices ;
}
wallet: try to save large outputs when using an unneeded second input
When a single input is enough to satisfy a transfer, the code would
previously try to add a second input, to match the "canonical" makeup
of a transaction with two inputs and two outputs. This would cause
wallets to slowly merge outputs till all the monero ends up in a
single output, which causes trouble when making two transactions
one after the other, since change is locked for 10 blocks, and an
increasing portion of the remaining balance would end up locked on
each transaction.
There are two new settings (min-output-count and min-output-value)
which can control when to stop adding such unneeded second outputs.
The idea is that small "dust" outputs will still get added, but
larger ones will not.
Enable with, eg:
set min-output-count 10
set min-output-value 30
to avoid using an unneeded second output of 30 monero or more, if
there would be less than 10 such outputs left.
This does not invalidate any other reason why such outputs would
be used (ie, when they're really needed to satisfy a transfer, or
when randomly picked in the normal course of selection). This may
be improved in the future.
2017-03-24 20:58:02 +00:00
static uint32_t get_count_above ( const std : : vector < wallet2 : : transfer_details > & transfers , const std : : vector < size_t > & indices , uint64_t threshold )
{
uint32_t count = 0 ;
for ( size_t idx : indices )
if ( transfers [ idx ] . amount ( ) > = threshold )
+ + count ;
return count ;
}
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bool wallet2 : : light_wallet_login ( bool & new_address )
{
MDEBUG ( " Light wallet login request " ) ;
m_light_wallet_connected = false ;
cryptonote : : COMMAND_RPC_LOGIN : : request request ;
cryptonote : : COMMAND_RPC_LOGIN : : response response ;
request . address = get_account ( ) . get_public_address_str ( m_testnet ) ;
request . view_key = string_tools : : pod_to_hex ( get_account ( ) . get_keys ( ) . m_view_secret_key ) ;
// Always create account if it doesnt exist.
request . create_account = true ;
m_daemon_rpc_mutex . lock ( ) ;
bool connected = epee : : net_utils : : invoke_http_json ( " /login " , request , response , m_http_client , rpc_timeout , " POST " ) ;
m_daemon_rpc_mutex . unlock ( ) ;
// MyMonero doesn't send any status message. OpenMonero does.
m_light_wallet_connected = connected & & ( response . status . empty ( ) | | response . status = = " success " ) ;
new_address = response . new_address ;
MDEBUG ( " Status: " < < response . status ) ;
MDEBUG ( " Reason: " < < response . reason ) ;
MDEBUG ( " New wallet: " < < response . new_address ) ;
if ( m_light_wallet_connected )
{
// Clear old data on successfull login.
// m_transfers.clear();
// m_payments.clear();
// m_unconfirmed_payments.clear();
}
return m_light_wallet_connected ;
}
bool wallet2 : : light_wallet_import_wallet_request ( cryptonote : : COMMAND_RPC_IMPORT_WALLET_REQUEST : : response & response )
{
MDEBUG ( " Light wallet import wallet request " ) ;
cryptonote : : COMMAND_RPC_IMPORT_WALLET_REQUEST : : request oreq ;
oreq . address = get_account ( ) . get_public_address_str ( m_testnet ) ;
oreq . view_key = string_tools : : pod_to_hex ( get_account ( ) . get_keys ( ) . m_view_secret_key ) ;
m_daemon_rpc_mutex . lock ( ) ;
bool r = epee : : net_utils : : invoke_http_json ( " /import_wallet_request " , oreq , response , m_http_client , rpc_timeout , " POST " ) ;
m_daemon_rpc_mutex . unlock ( ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( ! r , error : : no_connection_to_daemon , " import_wallet_request " ) ;
return true ;
}
void wallet2 : : light_wallet_get_unspent_outs ( )
{
MDEBUG ( " Getting unspent outs " ) ;
cryptonote : : COMMAND_RPC_GET_UNSPENT_OUTS : : request oreq ;
cryptonote : : COMMAND_RPC_GET_UNSPENT_OUTS : : response ores ;
oreq . amount = " 0 " ;
oreq . address = get_account ( ) . get_public_address_str ( m_testnet ) ;
oreq . view_key = string_tools : : pod_to_hex ( get_account ( ) . get_keys ( ) . m_view_secret_key ) ;
// openMonero specific
oreq . dust_threshold = boost : : lexical_cast < std : : string > ( : : config : : DEFAULT_DUST_THRESHOLD ) ;
// below are required by openMonero api - but are not used.
oreq . mixin = 0 ;
oreq . use_dust = true ;
m_daemon_rpc_mutex . lock ( ) ;
bool r = epee : : net_utils : : invoke_http_json ( " /get_unspent_outs " , oreq , ores , m_http_client , rpc_timeout , " POST " ) ;
m_daemon_rpc_mutex . unlock ( ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( ! r , error : : no_connection_to_daemon , " get_unspent_outs " ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( ores . status = = " error " , error : : wallet_internal_error , ores . reason ) ;
m_light_wallet_per_kb_fee = ores . per_kb_fee ;
std : : unordered_map < crypto : : hash , bool > transfers_txs ;
for ( const auto & t : m_transfers )
transfers_txs . emplace ( t . m_txid , t . m_spent ) ;
MDEBUG ( " FOUND " < < ores . outputs . size ( ) < < " outputs " ) ;
// return if no outputs found
if ( ores . outputs . empty ( ) )
return ;
// Clear old outputs
m_transfers . clear ( ) ;
for ( const auto & o : ores . outputs ) {
bool spent = false ;
bool add_transfer = true ;
crypto : : key_image unspent_key_image ;
crypto : : public_key tx_public_key = AUTO_VAL_INIT ( tx_public_key ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( string_tools : : validate_hex ( 64 , o . tx_pub_key ) , error : : wallet_internal_error , " Invalid tx_pub_key field " ) ;
string_tools : : hex_to_pod ( o . tx_pub_key , tx_public_key ) ;
for ( const std : : string & ski : o . spend_key_images ) {
spent = false ;
// Check if key image is ours
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( string_tools : : validate_hex ( 64 , ski ) , error : : wallet_internal_error , " Invalid key image " ) ;
string_tools : : hex_to_pod ( ski , unspent_key_image ) ;
if ( light_wallet_key_image_is_ours ( unspent_key_image , tx_public_key , o . index ) ) {
MTRACE ( " Output " < < o . public_key < < " is spent. Key image: " < < ski ) ;
spent = true ;
break ;
} {
MTRACE ( " Unspent output found. " < < o . public_key ) ;
}
}
// Check if tx already exists in m_transfers.
crypto : : hash txid ;
crypto : : public_key tx_pub_key ;
crypto : : public_key public_key ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( string_tools : : validate_hex ( 64 , o . tx_hash ) , error : : wallet_internal_error , " Invalid tx_hash field " ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( string_tools : : validate_hex ( 64 , o . public_key ) , error : : wallet_internal_error , " Invalid public_key field " ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( string_tools : : validate_hex ( 64 , o . tx_pub_key ) , error : : wallet_internal_error , " Invalid tx_pub_key field " ) ;
string_tools : : hex_to_pod ( o . tx_hash , txid ) ;
string_tools : : hex_to_pod ( o . public_key , public_key ) ;
string_tools : : hex_to_pod ( o . tx_pub_key , tx_pub_key ) ;
for ( auto & t : m_transfers ) {
if ( t . get_public_key ( ) = = public_key ) {
t . m_spent = spent ;
add_transfer = false ;
break ;
}
}
if ( ! add_transfer )
continue ;
m_transfers . push_back ( boost : : value_initialized < transfer_details > ( ) ) ;
transfer_details & td = m_transfers . back ( ) ;
td . m_block_height = o . height ;
td . m_global_output_index = o . global_index ;
td . m_txid = txid ;
// Add to extra
add_tx_pub_key_to_extra ( td . m_tx , tx_pub_key ) ;
td . m_key_image = unspent_key_image ;
td . m_key_image_known = ! m_watch_only ;
td . m_amount = o . amount ;
td . m_pk_index = 0 ;
td . m_internal_output_index = o . index ;
td . m_spent = spent ;
tx_out txout ;
txout . target = txout_to_key ( public_key ) ;
txout . amount = td . m_amount ;
td . m_tx . vout . resize ( td . m_internal_output_index + 1 ) ;
td . m_tx . vout [ td . m_internal_output_index ] = txout ;
// Add unlock time and coinbase bool got from get_address_txs api call
std : : unordered_map < crypto : : hash , address_tx > : : const_iterator found = m_light_wallet_address_txs . find ( txid ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( found = = m_light_wallet_address_txs . end ( ) , error : : wallet_internal_error , " Lightwallet: tx not found in m_light_wallet_address_txs " ) ;
bool miner_tx = found - > second . m_coinbase ;
td . m_tx . unlock_time = found - > second . m_unlock_time ;
if ( ! o . rct . empty ( ) )
{
// Coinbase tx's
if ( miner_tx )
{
td . m_mask = rct : : identity ( ) ;
}
else
{
// rct txs
// decrypt rct mask, calculate commit hash and compare against blockchain commit hash
rct : : key rct_commit ;
light_wallet_parse_rct_str ( o . rct , tx_pub_key , td . m_internal_output_index , td . m_mask , rct_commit , true ) ;
bool valid_commit = ( rct_commit = = rct : : commit ( td . amount ( ) , td . m_mask ) ) ;
if ( ! valid_commit )
{
MDEBUG ( " output index: " < < o . global_index ) ;
MDEBUG ( " mask: " + string_tools : : pod_to_hex ( td . m_mask ) ) ;
MDEBUG ( " calculated commit: " + string_tools : : pod_to_hex ( rct : : commit ( td . amount ( ) , td . m_mask ) ) ) ;
MDEBUG ( " expected commit: " + string_tools : : pod_to_hex ( rct_commit ) ) ;
MDEBUG ( " amount: " < < td . amount ( ) ) ;
}
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( ! valid_commit , error : : wallet_internal_error , " Lightwallet: rct commit hash mismatch! " ) ;
}
td . m_rct = true ;
}
else
{
td . m_mask = rct : : identity ( ) ;
td . m_rct = false ;
}
if ( ! spent )
set_unspent ( m_transfers . size ( ) - 1 ) ;
m_key_images [ td . m_key_image ] = m_transfers . size ( ) - 1 ;
m_pub_keys [ td . get_public_key ( ) ] = m_transfers . size ( ) - 1 ;
}
}
bool wallet2 : : light_wallet_get_address_info ( cryptonote : : COMMAND_RPC_GET_ADDRESS_INFO : : response & response )
{
MTRACE ( __FUNCTION__ ) ;
cryptonote : : COMMAND_RPC_GET_ADDRESS_INFO : : request request ;
request . address = get_account ( ) . get_public_address_str ( m_testnet ) ;
request . view_key = string_tools : : pod_to_hex ( get_account ( ) . get_keys ( ) . m_view_secret_key ) ;
m_daemon_rpc_mutex . lock ( ) ;
bool r = epee : : net_utils : : invoke_http_json ( " /get_address_info " , request , response , m_http_client , rpc_timeout , " POST " ) ;
m_daemon_rpc_mutex . unlock ( ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( ! r , error : : no_connection_to_daemon , " get_address_info " ) ;
// TODO: Validate result
return true ;
}
void wallet2 : : light_wallet_get_address_txs ( )
{
MDEBUG ( " Refreshing light wallet " ) ;
cryptonote : : COMMAND_RPC_GET_ADDRESS_TXS : : request ireq ;
cryptonote : : COMMAND_RPC_GET_ADDRESS_TXS : : response ires ;
ireq . address = get_account ( ) . get_public_address_str ( m_testnet ) ;
ireq . view_key = string_tools : : pod_to_hex ( get_account ( ) . get_keys ( ) . m_view_secret_key ) ;
m_daemon_rpc_mutex . lock ( ) ;
bool r = epee : : net_utils : : invoke_http_json ( " /get_address_txs " , ireq , ires , m_http_client , rpc_timeout , " POST " ) ;
m_daemon_rpc_mutex . unlock ( ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( ! r , error : : no_connection_to_daemon , " get_address_txs " ) ;
//OpenMonero sends status=success, Mymonero doesn't.
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( ( ! ires . status . empty ( ) & & ires . status ! = " success " ) , error : : no_connection_to_daemon , " get_address_txs " ) ;
// Abort if no transactions
if ( ires . transactions . empty ( ) )
return ;
// Create searchable vectors
std : : vector < crypto : : hash > payments_txs ;
for ( const auto & p : m_payments )
payments_txs . push_back ( p . second . m_tx_hash ) ;
std : : vector < crypto : : hash > unconfirmed_payments_txs ;
for ( const auto & up : m_unconfirmed_payments )
2017-09-22 12:57:20 +00:00
unconfirmed_payments_txs . push_back ( up . second . m_pd . m_tx_hash ) ;
2017-08-04 21:58:08 +00:00
// for balance calculation
uint64_t wallet_total_sent = 0 ;
uint64_t wallet_total_unlocked_sent = 0 ;
// txs in pool
std : : vector < crypto : : hash > pool_txs ;
for ( const auto & t : ires . transactions ) {
const uint64_t total_received = t . total_received ;
uint64_t total_sent = t . total_sent ;
// Check key images - subtract fake outputs from total_sent
for ( const auto & so : t . spent_outputs )
{
crypto : : public_key tx_public_key ;
crypto : : key_image key_image ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( string_tools : : validate_hex ( 64 , so . tx_pub_key ) , error : : wallet_internal_error , " Invalid tx_pub_key field " ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( string_tools : : validate_hex ( 64 , so . key_image ) , error : : wallet_internal_error , " Invalid key_image field " ) ;
string_tools : : hex_to_pod ( so . tx_pub_key , tx_public_key ) ;
string_tools : : hex_to_pod ( so . key_image , key_image ) ;
if ( ! light_wallet_key_image_is_ours ( key_image , tx_public_key , so . out_index ) ) {
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( so . amount > t . total_sent , error : : wallet_internal_error , " Lightwallet: total sent is negative! " ) ;
total_sent - = so . amount ;
}
}
// Do not add tx if empty.
if ( total_sent = = 0 & & total_received = = 0 )
continue ;
crypto : : hash payment_id = null_hash ;
crypto : : hash tx_hash ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( string_tools : : validate_hex ( 64 , t . payment_id ) , error : : wallet_internal_error , " Invalid payment_id field " ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( string_tools : : validate_hex ( 64 , t . hash ) , error : : wallet_internal_error , " Invalid hash field " ) ;
string_tools : : hex_to_pod ( t . payment_id , payment_id ) ;
string_tools : : hex_to_pod ( t . hash , tx_hash ) ;
// lightwallet specific info
bool incoming = ( total_received > total_sent ) ;
address_tx address_tx ;
address_tx . m_tx_hash = tx_hash ;
address_tx . m_incoming = incoming ;
address_tx . m_amount = incoming ? total_received - total_sent : total_sent - total_received ;
address_tx . m_block_height = t . height ;
address_tx . m_unlock_time = t . unlock_time ;
address_tx . m_timestamp = t . timestamp ;
address_tx . m_coinbase = t . coinbase ;
address_tx . m_mempool = t . mempool ;
m_light_wallet_address_txs . emplace ( tx_hash , address_tx ) ;
// populate data needed for history (m_payments, m_unconfirmed_payments, m_confirmed_txs)
// INCOMING transfers
if ( total_received > total_sent ) {
payment_details payment ;
payment . m_tx_hash = tx_hash ;
payment . m_amount = total_received - total_sent ;
payment . m_block_height = t . height ;
payment . m_unlock_time = t . unlock_time ;
payment . m_timestamp = t . timestamp ;
if ( t . mempool ) {
if ( std : : find ( unconfirmed_payments_txs . begin ( ) , unconfirmed_payments_txs . end ( ) , tx_hash ) = = unconfirmed_payments_txs . end ( ) ) {
pool_txs . push_back ( tx_hash ) ;
2017-09-22 12:57:20 +00:00
// assume false as we don't get that info from the light wallet server
crypto : : hash payment_id ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( ! epee : : string_tools : : hex_to_pod ( t . payment_id , payment_id ) ,
error : : wallet_internal_error , " Failed to parse payment id " ) ;
emplace_or_replace ( m_unconfirmed_payments , payment_id , pool_payment_details { payment , false } ) ;
2017-08-04 21:58:08 +00:00
if ( 0 ! = m_callback ) {
2017-08-05 15:01:50 +00:00
m_callback - > on_lw_unconfirmed_money_received ( t . height , payment . m_tx_hash , payment . m_amount ) ;
2017-08-04 21:58:08 +00:00
}
}
} else {
if ( std : : find ( payments_txs . begin ( ) , payments_txs . end ( ) , tx_hash ) = = payments_txs . end ( ) ) {
m_payments . emplace ( tx_hash , payment ) ;
if ( 0 ! = m_callback ) {
2017-08-05 15:01:50 +00:00
m_callback - > on_lw_money_received ( t . height , payment . m_tx_hash , payment . m_amount ) ;
2017-08-04 21:58:08 +00:00
}
}
}
// Outgoing transfers
} else {
uint64_t amount_sent = total_sent - total_received ;
cryptonote : : transaction dummy_tx ; // not used by light wallet
// increase wallet total sent
wallet_total_sent + = total_sent ;
if ( t . mempool )
{
// Handled by add_unconfirmed_tx in commit_tx
// If sent from another wallet instance we need to add it
if ( m_unconfirmed_txs . find ( tx_hash ) = = m_unconfirmed_txs . end ( ) )
{
unconfirmed_transfer_details utd ;
utd . m_amount_in = amount_sent ;
utd . m_amount_out = amount_sent ;
utd . m_change = 0 ;
utd . m_payment_id = payment_id ;
utd . m_timestamp = t . timestamp ;
utd . m_state = wallet2 : : unconfirmed_transfer_details : : pending ;
m_unconfirmed_txs . emplace ( tx_hash , utd ) ;
}
}
else
{
// Only add if new
auto confirmed_tx = m_confirmed_txs . find ( tx_hash ) ;
if ( confirmed_tx = = m_confirmed_txs . end ( ) ) {
// tx is added to m_unconfirmed_txs - move to confirmed
if ( m_unconfirmed_txs . find ( tx_hash ) ! = m_unconfirmed_txs . end ( ) )
{
process_unconfirmed ( tx_hash , dummy_tx , t . height ) ;
}
// Tx sent by another wallet instance
else
{
confirmed_transfer_details ctd ;
ctd . m_amount_in = amount_sent ;
ctd . m_amount_out = amount_sent ;
ctd . m_change = 0 ;
ctd . m_payment_id = payment_id ;
ctd . m_block_height = t . height ;
ctd . m_timestamp = t . timestamp ;
m_confirmed_txs . emplace ( tx_hash , ctd ) ;
}
if ( 0 ! = m_callback )
{
2017-08-05 15:01:50 +00:00
m_callback - > on_lw_money_spent ( t . height , tx_hash , amount_sent ) ;
2017-08-04 21:58:08 +00:00
}
}
// If not new - check the amount and update if necessary.
// when sending a tx to same wallet the receiving amount has to be credited
else
{
if ( confirmed_tx - > second . m_amount_in ! = amount_sent | | confirmed_tx - > second . m_amount_out ! = amount_sent )
{
MDEBUG ( " Adjusting amount sent/received for tx: < " + t . hash + " >. Is tx sent to own wallet? " < < print_money ( amount_sent ) < < " != " < < print_money ( confirmed_tx - > second . m_amount_in ) ) ;
confirmed_tx - > second . m_amount_in = amount_sent ;
confirmed_tx - > second . m_amount_out = amount_sent ;
confirmed_tx - > second . m_change = 0 ;
}
}
}
}
}
// TODO: purge old unconfirmed_txs
remove_obsolete_pool_txs ( pool_txs ) ;
// Calculate wallet balance
m_light_wallet_balance = ires . total_received - wallet_total_sent ;
// MyMonero doesnt send unlocked balance
if ( ires . total_received_unlocked > 0 )
m_light_wallet_unlocked_balance = ires . total_received_unlocked - wallet_total_sent ;
else
m_light_wallet_unlocked_balance = m_light_wallet_balance ;
}
bool wallet2 : : light_wallet_parse_rct_str ( const std : : string & rct_string , const crypto : : public_key & tx_pub_key , uint64_t internal_output_index , rct : : key & decrypted_mask , rct : : key & rct_commit , bool decrypt ) const
{
// rct string is empty if output is non RCT
if ( rct_string . empty ( ) )
return false ;
// rct_string is a string with length 64+64+64 (<rct commit> + <encrypted mask> + <rct amount>)
rct : : key encrypted_mask ;
std : : string rct_commit_str = rct_string . substr ( 0 , 64 ) ;
std : : string encrypted_mask_str = rct_string . substr ( 64 , 64 ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( string_tools : : validate_hex ( 64 , rct_commit_str ) , error : : wallet_internal_error , " Invalid rct commit hash: " + rct_commit_str ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( string_tools : : validate_hex ( 64 , encrypted_mask_str ) , error : : wallet_internal_error , " Invalid rct mask: " + encrypted_mask_str ) ;
string_tools : : hex_to_pod ( rct_commit_str , rct_commit ) ;
string_tools : : hex_to_pod ( encrypted_mask_str , encrypted_mask ) ;
if ( decrypt ) {
// Decrypt the mask
crypto : : key_derivation derivation ;
2017-12-12 10:58:27 +00:00
bool r = generate_key_derivation ( tx_pub_key , get_account ( ) . get_keys ( ) . m_view_secret_key , derivation ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( ! r , error : : wallet_internal_error , " Failed to generate key derivation " ) ;
2017-08-04 21:58:08 +00:00
crypto : : secret_key scalar ;
crypto : : derivation_to_scalar ( derivation , internal_output_index , scalar ) ;
sc_sub ( decrypted_mask . bytes , encrypted_mask . bytes , rct : : hash_to_scalar ( rct : : sk2rct ( scalar ) ) . bytes ) ;
}
return true ;
}
bool wallet2 : : light_wallet_key_image_is_ours ( const crypto : : key_image & key_image , const crypto : : public_key & tx_public_key , uint64_t out_index )
{
// Lookup key image from cache
std : : map < uint64_t , crypto : : key_image > index_keyimage_map ;
std : : unordered_map < crypto : : public_key , std : : map < uint64_t , crypto : : key_image > > : : const_iterator found_pub_key = m_key_image_cache . find ( tx_public_key ) ;
if ( found_pub_key ! = m_key_image_cache . end ( ) ) {
// pub key found. key image for index cached?
index_keyimage_map = found_pub_key - > second ;
std : : map < uint64_t , crypto : : key_image > : : const_iterator index_found = index_keyimage_map . find ( out_index ) ;
if ( index_found ! = index_keyimage_map . end ( ) )
return key_image = = index_found - > second ;
}
// Not in cache - calculate key image
crypto : : key_image calculated_key_image ;
cryptonote : : keypair in_ephemeral ;
2017-10-15 16:55:33 +00:00
2017-10-16 03:03:09 +00:00
// Subaddresses aren't supported in mymonero/openmonero yet. Roll out the original scheme:
// compute D = a*R
// compute P = Hs(D || i)*G + B
// compute x = Hs(D || i) + b (and check if P==x*G)
// compute I = x*Hp(P)
const account_keys & ack = get_account ( ) . get_keys ( ) ;
crypto : : key_derivation derivation ;
bool r = crypto : : generate_key_derivation ( tx_public_key , ack . m_view_secret_key , derivation ) ;
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES ( r , false , " failed to generate_key_derivation( " < < tx_public_key < < " , " < < ack . m_view_secret_key < < " ) " ) ;
r = crypto : : derive_public_key ( derivation , out_index , ack . m_account_address . m_spend_public_key , in_ephemeral . pub ) ;
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES ( r , false , " failed to derive_public_key ( " < < derivation < < " , " < < out_index < < " , " < < ack . m_account_address . m_spend_public_key < < " ) " ) ;
crypto : : derive_secret_key ( derivation , out_index , ack . m_spend_secret_key , in_ephemeral . sec ) ;
crypto : : public_key out_pkey_test ;
r = crypto : : secret_key_to_public_key ( in_ephemeral . sec , out_pkey_test ) ;
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES ( r , false , " failed to secret_key_to_public_key( " < < in_ephemeral . sec < < " ) " ) ;
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES ( in_ephemeral . pub = = out_pkey_test , false , " derived secret key doesn't match derived public key " ) ;
crypto : : generate_key_image ( in_ephemeral . pub , in_ephemeral . sec , calculated_key_image ) ;
2017-08-04 21:58:08 +00:00
index_keyimage_map . emplace ( out_index , calculated_key_image ) ;
m_key_image_cache . emplace ( tx_public_key , index_keyimage_map ) ;
return key_image = = calculated_key_image ;
}
2016-07-02 08:35:25 +00:00
// Another implementation of transaction creation that is hopefully better
// While there is anything left to pay, it goes through random outputs and tries
// to fill the next destination/amount. If it fully fills it, it will use the
// remainder to try to fill the next one as well.
// The tx size if roughly estimated as a linear function of only inputs, and a
// new tx will be created when that size goes above a given fraction of the
// max tx size. At that point, more outputs may be added if the fee cannot be
// satisfied.
// If the next output in the next tx would go to the same destination (ie, we
// cut off at a tx boundary in the middle of paying a given destination), the
// fee will be carved out of the current input if possible, to avoid having to
// add another output just for the fee and getting change.
// This system allows for sending (almost) the entire balance, since it does
// not generate spurious change in all txes, thus decreasing the instantaneous
// usable balance.
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std : : vector < wallet2 : : pending_tx > wallet2 : : create_transactions_2 ( std : : vector < cryptonote : : tx_destination_entry > dsts , const size_t fake_outs_count , const uint64_t unlock_time , uint32_t priority , const std : : vector < uint8_t > & extra , uint32_t subaddr_account , std : : set < uint32_t > subaddr_indices , bool trusted_daemon )
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{
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if ( m_light_wallet ) {
// Populate m_transfers
light_wallet_get_unspent_outs ( ) ;
}
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std : : vector < std : : pair < uint32_t , std : : vector < size_t > > > unused_transfers_indices_per_subaddr ;
std : : vector < std : : pair < uint32_t , std : : vector < size_t > > > unused_dust_indices_per_subaddr ;
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uint64_t needed_money ;
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uint64_t accumulated_fee , accumulated_outputs , accumulated_change ;
struct TX {
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std : : vector < size_t > selected_transfers ;
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std : : vector < cryptonote : : tx_destination_entry > dsts ;
cryptonote : : transaction tx ;
pending_tx ptx ;
size_t bytes ;
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void add ( const account_public_address & addr , bool is_subaddress , uint64_t amount , unsigned int original_output_index , bool merge_destinations ) {
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if ( merge_destinations )
{
std : : vector < cryptonote : : tx_destination_entry > : : iterator i ;
i = std : : find_if ( dsts . begin ( ) , dsts . end ( ) , [ & ] ( const cryptonote : : tx_destination_entry & d ) { return ! memcmp ( & d . addr , & addr , sizeof ( addr ) ) ; } ) ;
if ( i = = dsts . end ( ) )
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{
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dsts . push_back ( tx_destination_entry ( 0 , addr , is_subaddress ) ) ;
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i = dsts . end ( ) - 1 ;
}
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i - > amount + = amount ;
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}
else
{
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THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( original_output_index > dsts . size ( ) , error : : wallet_internal_error ,
std : : string ( " original_output_index too large: " ) + std : : to_string ( original_output_index ) + " > " + std : : to_string ( dsts . size ( ) ) ) ;
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if ( original_output_index = = dsts . size ( ) )
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dsts . push_back ( tx_destination_entry ( 0 , addr , is_subaddress ) ) ;
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THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( memcmp ( & dsts [ original_output_index ] . addr , & addr , sizeof ( addr ) ) , error : : wallet_internal_error , " Mismatched destination address " ) ;
dsts [ original_output_index ] . amount + = amount ;
}
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}
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} ;
std : : vector < TX > txes ;
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bool adding_fee ; // true if new outputs go towards fee, rather than destinations
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uint64_t needed_fee , available_for_fee = 0 ;
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uint64_t upper_transaction_size_limit = get_upper_transaction_size_limit ( ) ;
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const bool use_rct = use_fork_rules ( 4 , 0 ) ;
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const bool bulletproof = use_fork_rules ( get_bulletproof_fork ( m_testnet ) , 0 ) ;
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const uint64_t fee_per_kb = get_per_kb_fee ( ) ;
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const uint64_t fee_multiplier = get_fee_multiplier ( priority , get_fee_algorithm ( ) ) ;
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// throw if attempting a transaction with no destinations
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( dsts . empty ( ) , error : : zero_destination ) ;
// calculate total amount being sent to all destinations
// throw if total amount overflows uint64_t
needed_money = 0 ;
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for ( auto & dt : dsts )
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{
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( 0 = = dt . amount , error : : zero_destination ) ;
needed_money + = dt . amount ;
LOG_PRINT_L2 ( " transfer: adding " < < print_money ( dt . amount ) < < " , for a total of " < < print_money ( needed_money ) ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( needed_money < dt . amount , error : : tx_sum_overflow , dsts , 0 , m_testnet ) ;
}
// throw if attempting a transaction with no money
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( needed_money = = 0 , error : : zero_destination ) ;
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std : : map < uint32_t , uint64_t > unlocked_balance_per_subaddr = unlocked_balance_per_subaddress ( subaddr_account ) ;
std : : map < uint32_t , uint64_t > balance_per_subaddr = balance_per_subaddress ( subaddr_account ) ;
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if ( subaddr_indices . empty ( ) ) // "index=<N1>[,<N2>,...]" wasn't specified -> use all the indices with non-zero unlocked balance
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{
for ( const auto & i : balance_per_subaddr )
subaddr_indices . insert ( i . first ) ;
}
// early out if we know we can't make it anyway
// we could also check for being within FEE_PER_KB, but if the fee calculation
// ever changes, this might be missed, so let this go through
uint64_t balance_subtotal = 0 ;
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uint64_t unlocked_balance_subtotal = 0 ;
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for ( uint32_t index_minor : subaddr_indices )
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{
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balance_subtotal + = balance_per_subaddr [ index_minor ] ;
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unlocked_balance_subtotal + = unlocked_balance_per_subaddr [ index_minor ] ;
}
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THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( needed_money > balance_subtotal , error : : not_enough_money ,
balance_subtotal , needed_money , 0 ) ;
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// first check overall balance is enough, then unlocked one, so we throw distinct exceptions
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( needed_money > unlocked_balance_subtotal , error : : not_enough_unlocked_money ,
unlocked_balance_subtotal , needed_money , 0 ) ;
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for ( uint32_t i : subaddr_indices )
LOG_PRINT_L2 ( " Candidate subaddress index for spending: " < < i ) ;
// gather all dust and non-dust outputs belonging to specified subaddresses
size_t num_nondust_outputs = 0 ;
size_t num_dust_outputs = 0 ;
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for ( size_t i = 0 ; i < m_transfers . size ( ) ; + + i )
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{
const transfer_details & td = m_transfers [ i ] ;
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing
Scheme by luigi1111:
Multisig for RingCT on Monero
2 of 2
User A (coordinator):
Spendkey b,B
Viewkey a,A (shared)
User B:
Spendkey c,C
Viewkey a,A (shared)
Public Address: C+B, A
Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a
A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants)
A and B watch for incoming outputs
B creates "half" key images for discovered output D:
I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D)
B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D),
and sending the pubkeys with I2_D.
A also creates "half" key images:
I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D)
Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D
Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction).
A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D
to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R).
At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r,
which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo).
B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well).
B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D
to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well.
NOTE:
A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively.
Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible:
A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B.
B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A.
The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time!
The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature).
2 of 3
User A (coordinator)
Shared viewkey a,A
"spendkey" j,J
User B
"spendkey" k,K
User C
"spendkey" m,M
A collects K and M from B and C
B collects J and M from A and C
C collects J and K from A and B
A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK)
A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM)
B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK)
B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate
Address: N+O+P, A
The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other
needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two.
Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties:
A gives j to B
B gives k to C
C gives m to A
Address: J+K+M, A
3 of 3
Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others.
The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it
or send it back to A.
N-1 of N
Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around
(using either the secure or insecure method).
For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up):
[4 of 5]
User: spendkey
A: a
B: b
C: c
D: d
E: e
a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A
Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with
the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys.
Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each.
Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning:
1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image)
2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator
must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use.
You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might
also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format.
You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc.
The process is somewhat cumbersome:
To create a N/N multisig wallet:
- each participant creates a normal wallet
- each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant
- each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N)
As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent:
- each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant
- each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants
Then, a transaction may be initiated:
- one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT"
- this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file
- the initiator sends this file to another participant
- that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx"
- the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again
- if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed
- the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 21:34:26 +00:00
if ( ! td . m_spent & & ! td . m_key_image_partial & & ( use_rct ? true : ! td . is_rct ( ) ) & & is_transfer_unlocked ( td ) & & td . m_subaddr_index . major = = subaddr_account & & subaddr_indices . count ( td . m_subaddr_index . minor ) = = 1 )
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{
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const uint32_t index_minor = td . m_subaddr_index . minor ;
auto find_predicate = [ & index_minor ] ( const std : : pair < uint32_t , std : : vector < size_t > > & x ) { return x . first = = index_minor ; } ;
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if ( ( td . is_rct ( ) ) | | is_valid_decomposed_amount ( td . amount ( ) ) )
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{
auto found = std : : find_if ( unused_transfers_indices_per_subaddr . begin ( ) , unused_transfers_indices_per_subaddr . end ( ) , find_predicate ) ;
if ( found = = unused_transfers_indices_per_subaddr . end ( ) )
{
unused_transfers_indices_per_subaddr . push_back ( { index_minor , { i } } ) ;
}
else
{
found - > second . push_back ( i ) ;
}
+ + num_nondust_outputs ;
}
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else
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{
auto found = std : : find_if ( unused_dust_indices_per_subaddr . begin ( ) , unused_dust_indices_per_subaddr . end ( ) , find_predicate ) ;
if ( found = = unused_dust_indices_per_subaddr . end ( ) )
{
unused_dust_indices_per_subaddr . push_back ( { index_minor , { i } } ) ;
}
else
{
found - > second . push_back ( i ) ;
}
+ + num_dust_outputs ;
}
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}
}
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// shuffle & sort output indices
{
std : : random_device rd ;
std : : mt19937 g ( rd ( ) ) ;
std : : shuffle ( unused_transfers_indices_per_subaddr . begin ( ) , unused_transfers_indices_per_subaddr . end ( ) , g ) ;
std : : shuffle ( unused_dust_indices_per_subaddr . begin ( ) , unused_dust_indices_per_subaddr . end ( ) , g ) ;
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auto sort_predicate = [ & unlocked_balance_per_subaddr ] ( const std : : pair < uint32_t , std : : vector < size_t > > & x , const std : : pair < uint32_t , std : : vector < size_t > > & y )
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{
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return unlocked_balance_per_subaddr [ x . first ] > unlocked_balance_per_subaddr [ y . first ] ;
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} ;
std : : sort ( unused_transfers_indices_per_subaddr . begin ( ) , unused_transfers_indices_per_subaddr . end ( ) , sort_predicate ) ;
std : : sort ( unused_dust_indices_per_subaddr . begin ( ) , unused_dust_indices_per_subaddr . end ( ) , sort_predicate ) ;
}
2016-10-15 13:30:50 +00:00
2017-02-19 02:42:10 +00:00
LOG_PRINT_L2 ( " Starting with " < < num_nondust_outputs < < " non-dust outputs and " < < num_dust_outputs < < " dust outputs " ) ;
if ( unused_dust_indices_per_subaddr . empty ( ) & & unused_transfers_indices_per_subaddr . empty ( ) )
2016-09-18 09:44:32 +00:00
return std : : vector < wallet2 : : pending_tx > ( ) ;
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// if empty, put dummy entry so that the front can be referenced later in the loop
if ( unused_dust_indices_per_subaddr . empty ( ) )
unused_dust_indices_per_subaddr . push_back ( { } ) ;
if ( unused_transfers_indices_per_subaddr . empty ( ) )
unused_transfers_indices_per_subaddr . push_back ( { } ) ;
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// start with an empty tx
txes . push_back ( TX ( ) ) ;
accumulated_fee = 0 ;
accumulated_outputs = 0 ;
accumulated_change = 0 ;
adding_fee = false ;
needed_fee = 0 ;
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std : : vector < std : : vector < tools : : wallet2 : : get_outs_entry > > outs ;
2016-06-15 22:37:13 +00:00
2016-07-02 16:37:39 +00:00
// for rct, since we don't see the amounts, we will try to make all transactions
// look the same, with 1 or 2 inputs, and 2 outputs. One input is preferable, as
// this prevents linking to another by provenance analysis, but two is ok if we
// try to pick outputs not from the same block. We will get two outputs, one for
// the destination, and one for change.
2017-01-07 16:06:07 +00:00
LOG_PRINT_L2 ( " checking preferred " ) ;
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std : : vector < size_t > preferred_inputs ;
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uint64_t rct_outs_needed = 2 * ( fake_outs_count + 1 ) ;
rct_outs_needed + = 100 ; // some fudge factor since we don't know how many are locked
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if ( use_rct )
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{
// this is used to build a tx that's 1 or 2 inputs, and 2 outputs, which
// will get us a known fee.
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uint64_t estimated_fee = calculate_fee ( fee_per_kb , estimate_rct_tx_size ( 2 , fake_outs_count , 2 , extra . size ( ) , bulletproof ) , fee_multiplier ) ;
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preferred_inputs = pick_preferred_rct_inputs ( needed_money + estimated_fee , subaddr_account , subaddr_indices ) ;
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if ( ! preferred_inputs . empty ( ) )
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{
string s ;
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for ( auto i : preferred_inputs ) s + = boost : : lexical_cast < std : : string > ( i ) + " ( " + print_money ( m_transfers [ i ] . amount ( ) ) + " ) " ;
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LOG_PRINT_L1 ( " Found prefered rct inputs for rct tx: " < < s ) ;
// bring the list of available outputs stored by the same subaddress index to the front of the list
uint32_t index_minor = m_transfers [ preferred_inputs [ 0 ] ] . m_subaddr_index . minor ;
for ( size_t i = 1 ; i < unused_transfers_indices_per_subaddr . size ( ) ; + + i )
{
if ( unused_transfers_indices_per_subaddr [ i ] . first = = index_minor )
{
std : : swap ( unused_transfers_indices_per_subaddr [ 0 ] , unused_transfers_indices_per_subaddr [ i ] ) ;
break ;
}
}
for ( size_t i = 1 ; i < unused_dust_indices_per_subaddr . size ( ) ; + + i )
{
if ( unused_dust_indices_per_subaddr [ i ] . first = = index_minor )
{
std : : swap ( unused_dust_indices_per_subaddr [ 0 ] , unused_dust_indices_per_subaddr [ i ] ) ;
break ;
}
}
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}
}
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LOG_PRINT_L2 ( " done checking preferred " ) ;
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// while:
// - we have something to send
// - or we need to gather more fee
// - or we have just one input in that tx, which is rct (to try and make all/most rct txes 2/2)
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unsigned int original_output_index = 0 ;
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std : : vector < size_t > * unused_transfers_indices = & unused_transfers_indices_per_subaddr [ 0 ] . second ;
std : : vector < size_t > * unused_dust_indices = & unused_dust_indices_per_subaddr [ 0 ] . second ;
2017-11-13 21:50:37 +00:00
while ( ( ! dsts . empty ( ) & & dsts [ 0 ] . amount > 0 ) | | adding_fee | | ! preferred_inputs . empty ( ) | | should_pick_a_second_output ( use_rct , txes . back ( ) . selected_transfers . size ( ) , * unused_transfers_indices , * unused_dust_indices ) ) {
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TX & tx = txes . back ( ) ;
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LOG_PRINT_L2 ( " Start of loop with " < < unused_transfers_indices - > size ( ) < < " " < < unused_dust_indices - > size ( ) ) ;
LOG_PRINT_L2 ( " unused_transfers_indices: " < < strjoin ( * unused_transfers_indices , " " ) ) ;
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LOG_PRINT_L2 ( " unused_dust_indices: " < < strjoin ( * unused_dust_indices , " " ) ) ;
LOG_PRINT_L2 ( " dsts size " < < dsts . size ( ) < < " , first " < < ( dsts . empty ( ) ? " - " : cryptonote : : print_money ( dsts [ 0 ] . amount ) ) ) ;
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LOG_PRINT_L2 ( " adding_fee " < < adding_fee < < " , use_rct " < < use_rct ) ;
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// if we need to spend money and don't have any left, we fail
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if ( unused_dust_indices - > empty ( ) & & unused_transfers_indices - > empty ( ) ) {
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LOG_PRINT_L2 ( " No more outputs to choose from " ) ;
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THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( 1 , error : : tx_not_possible , unlocked_balance ( subaddr_account ) , needed_money , accumulated_fee + needed_fee ) ;
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}
// get a random unspent output and use it to pay part (or all) of the current destination (and maybe next one, etc)
// This could be more clever, but maybe at the cost of making probabilistic inferences easier
2017-01-14 17:18:14 +00:00
size_t idx ;
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if ( ! preferred_inputs . empty ( ) ) {
idx = pop_back ( preferred_inputs ) ;
pop_if_present ( * unused_transfers_indices , idx ) ;
pop_if_present ( * unused_dust_indices , idx ) ;
} else if ( ( dsts . empty ( ) | | dsts [ 0 ] . amount = = 0 ) & & ! adding_fee ) {
2017-01-14 17:18:14 +00:00
// the "make rct txes 2/2" case - we pick a small value output to "clean up" the wallet too
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std : : vector < size_t > indices = get_only_rct ( * unused_dust_indices , * unused_transfers_indices ) ;
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idx = pop_best_value ( indices , tx . selected_transfers , true ) ;
2017-01-22 15:12:13 +00:00
wallet: try to save large outputs when using an unneeded second input
When a single input is enough to satisfy a transfer, the code would
previously try to add a second input, to match the "canonical" makeup
of a transaction with two inputs and two outputs. This would cause
wallets to slowly merge outputs till all the monero ends up in a
single output, which causes trouble when making two transactions
one after the other, since change is locked for 10 blocks, and an
increasing portion of the remaining balance would end up locked on
each transaction.
There are two new settings (min-output-count and min-output-value)
which can control when to stop adding such unneeded second outputs.
The idea is that small "dust" outputs will still get added, but
larger ones will not.
Enable with, eg:
set min-output-count 10
set min-output-value 30
to avoid using an unneeded second output of 30 monero or more, if
there would be less than 10 such outputs left.
This does not invalidate any other reason why such outputs would
be used (ie, when they're really needed to satisfy a transfer, or
when randomly picked in the normal course of selection). This may
be improved in the future.
2017-03-24 20:58:02 +00:00
// we might not want to add it if it's a large output and we don't have many left
if ( m_transfers [ idx ] . amount ( ) > = m_min_output_value ) {
2017-02-19 02:42:10 +00:00
if ( get_count_above ( m_transfers , * unused_transfers_indices , m_min_output_value ) < m_min_output_count ) {
wallet: try to save large outputs when using an unneeded second input
When a single input is enough to satisfy a transfer, the code would
previously try to add a second input, to match the "canonical" makeup
of a transaction with two inputs and two outputs. This would cause
wallets to slowly merge outputs till all the monero ends up in a
single output, which causes trouble when making two transactions
one after the other, since change is locked for 10 blocks, and an
increasing portion of the remaining balance would end up locked on
each transaction.
There are two new settings (min-output-count and min-output-value)
which can control when to stop adding such unneeded second outputs.
The idea is that small "dust" outputs will still get added, but
larger ones will not.
Enable with, eg:
set min-output-count 10
set min-output-value 30
to avoid using an unneeded second output of 30 monero or more, if
there would be less than 10 such outputs left.
This does not invalidate any other reason why such outputs would
be used (ie, when they're really needed to satisfy a transfer, or
when randomly picked in the normal course of selection). This may
be improved in the future.
2017-03-24 20:58:02 +00:00
LOG_PRINT_L2 ( " Second output was not strictly needed, and we're running out of outputs above " < < print_money ( m_min_output_value ) < < " , not adding " ) ;
break ;
}
}
2017-01-22 15:12:13 +00:00
// since we're trying to add a second output which is not strictly needed,
// we only add it if it's unrelated enough to the first one
float relatedness = get_output_relatedness ( m_transfers [ idx ] , m_transfers [ tx . selected_transfers . front ( ) ] ) ;
if ( relatedness > SECOND_OUTPUT_RELATEDNESS_THRESHOLD )
{
wallet: try to save large outputs when using an unneeded second input
When a single input is enough to satisfy a transfer, the code would
previously try to add a second input, to match the "canonical" makeup
of a transaction with two inputs and two outputs. This would cause
wallets to slowly merge outputs till all the monero ends up in a
single output, which causes trouble when making two transactions
one after the other, since change is locked for 10 blocks, and an
increasing portion of the remaining balance would end up locked on
each transaction.
There are two new settings (min-output-count and min-output-value)
which can control when to stop adding such unneeded second outputs.
The idea is that small "dust" outputs will still get added, but
larger ones will not.
Enable with, eg:
set min-output-count 10
set min-output-value 30
to avoid using an unneeded second output of 30 monero or more, if
there would be less than 10 such outputs left.
This does not invalidate any other reason why such outputs would
be used (ie, when they're really needed to satisfy a transfer, or
when randomly picked in the normal course of selection). This may
be improved in the future.
2017-03-24 20:58:02 +00:00
LOG_PRINT_L2 ( " Second output was not strictly needed, and relatedness " < < relatedness < < " , not adding " ) ;
2017-01-22 15:12:13 +00:00
break ;
}
2017-02-19 02:42:10 +00:00
pop_if_present ( * unused_transfers_indices , idx ) ;
pop_if_present ( * unused_dust_indices , idx ) ;
2017-01-22 15:12:13 +00:00
} else
2017-02-19 02:42:10 +00:00
idx = pop_best_value ( unused_transfers_indices - > empty ( ) ? * unused_dust_indices : * unused_transfers_indices , tx . selected_transfers ) ;
2016-06-15 22:37:13 +00:00
const transfer_details & td = m_transfers [ idx ] ;
2016-10-25 20:19:47 +00:00
LOG_PRINT_L2 ( " Picking output " < < idx < < " , amount " < < print_money ( td . amount ( ) ) < < " , ki " < < td . m_key_image ) ;
2016-06-15 22:37:13 +00:00
// add this output to the list to spend
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tx . selected_transfers . push_back ( idx ) ;
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uint64_t available_amount = td . amount ( ) ;
accumulated_outputs + = available_amount ;
2017-01-07 16:06:07 +00:00
// clear any fake outs we'd already gathered, since we'll need a new set
outs . clear ( ) ;
2016-06-15 22:37:13 +00:00
if ( adding_fee )
{
LOG_PRINT_L2 ( " We need more fee, adding it to fee " ) ;
available_for_fee + = available_amount ;
}
else
{
2017-12-02 08:32:39 +00:00
while ( ! dsts . empty ( ) & & dsts [ 0 ] . amount < = available_amount & & estimate_tx_size ( use_rct , tx . selected_transfers . size ( ) , fake_outs_count , tx . dsts . size ( ) , extra . size ( ) , bulletproof ) < TX_SIZE_TARGET ( upper_transaction_size_limit ) )
2016-06-15 22:37:13 +00:00
{
// we can fully pay that destination
2017-02-19 02:42:10 +00:00
LOG_PRINT_L2 ( " We can fully pay " < < get_account_address_as_str ( m_testnet , dsts [ 0 ] . is_subaddress , dsts [ 0 ] . addr ) < <
2016-06-15 22:37:13 +00:00
" for " < < print_money ( dsts [ 0 ] . amount ) ) ;
2017-02-19 02:42:10 +00:00
tx . add ( dsts [ 0 ] . addr , dsts [ 0 ] . is_subaddress , dsts [ 0 ] . amount , original_output_index , m_merge_destinations ) ;
2016-06-15 22:37:13 +00:00
available_amount - = dsts [ 0 ] . amount ;
dsts [ 0 ] . amount = 0 ;
pop_index ( dsts , 0 ) ;
2017-04-08 10:13:28 +00:00
+ + original_output_index ;
2016-06-15 22:37:13 +00:00
}
2017-12-02 08:32:39 +00:00
if ( available_amount > 0 & & ! dsts . empty ( ) & & estimate_tx_size ( use_rct , tx . selected_transfers . size ( ) , fake_outs_count , tx . dsts . size ( ) , extra . size ( ) , bulletproof ) < TX_SIZE_TARGET ( upper_transaction_size_limit ) ) {
2016-06-15 22:37:13 +00:00
// we can partially fill that destination
2017-02-19 02:42:10 +00:00
LOG_PRINT_L2 ( " We can partially pay " < < get_account_address_as_str ( m_testnet , dsts [ 0 ] . is_subaddress , dsts [ 0 ] . addr ) < <
2016-06-15 22:37:13 +00:00
" for " < < print_money ( available_amount ) < < " / " < < print_money ( dsts [ 0 ] . amount ) ) ;
2017-02-19 02:42:10 +00:00
tx . add ( dsts [ 0 ] . addr , dsts [ 0 ] . is_subaddress , available_amount , original_output_index , m_merge_destinations ) ;
2016-06-15 22:37:13 +00:00
dsts [ 0 ] . amount - = available_amount ;
available_amount = 0 ;
}
}
// here, check if we need to sent tx and start a new one
LOG_PRINT_L2 ( " Considering whether to create a tx now, " < < tx . selected_transfers . size ( ) < < " inputs, tx limit "
< < upper_transaction_size_limit ) ;
2017-11-13 21:50:37 +00:00
bool try_tx = false ;
// if we have preferred picks, but haven't yet used all of them, continue
if ( preferred_inputs . empty ( ) )
2016-06-15 22:37:13 +00:00
{
2017-11-13 21:50:37 +00:00
if ( adding_fee )
{
/* might not actually be enough if adding this output bumps size to next kB, but we need to try */
try_tx = available_for_fee > = needed_fee ;
}
else
{
2017-12-02 08:32:39 +00:00
const size_t estimated_rct_tx_size = estimate_tx_size ( use_rct , tx . selected_transfers . size ( ) , fake_outs_count , tx . dsts . size ( ) , extra . size ( ) , bulletproof ) ;
2017-11-13 21:50:37 +00:00
try_tx = dsts . empty ( ) | | ( estimated_rct_tx_size > = TX_SIZE_TARGET ( upper_transaction_size_limit ) ) ;
}
2016-06-15 22:37:13 +00:00
}
if ( try_tx ) {
cryptonote : : transaction test_tx ;
pending_tx test_ptx ;
2017-12-02 08:32:39 +00:00
const size_t estimated_tx_size = estimate_tx_size ( use_rct , tx . selected_transfers . size ( ) , fake_outs_count , tx . dsts . size ( ) , extra . size ( ) , bulletproof ) ;
2017-11-13 21:50:37 +00:00
needed_fee = calculate_fee ( fee_per_kb , estimated_tx_size , fee_multiplier ) ;
2016-06-15 22:37:13 +00:00
2017-11-13 21:50:37 +00:00
LOG_PRINT_L2 ( " Trying to create a tx now, with " < < tx . dsts . size ( ) < < " outputs and " < <
tx . selected_transfers . size ( ) < < " inputs " ) ;
2016-07-02 08:35:25 +00:00
if ( use_rct )
2017-01-07 16:06:07 +00:00
transfer_selected_rct ( tx . dsts , tx . selected_transfers , fake_outs_count , outs , unlock_time , needed_fee , extra ,
2017-12-02 21:17:42 +00:00
test_tx , test_ptx , bulletproof ) ;
2016-07-02 08:35:25 +00:00
else
2017-01-07 16:06:07 +00:00
transfer_selected ( tx . dsts , tx . selected_transfers , fake_outs_count , outs , unlock_time , needed_fee , extra ,
2016-07-02 08:35:25 +00:00
detail : : digit_split_strategy , tx_dust_policy ( : : config : : DEFAULT_DUST_THRESHOLD ) , test_tx , test_ptx ) ;
2016-06-15 22:37:13 +00:00
auto txBlob = t_serializable_object_to_blob ( test_ptx . tx ) ;
2016-09-14 22:54:01 +00:00
needed_fee = calculate_fee ( fee_per_kb , txBlob , fee_multiplier ) ;
2016-06-15 22:37:13 +00:00
available_for_fee = test_ptx . fee + test_ptx . change_dts . amount + ( ! test_ptx . dust_added_to_fee ? test_ptx . dust : 0 ) ;
2016-09-26 22:10:22 +00:00
LOG_PRINT_L2 ( " Made a " < < ( ( txBlob . size ( ) + 1023 ) / 1024 ) < < " kB tx, with " < < print_money ( available_for_fee ) < < " available for fee ( " < <
2016-06-15 22:37:13 +00:00
print_money ( needed_fee ) < < " needed) " ) ;
2017-12-12 11:08:11 +00:00
if ( needed_fee > available_for_fee & & ! dsts . empty ( ) & & dsts [ 0 ] . amount > 0 )
2016-06-15 22:37:13 +00:00
{
// we don't have enough for the fee, but we've only partially paid the current address,
// so we can take the fee from the paid amount, since we'll have to make another tx anyway
std : : vector < cryptonote : : tx_destination_entry > : : iterator i ;
i = std : : find_if ( tx . dsts . begin ( ) , tx . dsts . end ( ) ,
[ & ] ( const cryptonote : : tx_destination_entry & d ) { return ! memcmp ( & d . addr , & dsts [ 0 ] . addr , sizeof ( dsts [ 0 ] . addr ) ) ; } ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( i = = tx . dsts . end ( ) , error : : wallet_internal_error , " paid address not found in outputs " ) ;
if ( i - > amount > needed_fee )
{
uint64_t new_paid_amount = i - > amount /*+ test_ptx.fee*/ - needed_fee ;
2017-02-19 02:42:10 +00:00
LOG_PRINT_L2 ( " Adjusting amount paid to " < < get_account_address_as_str ( m_testnet , i - > is_subaddress , i - > addr ) < < " from " < <
2017-07-05 07:53:16 +00:00
print_money ( i - > amount ) < < " to " < < print_money ( new_paid_amount ) < < " to accommodate " < <
2016-06-15 22:37:13 +00:00
print_money ( needed_fee ) < < " fee " ) ;
dsts [ 0 ] . amount + = i - > amount - new_paid_amount ;
i - > amount = new_paid_amount ;
test_ptx . fee = needed_fee ;
available_for_fee = needed_fee ;
}
}
if ( needed_fee > available_for_fee )
{
LOG_PRINT_L2 ( " We could not make a tx, switching to fee accumulation " ) ;
adding_fee = true ;
}
else
{
2017-11-13 21:50:37 +00:00
LOG_PRINT_L2 ( " We made a tx, adjusting fee and saving it, we need " < < print_money ( needed_fee ) < < " and we have " < < print_money ( test_ptx . fee ) ) ;
while ( needed_fee > test_ptx . fee ) {
2017-01-10 22:15:13 +00:00
if ( use_rct )
2017-01-07 16:06:07 +00:00
transfer_selected_rct ( tx . dsts , tx . selected_transfers , fake_outs_count , outs , unlock_time , needed_fee , extra ,
2017-12-02 21:17:42 +00:00
test_tx , test_ptx , bulletproof ) ;
2017-01-10 22:15:13 +00:00
else
2017-01-07 16:06:07 +00:00
transfer_selected ( tx . dsts , tx . selected_transfers , fake_outs_count , outs , unlock_time , needed_fee , extra ,
2017-01-10 22:15:13 +00:00
detail : : digit_split_strategy , tx_dust_policy ( : : config : : DEFAULT_DUST_THRESHOLD ) , test_tx , test_ptx ) ;
txBlob = t_serializable_object_to_blob ( test_ptx . tx ) ;
needed_fee = calculate_fee ( fee_per_kb , txBlob , fee_multiplier ) ;
LOG_PRINT_L2 ( " Made an attempt at a final " < < ( ( txBlob . size ( ) + 1023 ) / 1024 ) < < " kB tx, with " < < print_money ( test_ptx . fee ) < <
" fee and " < < print_money ( test_ptx . change_dts . amount ) < < " change " ) ;
2017-11-13 21:50:37 +00:00
}
2017-01-10 22:15:13 +00:00
2016-07-02 08:35:25 +00:00
LOG_PRINT_L2 ( " Made a final " < < ( ( txBlob . size ( ) + 1023 ) / 1024 ) < < " kB tx, with " < < print_money ( test_ptx . fee ) < <
" fee and " < < print_money ( test_ptx . change_dts . amount ) < < " change " ) ;
2016-06-15 22:37:13 +00:00
tx . tx = test_tx ;
tx . ptx = test_ptx ;
tx . bytes = txBlob . size ( ) ;
accumulated_fee + = test_ptx . fee ;
accumulated_change + = test_ptx . change_dts . amount ;
adding_fee = false ;
if ( ! dsts . empty ( ) )
{
LOG_PRINT_L2 ( " We have more to pay, starting another tx " ) ;
txes . push_back ( TX ( ) ) ;
2017-09-20 09:35:15 +00:00
original_output_index = 0 ;
2016-06-15 22:37:13 +00:00
}
}
}
2017-02-19 02:42:10 +00:00
// if unused_*_indices is empty while unused_*_indices_per_subaddr has multiple elements, and if we still have something to pay,
// pop front of unused_*_indices_per_subaddr and have unused_*_indices point to the front of unused_*_indices_per_subaddr
if ( ( ! dsts . empty ( ) & & dsts [ 0 ] . amount > 0 ) | | adding_fee )
{
if ( unused_transfers_indices - > empty ( ) & & unused_transfers_indices_per_subaddr . size ( ) > 1 )
{
unused_transfers_indices_per_subaddr . erase ( unused_transfers_indices_per_subaddr . begin ( ) ) ;
unused_transfers_indices = & unused_transfers_indices_per_subaddr [ 0 ] . second ;
}
if ( unused_dust_indices - > empty ( ) & & unused_dust_indices_per_subaddr . size ( ) > 1 )
{
unused_dust_indices_per_subaddr . erase ( unused_dust_indices_per_subaddr . begin ( ) ) ;
unused_dust_indices = & unused_dust_indices_per_subaddr [ 0 ] . second ;
}
}
2016-06-15 22:37:13 +00:00
}
if ( adding_fee )
{
LOG_PRINT_L1 ( " We ran out of outputs while trying to gather final fee " ) ;
2017-02-19 02:42:10 +00:00
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( 1 , error : : tx_not_possible , unlocked_balance ( subaddr_account ) , needed_money , accumulated_fee + needed_fee ) ;
2016-06-15 22:37:13 +00:00
}
LOG_PRINT_L1 ( " Done creating " < < txes . size ( ) < < " transactions, " < < print_money ( accumulated_fee ) < <
" total fee, " < < print_money ( accumulated_change ) < < " total change " ) ;
std : : vector < wallet2 : : pending_tx > ptx_vector ;
for ( std : : vector < TX > : : iterator i = txes . begin ( ) ; i ! = txes . end ( ) ; + + i )
{
TX & tx = * i ;
uint64_t tx_money = 0 ;
2016-09-26 22:11:10 +00:00
for ( size_t idx : tx . selected_transfers )
tx_money + = m_transfers [ idx ] . amount ( ) ;
2016-06-15 22:37:13 +00:00
LOG_PRINT_L1 ( " Transaction " < < ( 1 + std : : distance ( txes . begin ( ) , i ) ) < < " / " < < txes . size ( ) < <
" : " < < ( tx . bytes + 1023 ) / 1024 < < " kB, sending " < < print_money ( tx_money ) < < " in " < < tx . selected_transfers . size ( ) < <
" outputs to " < < tx . dsts . size ( ) < < " destination(s), including " < <
print_money ( tx . ptx . fee ) < < " fee, " < < print_money ( tx . ptx . change_dts . amount ) < < " change " ) ;
ptx_vector . push_back ( tx . ptx ) ;
}
// if we made it this far, we're OK to actually send the transactions
return ptx_vector ;
}
2017-02-19 02:42:10 +00:00
std : : vector < wallet2 : : pending_tx > wallet2 : : create_transactions_all ( uint64_t below , const cryptonote : : account_public_address & address , bool is_subaddress , const size_t fake_outs_count , const uint64_t unlock_time , uint32_t priority , const std : : vector < uint8_t > & extra , uint32_t subaddr_account , std : : set < uint32_t > subaddr_indices , bool trusted_daemon )
2016-06-15 22:37:13 +00:00
{
std : : vector < size_t > unused_transfers_indices ;
std : : vector < size_t > unused_dust_indices ;
2016-09-24 07:47:47 +00:00
const bool use_rct = use_fork_rules ( 4 , 0 ) ;
2017-11-07 14:04:40 +00:00
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( unlocked_balance ( subaddr_account ) = = 0 , error : : wallet_internal_error , " No unlocked balance in the entire wallet " ) ;
2017-02-19 02:42:10 +00:00
std : : map < uint32_t , uint64_t > balance_per_subaddr = unlocked_balance_per_subaddress ( subaddr_account ) ;
if ( subaddr_indices . empty ( ) )
{
// in case subaddress index wasn't specified, choose non-empty subaddress randomly (with index=0 being chosen last)
if ( balance_per_subaddr . count ( 0 ) = = 1 & & balance_per_subaddr . size ( ) > 1 )
balance_per_subaddr . erase ( 0 ) ;
auto i = balance_per_subaddr . begin ( ) ;
std : : advance ( i , crypto : : rand < size_t > ( ) % balance_per_subaddr . size ( ) ) ;
subaddr_indices . insert ( i - > first ) ;
}
for ( uint32_t i : subaddr_indices )
LOG_PRINT_L2 ( " Spending from subaddress index " < < i ) ;
// gather all dust and non-dust outputs of specified subaddress
2016-09-24 07:47:47 +00:00
for ( size_t i = 0 ; i < m_transfers . size ( ) ; + + i )
{
const transfer_details & td = m_transfers [ i ] ;
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing
Scheme by luigi1111:
Multisig for RingCT on Monero
2 of 2
User A (coordinator):
Spendkey b,B
Viewkey a,A (shared)
User B:
Spendkey c,C
Viewkey a,A (shared)
Public Address: C+B, A
Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a
A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants)
A and B watch for incoming outputs
B creates "half" key images for discovered output D:
I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D)
B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D),
and sending the pubkeys with I2_D.
A also creates "half" key images:
I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D)
Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D
Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction).
A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D
to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R).
At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r,
which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo).
B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well).
B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D
to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well.
NOTE:
A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively.
Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible:
A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B.
B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A.
The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time!
The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature).
2 of 3
User A (coordinator)
Shared viewkey a,A
"spendkey" j,J
User B
"spendkey" k,K
User C
"spendkey" m,M
A collects K and M from B and C
B collects J and M from A and C
C collects J and K from A and B
A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK)
A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM)
B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK)
B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate
Address: N+O+P, A
The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other
needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two.
Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties:
A gives j to B
B gives k to C
C gives m to A
Address: J+K+M, A
3 of 3
Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others.
The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it
or send it back to A.
N-1 of N
Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around
(using either the secure or insecure method).
For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up):
[4 of 5]
User: spendkey
A: a
B: b
C: c
D: d
E: e
a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A
Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with
the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys.
Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each.
Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning:
1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image)
2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator
must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use.
You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might
also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format.
You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc.
The process is somewhat cumbersome:
To create a N/N multisig wallet:
- each participant creates a normal wallet
- each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant
- each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N)
As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent:
- each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant
- each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants
Then, a transaction may be initiated:
- one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT"
- this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file
- the initiator sends this file to another participant
- that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx"
- the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again
- if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed
- the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 21:34:26 +00:00
if ( ! td . m_spent & & ! td . m_key_image_partial & & ( use_rct ? true : ! td . is_rct ( ) ) & & is_transfer_unlocked ( td ) & & td . m_subaddr_index . major = = subaddr_account & & subaddr_indices . count ( td . m_subaddr_index . minor ) = = 1 )
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{
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if ( below = = 0 | | td . amount ( ) < below )
{
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if ( ( td . is_rct ( ) ) | | is_valid_decomposed_amount ( td . amount ( ) ) )
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unused_transfers_indices . push_back ( i ) ;
else
unused_dust_indices . push_back ( i ) ;
}
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}
}
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THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( unused_transfers_indices . empty ( ) & & unused_dust_indices . empty ( ) , error : : not_enough_money , 0 , 0 , 0 ) ; // not sure if a new error class (something like 'cant_sweep_empty'?) should be introduced
return create_transactions_from ( address , is_subaddress , unused_transfers_indices , unused_dust_indices , fake_outs_count , unlock_time , priority , extra , trusted_daemon ) ;
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}
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std : : vector < wallet2 : : pending_tx > wallet2 : : create_transactions_single ( const crypto : : key_image & ki , const cryptonote : : account_public_address & address , bool is_subaddress , const size_t fake_outs_count , const uint64_t unlock_time , uint32_t priority , const std : : vector < uint8_t > & extra , bool trusted_daemon )
{
std : : vector < size_t > unused_transfers_indices ;
std : : vector < size_t > unused_dust_indices ;
const bool use_rct = use_fork_rules ( 4 , 0 ) ;
// find output with the given key image
for ( size_t i = 0 ; i < m_transfers . size ( ) ; + + i )
{
const transfer_details & td = m_transfers [ i ] ;
if ( td . m_key_image_known & & td . m_key_image = = ki & & ! td . m_spent & & ( use_rct ? true : ! td . is_rct ( ) ) & & is_transfer_unlocked ( td ) )
{
if ( td . is_rct ( ) | | is_valid_decomposed_amount ( td . amount ( ) ) )
unused_transfers_indices . push_back ( i ) ;
else
unused_dust_indices . push_back ( i ) ;
break ;
}
}
return create_transactions_from ( address , is_subaddress , unused_transfers_indices , unused_dust_indices , fake_outs_count , unlock_time , priority , extra , trusted_daemon ) ;
}
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std : : vector < wallet2 : : pending_tx > wallet2 : : create_transactions_from ( const cryptonote : : account_public_address & address , bool is_subaddress , std : : vector < size_t > unused_transfers_indices , std : : vector < size_t > unused_dust_indices , const size_t fake_outs_count , const uint64_t unlock_time , uint32_t priority , const std : : vector < uint8_t > & extra , bool trusted_daemon )
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{
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uint64_t accumulated_fee , accumulated_outputs , accumulated_change ;
struct TX {
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std : : vector < size_t > selected_transfers ;
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std : : vector < cryptonote : : tx_destination_entry > dsts ;
cryptonote : : transaction tx ;
pending_tx ptx ;
size_t bytes ;
} ;
std : : vector < TX > txes ;
uint64_t needed_fee , available_for_fee = 0 ;
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uint64_t upper_transaction_size_limit = get_upper_transaction_size_limit ( ) ;
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std : : vector < std : : vector < get_outs_entry > > outs ;
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const bool use_rct = fake_outs_count > 0 & & use_fork_rules ( 4 , 0 ) ;
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const bool bulletproof = use_fork_rules ( get_bulletproof_fork ( m_testnet ) , 0 ) ;
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const uint64_t fee_per_kb = get_per_kb_fee ( ) ;
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const uint64_t fee_multiplier = get_fee_multiplier ( priority , get_fee_algorithm ( ) ) ;
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LOG_PRINT_L2 ( " Starting with " < < unused_transfers_indices . size ( ) < < " non-dust outputs and " < < unused_dust_indices . size ( ) < < " dust outputs " ) ;
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if ( unused_dust_indices . empty ( ) & & unused_transfers_indices . empty ( ) )
return std : : vector < wallet2 : : pending_tx > ( ) ;
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// start with an empty tx
txes . push_back ( TX ( ) ) ;
accumulated_fee = 0 ;
accumulated_outputs = 0 ;
accumulated_change = 0 ;
needed_fee = 0 ;
// while we have something to send
while ( ! unused_dust_indices . empty ( ) | | ! unused_transfers_indices . empty ( ) ) {
TX & tx = txes . back ( ) ;
// get a random unspent output and use it to pay next chunk. We try to alternate
// dust and non dust to ensure we never get with only dust, from which we might
// get a tx that can't pay for itself
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size_t idx = unused_transfers_indices . empty ( ) ? pop_best_value ( unused_dust_indices , tx . selected_transfers ) : unused_dust_indices . empty ( ) ? pop_best_value ( unused_transfers_indices , tx . selected_transfers ) : ( ( tx . selected_transfers . size ( ) & 1 ) | | accumulated_outputs > fee_per_kb * fee_multiplier * ( upper_transaction_size_limit + 1023 ) / 1024 ) ? pop_best_value ( unused_dust_indices , tx . selected_transfers ) : pop_best_value ( unused_transfers_indices , tx . selected_transfers ) ;
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const transfer_details & td = m_transfers [ idx ] ;
LOG_PRINT_L2 ( " Picking output " < < idx < < " , amount " < < print_money ( td . amount ( ) ) ) ;
// add this output to the list to spend
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tx . selected_transfers . push_back ( idx ) ;
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uint64_t available_amount = td . amount ( ) ;
accumulated_outputs + = available_amount ;
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// clear any fake outs we'd already gathered, since we'll need a new set
outs . clear ( ) ;
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// here, check if we need to sent tx and start a new one
LOG_PRINT_L2 ( " Considering whether to create a tx now, " < < tx . selected_transfers . size ( ) < < " inputs, tx limit "
< < upper_transaction_size_limit ) ;
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const size_t estimated_rct_tx_size = estimate_tx_size ( use_rct , tx . selected_transfers . size ( ) , fake_outs_count , tx . dsts . size ( ) + 1 , extra . size ( ) , bulletproof ) ;
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bool try_tx = ( unused_dust_indices . empty ( ) & & unused_transfers_indices . empty ( ) ) | | ( estimated_rct_tx_size > = TX_SIZE_TARGET ( upper_transaction_size_limit ) ) ;
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if ( try_tx ) {
cryptonote : : transaction test_tx ;
pending_tx test_ptx ;
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const size_t estimated_tx_size = estimate_tx_size ( use_rct , tx . selected_transfers . size ( ) , fake_outs_count , tx . dsts . size ( ) , extra . size ( ) , bulletproof ) ;
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needed_fee = calculate_fee ( fee_per_kb , estimated_tx_size , fee_multiplier ) ;
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tx . dsts . push_back ( tx_destination_entry ( 1 , address , is_subaddress ) ) ;
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LOG_PRINT_L2 ( " Trying to create a tx now, with " < < tx . dsts . size ( ) < < " destinations and " < <
tx . selected_transfers . size ( ) < < " outputs " ) ;
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if ( use_rct )
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transfer_selected_rct ( tx . dsts , tx . selected_transfers , fake_outs_count , outs , unlock_time , needed_fee , extra ,
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test_tx , test_ptx , bulletproof ) ;
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else
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transfer_selected ( tx . dsts , tx . selected_transfers , fake_outs_count , outs , unlock_time , needed_fee , extra ,
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detail : : digit_split_strategy , tx_dust_policy ( : : config : : DEFAULT_DUST_THRESHOLD ) , test_tx , test_ptx ) ;
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auto txBlob = t_serializable_object_to_blob ( test_ptx . tx ) ;
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needed_fee = calculate_fee ( fee_per_kb , txBlob , fee_multiplier ) ;
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available_for_fee = test_ptx . fee + test_ptx . dests [ 0 ] . amount + test_ptx . change_dts . amount ;
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LOG_PRINT_L2 ( " Made a " < < ( ( txBlob . size ( ) + 1023 ) / 1024 ) < < " kB tx, with " < < print_money ( available_for_fee ) < < " available for fee ( " < <
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print_money ( needed_fee ) < < " needed) " ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( needed_fee > available_for_fee , error : : wallet_internal_error , " Transaction cannot pay for itself " ) ;
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while ( needed_fee > test_ptx . fee ) {
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LOG_PRINT_L2 ( " We made a tx, adjusting fee and saving it " ) ;
tx . dsts [ 0 ] . amount = available_for_fee - needed_fee ;
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if ( use_rct )
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transfer_selected_rct ( tx . dsts , tx . selected_transfers , fake_outs_count , outs , unlock_time , needed_fee , extra ,
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test_tx , test_ptx , bulletproof ) ;
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else
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transfer_selected ( tx . dsts , tx . selected_transfers , fake_outs_count , outs , unlock_time , needed_fee , extra ,
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detail : : digit_split_strategy , tx_dust_policy ( : : config : : DEFAULT_DUST_THRESHOLD ) , test_tx , test_ptx ) ;
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txBlob = t_serializable_object_to_blob ( test_ptx . tx ) ;
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needed_fee = calculate_fee ( fee_per_kb , txBlob , fee_multiplier ) ;
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LOG_PRINT_L2 ( " Made an attempt at a final " < < ( ( txBlob . size ( ) + 1023 ) / 1024 ) < < " kB tx, with " < < print_money ( test_ptx . fee ) < <
" fee and " < < print_money ( test_ptx . change_dts . amount ) < < " change " ) ;
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}
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LOG_PRINT_L2 ( " Made a final " < < ( ( txBlob . size ( ) + 1023 ) / 1024 ) < < " kB tx, with " < < print_money ( test_ptx . fee ) < <
" fee and " < < print_money ( test_ptx . change_dts . amount ) < < " change " ) ;
tx . tx = test_tx ;
tx . ptx = test_ptx ;
tx . bytes = txBlob . size ( ) ;
accumulated_fee + = test_ptx . fee ;
accumulated_change + = test_ptx . change_dts . amount ;
if ( ! unused_transfers_indices . empty ( ) | | ! unused_dust_indices . empty ( ) )
{
LOG_PRINT_L2 ( " We have more to pay, starting another tx " ) ;
txes . push_back ( TX ( ) ) ;
}
}
}
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LOG_PRINT_L1 ( " Done creating " < < txes . size ( ) < < " transactions, " < < print_money ( accumulated_fee ) < <
" total fee, " < < print_money ( accumulated_change ) < < " total change " ) ;
std : : vector < wallet2 : : pending_tx > ptx_vector ;
for ( std : : vector < TX > : : iterator i = txes . begin ( ) ; i ! = txes . end ( ) ; + + i )
{
TX & tx = * i ;
uint64_t tx_money = 0 ;
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for ( size_t idx : tx . selected_transfers )
tx_money + = m_transfers [ idx ] . amount ( ) ;
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LOG_PRINT_L1 ( " Transaction " < < ( 1 + std : : distance ( txes . begin ( ) , i ) ) < < " / " < < txes . size ( ) < <
" : " < < ( tx . bytes + 1023 ) / 1024 < < " kB, sending " < < print_money ( tx_money ) < < " in " < < tx . selected_transfers . size ( ) < <
" outputs to " < < tx . dsts . size ( ) < < " destination(s), including " < <
print_money ( tx . ptx . fee ) < < " fee, " < < print_money ( tx . ptx . change_dts . amount ) < < " change " ) ;
ptx_vector . push_back ( tx . ptx ) ;
}
// if we made it this far, we're OK to actually send the transactions
return ptx_vector ;
}
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//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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void wallet2 : : get_hard_fork_info ( uint8_t version , uint64_t & earliest_height )
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{
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boost : : optional < std : : string > result = m_node_rpc_proxy . get_earliest_height ( version , earliest_height ) ;
throw_on_rpc_response_error ( result , " get_hard_fork_info " ) ;
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}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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bool wallet2 : : use_fork_rules ( uint8_t version , int64_t early_blocks )
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{
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// TODO: How to get fork rule info from light wallet node?
if ( m_light_wallet )
return true ;
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uint64_t height , earliest_height ;
boost : : optional < std : : string > result = m_node_rpc_proxy . get_height ( height ) ;
throw_on_rpc_response_error ( result , " get_info " ) ;
result = m_node_rpc_proxy . get_earliest_height ( version , earliest_height ) ;
throw_on_rpc_response_error ( result , " get_hard_fork_info " ) ;
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bool close_enough = height > = earliest_height - early_blocks ; // start using the rules that many blocks beforehand
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if ( close_enough )
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LOG_PRINT_L2 ( " Using v " < < ( unsigned ) version < < " rules " ) ;
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else
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LOG_PRINT_L2 ( " Not using v " < < ( unsigned ) version < < " rules " ) ;
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return close_enough ;
}
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//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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uint64_t wallet2 : : get_upper_transaction_size_limit ( )
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{
if ( m_upper_transaction_size_limit > 0 )
return m_upper_transaction_size_limit ;
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uint64_t full_reward_zone = use_fork_rules ( 5 , 10 ) ? CRYPTONOTE_BLOCK_GRANTED_FULL_REWARD_ZONE_V5 : use_fork_rules ( 2 , 10 ) ? CRYPTONOTE_BLOCK_GRANTED_FULL_REWARD_ZONE_V2 : CRYPTONOTE_BLOCK_GRANTED_FULL_REWARD_ZONE_V1 ;
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return full_reward_zone - CRYPTONOTE_COINBASE_BLOB_RESERVED_SIZE ;
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}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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std : : vector < size_t > wallet2 : : select_available_outputs ( const std : : function < bool ( const transfer_details & td ) > & f )
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{
std : : vector < size_t > outputs ;
size_t n = 0 ;
for ( transfer_container : : const_iterator i = m_transfers . begin ( ) ; i ! = m_transfers . end ( ) ; + + i , + + n )
{
if ( i - > m_spent )
continue ;
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing
Scheme by luigi1111:
Multisig for RingCT on Monero
2 of 2
User A (coordinator):
Spendkey b,B
Viewkey a,A (shared)
User B:
Spendkey c,C
Viewkey a,A (shared)
Public Address: C+B, A
Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a
A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants)
A and B watch for incoming outputs
B creates "half" key images for discovered output D:
I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D)
B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D),
and sending the pubkeys with I2_D.
A also creates "half" key images:
I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D)
Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D
Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction).
A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D
to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R).
At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r,
which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo).
B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well).
B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D
to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well.
NOTE:
A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively.
Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible:
A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B.
B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A.
The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time!
The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature).
2 of 3
User A (coordinator)
Shared viewkey a,A
"spendkey" j,J
User B
"spendkey" k,K
User C
"spendkey" m,M
A collects K and M from B and C
B collects J and M from A and C
C collects J and K from A and B
A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK)
A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM)
B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK)
B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate
Address: N+O+P, A
The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other
needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two.
Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties:
A gives j to B
B gives k to C
C gives m to A
Address: J+K+M, A
3 of 3
Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others.
The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it
or send it back to A.
N-1 of N
Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around
(using either the secure or insecure method).
For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up):
[4 of 5]
User: spendkey
A: a
B: b
C: c
D: d
E: e
a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A
Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with
the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys.
Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each.
Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning:
1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image)
2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator
must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use.
You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might
also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format.
You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc.
The process is somewhat cumbersome:
To create a N/N multisig wallet:
- each participant creates a normal wallet
- each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant
- each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N)
As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent:
- each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant
- each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants
Then, a transaction may be initiated:
- one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT"
- this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file
- the initiator sends this file to another participant
- that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx"
- the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again
- if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed
- the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
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if ( i - > m_key_image_partial )
continue ;
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if ( ! is_transfer_unlocked ( * i ) )
continue ;
if ( f ( * i ) )
outputs . push_back ( n ) ;
}
return outputs ;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
std : : vector < uint64_t > wallet2 : : get_unspent_amounts_vector ( )
{
std : : set < uint64_t > set ;
for ( const auto & td : m_transfers )
{
if ( ! td . m_spent )
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set . insert ( td . is_rct ( ) ? 0 : td . amount ( ) ) ;
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}
std : : vector < uint64_t > vector ;
vector . reserve ( set . size ( ) ) ;
for ( const auto & i : set )
{
vector . push_back ( i ) ;
}
return vector ;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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std : : vector < size_t > wallet2 : : select_available_outputs_from_histogram ( uint64_t count , bool atleast , bool unlocked , bool allow_rct , bool trusted_daemon )
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{
epee : : json_rpc : : request < cryptonote : : COMMAND_RPC_GET_OUTPUT_HISTOGRAM : : request > req_t = AUTO_VAL_INIT ( req_t ) ;
epee : : json_rpc : : response < cryptonote : : COMMAND_RPC_GET_OUTPUT_HISTOGRAM : : response , std : : string > resp_t = AUTO_VAL_INIT ( resp_t ) ;
m_daemon_rpc_mutex . lock ( ) ;
req_t . jsonrpc = " 2.0 " ;
req_t . id = epee : : serialization : : storage_entry ( 0 ) ;
req_t . method = " get_output_histogram " ;
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if ( trusted_daemon )
req_t . params . amounts = get_unspent_amounts_vector ( ) ;
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req_t . params . min_count = count ;
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req_t . params . max_count = 0 ;
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req_t . params . unlocked = unlocked ;
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bool r = net_utils : : invoke_http_json ( " /json_rpc " , req_t , resp_t , m_http_client , rpc_timeout ) ;
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m_daemon_rpc_mutex . unlock ( ) ;
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THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( ! r , error : : no_connection_to_daemon , " select_available_outputs_from_histogram " ) ;
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THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( resp_t . result . status = = CORE_RPC_STATUS_BUSY , error : : daemon_busy , " get_output_histogram " ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( resp_t . result . status ! = CORE_RPC_STATUS_OK , error : : get_histogram_error , resp_t . result . status ) ;
std : : set < uint64_t > mixable ;
for ( const auto & i : resp_t . result . histogram )
{
mixable . insert ( i . amount ) ;
}
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return select_available_outputs ( [ mixable , atleast , allow_rct ] ( const transfer_details & td ) {
if ( ! allow_rct & & td . is_rct ( ) )
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return false ;
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const uint64_t amount = td . is_rct ( ) ? 0 : td . amount ( ) ;
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if ( atleast ) {
if ( mixable . find ( amount ) ! = mixable . end ( ) )
return true ;
}
else {
if ( mixable . find ( amount ) = = mixable . end ( ) )
return true ;
}
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return false ;
} ) ;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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uint64_t wallet2 : : get_num_rct_outputs ( )
{
epee : : json_rpc : : request < cryptonote : : COMMAND_RPC_GET_OUTPUT_HISTOGRAM : : request > req_t = AUTO_VAL_INIT ( req_t ) ;
epee : : json_rpc : : response < cryptonote : : COMMAND_RPC_GET_OUTPUT_HISTOGRAM : : response , std : : string > resp_t = AUTO_VAL_INIT ( resp_t ) ;
m_daemon_rpc_mutex . lock ( ) ;
req_t . jsonrpc = " 2.0 " ;
req_t . id = epee : : serialization : : storage_entry ( 0 ) ;
req_t . method = " get_output_histogram " ;
req_t . params . amounts . push_back ( 0 ) ;
req_t . params . min_count = 0 ;
req_t . params . max_count = 0 ;
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bool r = net_utils : : invoke_http_json ( " /json_rpc " , req_t , resp_t , m_http_client , rpc_timeout ) ;
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m_daemon_rpc_mutex . unlock ( ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( ! r , error : : no_connection_to_daemon , " get_num_rct_outputs " ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( resp_t . result . status = = CORE_RPC_STATUS_BUSY , error : : daemon_busy , " get_output_histogram " ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( resp_t . result . status ! = CORE_RPC_STATUS_OK , error : : get_histogram_error , resp_t . result . status ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( resp_t . result . histogram . size ( ) ! = 1 , error : : get_histogram_error , " Expected exactly one response " ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( resp_t . result . histogram [ 0 ] . amount ! = 0 , error : : get_histogram_error , " Expected 0 amount " ) ;
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return resp_t . result . histogram [ 0 ] . total_instances ;
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}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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const wallet2 : : transfer_details & wallet2 : : get_transfer_details ( size_t idx ) const
{
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( idx > = m_transfers . size ( ) , error : : wallet_internal_error , " Bad transfer index " ) ;
return m_transfers [ idx ] ;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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std : : vector < size_t > wallet2 : : select_available_unmixable_outputs ( bool trusted_daemon )
{
// request all outputs with less than 3 instances
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const size_t min_mixin = use_fork_rules ( 6 , 10 ) ? 4 : 2 ; // v6 increases min mixin from 2 to 4
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return select_available_outputs_from_histogram ( min_mixin + 1 , false , true , false , trusted_daemon ) ;
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}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
std : : vector < size_t > wallet2 : : select_available_mixable_outputs ( bool trusted_daemon )
{
// request all outputs with at least 3 instances, so we can use mixin 2 with
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const size_t min_mixin = use_fork_rules ( 6 , 10 ) ? 4 : 2 ; // v6 increases min mixin from 2 to 4
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return select_available_outputs_from_histogram ( min_mixin + 1 , true , true , true , trusted_daemon ) ;
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}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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std : : vector < wallet2 : : pending_tx > wallet2 : : create_unmixable_sweep_transactions ( bool trusted_daemon )
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{
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// From hard fork 1, we don't consider small amounts to be dust anymore
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const bool hf1_rules = use_fork_rules ( 2 , 10 ) ; // first hard fork has version 2
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tx_dust_policy dust_policy ( hf1_rules ? 0 : : : config : : DEFAULT_DUST_THRESHOLD ) ;
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const uint64_t fee_per_kb = get_per_kb_fee ( ) ;
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// may throw
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std : : vector < size_t > unmixable_outputs = select_available_unmixable_outputs ( trusted_daemon ) ;
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size_t num_dust_outputs = unmixable_outputs . size ( ) ;
if ( num_dust_outputs = = 0 )
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{
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return std : : vector < wallet2 : : pending_tx > ( ) ;
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}
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// split in "dust" and "non dust" to make it easier to select outputs
std : : vector < size_t > unmixable_transfer_outputs , unmixable_dust_outputs ;
for ( auto n : unmixable_outputs )
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{
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if ( m_transfers [ n ] . amount ( ) < fee_per_kb )
unmixable_dust_outputs . push_back ( n ) ;
else
unmixable_transfer_outputs . push_back ( n ) ;
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}
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return create_transactions_from ( m_account_public_address , false , unmixable_transfer_outputs , unmixable_dust_outputs , 0 /*fake_outs_count */ , 0 /* unlock_time */ , 1 /*priority */ , std : : vector < uint8_t > ( ) , trusted_daemon ) ;
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}
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bool wallet2 : : get_tx_key ( const crypto : : hash & txid , crypto : : secret_key & tx_key , std : : vector < crypto : : secret_key > & additional_tx_keys ) const
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{
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additional_tx_keys . clear ( ) ;
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const std : : unordered_map < crypto : : hash , crypto : : secret_key > : : const_iterator i = m_tx_keys . find ( txid ) ;
if ( i = = m_tx_keys . end ( ) )
return false ;
tx_key = i - > second ;
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const auto j = m_additional_tx_keys . find ( txid ) ;
if ( j ! = m_additional_tx_keys . end ( ) )
additional_tx_keys = j - > second ;
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return true ;
}
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//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
std : : string wallet2 : : get_spend_proof ( const crypto : : hash & txid , const std : : string & message )
{
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( m_watch_only , error : : wallet_internal_error ,
" get_spend_proof requires spend secret key and is not available for a watch-only wallet " ) ;
// fetch tx from daemon
COMMAND_RPC_GET_TRANSACTIONS : : request req = AUTO_VAL_INIT ( req ) ;
req . txs_hashes . push_back ( epee : : string_tools : : pod_to_hex ( txid ) ) ;
req . decode_as_json = false ;
COMMAND_RPC_GET_TRANSACTIONS : : response res = AUTO_VAL_INIT ( res ) ;
bool r ;
{
const boost : : lock_guard < boost : : mutex > lock { m_daemon_rpc_mutex } ;
r = epee : : net_utils : : invoke_http_json ( " /gettransactions " , req , res , m_http_client , rpc_timeout ) ;
}
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( ! r , error : : no_connection_to_daemon , " gettransactions " ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( res . status = = CORE_RPC_STATUS_BUSY , error : : daemon_busy , " gettransactions " ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( res . status ! = CORE_RPC_STATUS_OK , error : : wallet_internal_error , " gettransactions " ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( res . txs . size ( ) ! = 1 , error : : wallet_internal_error ,
" daemon returned wrong response for gettransactions, wrong txs count = " +
std : : to_string ( res . txs . size ( ) ) + " , expected 1 " ) ;
cryptonote : : blobdata bd ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( ! epee : : string_tools : : parse_hexstr_to_binbuff ( res . txs [ 0 ] . as_hex , bd ) , error : : wallet_internal_error , " failed to parse tx from hexstr " ) ;
cryptonote : : transaction tx ;
crypto : : hash tx_hash , tx_prefix_hash ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( ! cryptonote : : parse_and_validate_tx_from_blob ( bd , tx , tx_hash , tx_prefix_hash ) , error : : wallet_internal_error , " failed to parse tx from blob " ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( tx_hash ! = txid , error : : wallet_internal_error , " txid mismatch " ) ;
std : : vector < std : : vector < crypto : : signature > > signatures ;
// get signature prefix hash
std : : string sig_prefix_data ( ( const char * ) & txid , sizeof ( crypto : : hash ) ) ;
sig_prefix_data + = message ;
crypto : : hash sig_prefix_hash ;
crypto : : cn_fast_hash ( sig_prefix_data . data ( ) , sig_prefix_data . size ( ) , sig_prefix_hash ) ;
for ( size_t i = 0 ; i < tx . vin . size ( ) ; + + i )
{
const txin_to_key * const in_key = boost : : get < txin_to_key > ( std : : addressof ( tx . vin [ i ] ) ) ;
if ( in_key = = nullptr )
continue ;
// check if the key image belongs to us
const auto found = m_key_images . find ( in_key - > k_image ) ;
if ( found = = m_key_images . end ( ) )
{
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( i > 0 , error : : wallet_internal_error , " subset of key images belong to us, very weird! " ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( true , error : : wallet_internal_error , " This tx wasn't generated by this wallet! " ) ;
}
// derive the real output keypair
const transfer_details & in_td = m_transfers [ found - > second ] ;
const txout_to_key * const in_tx_out_pkey = boost : : get < txout_to_key > ( std : : addressof ( in_td . m_tx . vout [ in_td . m_internal_output_index ] . target ) ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( in_tx_out_pkey = = nullptr , error : : wallet_internal_error , " Output is not txout_to_key " ) ;
const crypto : : public_key in_tx_pub_key = get_tx_pub_key_from_extra ( in_td . m_tx , in_td . m_pk_index ) ;
const std : : vector < crypto : : public_key > in_additionakl_tx_pub_keys = get_additional_tx_pub_keys_from_extra ( in_td . m_tx ) ;
keypair in_ephemeral ;
crypto : : key_image in_img ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( ! generate_key_image_helper ( m_account . get_keys ( ) , m_subaddresses , in_tx_out_pkey - > key , in_tx_pub_key , in_additionakl_tx_pub_keys , in_td . m_internal_output_index , in_ephemeral , in_img ) ,
error : : wallet_internal_error , " failed to generate key image " ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( in_key - > k_image ! = in_img , error : : wallet_internal_error , " key image mismatch " ) ;
// get output pubkeys in the ring
const std : : vector < uint64_t > absolute_offsets = cryptonote : : relative_output_offsets_to_absolute ( in_key - > key_offsets ) ;
const size_t ring_size = in_key - > key_offsets . size ( ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( absolute_offsets . size ( ) ! = ring_size , error : : wallet_internal_error , " absolute offsets size is wrong " ) ;
COMMAND_RPC_GET_OUTPUTS_BIN : : request req = AUTO_VAL_INIT ( req ) ;
req . outputs . resize ( ring_size ) ;
for ( size_t j = 0 ; j < ring_size ; + + j )
{
req . outputs [ j ] . amount = in_key - > amount ;
req . outputs [ j ] . index = absolute_offsets [ j ] ;
}
COMMAND_RPC_GET_OUTPUTS_BIN : : response res = AUTO_VAL_INIT ( res ) ;
bool r ;
{
const boost : : lock_guard < boost : : mutex > lock { m_daemon_rpc_mutex } ;
r = epee : : net_utils : : invoke_http_bin ( " /get_outs.bin " , req , res , m_http_client , rpc_timeout ) ;
}
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( ! r , error : : no_connection_to_daemon , " get_outs.bin " ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( res . status = = CORE_RPC_STATUS_BUSY , error : : daemon_busy , " get_outs.bin " ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( res . status ! = CORE_RPC_STATUS_OK , error : : wallet_internal_error , " get_outs.bin " ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( res . outs . size ( ) ! = ring_size , error : : wallet_internal_error ,
" daemon returned wrong response for get_outs.bin, wrong amounts count = " +
std : : to_string ( res . outs . size ( ) ) + " , expected " + std : : to_string ( ring_size ) ) ;
// copy pubkey pointers
std : : vector < const crypto : : public_key * > p_output_keys ;
for ( const COMMAND_RPC_GET_OUTPUTS_BIN : : outkey & out : res . outs )
p_output_keys . push_back ( & out . key ) ;
// figure out real output index and secret key
size_t sec_index = - 1 ;
for ( size_t j = 0 ; j < ring_size ; + + j )
{
if ( res . outs [ j ] . key = = in_ephemeral . pub )
{
sec_index = j ;
break ;
}
}
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( sec_index > = ring_size , error : : wallet_internal_error , " secret index not found " ) ;
// generate ring sig for this input
signatures . push_back ( std : : vector < crypto : : signature > ( ) ) ;
std : : vector < crypto : : signature > & sigs = signatures . back ( ) ;
sigs . resize ( in_key - > key_offsets . size ( ) ) ;
crypto : : generate_ring_signature ( sig_prefix_hash , in_key - > k_image , p_output_keys , in_ephemeral . sec , sec_index , sigs . data ( ) ) ;
}
std : : string sig_str = " SpendProofV1 " ;
for ( const std : : vector < crypto : : signature > & ring_sig : signatures )
for ( const crypto : : signature & sig : ring_sig )
sig_str + = tools : : base58 : : encode ( std : : string ( ( const char * ) & sig , sizeof ( crypto : : signature ) ) ) ;
return sig_str ;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
bool wallet2 : : check_spend_proof ( const crypto : : hash & txid , const std : : string & message , const std : : string & sig_str )
{
const std : : string header = " SpendProofV1 " ;
const size_t header_len = header . size ( ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( sig_str . size ( ) < header_len | | sig_str . substr ( 0 , header_len ) ! = header , error : : wallet_internal_error ,
" Signature header check error " ) ;
// fetch tx from daemon
COMMAND_RPC_GET_TRANSACTIONS : : request req = AUTO_VAL_INIT ( req ) ;
req . txs_hashes . push_back ( epee : : string_tools : : pod_to_hex ( txid ) ) ;
req . decode_as_json = false ;
COMMAND_RPC_GET_TRANSACTIONS : : response res = AUTO_VAL_INIT ( res ) ;
bool r ;
{
const boost : : lock_guard < boost : : mutex > lock { m_daemon_rpc_mutex } ;
r = epee : : net_utils : : invoke_http_json ( " /gettransactions " , req , res , m_http_client , rpc_timeout ) ;
}
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( ! r , error : : no_connection_to_daemon , " gettransactions " ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( res . status = = CORE_RPC_STATUS_BUSY , error : : daemon_busy , " gettransactions " ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( res . status ! = CORE_RPC_STATUS_OK , error : : wallet_internal_error , " gettransactions " ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( res . txs . size ( ) ! = 1 , error : : wallet_internal_error ,
" daemon returned wrong response for gettransactions, wrong txs count = " +
std : : to_string ( res . txs . size ( ) ) + " , expected 1 " ) ;
cryptonote : : blobdata bd ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( ! epee : : string_tools : : parse_hexstr_to_binbuff ( res . txs [ 0 ] . as_hex , bd ) , error : : wallet_internal_error , " failed to parse tx from hexstr " ) ;
cryptonote : : transaction tx ;
crypto : : hash tx_hash , tx_prefix_hash ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( ! cryptonote : : parse_and_validate_tx_from_blob ( bd , tx , tx_hash , tx_prefix_hash ) , error : : wallet_internal_error , " failed to parse tx from blob " ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( tx_hash ! = txid , error : : wallet_internal_error , " txid mismatch " ) ;
// check signature size
size_t num_sigs = 0 ;
for ( size_t i = 0 ; i < tx . vin . size ( ) ; + + i )
{
const txin_to_key * const in_key = boost : : get < txin_to_key > ( std : : addressof ( tx . vin [ i ] ) ) ;
if ( in_key ! = nullptr )
num_sigs + = in_key - > key_offsets . size ( ) ;
}
std : : vector < std : : vector < crypto : : signature > > signatures = { std : : vector < crypto : : signature > ( 1 ) } ;
const size_t sig_len = tools : : base58 : : encode ( std : : string ( ( const char * ) & signatures [ 0 ] [ 0 ] , sizeof ( crypto : : signature ) ) ) . size ( ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( sig_str . size ( ) ! = header_len + num_sigs * sig_len ,
error : : wallet_internal_error , " incorrect signature size " ) ;
// decode base58
signatures . clear ( ) ;
size_t offset = header_len ;
for ( size_t i = 0 ; i < tx . vin . size ( ) ; + + i )
{
const txin_to_key * const in_key = boost : : get < txin_to_key > ( std : : addressof ( tx . vin [ i ] ) ) ;
if ( in_key = = nullptr )
continue ;
signatures . resize ( signatures . size ( ) + 1 ) ;
signatures . back ( ) . resize ( in_key - > key_offsets . size ( ) ) ;
for ( size_t j = 0 ; j < in_key - > key_offsets . size ( ) ; + + j )
{
std : : string sig_decoded ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( ! tools : : base58 : : decode ( sig_str . substr ( offset , sig_len ) , sig_decoded ) , error : : wallet_internal_error , " Signature decoding error " ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( sizeof ( crypto : : signature ) ! = sig_decoded . size ( ) , error : : wallet_internal_error , " Signature decoding error " ) ;
memcpy ( & signatures . back ( ) [ j ] , sig_decoded . data ( ) , sizeof ( crypto : : signature ) ) ;
offset + = sig_len ;
}
}
// get signature prefix hash
std : : string sig_prefix_data ( ( const char * ) & txid , sizeof ( crypto : : hash ) ) ;
sig_prefix_data + = message ;
crypto : : hash sig_prefix_hash ;
crypto : : cn_fast_hash ( sig_prefix_data . data ( ) , sig_prefix_data . size ( ) , sig_prefix_hash ) ;
std : : vector < std : : vector < crypto : : signature > > : : const_iterator sig_iter = signatures . cbegin ( ) ;
for ( size_t i = 0 ; i < tx . vin . size ( ) ; + + i )
{
const txin_to_key * const in_key = boost : : get < txin_to_key > ( std : : addressof ( tx . vin [ i ] ) ) ;
if ( in_key = = nullptr )
continue ;
// get output pubkeys in the ring
COMMAND_RPC_GET_OUTPUTS_BIN : : request req = AUTO_VAL_INIT ( req ) ;
const std : : vector < uint64_t > absolute_offsets = cryptonote : : relative_output_offsets_to_absolute ( in_key - > key_offsets ) ;
req . outputs . resize ( absolute_offsets . size ( ) ) ;
for ( size_t j = 0 ; j < absolute_offsets . size ( ) ; + + j )
{
req . outputs [ j ] . amount = in_key - > amount ;
req . outputs [ j ] . index = absolute_offsets [ j ] ;
}
COMMAND_RPC_GET_OUTPUTS_BIN : : response res = AUTO_VAL_INIT ( res ) ;
bool r ;
{
const boost : : lock_guard < boost : : mutex > lock { m_daemon_rpc_mutex } ;
r = epee : : net_utils : : invoke_http_bin ( " /get_outs.bin " , req , res , m_http_client , rpc_timeout ) ;
}
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( ! r , error : : no_connection_to_daemon , " get_outs.bin " ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( res . status = = CORE_RPC_STATUS_BUSY , error : : daemon_busy , " get_outs.bin " ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( res . status ! = CORE_RPC_STATUS_OK , error : : wallet_internal_error , " get_outs.bin " ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( res . outs . size ( ) ! = req . outputs . size ( ) , error : : wallet_internal_error ,
" daemon returned wrong response for get_outs.bin, wrong amounts count = " +
std : : to_string ( res . outs . size ( ) ) + " , expected " + std : : to_string ( req . outputs . size ( ) ) ) ;
// copy pointers
std : : vector < const crypto : : public_key * > p_output_keys ;
for ( const COMMAND_RPC_GET_OUTPUTS_BIN : : outkey & out : res . outs )
p_output_keys . push_back ( & out . key ) ;
// check this ring
if ( ! crypto : : check_ring_signature ( sig_prefix_hash , in_key - > k_image , p_output_keys , sig_iter - > data ( ) ) )
return false ;
+ + sig_iter ;
}
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( sig_iter ! = signatures . cend ( ) , error : : wallet_internal_error , " Signature iterator didn't reach the end " ) ;
return true ;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2015-08-19 19:59:44 +00:00
2017-09-12 01:05:41 +00:00
void wallet2 : : check_tx_key ( const crypto : : hash & txid , const crypto : : secret_key & tx_key , const std : : vector < crypto : : secret_key > & additional_tx_keys , const cryptonote : : account_public_address & address , uint64_t & received , bool & in_pool , uint64_t & confirmations )
{
crypto : : key_derivation derivation ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( ! crypto : : generate_key_derivation ( address . m_view_public_key , tx_key , derivation ) , error : : wallet_internal_error ,
" Failed to generate key derivation from supplied parameters " ) ;
std : : vector < crypto : : key_derivation > additional_derivations ;
additional_derivations . resize ( additional_tx_keys . size ( ) ) ;
for ( size_t i = 0 ; i < additional_tx_keys . size ( ) ; + + i )
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( ! crypto : : generate_key_derivation ( address . m_view_public_key , additional_tx_keys [ i ] , additional_derivations [ i ] ) , error : : wallet_internal_error ,
" Failed to generate key derivation from supplied parameters " ) ;
check_tx_key_helper ( txid , derivation , additional_derivations , address , received , in_pool , confirmations ) ;
}
void wallet2 : : check_tx_key_helper ( const crypto : : hash & txid , const crypto : : key_derivation & derivation , const std : : vector < crypto : : key_derivation > & additional_derivations , const cryptonote : : account_public_address & address , uint64_t & received , bool & in_pool , uint64_t & confirmations )
{
COMMAND_RPC_GET_TRANSACTIONS : : request req ;
COMMAND_RPC_GET_TRANSACTIONS : : response res ;
req . txs_hashes . push_back ( epee : : string_tools : : pod_to_hex ( txid ) ) ;
m_daemon_rpc_mutex . lock ( ) ;
bool ok = epee : : net_utils : : invoke_http_json ( " /gettransactions " , req , res , m_http_client ) ;
m_daemon_rpc_mutex . unlock ( ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( ! ok | | ( res . txs . size ( ) ! = 1 & & res . txs_as_hex . size ( ) ! = 1 ) ,
error : : wallet_internal_error , " Failed to get transaction from daemon " ) ;
cryptonote : : blobdata tx_data ;
if ( res . txs . size ( ) = = 1 )
ok = string_tools : : parse_hexstr_to_binbuff ( res . txs . front ( ) . as_hex , tx_data ) ;
else
ok = string_tools : : parse_hexstr_to_binbuff ( res . txs_as_hex . front ( ) , tx_data ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( ! ok , error : : wallet_internal_error , " Failed to parse transaction from daemon " ) ;
crypto : : hash tx_hash , tx_prefix_hash ;
cryptonote : : transaction tx ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( ! cryptonote : : parse_and_validate_tx_from_blob ( tx_data , tx , tx_hash , tx_prefix_hash ) , error : : wallet_internal_error ,
" Failed to validate transaction from daemon " ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( tx_hash ! = txid , error : : wallet_internal_error ,
" Failed to get the right transaction from daemon " ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( ! additional_derivations . empty ( ) & & additional_derivations . size ( ) ! = tx . vout . size ( ) , error : : wallet_internal_error ,
" The size of additional derivations is wrong " ) ;
received = 0 ;
for ( size_t n = 0 ; n < tx . vout . size ( ) ; + + n )
{
const cryptonote : : txout_to_key * const out_key = boost : : get < cryptonote : : txout_to_key > ( std : : addressof ( tx . vout [ n ] . target ) ) ;
if ( ! out_key )
continue ;
crypto : : public_key derived_out_key ;
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bool r = derive_public_key ( derivation , n , address . m_spend_public_key , derived_out_key ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( ! r , error : : wallet_internal_error , " Failed to derive public key " ) ;
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bool found = out_key - > key = = derived_out_key ;
crypto : : key_derivation found_derivation = derivation ;
if ( ! found & & ! additional_derivations . empty ( ) )
{
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r = derive_public_key ( additional_derivations [ n ] , n , address . m_spend_public_key , derived_out_key ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( ! r , error : : wallet_internal_error , " Failed to derive public key " ) ;
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found = out_key - > key = = derived_out_key ;
found_derivation = additional_derivations [ n ] ;
}
if ( found )
{
uint64_t amount ;
if ( tx . version = = 1 | | tx . rct_signatures . type = = rct : : RCTTypeNull )
{
amount = tx . vout [ n ] . amount ;
}
else
{
crypto : : secret_key scalar1 ;
crypto : : derivation_to_scalar ( found_derivation , n , scalar1 ) ;
rct : : ecdhTuple ecdh_info = tx . rct_signatures . ecdhInfo [ n ] ;
rct : : ecdhDecode ( ecdh_info , rct : : sk2rct ( scalar1 ) ) ;
const rct : : key C = tx . rct_signatures . outPk [ n ] . mask ;
rct : : key Ctmp ;
rct : : addKeys2 ( Ctmp , ecdh_info . mask , ecdh_info . amount , rct : : H ) ;
if ( rct : : equalKeys ( C , Ctmp ) )
amount = rct : : h2d ( ecdh_info . amount ) ;
else
amount = 0 ;
}
received + = amount ;
}
}
in_pool = res . txs . front ( ) . in_pool ;
confirmations = ( uint64_t ) - 1 ;
if ( ! in_pool )
{
std : : string err ;
uint64_t bc_height = get_daemon_blockchain_height ( err ) ;
if ( err . empty ( ) )
confirmations = bc_height - ( res . txs . front ( ) . block_height + 1 ) ;
}
}
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std : : string wallet2 : : get_tx_proof ( const crypto : : hash & txid , const cryptonote : : account_public_address & address , bool is_subaddress , const std : : string & message )
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{
// determine if the address is found in the subaddress hash table (i.e. whether the proof is outbound or inbound)
const bool is_out = m_subaddresses . count ( address . m_spend_public_key ) = = 0 ;
std : : string prefix_data ( ( const char * ) & txid , sizeof ( crypto : : hash ) ) ;
prefix_data + = message ;
crypto : : hash prefix_hash ;
crypto : : cn_fast_hash ( prefix_data . data ( ) , prefix_data . size ( ) , prefix_hash ) ;
std : : vector < crypto : : public_key > shared_secret ;
std : : vector < crypto : : signature > sig ;
std : : string sig_str ;
if ( is_out )
{
crypto : : secret_key tx_key ;
std : : vector < crypto : : secret_key > additional_tx_keys ;
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THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( ! get_tx_key ( txid , tx_key , additional_tx_keys ) , error : : wallet_internal_error , " Tx secret key wasn't found in the wallet file. " ) ;
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const size_t num_sigs = 1 + additional_tx_keys . size ( ) ;
shared_secret . resize ( num_sigs ) ;
sig . resize ( num_sigs ) ;
shared_secret [ 0 ] = rct : : rct2pk ( rct : : scalarmultKey ( rct : : pk2rct ( address . m_view_public_key ) , rct : : sk2rct ( tx_key ) ) ) ;
crypto : : public_key tx_pub_key ;
if ( is_subaddress )
{
tx_pub_key = rct2pk ( rct : : scalarmultKey ( rct : : pk2rct ( address . m_spend_public_key ) , rct : : sk2rct ( tx_key ) ) ) ;
crypto : : generate_tx_proof ( prefix_hash , tx_pub_key , address . m_view_public_key , address . m_spend_public_key , shared_secret [ 0 ] , tx_key , sig [ 0 ] ) ;
}
else
{
crypto : : secret_key_to_public_key ( tx_key , tx_pub_key ) ;
crypto : : generate_tx_proof ( prefix_hash , tx_pub_key , address . m_view_public_key , boost : : none , shared_secret [ 0 ] , tx_key , sig [ 0 ] ) ;
}
for ( size_t i = 1 ; i < num_sigs ; + + i )
{
shared_secret [ i ] = rct : : rct2pk ( rct : : scalarmultKey ( rct : : pk2rct ( address . m_view_public_key ) , rct : : sk2rct ( additional_tx_keys [ i - 1 ] ) ) ) ;
if ( is_subaddress )
{
tx_pub_key = rct2pk ( rct : : scalarmultKey ( rct : : pk2rct ( address . m_spend_public_key ) , rct : : sk2rct ( additional_tx_keys [ i - 1 ] ) ) ) ;
crypto : : generate_tx_proof ( prefix_hash , tx_pub_key , address . m_view_public_key , address . m_spend_public_key , shared_secret [ i ] , additional_tx_keys [ i - 1 ] , sig [ i ] ) ;
}
else
{
crypto : : secret_key_to_public_key ( additional_tx_keys [ i - 1 ] , tx_pub_key ) ;
crypto : : generate_tx_proof ( prefix_hash , tx_pub_key , address . m_view_public_key , boost : : none , shared_secret [ i ] , additional_tx_keys [ i - 1 ] , sig [ i ] ) ;
}
}
sig_str = std : : string ( " OutProofV1 " ) ;
}
else
{
// fetch tx pubkey from the daemon
COMMAND_RPC_GET_TRANSACTIONS : : request req ;
COMMAND_RPC_GET_TRANSACTIONS : : response res ;
req . txs_hashes . push_back ( epee : : string_tools : : pod_to_hex ( txid ) ) ;
m_daemon_rpc_mutex . lock ( ) ;
bool ok = net_utils : : invoke_http_json ( " /gettransactions " , req , res , m_http_client ) ;
m_daemon_rpc_mutex . unlock ( ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( ! ok | | ( res . txs . size ( ) ! = 1 & & res . txs_as_hex . size ( ) ! = 1 ) ,
error : : wallet_internal_error , " Failed to get transaction from daemon " ) ;
cryptonote : : blobdata tx_data ;
if ( res . txs . size ( ) = = 1 )
ok = string_tools : : parse_hexstr_to_binbuff ( res . txs . front ( ) . as_hex , tx_data ) ;
else
ok = string_tools : : parse_hexstr_to_binbuff ( res . txs_as_hex . front ( ) , tx_data ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( ! ok , error : : wallet_internal_error , " Failed to parse transaction from daemon " ) ;
crypto : : hash tx_hash , tx_prefix_hash ;
cryptonote : : transaction tx ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( ! cryptonote : : parse_and_validate_tx_from_blob ( tx_data , tx , tx_hash , tx_prefix_hash ) , error : : wallet_internal_error ,
" Failed to validate transaction from daemon " ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( tx_hash ! = txid , error : : wallet_internal_error , " Failed to get the right transaction from daemon " ) ;
crypto : : public_key tx_pub_key = get_tx_pub_key_from_extra ( tx ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( tx_pub_key = = null_pkey , error : : wallet_internal_error , " Tx pubkey was not found " ) ;
std : : vector < crypto : : public_key > additional_tx_pub_keys = get_additional_tx_pub_keys_from_extra ( tx ) ;
const size_t num_sigs = 1 + additional_tx_pub_keys . size ( ) ;
shared_secret . resize ( num_sigs ) ;
sig . resize ( num_sigs ) ;
const crypto : : secret_key & a = m_account . get_keys ( ) . m_view_secret_key ;
shared_secret [ 0 ] = rct : : rct2pk ( rct : : scalarmultKey ( rct : : pk2rct ( tx_pub_key ) , rct : : sk2rct ( a ) ) ) ;
if ( is_subaddress )
{
crypto : : generate_tx_proof ( prefix_hash , address . m_view_public_key , tx_pub_key , address . m_spend_public_key , shared_secret [ 0 ] , a , sig [ 0 ] ) ;
}
else
{
crypto : : generate_tx_proof ( prefix_hash , address . m_view_public_key , tx_pub_key , boost : : none , shared_secret [ 0 ] , a , sig [ 0 ] ) ;
}
for ( size_t i = 1 ; i < num_sigs ; + + i )
{
shared_secret [ i ] = rct : : rct2pk ( rct : : scalarmultKey ( rct : : pk2rct ( additional_tx_pub_keys [ i - 1 ] ) , rct : : sk2rct ( a ) ) ) ;
if ( is_subaddress )
{
crypto : : generate_tx_proof ( prefix_hash , address . m_view_public_key , additional_tx_pub_keys [ i - 1 ] , address . m_spend_public_key , shared_secret [ i ] , a , sig [ i ] ) ;
}
else
{
crypto : : generate_tx_proof ( prefix_hash , address . m_view_public_key , additional_tx_pub_keys [ i - 1 ] , boost : : none , shared_secret [ i ] , a , sig [ i ] ) ;
}
}
sig_str = std : : string ( " InProofV1 " ) ;
}
const size_t num_sigs = shared_secret . size ( ) ;
// check if this address actually received any funds
crypto : : key_derivation derivation ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( ! crypto : : generate_key_derivation ( shared_secret [ 0 ] , rct : : rct2sk ( rct : : I ) , derivation ) , error : : wallet_internal_error , " Failed to generate key derivation " ) ;
std : : vector < crypto : : key_derivation > additional_derivations ( num_sigs - 1 ) ;
for ( size_t i = 1 ; i < num_sigs ; + + i )
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( ! crypto : : generate_key_derivation ( shared_secret [ i ] , rct : : rct2sk ( rct : : I ) , additional_derivations [ i - 1 ] ) , error : : wallet_internal_error , " Failed to generate key derivation " ) ;
uint64_t received ;
bool in_pool ;
uint64_t confirmations ;
check_tx_key_helper ( txid , derivation , additional_derivations , address , received , in_pool , confirmations ) ;
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THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( ! received , error : : wallet_internal_error , tr ( " No funds received in this tx. " ) ) ;
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// concatenate all signature strings
for ( size_t i = 0 ; i < num_sigs ; + + i )
sig_str + =
tools : : base58 : : encode ( std : : string ( ( const char * ) & shared_secret [ i ] , sizeof ( crypto : : public_key ) ) ) +
tools : : base58 : : encode ( std : : string ( ( const char * ) & sig [ i ] , sizeof ( crypto : : signature ) ) ) ;
return sig_str ;
}
bool wallet2 : : check_tx_proof ( const crypto : : hash & txid , const cryptonote : : account_public_address & address , bool is_subaddress , const std : : string & message , const std : : string & sig_str , uint64_t & received , bool & in_pool , uint64_t & confirmations )
{
const bool is_out = sig_str . substr ( 0 , 3 ) = = " Out " ;
const std : : string header = is_out ? " OutProofV1 " : " InProofV1 " ;
const size_t header_len = header . size ( ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( sig_str . size ( ) < header_len | | sig_str . substr ( 0 , header_len ) ! = header , error : : wallet_internal_error ,
" Signature header check error " ) ;
// decode base58
std : : vector < crypto : : public_key > shared_secret ( 1 ) ;
std : : vector < crypto : : signature > sig ( 1 ) ;
const size_t pk_len = tools : : base58 : : encode ( std : : string ( ( const char * ) & shared_secret [ 0 ] , sizeof ( crypto : : public_key ) ) ) . size ( ) ;
const size_t sig_len = tools : : base58 : : encode ( std : : string ( ( const char * ) & sig [ 0 ] , sizeof ( crypto : : signature ) ) ) . size ( ) ;
const size_t num_sigs = ( sig_str . size ( ) - header_len ) / ( pk_len + sig_len ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( sig_str . size ( ) ! = header_len + num_sigs * ( pk_len + sig_len ) , error : : wallet_internal_error ,
" Wrong signature size " ) ;
shared_secret . resize ( num_sigs ) ;
sig . resize ( num_sigs ) ;
for ( size_t i = 0 ; i < num_sigs ; + + i )
{
std : : string pk_decoded ;
std : : string sig_decoded ;
const size_t offset = header_len + i * ( pk_len + sig_len ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( ! tools : : base58 : : decode ( sig_str . substr ( offset , pk_len ) , pk_decoded ) , error : : wallet_internal_error ,
" Signature decoding error " ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( ! tools : : base58 : : decode ( sig_str . substr ( offset + pk_len , sig_len ) , sig_decoded ) , error : : wallet_internal_error ,
" Signature decoding error " ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( sizeof ( crypto : : public_key ) ! = pk_decoded . size ( ) | | sizeof ( crypto : : signature ) ! = sig_decoded . size ( ) , error : : wallet_internal_error ,
" Signature decoding error " ) ;
memcpy ( & shared_secret [ i ] , pk_decoded . data ( ) , sizeof ( crypto : : public_key ) ) ;
memcpy ( & sig [ i ] , sig_decoded . data ( ) , sizeof ( crypto : : signature ) ) ;
}
// fetch tx pubkey from the daemon
COMMAND_RPC_GET_TRANSACTIONS : : request req ;
COMMAND_RPC_GET_TRANSACTIONS : : response res ;
req . txs_hashes . push_back ( epee : : string_tools : : pod_to_hex ( txid ) ) ;
m_daemon_rpc_mutex . lock ( ) ;
bool ok = net_utils : : invoke_http_json ( " /gettransactions " , req , res , m_http_client ) ;
m_daemon_rpc_mutex . unlock ( ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( ! ok | | ( res . txs . size ( ) ! = 1 & & res . txs_as_hex . size ( ) ! = 1 ) ,
error : : wallet_internal_error , " Failed to get transaction from daemon " ) ;
cryptonote : : blobdata tx_data ;
if ( res . txs . size ( ) = = 1 )
ok = string_tools : : parse_hexstr_to_binbuff ( res . txs . front ( ) . as_hex , tx_data ) ;
else
ok = string_tools : : parse_hexstr_to_binbuff ( res . txs_as_hex . front ( ) , tx_data ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( ! ok , error : : wallet_internal_error , " Failed to parse transaction from daemon " ) ;
crypto : : hash tx_hash , tx_prefix_hash ;
cryptonote : : transaction tx ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( ! cryptonote : : parse_and_validate_tx_from_blob ( tx_data , tx , tx_hash , tx_prefix_hash ) , error : : wallet_internal_error ,
" Failed to validate transaction from daemon " ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( tx_hash ! = txid , error : : wallet_internal_error , " Failed to get the right transaction from daemon " ) ;
crypto : : public_key tx_pub_key = get_tx_pub_key_from_extra ( tx ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( tx_pub_key = = null_pkey , error : : wallet_internal_error , " Tx pubkey was not found " ) ;
std : : vector < crypto : : public_key > additional_tx_pub_keys = get_additional_tx_pub_keys_from_extra ( tx ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( additional_tx_pub_keys . size ( ) + 1 ! = num_sigs , error : : wallet_internal_error , " Signature size mismatch with additional tx pubkeys " ) ;
std : : string prefix_data ( ( const char * ) & txid , sizeof ( crypto : : hash ) ) ;
prefix_data + = message ;
crypto : : hash prefix_hash ;
crypto : : cn_fast_hash ( prefix_data . data ( ) , prefix_data . size ( ) , prefix_hash ) ;
// check signature
std : : vector < int > good_signature ( num_sigs , 0 ) ;
if ( is_out )
{
good_signature [ 0 ] = is_subaddress ?
crypto : : check_tx_proof ( prefix_hash , tx_pub_key , address . m_view_public_key , address . m_spend_public_key , shared_secret [ 0 ] , sig [ 0 ] ) :
crypto : : check_tx_proof ( prefix_hash , tx_pub_key , address . m_view_public_key , boost : : none , shared_secret [ 0 ] , sig [ 0 ] ) ;
for ( size_t i = 0 ; i < additional_tx_pub_keys . size ( ) ; + + i )
{
good_signature [ i + 1 ] = is_subaddress ?
crypto : : check_tx_proof ( prefix_hash , additional_tx_pub_keys [ i ] , address . m_view_public_key , address . m_spend_public_key , shared_secret [ i + 1 ] , sig [ i + 1 ] ) :
crypto : : check_tx_proof ( prefix_hash , additional_tx_pub_keys [ i ] , address . m_view_public_key , boost : : none , shared_secret [ i + 1 ] , sig [ i + 1 ] ) ;
}
}
else
{
good_signature [ 0 ] = is_subaddress ?
crypto : : check_tx_proof ( prefix_hash , address . m_view_public_key , tx_pub_key , address . m_spend_public_key , shared_secret [ 0 ] , sig [ 0 ] ) :
crypto : : check_tx_proof ( prefix_hash , address . m_view_public_key , tx_pub_key , boost : : none , shared_secret [ 0 ] , sig [ 0 ] ) ;
for ( size_t i = 0 ; i < additional_tx_pub_keys . size ( ) ; + + i )
{
good_signature [ i + 1 ] = is_subaddress ?
crypto : : check_tx_proof ( prefix_hash , address . m_view_public_key , additional_tx_pub_keys [ i ] , address . m_spend_public_key , shared_secret [ i + 1 ] , sig [ i + 1 ] ) :
crypto : : check_tx_proof ( prefix_hash , address . m_view_public_key , additional_tx_pub_keys [ i ] , boost : : none , shared_secret [ i + 1 ] , sig [ i + 1 ] ) ;
}
}
if ( std : : any_of ( good_signature . begin ( ) , good_signature . end ( ) , [ ] ( int i ) { return i > 0 ; } ) )
{
// obtain key derivation by multiplying scalar 1 to the shared secret
crypto : : key_derivation derivation ;
if ( good_signature [ 0 ] )
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( ! crypto : : generate_key_derivation ( shared_secret [ 0 ] , rct : : rct2sk ( rct : : I ) , derivation ) , error : : wallet_internal_error , " Failed to generate key derivation " ) ;
std : : vector < crypto : : key_derivation > additional_derivations ( num_sigs - 1 ) ;
for ( size_t i = 1 ; i < num_sigs ; + + i )
if ( good_signature [ i ] )
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( ! crypto : : generate_key_derivation ( shared_secret [ i ] , rct : : rct2sk ( rct : : I ) , additional_derivations [ i - 1 ] ) , error : : wallet_internal_error , " Failed to generate key derivation " ) ;
check_tx_key_helper ( txid , derivation , additional_derivations , address , received , in_pool , confirmations ) ;
return true ;
}
return false ;
}
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std : : string wallet2 : : get_wallet_file ( ) const
{
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return m_wallet_file ;
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}
std : : string wallet2 : : get_keys_file ( ) const
{
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return m_keys_file ;
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}
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std : : string wallet2 : : get_daemon_address ( ) const
{
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return m_daemon_address ;
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}
uint64_t wallet2 : : get_daemon_blockchain_height ( string & err )
{
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uint64_t height ;
boost : : optional < std : : string > result = m_node_rpc_proxy . get_height ( height ) ;
if ( result )
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{
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err = * result ;
return 0 ;
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}
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err = " " ;
return height ;
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}
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uint64_t wallet2 : : get_daemon_blockchain_target_height ( string & err )
{
epee : : json_rpc : : request < cryptonote : : COMMAND_RPC_GET_INFO : : request > req_t = AUTO_VAL_INIT ( req_t ) ;
epee : : json_rpc : : response < cryptonote : : COMMAND_RPC_GET_INFO : : response , std : : string > resp_t = AUTO_VAL_INIT ( resp_t ) ;
m_daemon_rpc_mutex . lock ( ) ;
req_t . jsonrpc = " 2.0 " ;
req_t . id = epee : : serialization : : storage_entry ( 0 ) ;
req_t . method = " get_info " ;
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bool ok = net_utils : : invoke_http_json ( " /json_rpc " , req_t , resp_t , m_http_client ) ;
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m_daemon_rpc_mutex . unlock ( ) ;
if ( ok )
{
if ( resp_t . result . status = = CORE_RPC_STATUS_BUSY )
{
err = " daemon is busy. Please try again later. " ;
}
else if ( resp_t . result . status ! = CORE_RPC_STATUS_OK )
{
err = resp_t . result . status ;
}
else // success, cleaning up error message
{
err = " " ;
}
}
else
{
err = " possibly lost connection to daemon " ;
}
return resp_t . result . target_height ;
}
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uint64_t wallet2 : : get_approximate_blockchain_height ( ) const
{
// time of v2 fork
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const time_t fork_time = m_testnet ? 1448285909 : 1458748658 ;
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// v2 fork block
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const uint64_t fork_block = m_testnet ? 624634 : 1009827 ;
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// avg seconds per block
const int seconds_per_block = DIFFICULTY_TARGET_V2 ;
// Calculated blockchain height
uint64_t approx_blockchain_height = fork_block + ( time ( NULL ) - fork_time ) / seconds_per_block ;
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// testnet got some huge rollbacks, so the estimation is way off
if ( m_testnet & & approx_blockchain_height > 105000 )
approx_blockchain_height - = 105000 ;
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LOG_PRINT_L2 ( " Calculated blockchain height: " < < approx_blockchain_height ) ;
return approx_blockchain_height ;
}
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void wallet2 : : set_tx_note ( const crypto : : hash & txid , const std : : string & note )
{
m_tx_notes [ txid ] = note ;
}
std : : string wallet2 : : get_tx_note ( const crypto : : hash & txid ) const
{
std : : unordered_map < crypto : : hash , std : : string > : : const_iterator i = m_tx_notes . find ( txid ) ;
if ( i = = m_tx_notes . end ( ) )
return std : : string ( ) ;
return i - > second ;
}
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void wallet2 : : set_attribute ( const std : : string & key , const std : : string & value )
{
m_attributes [ key ] = value ;
}
std : : string wallet2 : : get_attribute ( const std : : string & key ) const
{
std : : unordered_map < std : : string , std : : string > : : const_iterator i = m_attributes . find ( key ) ;
if ( i = = m_attributes . end ( ) )
return std : : string ( ) ;
return i - > second ;
}
void wallet2 : : set_description ( const std : : string & description )
{
set_attribute ( ATTRIBUTE_DESCRIPTION , description ) ;
}
std : : string wallet2 : : get_description ( ) const
{
return get_attribute ( ATTRIBUTE_DESCRIPTION ) ;
}
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const std : : pair < std : : map < std : : string , std : : string > , std : : vector < std : : string > > & wallet2 : : get_account_tags ( )
{
// ensure consistency
if ( m_account_tags . second . size ( ) ! = get_num_subaddress_accounts ( ) )
m_account_tags . second . resize ( get_num_subaddress_accounts ( ) , " " ) ;
for ( const std : : string & tag : m_account_tags . second )
{
if ( ! tag . empty ( ) & & m_account_tags . first . count ( tag ) = = 0 )
m_account_tags . first . insert ( { tag , " " } ) ;
}
for ( auto i = m_account_tags . first . begin ( ) ; i ! = m_account_tags . first . end ( ) ; )
{
if ( std : : find ( m_account_tags . second . begin ( ) , m_account_tags . second . end ( ) , i - > first ) = = m_account_tags . second . end ( ) )
i = m_account_tags . first . erase ( i ) ;
else
+ + i ;
}
return m_account_tags ;
}
void wallet2 : : set_account_tag ( const std : : set < uint32_t > account_indices , const std : : string & tag )
{
for ( uint32_t account_index : account_indices )
{
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( account_index > = get_num_subaddress_accounts ( ) , error : : wallet_internal_error , " Account index out of bound " ) ;
if ( m_account_tags . second [ account_index ] = = tag )
MDEBUG ( " This tag is already assigned to this account " ) ;
else
m_account_tags . second [ account_index ] = tag ;
}
get_account_tags ( ) ;
}
void wallet2 : : set_account_tag_description ( const std : : string & tag , const std : : string & description )
{
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( tag . empty ( ) , error : : wallet_internal_error , " Tag must not be empty " ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( m_account_tags . first . count ( tag ) = = 0 , error : : wallet_internal_error , " Tag is unregistered " ) ;
m_account_tags . first [ tag ] = description ;
}
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std : : string wallet2 : : sign ( const std : : string & data ) const
{
crypto : : hash hash ;
crypto : : cn_fast_hash ( data . data ( ) , data . size ( ) , hash ) ;
const cryptonote : : account_keys & keys = m_account . get_keys ( ) ;
crypto : : signature signature ;
crypto : : generate_signature ( hash , keys . m_account_address . m_spend_public_key , keys . m_spend_secret_key , signature ) ;
return std : : string ( " SigV1 " ) + tools : : base58 : : encode ( std : : string ( ( const char * ) & signature , sizeof ( signature ) ) ) ;
}
bool wallet2 : : verify ( const std : : string & data , const cryptonote : : account_public_address & address , const std : : string & signature ) const
{
const size_t header_len = strlen ( " SigV1 " ) ;
if ( signature . size ( ) < header_len | | signature . substr ( 0 , header_len ) ! = " SigV1 " ) {
LOG_PRINT_L0 ( " Signature header check error " ) ;
return false ;
}
crypto : : hash hash ;
crypto : : cn_fast_hash ( data . data ( ) , data . size ( ) , hash ) ;
std : : string decoded ;
if ( ! tools : : base58 : : decode ( signature . substr ( header_len ) , decoded ) ) {
LOG_PRINT_L0 ( " Signature decoding error " ) ;
return false ;
}
crypto : : signature s ;
if ( sizeof ( s ) ! = decoded . size ( ) ) {
LOG_PRINT_L0 ( " Signature decoding error " ) ;
return false ;
}
memcpy ( & s , decoded . data ( ) , sizeof ( s ) ) ;
return crypto : : check_signature ( hash , address . m_spend_public_key , s ) ;
}
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//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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crypto : : public_key wallet2 : : get_tx_pub_key_from_received_outs ( const tools : : wallet2 : : transfer_details & td ) const
{
std : : vector < tx_extra_field > tx_extra_fields ;
if ( ! parse_tx_extra ( td . m_tx . extra , tx_extra_fields ) )
{
// Extra may only be partially parsed, it's OK if tx_extra_fields contains public key
}
// Due to a previous bug, there might be more than one tx pubkey in extra, one being
// the result of a previously discarded signature.
// For speed, since scanning for outputs is a slow process, we check whether extra
// contains more than one pubkey. If not, the first one is returned. If yes, they're
// checked for whether they yield at least one output
tx_extra_pub_key pub_key_field ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( ! find_tx_extra_field_by_type ( tx_extra_fields , pub_key_field , 0 ) , error : : wallet_internal_error ,
" Public key wasn't found in the transaction extra " ) ;
const crypto : : public_key tx_pub_key = pub_key_field . pub_key ;
bool two_found = find_tx_extra_field_by_type ( tx_extra_fields , pub_key_field , 1 ) ;
if ( ! two_found ) {
// easy case, just one found
return tx_pub_key ;
}
// more than one, loop and search
const cryptonote : : account_keys & keys = m_account . get_keys ( ) ;
size_t pk_index = 0 ;
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const std : : vector < crypto : : public_key > additional_tx_pub_keys = get_additional_tx_pub_keys_from_extra ( td . m_tx ) ;
std : : vector < crypto : : key_derivation > additional_derivations ;
for ( size_t i = 0 ; i < additional_tx_pub_keys . size ( ) ; + + i )
{
additional_derivations . push_back ( { } ) ;
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bool r = generate_key_derivation ( additional_tx_pub_keys [ i ] , keys . m_view_secret_key , additional_derivations . back ( ) ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( ! r , error : : wallet_internal_error , " Failed to generate key derivation " ) ;
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}
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while ( find_tx_extra_field_by_type ( tx_extra_fields , pub_key_field , pk_index + + ) ) {
const crypto : : public_key tx_pub_key = pub_key_field . pub_key ;
crypto : : key_derivation derivation ;
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bool r = generate_key_derivation ( tx_pub_key , keys . m_view_secret_key , derivation ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( ! r , error : : wallet_internal_error , " Failed to generate key derivation " ) ;
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for ( size_t i = 0 ; i < td . m_tx . vout . size ( ) ; + + i )
{
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tx_scan_info_t tx_scan_info ;
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check_acc_out_precomp ( td . m_tx . vout [ i ] , derivation , additional_derivations , i , tx_scan_info ) ;
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if ( ! tx_scan_info . error & & tx_scan_info . received )
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return tx_pub_key ;
}
}
// we found no key yielding an output
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( true , error : : wallet_internal_error ,
" Public key yielding at least one output wasn't found in the transaction extra " ) ;
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return crypto : : null_pkey ;
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}
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bool wallet2 : : export_key_images ( const std : : string & filename )
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{
std : : vector < std : : pair < crypto : : key_image , crypto : : signature > > ski = export_key_images ( ) ;
std : : string magic ( KEY_IMAGE_EXPORT_FILE_MAGIC , strlen ( KEY_IMAGE_EXPORT_FILE_MAGIC ) ) ;
const cryptonote : : account_public_address & keys = get_account ( ) . get_keys ( ) . m_account_address ;
std : : string data ;
data + = std : : string ( ( const char * ) & keys . m_spend_public_key , sizeof ( crypto : : public_key ) ) ;
data + = std : : string ( ( const char * ) & keys . m_view_public_key , sizeof ( crypto : : public_key ) ) ;
for ( const auto & i : ski )
{
data + = std : : string ( ( const char * ) & i . first , sizeof ( crypto : : key_image ) ) ;
data + = std : : string ( ( const char * ) & i . second , sizeof ( crypto : : signature ) ) ;
}
// encrypt data, keep magic plaintext
std : : string ciphertext = encrypt_with_view_secret_key ( data ) ;
return epee : : file_io_utils : : save_string_to_file ( filename , magic + ciphertext ) ;
}
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//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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std : : vector < std : : pair < crypto : : key_image , crypto : : signature > > wallet2 : : export_key_images ( ) const
{
std : : vector < std : : pair < crypto : : key_image , crypto : : signature > > ski ;
ski . reserve ( m_transfers . size ( ) ) ;
for ( size_t n = 0 ; n < m_transfers . size ( ) ; + + n )
{
const transfer_details & td = m_transfers [ n ] ;
crypto : : hash hash ;
crypto : : cn_fast_hash ( & td . m_key_image , sizeof ( td . m_key_image ) , hash ) ;
// get ephemeral public key
const cryptonote : : tx_out & out = td . m_tx . vout [ td . m_internal_output_index ] ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( out . target . type ( ) ! = typeid ( txout_to_key ) , error : : wallet_internal_error ,
" Output is not txout_to_key " ) ;
const cryptonote : : txout_to_key & o = boost : : get < const cryptonote : : txout_to_key > ( out . target ) ;
const crypto : : public_key pkey = o . key ;
// get tx pub key
std : : vector < tx_extra_field > tx_extra_fields ;
if ( ! parse_tx_extra ( td . m_tx . extra , tx_extra_fields ) )
{
// Extra may only be partially parsed, it's OK if tx_extra_fields contains public key
}
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crypto : : public_key tx_pub_key = get_tx_pub_key_from_received_outs ( td ) ;
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const std : : vector < crypto : : public_key > additional_tx_pub_keys = get_additional_tx_pub_keys_from_extra ( td . m_tx ) ;
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// generate ephemeral secret key
crypto : : key_image ki ;
cryptonote : : keypair in_ephemeral ;
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bool r = cryptonote : : generate_key_image_helper ( m_account . get_keys ( ) , m_subaddresses , pkey , tx_pub_key , additional_tx_pub_keys , td . m_internal_output_index , in_ephemeral , ki ) ;
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THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( ! r , error : : wallet_internal_error , " Failed to generate key image " ) ;
2016-10-30 19:37:09 +00:00
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing
Scheme by luigi1111:
Multisig for RingCT on Monero
2 of 2
User A (coordinator):
Spendkey b,B
Viewkey a,A (shared)
User B:
Spendkey c,C
Viewkey a,A (shared)
Public Address: C+B, A
Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a
A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants)
A and B watch for incoming outputs
B creates "half" key images for discovered output D:
I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D)
B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D),
and sending the pubkeys with I2_D.
A also creates "half" key images:
I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D)
Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D
Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction).
A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D
to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R).
At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r,
which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo).
B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well).
B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D
to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well.
NOTE:
A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively.
Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible:
A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B.
B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A.
The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time!
The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature).
2 of 3
User A (coordinator)
Shared viewkey a,A
"spendkey" j,J
User B
"spendkey" k,K
User C
"spendkey" m,M
A collects K and M from B and C
B collects J and M from A and C
C collects J and K from A and B
A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK)
A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM)
B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK)
B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate
Address: N+O+P, A
The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other
needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two.
Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties:
A gives j to B
B gives k to C
C gives m to A
Address: J+K+M, A
3 of 3
Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others.
The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it
or send it back to A.
N-1 of N
Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around
(using either the secure or insecure method).
For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up):
[4 of 5]
User: spendkey
A: a
B: b
C: c
D: d
E: e
a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A
Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with
the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys.
Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each.
Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning:
1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image)
2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator
must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use.
You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might
also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format.
You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc.
The process is somewhat cumbersome:
To create a N/N multisig wallet:
- each participant creates a normal wallet
- each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant
- each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N)
As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent:
- each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant
- each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants
Then, a transaction may be initiated:
- one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT"
- this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file
- the initiator sends this file to another participant
- that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx"
- the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again
- if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed
- the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
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THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( td . m_key_image_known & & ! td . m_key_image_partial & & ki ! = td . m_key_image ,
2016-07-15 11:11:55 +00:00
error : : wallet_internal_error , " key_image generated not matched with cached key image " ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( in_ephemeral . pub ! = pkey ,
error : : wallet_internal_error , " key_image generated ephemeral public key not matched with output_key " ) ;
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2016-07-15 11:11:55 +00:00
// sign the key image with the output secret key
crypto : : signature signature ;
std : : vector < const crypto : : public_key * > key_ptrs ;
key_ptrs . push_back ( & pkey ) ;
crypto : : generate_ring_signature ( ( const crypto : : hash & ) td . m_key_image , td . m_key_image , key_ptrs , in_ephemeral . sec , 0 , & signature ) ;
ski . push_back ( std : : make_pair ( td . m_key_image , signature ) ) ;
}
return ski ;
}
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uint64_t wallet2 : : import_key_images ( const std : : string & filename , uint64_t & spent , uint64_t & unspent )
{
std : : string data ;
bool r = epee : : file_io_utils : : load_file_to_string ( filename , data ) ;
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THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( ! r , error : : wallet_internal_error , std : : string ( tr ( " failed to read file " ) ) + filename ) ;
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const size_t magiclen = strlen ( KEY_IMAGE_EXPORT_FILE_MAGIC ) ;
if ( data . size ( ) < magiclen | | memcmp ( data . data ( ) , KEY_IMAGE_EXPORT_FILE_MAGIC , magiclen ) )
{
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THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION ( error : : wallet_internal_error , std : : string ( " Bad key image export file magic in " ) + filename ) ;
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}
try
{
data = decrypt_with_view_secret_key ( std : : string ( data , magiclen ) ) ;
}
catch ( const std : : exception & e )
{
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THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION ( error : : wallet_internal_error , std : : string ( " Failed to decrypt " ) + filename + " : " + e . what ( ) ) ;
2017-01-13 11:02:13 +00:00
}
const size_t headerlen = 2 * sizeof ( crypto : : public_key ) ;
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THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( data . size ( ) < headerlen , error : : wallet_internal_error , std : : string ( " Bad data size from file " ) + filename ) ;
2017-01-13 11:02:13 +00:00
const crypto : : public_key & public_spend_key = * ( const crypto : : public_key * ) & data [ 0 ] ;
const crypto : : public_key & public_view_key = * ( const crypto : : public_key * ) & data [ sizeof ( crypto : : public_key ) ] ;
const cryptonote : : account_public_address & keys = get_account ( ) . get_keys ( ) . m_account_address ;
if ( public_spend_key ! = keys . m_spend_public_key | | public_view_key ! = keys . m_view_public_key )
{
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THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION ( error : : wallet_internal_error , std : : string ( " Key images from " ) + filename + " are for a different account " ) ;
2017-01-13 11:02:13 +00:00
}
const size_t record_size = sizeof ( crypto : : key_image ) + sizeof ( crypto : : signature ) ;
2017-10-28 22:04:24 +00:00
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( ( data . size ( ) - headerlen ) % record_size ,
error : : wallet_internal_error , std : : string ( " Bad data size from file " ) + filename ) ;
2017-01-13 11:02:13 +00:00
size_t nki = ( data . size ( ) - headerlen ) / record_size ;
std : : vector < std : : pair < crypto : : key_image , crypto : : signature > > ski ;
ski . reserve ( nki ) ;
for ( size_t n = 0 ; n < nki ; + + n )
{
crypto : : key_image key_image = * reinterpret_cast < const crypto : : key_image * > ( & data [ headerlen + n * record_size ] ) ;
crypto : : signature signature = * reinterpret_cast < const crypto : : signature * > ( & data [ headerlen + n * record_size + sizeof ( crypto : : key_image ) ] ) ;
ski . push_back ( std : : make_pair ( key_image , signature ) ) ;
}
return import_key_images ( ski , spent , unspent ) ;
}
2016-07-15 11:11:55 +00:00
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2017-08-18 12:19:07 +00:00
uint64_t wallet2 : : import_key_images ( const std : : vector < std : : pair < crypto : : key_image , crypto : : signature > > & signed_key_images , uint64_t & spent , uint64_t & unspent , bool check_spent )
2016-07-15 11:11:55 +00:00
{
COMMAND_RPC_IS_KEY_IMAGE_SPENT : : request req = AUTO_VAL_INIT ( req ) ;
COMMAND_RPC_IS_KEY_IMAGE_SPENT : : response daemon_resp = AUTO_VAL_INIT ( daemon_resp ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( signed_key_images . size ( ) > m_transfers . size ( ) , error : : wallet_internal_error ,
" The blockchain is out of date compared to the signed key images " ) ;
if ( signed_key_images . empty ( ) )
{
spent = 0 ;
unspent = 0 ;
return 0 ;
}
for ( size_t n = 0 ; n < signed_key_images . size ( ) ; + + n )
{
const transfer_details & td = m_transfers [ n ] ;
const crypto : : key_image & key_image = signed_key_images [ n ] . first ;
const crypto : : signature & signature = signed_key_images [ n ] . second ;
// get ephemeral public key
const cryptonote : : tx_out & out = td . m_tx . vout [ td . m_internal_output_index ] ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( out . target . type ( ) ! = typeid ( txout_to_key ) , error : : wallet_internal_error ,
" Non txout_to_key output found " ) ;
const cryptonote : : txout_to_key & o = boost : : get < cryptonote : : txout_to_key > ( out . target ) ;
const crypto : : public_key pkey = o . key ;
std : : vector < const crypto : : public_key * > pkeys ;
pkeys . push_back ( & pkey ) ;
2017-02-21 13:57:10 +00:00
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( ! ( rct : : scalarmultKey ( rct : : ki2rct ( key_image ) , rct : : curveOrder ( ) ) = = rct : : identity ( ) ) ,
error : : wallet_internal_error , " Key image out of validity domain: input " + boost : : lexical_cast < std : : string > ( n ) + " / "
+ boost : : lexical_cast < std : : string > ( signed_key_images . size ( ) ) + " , key image " + epee : : string_tools : : pod_to_hex ( key_image ) ) ;
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THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( ! crypto : : check_ring_signature ( ( const crypto : : hash & ) key_image , key_image , pkeys , & signature ) ,
2016-08-04 07:19:29 +00:00
error : : wallet_internal_error , " Signature check failed: input " + boost : : lexical_cast < std : : string > ( n ) + " / "
+ boost : : lexical_cast < std : : string > ( signed_key_images . size ( ) ) + " , key image " + epee : : string_tools : : pod_to_hex ( key_image )
2016-07-15 11:11:55 +00:00
+ " , signature " + epee : : string_tools : : pod_to_hex ( signature ) + " , pubkey " + epee : : string_tools : : pod_to_hex ( * pkeys [ 0 ] ) ) ;
req . key_images . push_back ( epee : : string_tools : : pod_to_hex ( key_image ) ) ;
}
2016-08-17 07:37:56 +00:00
for ( size_t n = 0 ; n < signed_key_images . size ( ) ; + + n )
2016-11-07 18:50:05 +00:00
{
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m_transfers [ n ] . m_key_image = signed_key_images [ n ] . first ;
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m_key_images [ m_transfers [ n ] . m_key_image ] = n ;
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m_transfers [ n ] . m_key_image_known = true ;
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing
Scheme by luigi1111:
Multisig for RingCT on Monero
2 of 2
User A (coordinator):
Spendkey b,B
Viewkey a,A (shared)
User B:
Spendkey c,C
Viewkey a,A (shared)
Public Address: C+B, A
Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a
A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants)
A and B watch for incoming outputs
B creates "half" key images for discovered output D:
I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D)
B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D),
and sending the pubkeys with I2_D.
A also creates "half" key images:
I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D)
Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D
Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction).
A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D
to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R).
At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r,
which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo).
B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well).
B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D
to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well.
NOTE:
A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively.
Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible:
A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B.
B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A.
The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time!
The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature).
2 of 3
User A (coordinator)
Shared viewkey a,A
"spendkey" j,J
User B
"spendkey" k,K
User C
"spendkey" m,M
A collects K and M from B and C
B collects J and M from A and C
C collects J and K from A and B
A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK)
A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM)
B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK)
B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate
Address: N+O+P, A
The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other
needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two.
Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties:
A gives j to B
B gives k to C
C gives m to A
Address: J+K+M, A
3 of 3
Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others.
The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it
or send it back to A.
N-1 of N
Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around
(using either the secure or insecure method).
For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up):
[4 of 5]
User: spendkey
A: a
B: b
C: c
D: d
E: e
a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A
Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with
the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys.
Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each.
Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning:
1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image)
2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator
must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use.
You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might
also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format.
You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc.
The process is somewhat cumbersome:
To create a N/N multisig wallet:
- each participant creates a normal wallet
- each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant
- each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N)
As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent:
- each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant
- each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants
Then, a transaction may be initiated:
- one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT"
- this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file
- the initiator sends this file to another participant
- that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx"
- the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again
- if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed
- the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 21:34:26 +00:00
m_transfers [ n ] . m_key_image_partial = false ;
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}
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if ( check_spent )
{
m_daemon_rpc_mutex . lock ( ) ;
bool r = epee : : net_utils : : invoke_http_json ( " /is_key_image_spent " , req , daemon_resp , m_http_client , rpc_timeout ) ;
m_daemon_rpc_mutex . unlock ( ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( ! r , error : : no_connection_to_daemon , " is_key_image_spent " ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( daemon_resp . status = = CORE_RPC_STATUS_BUSY , error : : daemon_busy , " is_key_image_spent " ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( daemon_resp . status ! = CORE_RPC_STATUS_OK , error : : is_key_image_spent_error , daemon_resp . status ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( daemon_resp . spent_status . size ( ) ! = signed_key_images . size ( ) , error : : wallet_internal_error ,
" daemon returned wrong response for is_key_image_spent, wrong amounts count = " +
std : : to_string ( daemon_resp . spent_status . size ( ) ) + " , expected " + std : : to_string ( signed_key_images . size ( ) ) ) ;
for ( size_t n = 0 ; n < daemon_resp . spent_status . size ( ) ; + + n )
{
transfer_details & td = m_transfers [ n ] ;
td . m_spent = daemon_resp . spent_status [ n ] ! = COMMAND_RPC_IS_KEY_IMAGE_SPENT : : UNSPENT ;
}
}
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spent = 0 ;
unspent = 0 ;
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std : : unordered_set < crypto : : hash > spent_txids ; // For each spent key image, search for a tx in m_transfers that uses it as input.
std : : vector < size_t > swept_transfers ; // If such a spending tx wasn't found in m_transfers, this means the spending tx
// was created by sweep_all, so we can't know the spent height and other detailed info.
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for ( size_t i = 0 ; i < m_transfers . size ( ) ; + + i )
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{
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transfer_details & td = m_transfers [ i ] ;
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uint64_t amount = td . amount ( ) ;
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if ( td . m_spent )
spent + = amount ;
else
unspent + = amount ;
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LOG_PRINT_L2 ( " Transfer " < < i < < " : " < < print_money ( amount ) < < " ( " < < td . m_global_output_index < < " ): "
< < ( td . m_spent ? " spent " : " unspent " ) < < " (key image " < < req . key_images [ i ] < < " ) " ) ;
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if ( i < daemon_resp . spent_status . size ( ) & & daemon_resp . spent_status [ i ] = = COMMAND_RPC_IS_KEY_IMAGE_SPENT : : SPENT_IN_BLOCKCHAIN )
{
bool is_spent_tx_found = false ;
for ( auto it = m_transfers . rbegin ( ) ; & ( * it ) ! = & td ; + + it )
{
bool is_spent_tx = false ;
for ( const cryptonote : : txin_v & in : it - > m_tx . vin )
{
if ( in . type ( ) = = typeid ( cryptonote : : txin_to_key ) & & td . m_key_image = = boost : : get < cryptonote : : txin_to_key > ( in ) . k_image )
{
is_spent_tx = true ;
break ;
}
}
if ( is_spent_tx )
{
is_spent_tx_found = true ;
spent_txids . insert ( it - > m_txid ) ;
break ;
}
}
if ( ! is_spent_tx_found )
swept_transfers . push_back ( i ) ;
}
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}
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MDEBUG ( " Total: " < < print_money ( spent ) < < " spent, " < < print_money ( unspent ) < < " unspent " ) ;
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if ( check_spent )
{
// query outgoing txes
COMMAND_RPC_GET_TRANSACTIONS : : request gettxs_req ;
COMMAND_RPC_GET_TRANSACTIONS : : response gettxs_res ;
gettxs_req . decode_as_json = false ;
for ( const crypto : : hash & spent_txid : spent_txids )
gettxs_req . txs_hashes . push_back ( epee : : string_tools : : pod_to_hex ( spent_txid ) ) ;
m_daemon_rpc_mutex . lock ( ) ;
bool r = epee : : net_utils : : invoke_http_json ( " /gettransactions " , gettxs_req , gettxs_res , m_http_client , rpc_timeout ) ;
m_daemon_rpc_mutex . unlock ( ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( ! r , error : : no_connection_to_daemon , " gettransactions " ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( gettxs_res . status = = CORE_RPC_STATUS_BUSY , error : : daemon_busy , " gettransactions " ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( gettxs_res . txs . size ( ) ! = spent_txids . size ( ) , error : : wallet_internal_error ,
" daemon returned wrong response for gettransactions, wrong count = " + std : : to_string ( gettxs_res . txs . size ( ) ) + " , expected " + std : : to_string ( spent_txids . size ( ) ) ) ;
// process each outgoing tx
auto spent_txid = spent_txids . begin ( ) ;
for ( const COMMAND_RPC_GET_TRANSACTIONS : : entry & e : gettxs_res . txs )
{
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( e . in_pool , error : : wallet_internal_error , " spent tx isn't supposed to be in txpool " ) ;
// parse tx
cryptonote : : blobdata bd ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( ! epee : : string_tools : : parse_hexstr_to_binbuff ( e . as_hex , bd ) , error : : wallet_internal_error , " parse_hexstr_to_binbuff failed " ) ;
cryptonote : : transaction spent_tx ;
crypto : : hash spnet_txid_parsed , spent_txid_prefix ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( ! cryptonote : : parse_and_validate_tx_from_blob ( bd , spent_tx , spnet_txid_parsed , spent_txid_prefix ) , error : : wallet_internal_error , " parse_and_validate_tx_from_blob failed " ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( * spent_txid ! = spnet_txid_parsed , error : : wallet_internal_error , " parsed txid mismatch " ) ;
// get received (change) amount
uint64_t tx_money_got_in_outs = 0 ;
const cryptonote : : account_keys & keys = m_account . get_keys ( ) ;
const crypto : : public_key tx_pub_key = get_tx_pub_key_from_extra ( spent_tx ) ;
crypto : : key_derivation derivation ;
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bool r = generate_key_derivation ( tx_pub_key , keys . m_view_secret_key , derivation ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( ! r , error : : wallet_internal_error , " Failed to generate key derivation " ) ;
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const std : : vector < crypto : : public_key > additional_tx_pub_keys = get_additional_tx_pub_keys_from_extra ( spent_tx ) ;
std : : vector < crypto : : key_derivation > additional_derivations ;
for ( size_t i = 0 ; i < additional_tx_pub_keys . size ( ) ; + + i )
{
additional_derivations . push_back ( { } ) ;
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r = generate_key_derivation ( additional_tx_pub_keys [ i ] , keys . m_view_secret_key , additional_derivations . back ( ) ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( ! r , error : : wallet_internal_error , " Failed to generate key derivation " ) ;
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}
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size_t output_index = 0 ;
for ( const cryptonote : : tx_out & out : spent_tx . vout )
{
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tx_scan_info_t tx_scan_info ;
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check_acc_out_precomp ( out , derivation , additional_derivations , output_index , tx_scan_info ) ;
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THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( tx_scan_info . error , error : : wallet_internal_error , " check_acc_out_precomp failed " ) ;
if ( tx_scan_info . received )
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{
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if ( tx_scan_info . money_transfered = = 0 )
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{
rct : : key mask ;
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tx_scan_info . money_transfered = tools : : decodeRct ( spent_tx . rct_signatures , tx_scan_info . received - > derivation , output_index , mask ) ;
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}
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tx_money_got_in_outs + = tx_scan_info . money_transfered ;
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}
+ + output_index ;
}
// get spent amount
uint64_t tx_money_spent_in_ins = 0 ;
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uint32_t subaddr_account = ( uint32_t ) - 1 ;
std : : set < uint32_t > subaddr_indices ;
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for ( const cryptonote : : txin_v & in : spent_tx . vin )
{
if ( in . type ( ) ! = typeid ( cryptonote : : txin_to_key ) )
continue ;
auto it = m_key_images . find ( boost : : get < cryptonote : : txin_to_key > ( in ) . k_image ) ;
if ( it ! = m_key_images . end ( ) )
{
const transfer_details & td = m_transfers [ it - > second ] ;
uint64_t amount = boost : : get < cryptonote : : txin_to_key > ( in ) . amount ;
if ( amount > 0 )
{
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( amount ! = td . amount ( ) , error : : wallet_internal_error ,
std : : string ( " Inconsistent amount in tx input: got " ) + print_money ( amount ) +
std : : string ( " , expected " ) + print_money ( td . amount ( ) ) ) ;
}
amount = td . amount ( ) ;
tx_money_spent_in_ins + = amount ;
LOG_PRINT_L0 ( " Spent money: " < < print_money ( amount ) < < " , with tx: " < < * spent_txid ) ;
set_spent ( it - > second , e . block_height ) ;
if ( m_callback )
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m_callback - > on_money_spent ( e . block_height , * spent_txid , spent_tx , amount , spent_tx , td . m_subaddr_index ) ;
if ( subaddr_account ! = ( uint32_t ) - 1 & & subaddr_account ! = td . m_subaddr_index . major )
LOG_PRINT_L0 ( " WARNING: This tx spends outputs received by different subaddress accounts, which isn't supposed to happen " ) ;
subaddr_account = td . m_subaddr_index . major ;
subaddr_indices . insert ( td . m_subaddr_index . minor ) ;
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}
}
// create outgoing payment
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process_outgoing ( * spent_txid , spent_tx , e . block_height , e . block_timestamp , tx_money_spent_in_ins , tx_money_got_in_outs , subaddr_account , subaddr_indices ) ;
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// erase corresponding incoming payment
for ( auto j = m_payments . begin ( ) ; j ! = m_payments . end ( ) ; + + j )
{
if ( j - > second . m_tx_hash = = * spent_txid )
{
m_payments . erase ( j ) ;
break ;
}
}
+ + spent_txid ;
}
for ( size_t n : swept_transfers )
{
const transfer_details & td = m_transfers [ n ] ;
confirmed_transfer_details pd ;
pd . m_change = ( uint64_t ) - 1 ; // cahnge is unknown
pd . m_amount_in = pd . m_amount_out = td . amount ( ) ; // fee is unknown
std : : string err ;
pd . m_block_height = get_daemon_blockchain_height ( err ) ; // spent block height is unknown, so hypothetically set to the highest
crypto : : hash spent_txid = crypto : : rand < crypto : : hash > ( ) ; // spent txid is unknown, so hypothetically set to random
m_confirmed_txs . insert ( std : : make_pair ( spent_txid , pd ) ) ;
}
}
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return m_transfers [ signed_key_images . size ( ) - 1 ] . m_block_height ;
}
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wallet2 : : payment_container wallet2 : : export_payments ( ) const
{
payment_container payments ;
for ( auto const & p : m_payments )
{
payments . emplace ( p ) ;
}
return payments ;
}
void wallet2 : : import_payments ( const payment_container & payments )
{
m_payments . clear ( ) ;
for ( auto const & p : payments )
{
m_payments . emplace ( p ) ;
}
}
void wallet2 : : import_payments_out ( const std : : list < std : : pair < crypto : : hash , wallet2 : : confirmed_transfer_details > > & confirmed_payments )
{
m_confirmed_txs . clear ( ) ;
for ( auto const & p : confirmed_payments )
{
m_confirmed_txs . emplace ( p ) ;
}
}
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std : : tuple < size_t , crypto : : hash , std : : vector < crypto : : hash > > wallet2 : : export_blockchain ( ) const
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{
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std : : tuple < size_t , crypto : : hash , std : : vector < crypto : : hash > > bc ;
std : : get < 0 > ( bc ) = m_blockchain . offset ( ) ;
std : : get < 1 > ( bc ) = m_blockchain . empty ( ) ? crypto : : null_hash : m_blockchain . genesis ( ) ;
for ( size_t n = m_blockchain . offset ( ) ; n < m_blockchain . size ( ) ; + + n )
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{
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std : : get < 2 > ( bc ) . push_back ( m_blockchain [ n ] ) ;
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}
return bc ;
}
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void wallet2 : : import_blockchain ( const std : : tuple < size_t , crypto : : hash , std : : vector < crypto : : hash > > & bc )
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{
m_blockchain . clear ( ) ;
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if ( std : : get < 0 > ( bc ) )
{
for ( size_t n = std : : get < 0 > ( bc ) ; n > 0 ; + + n )
m_blockchain . push_back ( std : : get < 1 > ( bc ) ) ;
m_blockchain . trim ( std : : get < 0 > ( bc ) ) ;
}
for ( auto const & b : std : : get < 2 > ( bc ) )
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{
m_blockchain . push_back ( b ) ;
}
cryptonote : : block genesis ;
generate_genesis ( genesis ) ;
crypto : : hash genesis_hash = get_block_hash ( genesis ) ;
check_genesis ( genesis_hash ) ;
m_local_bc_height = m_blockchain . size ( ) ;
}
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//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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std : : vector < tools : : wallet2 : : transfer_details > wallet2 : : export_outputs ( ) const
{
std : : vector < tools : : wallet2 : : transfer_details > outs ;
outs . reserve ( m_transfers . size ( ) ) ;
for ( size_t n = 0 ; n < m_transfers . size ( ) ; + + n )
{
const transfer_details & td = m_transfers [ n ] ;
outs . push_back ( td ) ;
}
return outs ;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
size_t wallet2 : : import_outputs ( const std : : vector < tools : : wallet2 : : transfer_details > & outputs )
{
m_transfers . clear ( ) ;
m_transfers . reserve ( outputs . size ( ) ) ;
for ( size_t i = 0 ; i < outputs . size ( ) ; + + i )
{
transfer_details td = outputs [ i ] ;
// the hot wallet wouldn't have known about key images (except if we already exported them)
cryptonote : : keypair in_ephemeral ;
std : : vector < tx_extra_field > tx_extra_fields ;
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THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( td . m_tx . vout . empty ( ) , error : : wallet_internal_error , " tx with no outputs at index " + boost : : lexical_cast < std : : string > ( i ) ) ;
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THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( ! parse_tx_extra ( td . m_tx . extra , tx_extra_fields ) , error : : wallet_internal_error ,
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" Transaction extra has unsupported format at index " + boost : : lexical_cast < std : : string > ( i ) ) ;
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crypto : : public_key tx_pub_key = get_tx_pub_key_from_received_outs ( td ) ;
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const std : : vector < crypto : : public_key > additional_tx_pub_keys = get_additional_tx_pub_keys_from_extra ( td . m_tx ) ;
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const crypto : : public_key & out_key = boost : : get < cryptonote : : txout_to_key > ( td . m_tx . vout [ td . m_internal_output_index ] . target ) . key ;
bool r = cryptonote : : generate_key_image_helper ( m_account . get_keys ( ) , m_subaddresses , out_key , tx_pub_key , additional_tx_pub_keys , td . m_internal_output_index , in_ephemeral , td . m_key_image ) ;
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THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( ! r , error : : wallet_internal_error , " Failed to generate key image " ) ;
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expand_subaddresses ( td . m_subaddr_index ) ;
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td . m_key_image_known = true ;
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing
Scheme by luigi1111:
Multisig for RingCT on Monero
2 of 2
User A (coordinator):
Spendkey b,B
Viewkey a,A (shared)
User B:
Spendkey c,C
Viewkey a,A (shared)
Public Address: C+B, A
Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a
A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants)
A and B watch for incoming outputs
B creates "half" key images for discovered output D:
I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D)
B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D),
and sending the pubkeys with I2_D.
A also creates "half" key images:
I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D)
Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D
Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction).
A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D
to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R).
At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r,
which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo).
B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well).
B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D
to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well.
NOTE:
A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively.
Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible:
A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B.
B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A.
The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time!
The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature).
2 of 3
User A (coordinator)
Shared viewkey a,A
"spendkey" j,J
User B
"spendkey" k,K
User C
"spendkey" m,M
A collects K and M from B and C
B collects J and M from A and C
C collects J and K from A and B
A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK)
A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM)
B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK)
B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate
Address: N+O+P, A
The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other
needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two.
Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties:
A gives j to B
B gives k to C
C gives m to A
Address: J+K+M, A
3 of 3
Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others.
The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it
or send it back to A.
N-1 of N
Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around
(using either the secure or insecure method).
For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up):
[4 of 5]
User: spendkey
A: a
B: b
C: c
D: d
E: e
a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A
Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with
the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys.
Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each.
Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning:
1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image)
2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator
must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use.
You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might
also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format.
You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc.
The process is somewhat cumbersome:
To create a N/N multisig wallet:
- each participant creates a normal wallet
- each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant
- each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N)
As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent:
- each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant
- each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants
Then, a transaction may be initiated:
- one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT"
- this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file
- the initiator sends this file to another participant
- that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx"
- the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again
- if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed
- the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 21:34:26 +00:00
td . m_key_image_partial = false ;
2016-10-30 19:37:09 +00:00
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( in_ephemeral . pub ! = boost : : get < cryptonote : : txout_to_key > ( td . m_tx . vout [ td . m_internal_output_index ] . target ) . key ,
2016-11-15 20:54:51 +00:00
error : : wallet_internal_error , " key_image generated ephemeral public key not matched with output_key at index " + boost : : lexical_cast < std : : string > ( i ) ) ;
2016-10-30 19:37:09 +00:00
2016-11-15 21:14:49 +00:00
m_key_images [ td . m_key_image ] = m_transfers . size ( ) ;
m_pub_keys [ td . get_public_key ( ) ] = m_transfers . size ( ) ;
2016-10-30 19:37:09 +00:00
m_transfers . push_back ( td ) ;
}
return m_transfers . size ( ) ;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2017-08-13 14:29:31 +00:00
crypto : : public_key wallet2 : : get_multisig_signer_public_key ( const crypto : : secret_key & spend_skey ) const
{
crypto : : public_key pkey ;
2017-11-04 10:39:17 +00:00
crypto : : secret_key_to_public_key ( get_multisig_blinded_secret_key ( spend_skey ) , pkey ) ;
2017-08-13 14:29:31 +00:00
return pkey ;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
crypto : : public_key wallet2 : : get_multisig_signer_public_key ( ) const
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing
Scheme by luigi1111:
Multisig for RingCT on Monero
2 of 2
User A (coordinator):
Spendkey b,B
Viewkey a,A (shared)
User B:
Spendkey c,C
Viewkey a,A (shared)
Public Address: C+B, A
Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a
A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants)
A and B watch for incoming outputs
B creates "half" key images for discovered output D:
I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D)
B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D),
and sending the pubkeys with I2_D.
A also creates "half" key images:
I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D)
Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D
Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction).
A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D
to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R).
At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r,
which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo).
B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well).
B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D
to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well.
NOTE:
A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively.
Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible:
A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B.
B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A.
The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time!
The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature).
2 of 3
User A (coordinator)
Shared viewkey a,A
"spendkey" j,J
User B
"spendkey" k,K
User C
"spendkey" m,M
A collects K and M from B and C
B collects J and M from A and C
C collects J and K from A and B
A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK)
A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM)
B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK)
B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate
Address: N+O+P, A
The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other
needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two.
Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties:
A gives j to B
B gives k to C
C gives m to A
Address: J+K+M, A
3 of 3
Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others.
The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it
or send it back to A.
N-1 of N
Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around
(using either the secure or insecure method).
For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up):
[4 of 5]
User: spendkey
A: a
B: b
C: c
D: d
E: e
a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A
Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with
the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys.
Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each.
Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning:
1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image)
2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator
must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use.
You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might
also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format.
You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc.
The process is somewhat cumbersome:
To create a N/N multisig wallet:
- each participant creates a normal wallet
- each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant
- each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N)
As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent:
- each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant
- each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants
Then, a transaction may be initiated:
- one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT"
- this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file
- the initiator sends this file to another participant
- that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx"
- the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again
- if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed
- the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 21:34:26 +00:00
{
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES ( m_multisig , " Wallet is not multisig " ) ;
2017-11-29 16:55:50 +00:00
crypto : : public_key signer ;
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES ( crypto : : secret_key_to_public_key ( get_account ( ) . get_keys ( ) . m_spend_secret_key , signer ) , " Failed to generate signer public key " ) ;
return signer ;
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing
Scheme by luigi1111:
Multisig for RingCT on Monero
2 of 2
User A (coordinator):
Spendkey b,B
Viewkey a,A (shared)
User B:
Spendkey c,C
Viewkey a,A (shared)
Public Address: C+B, A
Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a
A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants)
A and B watch for incoming outputs
B creates "half" key images for discovered output D:
I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D)
B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D),
and sending the pubkeys with I2_D.
A also creates "half" key images:
I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D)
Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D
Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction).
A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D
to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R).
At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r,
which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo).
B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well).
B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D
to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well.
NOTE:
A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively.
Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible:
A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B.
B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A.
The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time!
The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature).
2 of 3
User A (coordinator)
Shared viewkey a,A
"spendkey" j,J
User B
"spendkey" k,K
User C
"spendkey" m,M
A collects K and M from B and C
B collects J and M from A and C
C collects J and K from A and B
A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK)
A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM)
B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK)
B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate
Address: N+O+P, A
The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other
needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two.
Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties:
A gives j to B
B gives k to C
C gives m to A
Address: J+K+M, A
3 of 3
Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others.
The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it
or send it back to A.
N-1 of N
Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around
(using either the secure or insecure method).
For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up):
[4 of 5]
User: spendkey
A: a
B: b
C: c
D: d
E: e
a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A
Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with
the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys.
Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each.
Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning:
1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image)
2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator
must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use.
You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might
also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format.
You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc.
The process is somewhat cumbersome:
To create a N/N multisig wallet:
- each participant creates a normal wallet
- each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant
- each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N)
As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent:
- each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant
- each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants
Then, a transaction may be initiated:
- one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT"
- this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file
- the initiator sends this file to another participant
- that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx"
- the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again
- if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed
- the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 21:34:26 +00:00
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2017-08-13 14:29:31 +00:00
crypto : : public_key wallet2 : : get_multisig_signing_public_key ( const crypto : : secret_key & msk ) const
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing
Scheme by luigi1111:
Multisig for RingCT on Monero
2 of 2
User A (coordinator):
Spendkey b,B
Viewkey a,A (shared)
User B:
Spendkey c,C
Viewkey a,A (shared)
Public Address: C+B, A
Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a
A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants)
A and B watch for incoming outputs
B creates "half" key images for discovered output D:
I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D)
B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D),
and sending the pubkeys with I2_D.
A also creates "half" key images:
I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D)
Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D
Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction).
A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D
to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R).
At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r,
which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo).
B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well).
B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D
to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well.
NOTE:
A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively.
Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible:
A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B.
B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A.
The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time!
The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature).
2 of 3
User A (coordinator)
Shared viewkey a,A
"spendkey" j,J
User B
"spendkey" k,K
User C
"spendkey" m,M
A collects K and M from B and C
B collects J and M from A and C
C collects J and K from A and B
A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK)
A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM)
B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK)
B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate
Address: N+O+P, A
The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other
needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two.
Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties:
A gives j to B
B gives k to C
C gives m to A
Address: J+K+M, A
3 of 3
Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others.
The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it
or send it back to A.
N-1 of N
Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around
(using either the secure or insecure method).
For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up):
[4 of 5]
User: spendkey
A: a
B: b
C: c
D: d
E: e
a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A
Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with
the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys.
Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each.
Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning:
1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image)
2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator
must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use.
You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might
also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format.
You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc.
The process is somewhat cumbersome:
To create a N/N multisig wallet:
- each participant creates a normal wallet
- each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant
- each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N)
As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent:
- each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant
- each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants
Then, a transaction may be initiated:
- one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT"
- this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file
- the initiator sends this file to another participant
- that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx"
- the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again
- if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed
- the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 21:34:26 +00:00
{
2017-08-13 14:29:31 +00:00
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES ( m_multisig , " Wallet is not multisig " ) ;
crypto : : public_key pkey ;
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES ( crypto : : secret_key_to_public_key ( msk , pkey ) , " Failed to derive public key " ) ;
return pkey ;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
crypto : : public_key wallet2 : : get_multisig_signing_public_key ( size_t idx ) const
{
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES ( m_multisig , " Wallet is not multisig " ) ;
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES ( idx < get_account ( ) . get_multisig_keys ( ) . size ( ) , " Multisig signing key index out of range " ) ;
return get_multisig_signing_public_key ( get_account ( ) . get_multisig_keys ( ) [ idx ] ) ;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
rct : : key wallet2 : : get_multisig_k ( size_t idx , const std : : unordered_set < rct : : key > & used_L ) const
{
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES ( m_multisig , " Wallet is not multisig " ) ;
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES ( idx < m_transfers . size ( ) , " idx out of range " ) ;
for ( const auto & k : m_transfers [ idx ] . m_multisig_k )
{
rct : : key L ;
rct : : scalarmultBase ( L , k ) ;
if ( used_L . find ( L ) ! = used_L . end ( ) )
return k ;
}
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION ( tools : : error : : multisig_export_needed ) ;
return rct : : zero ( ) ;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
rct : : multisig_kLRki wallet2 : : get_multisig_kLRki ( size_t n , const rct : : key & k ) const
{
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES ( n < m_transfers . size ( ) , " Bad m_transfers index " ) ;
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing
Scheme by luigi1111:
Multisig for RingCT on Monero
2 of 2
User A (coordinator):
Spendkey b,B
Viewkey a,A (shared)
User B:
Spendkey c,C
Viewkey a,A (shared)
Public Address: C+B, A
Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a
A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants)
A and B watch for incoming outputs
B creates "half" key images for discovered output D:
I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D)
B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D),
and sending the pubkeys with I2_D.
A also creates "half" key images:
I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D)
Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D
Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction).
A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D
to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R).
At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r,
which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo).
B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well).
B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D
to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well.
NOTE:
A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively.
Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible:
A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B.
B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A.
The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time!
The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature).
2 of 3
User A (coordinator)
Shared viewkey a,A
"spendkey" j,J
User B
"spendkey" k,K
User C
"spendkey" m,M
A collects K and M from B and C
B collects J and M from A and C
C collects J and K from A and B
A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK)
A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM)
B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK)
B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate
Address: N+O+P, A
The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other
needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two.
Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties:
A gives j to B
B gives k to C
C gives m to A
Address: J+K+M, A
3 of 3
Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others.
The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it
or send it back to A.
N-1 of N
Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around
(using either the secure or insecure method).
For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up):
[4 of 5]
User: spendkey
A: a
B: b
C: c
D: d
E: e
a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A
Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with
the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys.
Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each.
Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning:
1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image)
2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator
must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use.
You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might
also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format.
You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc.
The process is somewhat cumbersome:
To create a N/N multisig wallet:
- each participant creates a normal wallet
- each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant
- each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N)
As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent:
- each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant
- each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants
Then, a transaction may be initiated:
- one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT"
- this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file
- the initiator sends this file to another participant
- that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx"
- the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again
- if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed
- the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 21:34:26 +00:00
rct : : multisig_kLRki kLRki ;
kLRki . k = k ;
2017-09-26 22:16:25 +00:00
cryptonote : : generate_multisig_LR ( m_transfers [ n ] . get_public_key ( ) , rct : : rct2sk ( kLRki . k ) , ( crypto : : public_key & ) kLRki . L , ( crypto : : public_key & ) kLRki . R ) ;
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing
Scheme by luigi1111:
Multisig for RingCT on Monero
2 of 2
User A (coordinator):
Spendkey b,B
Viewkey a,A (shared)
User B:
Spendkey c,C
Viewkey a,A (shared)
Public Address: C+B, A
Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a
A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants)
A and B watch for incoming outputs
B creates "half" key images for discovered output D:
I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D)
B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D),
and sending the pubkeys with I2_D.
A also creates "half" key images:
I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D)
Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D
Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction).
A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D
to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R).
At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r,
which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo).
B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well).
B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D
to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well.
NOTE:
A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively.
Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible:
A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B.
B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A.
The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time!
The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature).
2 of 3
User A (coordinator)
Shared viewkey a,A
"spendkey" j,J
User B
"spendkey" k,K
User C
"spendkey" m,M
A collects K and M from B and C
B collects J and M from A and C
C collects J and K from A and B
A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK)
A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM)
B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK)
B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate
Address: N+O+P, A
The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other
needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two.
Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties:
A gives j to B
B gives k to C
C gives m to A
Address: J+K+M, A
3 of 3
Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others.
The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it
or send it back to A.
N-1 of N
Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around
(using either the secure or insecure method).
For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up):
[4 of 5]
User: spendkey
A: a
B: b
C: c
D: d
E: e
a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A
Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with
the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys.
Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each.
Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning:
1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image)
2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator
must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use.
You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might
also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format.
You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc.
The process is somewhat cumbersome:
To create a N/N multisig wallet:
- each participant creates a normal wallet
- each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant
- each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N)
As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent:
- each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant
- each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants
Then, a transaction may be initiated:
- one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT"
- this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file
- the initiator sends this file to another participant
- that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx"
- the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again
- if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed
- the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 21:34:26 +00:00
kLRki . ki = rct : : ki2rct ( m_transfers [ n ] . m_key_image ) ;
return kLRki ;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2017-08-13 14:29:31 +00:00
rct : : multisig_kLRki wallet2 : : get_multisig_composite_kLRki ( size_t n , const crypto : : public_key & ignore , std : : unordered_set < rct : : key > & used_L , std : : unordered_set < rct : : key > & new_used_L ) const
{
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES ( n < m_transfers . size ( ) , " Bad transfer index " ) ;
const transfer_details & td = m_transfers [ n ] ;
rct : : multisig_kLRki kLRki = get_multisig_kLRki ( n , rct : : skGen ( ) ) ;
// pick a L/R pair from every other participant but one
size_t n_signers_used = 1 ;
for ( const auto & p : m_transfers [ n ] . m_multisig_info )
{
if ( p . m_signer = = ignore )
continue ;
for ( const auto & lr : p . m_LR )
{
if ( used_L . find ( lr . m_L ) ! = used_L . end ( ) )
continue ;
used_L . insert ( lr . m_L ) ;
new_used_L . insert ( lr . m_L ) ;
rct : : addKeys ( kLRki . L , kLRki . L , lr . m_L ) ;
rct : : addKeys ( kLRki . R , kLRki . R , lr . m_R ) ;
+ + n_signers_used ;
break ;
}
}
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES ( n_signers_used > = m_multisig_threshold , " LR not found for enough participants " ) ;
return kLRki ;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
crypto : : key_image wallet2 : : get_multisig_composite_key_image ( size_t n ) const
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing
Scheme by luigi1111:
Multisig for RingCT on Monero
2 of 2
User A (coordinator):
Spendkey b,B
Viewkey a,A (shared)
User B:
Spendkey c,C
Viewkey a,A (shared)
Public Address: C+B, A
Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a
A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants)
A and B watch for incoming outputs
B creates "half" key images for discovered output D:
I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D)
B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D),
and sending the pubkeys with I2_D.
A also creates "half" key images:
I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D)
Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D
Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction).
A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D
to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R).
At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r,
which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo).
B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well).
B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D
to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well.
NOTE:
A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively.
Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible:
A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B.
B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A.
The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time!
The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature).
2 of 3
User A (coordinator)
Shared viewkey a,A
"spendkey" j,J
User B
"spendkey" k,K
User C
"spendkey" m,M
A collects K and M from B and C
B collects J and M from A and C
C collects J and K from A and B
A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK)
A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM)
B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK)
B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate
Address: N+O+P, A
The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other
needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two.
Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties:
A gives j to B
B gives k to C
C gives m to A
Address: J+K+M, A
3 of 3
Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others.
The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it
or send it back to A.
N-1 of N
Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around
(using either the secure or insecure method).
For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up):
[4 of 5]
User: spendkey
A: a
B: b
C: c
D: d
E: e
a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A
Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with
the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys.
Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each.
Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning:
1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image)
2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator
must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use.
You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might
also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format.
You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc.
The process is somewhat cumbersome:
To create a N/N multisig wallet:
- each participant creates a normal wallet
- each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant
- each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N)
As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent:
- each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant
- each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants
Then, a transaction may be initiated:
- one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT"
- this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file
- the initiator sends this file to another participant
- that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx"
- the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again
- if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed
- the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 21:34:26 +00:00
{
2017-08-13 14:29:31 +00:00
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES ( n < m_transfers . size ( ) , " Bad output index " ) ;
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing
Scheme by luigi1111:
Multisig for RingCT on Monero
2 of 2
User A (coordinator):
Spendkey b,B
Viewkey a,A (shared)
User B:
Spendkey c,C
Viewkey a,A (shared)
Public Address: C+B, A
Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a
A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants)
A and B watch for incoming outputs
B creates "half" key images for discovered output D:
I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D)
B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D),
and sending the pubkeys with I2_D.
A also creates "half" key images:
I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D)
Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D
Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction).
A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D
to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R).
At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r,
which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo).
B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well).
B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D
to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well.
NOTE:
A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively.
Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible:
A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B.
B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A.
The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time!
The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature).
2 of 3
User A (coordinator)
Shared viewkey a,A
"spendkey" j,J
User B
"spendkey" k,K
User C
"spendkey" m,M
A collects K and M from B and C
B collects J and M from A and C
C collects J and K from A and B
A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK)
A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM)
B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK)
B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate
Address: N+O+P, A
The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other
needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two.
Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties:
A gives j to B
B gives k to C
C gives m to A
Address: J+K+M, A
3 of 3
Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others.
The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it
or send it back to A.
N-1 of N
Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around
(using either the secure or insecure method).
For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up):
[4 of 5]
User: spendkey
A: a
B: b
C: c
D: d
E: e
a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A
Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with
the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys.
Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each.
Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning:
1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image)
2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator
must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use.
You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might
also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format.
You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc.
The process is somewhat cumbersome:
To create a N/N multisig wallet:
- each participant creates a normal wallet
- each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant
- each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N)
As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent:
- each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant
- each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants
Then, a transaction may be initiated:
- one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT"
- this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file
- the initiator sends this file to another participant
- that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx"
- the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again
- if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed
- the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 21:34:26 +00:00
const transfer_details & td = m_transfers [ n ] ;
2017-10-21 11:14:31 +00:00
const crypto : : public_key tx_key = get_tx_pub_key_from_received_outs ( td ) ;
const std : : vector < crypto : : public_key > additional_tx_keys = cryptonote : : get_additional_tx_pub_keys_from_extra ( td . m_tx ) ;
2017-08-13 14:29:31 +00:00
crypto : : key_image ki ;
2017-09-26 22:16:25 +00:00
std : : vector < crypto : : key_image > pkis ;
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing
Scheme by luigi1111:
Multisig for RingCT on Monero
2 of 2
User A (coordinator):
Spendkey b,B
Viewkey a,A (shared)
User B:
Spendkey c,C
Viewkey a,A (shared)
Public Address: C+B, A
Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a
A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants)
A and B watch for incoming outputs
B creates "half" key images for discovered output D:
I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D)
B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D),
and sending the pubkeys with I2_D.
A also creates "half" key images:
I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D)
Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D
Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction).
A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D
to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R).
At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r,
which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo).
B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well).
B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D
to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well.
NOTE:
A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively.
Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible:
A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B.
B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A.
The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time!
The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature).
2 of 3
User A (coordinator)
Shared viewkey a,A
"spendkey" j,J
User B
"spendkey" k,K
User C
"spendkey" m,M
A collects K and M from B and C
B collects J and M from A and C
C collects J and K from A and B
A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK)
A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM)
B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK)
B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate
Address: N+O+P, A
The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other
needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two.
Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties:
A gives j to B
B gives k to C
C gives m to A
Address: J+K+M, A
3 of 3
Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others.
The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it
or send it back to A.
N-1 of N
Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around
(using either the secure or insecure method).
For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up):
[4 of 5]
User: spendkey
A: a
B: b
C: c
D: d
E: e
a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A
Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with
the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys.
Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each.
Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning:
1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image)
2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator
must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use.
You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might
also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format.
You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc.
The process is somewhat cumbersome:
To create a N/N multisig wallet:
- each participant creates a normal wallet
- each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant
- each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N)
As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent:
- each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant
- each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants
Then, a transaction may be initiated:
- one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT"
- this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file
- the initiator sends this file to another participant
- that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx"
- the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again
- if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed
- the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 21:34:26 +00:00
for ( const auto & info : td . m_multisig_info )
2017-08-13 14:29:31 +00:00
for ( const auto & pki : info . m_partial_key_images )
2017-09-26 22:16:25 +00:00
pkis . push_back ( pki ) ;
2017-10-21 11:14:31 +00:00
bool r = cryptonote : : generate_multisig_composite_key_image ( get_account ( ) . get_keys ( ) , m_subaddresses , td . get_public_key ( ) , tx_key , additional_tx_keys , td . m_internal_output_index , pkis , ki ) ;
2017-09-26 22:16:25 +00:00
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( ! r , error : : wallet_internal_error , " Failed to generate key image " ) ;
2017-08-13 14:29:31 +00:00
return ki ;
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing
Scheme by luigi1111:
Multisig for RingCT on Monero
2 of 2
User A (coordinator):
Spendkey b,B
Viewkey a,A (shared)
User B:
Spendkey c,C
Viewkey a,A (shared)
Public Address: C+B, A
Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a
A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants)
A and B watch for incoming outputs
B creates "half" key images for discovered output D:
I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D)
B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D),
and sending the pubkeys with I2_D.
A also creates "half" key images:
I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D)
Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D
Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction).
A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D
to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R).
At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r,
which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo).
B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well).
B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D
to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well.
NOTE:
A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively.
Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible:
A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B.
B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A.
The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time!
The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature).
2 of 3
User A (coordinator)
Shared viewkey a,A
"spendkey" j,J
User B
"spendkey" k,K
User C
"spendkey" m,M
A collects K and M from B and C
B collects J and M from A and C
C collects J and K from A and B
A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK)
A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM)
B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK)
B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate
Address: N+O+P, A
The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other
needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two.
Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties:
A gives j to B
B gives k to C
C gives m to A
Address: J+K+M, A
3 of 3
Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others.
The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it
or send it back to A.
N-1 of N
Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around
(using either the secure or insecure method).
For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up):
[4 of 5]
User: spendkey
A: a
B: b
C: c
D: d
E: e
a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A
Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with
the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys.
Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each.
Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning:
1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image)
2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator
must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use.
You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might
also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format.
You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc.
The process is somewhat cumbersome:
To create a N/N multisig wallet:
- each participant creates a normal wallet
- each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant
- each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N)
As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent:
- each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant
- each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants
Then, a transaction may be initiated:
- one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT"
- this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file
- the initiator sends this file to another participant
- that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx"
- the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again
- if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed
- the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 21:34:26 +00:00
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2017-11-13 16:24:42 +00:00
cryptonote : : blobdata wallet2 : : export_multisig ( )
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing
Scheme by luigi1111:
Multisig for RingCT on Monero
2 of 2
User A (coordinator):
Spendkey b,B
Viewkey a,A (shared)
User B:
Spendkey c,C
Viewkey a,A (shared)
Public Address: C+B, A
Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a
A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants)
A and B watch for incoming outputs
B creates "half" key images for discovered output D:
I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D)
B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D),
and sending the pubkeys with I2_D.
A also creates "half" key images:
I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D)
Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D
Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction).
A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D
to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R).
At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r,
which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo).
B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well).
B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D
to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well.
NOTE:
A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively.
Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible:
A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B.
B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A.
The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time!
The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature).
2 of 3
User A (coordinator)
Shared viewkey a,A
"spendkey" j,J
User B
"spendkey" k,K
User C
"spendkey" m,M
A collects K and M from B and C
B collects J and M from A and C
C collects J and K from A and B
A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK)
A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM)
B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK)
B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate
Address: N+O+P, A
The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other
needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two.
Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties:
A gives j to B
B gives k to C
C gives m to A
Address: J+K+M, A
3 of 3
Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others.
The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it
or send it back to A.
N-1 of N
Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around
(using either the secure or insecure method).
For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up):
[4 of 5]
User: spendkey
A: a
B: b
C: c
D: d
E: e
a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A
Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with
the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys.
Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each.
Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning:
1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image)
2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator
must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use.
You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might
also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format.
You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc.
The process is somewhat cumbersome:
To create a N/N multisig wallet:
- each participant creates a normal wallet
- each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant
- each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N)
As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent:
- each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant
- each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants
Then, a transaction may be initiated:
- one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT"
- this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file
- the initiator sends this file to another participant
- that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx"
- the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again
- if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed
- the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 21:34:26 +00:00
{
std : : vector < tools : : wallet2 : : multisig_info > info ;
2017-08-13 14:29:31 +00:00
const crypto : : public_key signer = get_multisig_signer_public_key ( ) ;
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing
Scheme by luigi1111:
Multisig for RingCT on Monero
2 of 2
User A (coordinator):
Spendkey b,B
Viewkey a,A (shared)
User B:
Spendkey c,C
Viewkey a,A (shared)
Public Address: C+B, A
Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a
A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants)
A and B watch for incoming outputs
B creates "half" key images for discovered output D:
I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D)
B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D),
and sending the pubkeys with I2_D.
A also creates "half" key images:
I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D)
Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D
Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction).
A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D
to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R).
At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r,
which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo).
B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well).
B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D
to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well.
NOTE:
A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively.
Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible:
A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B.
B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A.
The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time!
The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature).
2 of 3
User A (coordinator)
Shared viewkey a,A
"spendkey" j,J
User B
"spendkey" k,K
User C
"spendkey" m,M
A collects K and M from B and C
B collects J and M from A and C
C collects J and K from A and B
A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK)
A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM)
B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK)
B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate
Address: N+O+P, A
The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other
needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two.
Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties:
A gives j to B
B gives k to C
C gives m to A
Address: J+K+M, A
3 of 3
Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others.
The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it
or send it back to A.
N-1 of N
Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around
(using either the secure or insecure method).
For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up):
[4 of 5]
User: spendkey
A: a
B: b
C: c
D: d
E: e
a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A
Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with
the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys.
Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each.
Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning:
1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image)
2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator
must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use.
You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might
also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format.
You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc.
The process is somewhat cumbersome:
To create a N/N multisig wallet:
- each participant creates a normal wallet
- each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant
- each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N)
As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent:
- each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant
- each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants
Then, a transaction may be initiated:
- one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT"
- this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file
- the initiator sends this file to another participant
- that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx"
- the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again
- if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed
- the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 21:34:26 +00:00
info . resize ( m_transfers . size ( ) ) ;
for ( size_t n = 0 ; n < m_transfers . size ( ) ; + + n )
{
transfer_details & td = m_transfers [ n ] ;
2017-10-21 11:14:31 +00:00
const std : : vector < crypto : : public_key > additional_tx_pub_keys = get_additional_tx_pub_keys_from_extra ( td . m_tx ) ;
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing
Scheme by luigi1111:
Multisig for RingCT on Monero
2 of 2
User A (coordinator):
Spendkey b,B
Viewkey a,A (shared)
User B:
Spendkey c,C
Viewkey a,A (shared)
Public Address: C+B, A
Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a
A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants)
A and B watch for incoming outputs
B creates "half" key images for discovered output D:
I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D)
B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D),
and sending the pubkeys with I2_D.
A also creates "half" key images:
I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D)
Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D
Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction).
A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D
to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R).
At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r,
which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo).
B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well).
B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D
to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well.
NOTE:
A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively.
Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible:
A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B.
B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A.
The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time!
The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature).
2 of 3
User A (coordinator)
Shared viewkey a,A
"spendkey" j,J
User B
"spendkey" k,K
User C
"spendkey" m,M
A collects K and M from B and C
B collects J and M from A and C
C collects J and K from A and B
A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK)
A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM)
B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK)
B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate
Address: N+O+P, A
The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other
needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two.
Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties:
A gives j to B
B gives k to C
C gives m to A
Address: J+K+M, A
3 of 3
Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others.
The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it
or send it back to A.
N-1 of N
Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around
(using either the secure or insecure method).
For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up):
[4 of 5]
User: spendkey
A: a
B: b
C: c
D: d
E: e
a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A
Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with
the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys.
Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each.
Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning:
1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image)
2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator
must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use.
You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might
also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format.
You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc.
The process is somewhat cumbersome:
To create a N/N multisig wallet:
- each participant creates a normal wallet
- each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant
- each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N)
As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent:
- each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant
- each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants
Then, a transaction may be initiated:
- one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT"
- this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file
- the initiator sends this file to another participant
- that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx"
- the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again
- if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed
- the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 21:34:26 +00:00
crypto : : key_image ki ;
2017-08-13 14:29:31 +00:00
td . m_multisig_k . clear ( ) ;
info [ n ] . m_LR . clear ( ) ;
info [ n ] . m_partial_key_images . clear ( ) ;
for ( size_t m = 0 ; m < get_account ( ) . get_multisig_keys ( ) . size ( ) ; + + m )
{
// we want to export the partial key image, not the full one, so we can't use td.m_key_image
2017-10-21 11:14:31 +00:00
bool r = generate_multisig_key_image ( get_account ( ) . get_keys ( ) , m , td . get_public_key ( ) , ki ) ;
2017-08-13 14:29:31 +00:00
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES ( r , " Failed to generate key image " ) ;
info [ n ] . m_partial_key_images . push_back ( ki ) ;
}
size_t nlr = m_multisig_threshold < m_multisig_signers . size ( ) ? m_multisig_threshold - 1 : 1 ;
for ( size_t m = 0 ; m < nlr ; + + m )
{
td . m_multisig_k . push_back ( rct : : skGen ( ) ) ;
const rct : : multisig_kLRki kLRki = get_multisig_kLRki ( n , td . m_multisig_k . back ( ) ) ;
info [ n ] . m_LR . push_back ( { kLRki . L , kLRki . R } ) ;
}
info [ n ] . m_signer = signer ;
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing
Scheme by luigi1111:
Multisig for RingCT on Monero
2 of 2
User A (coordinator):
Spendkey b,B
Viewkey a,A (shared)
User B:
Spendkey c,C
Viewkey a,A (shared)
Public Address: C+B, A
Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a
A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants)
A and B watch for incoming outputs
B creates "half" key images for discovered output D:
I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D)
B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D),
and sending the pubkeys with I2_D.
A also creates "half" key images:
I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D)
Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D
Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction).
A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D
to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R).
At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r,
which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo).
B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well).
B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D
to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well.
NOTE:
A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively.
Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible:
A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B.
B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A.
The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time!
The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature).
2 of 3
User A (coordinator)
Shared viewkey a,A
"spendkey" j,J
User B
"spendkey" k,K
User C
"spendkey" m,M
A collects K and M from B and C
B collects J and M from A and C
C collects J and K from A and B
A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK)
A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM)
B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK)
B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate
Address: N+O+P, A
The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other
needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two.
Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties:
A gives j to B
B gives k to C
C gives m to A
Address: J+K+M, A
3 of 3
Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others.
The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it
or send it back to A.
N-1 of N
Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around
(using either the secure or insecure method).
For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up):
[4 of 5]
User: spendkey
A: a
B: b
C: c
D: d
E: e
a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A
Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with
the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys.
Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each.
Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning:
1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image)
2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator
must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use.
You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might
also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format.
You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc.
The process is somewhat cumbersome:
To create a N/N multisig wallet:
- each participant creates a normal wallet
- each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant
- each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N)
As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent:
- each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant
- each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants
Then, a transaction may be initiated:
- one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT"
- this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file
- the initiator sends this file to another participant
- that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx"
- the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again
- if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed
- the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 21:34:26 +00:00
}
2017-11-13 16:24:42 +00:00
std : : stringstream oss ;
boost : : archive : : portable_binary_oarchive ar ( oss ) ;
ar < < info ;
std : : string magic ( MULTISIG_EXPORT_FILE_MAGIC , strlen ( MULTISIG_EXPORT_FILE_MAGIC ) ) ;
const cryptonote : : account_public_address & keys = get_account ( ) . get_keys ( ) . m_account_address ;
std : : string header ;
header + = std : : string ( ( const char * ) & keys . m_spend_public_key , sizeof ( crypto : : public_key ) ) ;
header + = std : : string ( ( const char * ) & keys . m_view_public_key , sizeof ( crypto : : public_key ) ) ;
header + = std : : string ( ( const char * ) & signer , sizeof ( crypto : : public_key ) ) ;
std : : string ciphertext = encrypt_with_view_secret_key ( header + oss . str ( ) ) ;
return MULTISIG_EXPORT_FILE_MAGIC + ciphertext ;
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing
Scheme by luigi1111:
Multisig for RingCT on Monero
2 of 2
User A (coordinator):
Spendkey b,B
Viewkey a,A (shared)
User B:
Spendkey c,C
Viewkey a,A (shared)
Public Address: C+B, A
Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a
A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants)
A and B watch for incoming outputs
B creates "half" key images for discovered output D:
I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D)
B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D),
and sending the pubkeys with I2_D.
A also creates "half" key images:
I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D)
Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D
Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction).
A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D
to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R).
At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r,
which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo).
B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well).
B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D
to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well.
NOTE:
A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively.
Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible:
A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B.
B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A.
The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time!
The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature).
2 of 3
User A (coordinator)
Shared viewkey a,A
"spendkey" j,J
User B
"spendkey" k,K
User C
"spendkey" m,M
A collects K and M from B and C
B collects J and M from A and C
C collects J and K from A and B
A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK)
A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM)
B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK)
B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate
Address: N+O+P, A
The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other
needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two.
Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties:
A gives j to B
B gives k to C
C gives m to A
Address: J+K+M, A
3 of 3
Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others.
The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it
or send it back to A.
N-1 of N
Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around
(using either the secure or insecure method).
For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up):
[4 of 5]
User: spendkey
A: a
B: b
C: c
D: d
E: e
a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A
Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with
the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys.
Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each.
Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning:
1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image)
2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator
must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use.
You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might
also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format.
You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc.
The process is somewhat cumbersome:
To create a N/N multisig wallet:
- each participant creates a normal wallet
- each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant
- each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N)
As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent:
- each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant
- each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants
Then, a transaction may be initiated:
- one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT"
- this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file
- the initiator sends this file to another participant
- that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx"
- the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again
- if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed
- the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 21:34:26 +00:00
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2017-08-13 14:29:31 +00:00
void wallet2 : : update_multisig_rescan_info ( const std : : vector < std : : vector < rct : : key > > & multisig_k , const std : : vector < std : : vector < tools : : wallet2 : : multisig_info > > & info , size_t n )
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing
Scheme by luigi1111:
Multisig for RingCT on Monero
2 of 2
User A (coordinator):
Spendkey b,B
Viewkey a,A (shared)
User B:
Spendkey c,C
Viewkey a,A (shared)
Public Address: C+B, A
Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a
A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants)
A and B watch for incoming outputs
B creates "half" key images for discovered output D:
I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D)
B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D),
and sending the pubkeys with I2_D.
A also creates "half" key images:
I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D)
Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D
Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction).
A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D
to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R).
At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r,
which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo).
B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well).
B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D
to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well.
NOTE:
A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively.
Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible:
A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B.
B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A.
The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time!
The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature).
2 of 3
User A (coordinator)
Shared viewkey a,A
"spendkey" j,J
User B
"spendkey" k,K
User C
"spendkey" m,M
A collects K and M from B and C
B collects J and M from A and C
C collects J and K from A and B
A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK)
A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM)
B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK)
B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate
Address: N+O+P, A
The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other
needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two.
Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties:
A gives j to B
B gives k to C
C gives m to A
Address: J+K+M, A
3 of 3
Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others.
The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it
or send it back to A.
N-1 of N
Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around
(using either the secure or insecure method).
For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up):
[4 of 5]
User: spendkey
A: a
B: b
C: c
D: d
E: e
a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A
Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with
the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys.
Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each.
Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning:
1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image)
2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator
must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use.
You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might
also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format.
You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc.
The process is somewhat cumbersome:
To create a N/N multisig wallet:
- each participant creates a normal wallet
- each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant
- each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N)
As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent:
- each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant
- each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants
Then, a transaction may be initiated:
- one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT"
- this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file
- the initiator sends this file to another participant
- that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx"
- the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again
- if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed
- the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 21:34:26 +00:00
{
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES ( n < m_transfers . size ( ) , " Bad index in update_multisig_info " ) ;
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES ( multisig_k . size ( ) > = m_transfers . size ( ) , " Mismatched sizes of multisig_k and info " ) ;
MDEBUG ( " update_multisig_rescan_info: updating index " < < n ) ;
transfer_details & td = m_transfers [ n ] ;
td . m_multisig_info . clear ( ) ;
for ( const auto & pi : info )
{
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES ( n < pi . size ( ) , " Bad pi size " ) ;
td . m_multisig_info . push_back ( pi [ n ] ) ;
}
m_key_images . erase ( td . m_key_image ) ;
2017-08-13 14:29:31 +00:00
td . m_key_image = get_multisig_composite_key_image ( n ) ;
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing
Scheme by luigi1111:
Multisig for RingCT on Monero
2 of 2
User A (coordinator):
Spendkey b,B
Viewkey a,A (shared)
User B:
Spendkey c,C
Viewkey a,A (shared)
Public Address: C+B, A
Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a
A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants)
A and B watch for incoming outputs
B creates "half" key images for discovered output D:
I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D)
B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D),
and sending the pubkeys with I2_D.
A also creates "half" key images:
I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D)
Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D
Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction).
A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D
to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R).
At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r,
which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo).
B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well).
B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D
to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well.
NOTE:
A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively.
Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible:
A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B.
B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A.
The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time!
The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature).
2 of 3
User A (coordinator)
Shared viewkey a,A
"spendkey" j,J
User B
"spendkey" k,K
User C
"spendkey" m,M
A collects K and M from B and C
B collects J and M from A and C
C collects J and K from A and B
A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK)
A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM)
B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK)
B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate
Address: N+O+P, A
The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other
needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two.
Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties:
A gives j to B
B gives k to C
C gives m to A
Address: J+K+M, A
3 of 3
Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others.
The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it
or send it back to A.
N-1 of N
Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around
(using either the secure or insecure method).
For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up):
[4 of 5]
User: spendkey
A: a
B: b
C: c
D: d
E: e
a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A
Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with
the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys.
Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each.
Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning:
1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image)
2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator
must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use.
You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might
also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format.
You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc.
The process is somewhat cumbersome:
To create a N/N multisig wallet:
- each participant creates a normal wallet
- each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant
- each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N)
As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent:
- each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant
- each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants
Then, a transaction may be initiated:
- one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT"
- this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file
- the initiator sends this file to another participant
- that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx"
- the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again
- if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed
- the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 21:34:26 +00:00
td . m_key_image_known = true ;
td . m_key_image_partial = false ;
td . m_multisig_k = multisig_k [ n ] ;
m_key_images [ td . m_key_image ] = n ;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2017-11-13 16:24:42 +00:00
size_t wallet2 : : import_multisig ( std : : vector < cryptonote : : blobdata > blobs )
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing
Scheme by luigi1111:
Multisig for RingCT on Monero
2 of 2
User A (coordinator):
Spendkey b,B
Viewkey a,A (shared)
User B:
Spendkey c,C
Viewkey a,A (shared)
Public Address: C+B, A
Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a
A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants)
A and B watch for incoming outputs
B creates "half" key images for discovered output D:
I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D)
B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D),
and sending the pubkeys with I2_D.
A also creates "half" key images:
I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D)
Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D
Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction).
A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D
to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R).
At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r,
which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo).
B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well).
B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D
to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well.
NOTE:
A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively.
Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible:
A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B.
B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A.
The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time!
The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature).
2 of 3
User A (coordinator)
Shared viewkey a,A
"spendkey" j,J
User B
"spendkey" k,K
User C
"spendkey" m,M
A collects K and M from B and C
B collects J and M from A and C
C collects J and K from A and B
A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK)
A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM)
B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK)
B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate
Address: N+O+P, A
The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other
needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two.
Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties:
A gives j to B
B gives k to C
C gives m to A
Address: J+K+M, A
3 of 3
Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others.
The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it
or send it back to A.
N-1 of N
Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around
(using either the secure or insecure method).
For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up):
[4 of 5]
User: spendkey
A: a
B: b
C: c
D: d
E: e
a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A
Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with
the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys.
Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each.
Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning:
1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image)
2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator
must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use.
You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might
also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format.
You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc.
The process is somewhat cumbersome:
To create a N/N multisig wallet:
- each participant creates a normal wallet
- each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant
- each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N)
As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent:
- each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant
- each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants
Then, a transaction may be initiated:
- one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT"
- this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file
- the initiator sends this file to another participant
- that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx"
- the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again
- if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed
- the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 21:34:26 +00:00
{
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES ( m_multisig , " Wallet is not multisig " ) ;
2017-11-13 16:24:42 +00:00
std : : vector < std : : vector < tools : : wallet2 : : multisig_info > > info ;
std : : unordered_set < crypto : : public_key > seen ;
for ( cryptonote : : blobdata & data : blobs )
{
const size_t magiclen = strlen ( MULTISIG_EXPORT_FILE_MAGIC ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( data . size ( ) < magiclen | | memcmp ( data . data ( ) , MULTISIG_EXPORT_FILE_MAGIC , magiclen ) ,
error : : wallet_internal_error , " Bad multisig info file magic in " ) ;
data = decrypt_with_view_secret_key ( std : : string ( data , magiclen ) ) ;
const size_t headerlen = 3 * sizeof ( crypto : : public_key ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( data . size ( ) < headerlen , error : : wallet_internal_error , " Bad data size " ) ;
const crypto : : public_key & public_spend_key = * ( const crypto : : public_key * ) & data [ 0 ] ;
const crypto : : public_key & public_view_key = * ( const crypto : : public_key * ) & data [ sizeof ( crypto : : public_key ) ] ;
const crypto : : public_key & signer = * ( const crypto : : public_key * ) & data [ 2 * sizeof ( crypto : : public_key ) ] ;
const cryptonote : : account_public_address & keys = get_account ( ) . get_keys ( ) . m_account_address ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( public_spend_key ! = keys . m_spend_public_key | | public_view_key ! = keys . m_view_public_key ,
error : : wallet_internal_error , " Multisig info is for a different account " ) ;
if ( get_multisig_signer_public_key ( ) = = signer )
{
MINFO ( " Multisig info from this wallet ignored " ) ;
continue ;
}
if ( seen . find ( signer ) ! = seen . end ( ) )
{
MINFO ( " Duplicate multisig info ignored " ) ;
continue ;
}
seen . insert ( signer ) ;
std : : string body ( data , headerlen ) ;
std : : istringstream iss ( body ) ;
std : : vector < tools : : wallet2 : : multisig_info > i ;
boost : : archive : : portable_binary_iarchive ar ( iss ) ;
ar > > i ;
MINFO ( boost : : format ( " %u outputs found " ) % boost : : lexical_cast < std : : string > ( i . size ( ) ) ) ;
info . push_back ( std : : move ( i ) ) ;
}
2017-08-13 14:29:31 +00:00
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES ( info . size ( ) + 1 < = m_multisig_signers . size ( ) & & info . size ( ) + 1 > = m_multisig_threshold , " Wrong number of multisig sources " ) ;
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing
Scheme by luigi1111:
Multisig for RingCT on Monero
2 of 2
User A (coordinator):
Spendkey b,B
Viewkey a,A (shared)
User B:
Spendkey c,C
Viewkey a,A (shared)
Public Address: C+B, A
Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a
A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants)
A and B watch for incoming outputs
B creates "half" key images for discovered output D:
I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D)
B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D),
and sending the pubkeys with I2_D.
A also creates "half" key images:
I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D)
Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D
Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction).
A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D
to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R).
At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r,
which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo).
B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well).
B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D
to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well.
NOTE:
A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively.
Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible:
A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B.
B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A.
The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time!
The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature).
2 of 3
User A (coordinator)
Shared viewkey a,A
"spendkey" j,J
User B
"spendkey" k,K
User C
"spendkey" m,M
A collects K and M from B and C
B collects J and M from A and C
C collects J and K from A and B
A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK)
A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM)
B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK)
B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate
Address: N+O+P, A
The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other
needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two.
Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties:
A gives j to B
B gives k to C
C gives m to A
Address: J+K+M, A
3 of 3
Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others.
The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it
or send it back to A.
N-1 of N
Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around
(using either the secure or insecure method).
For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up):
[4 of 5]
User: spendkey
A: a
B: b
C: c
D: d
E: e
a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A
Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with
the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys.
Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each.
Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning:
1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image)
2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator
must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use.
You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might
also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format.
You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc.
The process is somewhat cumbersome:
To create a N/N multisig wallet:
- each participant creates a normal wallet
- each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant
- each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N)
As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent:
- each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant
- each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants
Then, a transaction may be initiated:
- one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT"
- this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file
- the initiator sends this file to another participant
- that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx"
- the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again
- if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed
- the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 21:34:26 +00:00
2017-08-13 14:29:31 +00:00
std : : vector < std : : vector < rct : : key > > k ;
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing
Scheme by luigi1111:
Multisig for RingCT on Monero
2 of 2
User A (coordinator):
Spendkey b,B
Viewkey a,A (shared)
User B:
Spendkey c,C
Viewkey a,A (shared)
Public Address: C+B, A
Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a
A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants)
A and B watch for incoming outputs
B creates "half" key images for discovered output D:
I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D)
B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D),
and sending the pubkeys with I2_D.
A also creates "half" key images:
I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D)
Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D
Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction).
A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D
to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R).
At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r,
which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo).
B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well).
B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D
to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well.
NOTE:
A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively.
Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible:
A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B.
B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A.
The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time!
The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature).
2 of 3
User A (coordinator)
Shared viewkey a,A
"spendkey" j,J
User B
"spendkey" k,K
User C
"spendkey" m,M
A collects K and M from B and C
B collects J and M from A and C
C collects J and K from A and B
A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK)
A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM)
B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK)
B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate
Address: N+O+P, A
The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other
needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two.
Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties:
A gives j to B
B gives k to C
C gives m to A
Address: J+K+M, A
3 of 3
Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others.
The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it
or send it back to A.
N-1 of N
Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around
(using either the secure or insecure method).
For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up):
[4 of 5]
User: spendkey
A: a
B: b
C: c
D: d
E: e
a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A
Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with
the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys.
Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each.
Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning:
1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image)
2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator
must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use.
You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might
also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format.
You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc.
The process is somewhat cumbersome:
To create a N/N multisig wallet:
- each participant creates a normal wallet
- each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant
- each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N)
As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent:
- each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant
- each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants
Then, a transaction may be initiated:
- one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT"
- this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file
- the initiator sends this file to another participant
- that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx"
- the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again
- if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed
- the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 21:34:26 +00:00
k . reserve ( m_transfers . size ( ) ) ;
for ( const auto & td : m_transfers )
k . push_back ( td . m_multisig_k ) ;
// how many outputs we're going to update
size_t n_outputs = m_transfers . size ( ) ;
for ( const auto & pi : info )
if ( pi . size ( ) < n_outputs )
n_outputs = pi . size ( ) ;
2017-08-13 14:29:31 +00:00
if ( n_outputs = = 0 )
return 0 ;
// check signers are consistent
for ( const auto & pi : info )
{
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES ( std : : find ( m_multisig_signers . begin ( ) , m_multisig_signers . end ( ) , pi [ 0 ] . m_signer ) ! = m_multisig_signers . end ( ) ,
" Signer is not a member of this multisig wallet " ) ;
for ( size_t n = 1 ; n < n_outputs ; + + n )
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES ( pi [ n ] . m_signer = = pi [ 0 ] . m_signer , " Mismatched signers in imported multisig info " ) ;
}
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing
Scheme by luigi1111:
Multisig for RingCT on Monero
2 of 2
User A (coordinator):
Spendkey b,B
Viewkey a,A (shared)
User B:
Spendkey c,C
Viewkey a,A (shared)
Public Address: C+B, A
Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a
A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants)
A and B watch for incoming outputs
B creates "half" key images for discovered output D:
I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D)
B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D),
and sending the pubkeys with I2_D.
A also creates "half" key images:
I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D)
Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D
Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction).
A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D
to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R).
At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r,
which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo).
B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well).
B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D
to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well.
NOTE:
A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively.
Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible:
A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B.
B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A.
The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time!
The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature).
2 of 3
User A (coordinator)
Shared viewkey a,A
"spendkey" j,J
User B
"spendkey" k,K
User C
"spendkey" m,M
A collects K and M from B and C
B collects J and M from A and C
C collects J and K from A and B
A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK)
A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM)
B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK)
B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate
Address: N+O+P, A
The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other
needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two.
Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties:
A gives j to B
B gives k to C
C gives m to A
Address: J+K+M, A
3 of 3
Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others.
The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it
or send it back to A.
N-1 of N
Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around
(using either the secure or insecure method).
For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up):
[4 of 5]
User: spendkey
A: a
B: b
C: c
D: d
E: e
a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A
Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with
the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys.
Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each.
Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning:
1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image)
2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator
must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use.
You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might
also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format.
You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc.
The process is somewhat cumbersome:
To create a N/N multisig wallet:
- each participant creates a normal wallet
- each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant
- each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N)
As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent:
- each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant
- each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants
Then, a transaction may be initiated:
- one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT"
- this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file
- the initiator sends this file to another participant
- that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx"
- the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again
- if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed
- the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 21:34:26 +00:00
// trim data we don't have info for from all participants
for ( auto & pi : info )
pi . resize ( n_outputs ) ;
2017-08-13 14:29:31 +00:00
// sort by signer
if ( ! info . empty ( ) & & ! info . front ( ) . empty ( ) )
{
std : : sort ( info . begin ( ) , info . end ( ) , [ ] ( const std : : vector < tools : : wallet2 : : multisig_info > & i0 , const std : : vector < tools : : wallet2 : : multisig_info > & i1 ) { return memcmp ( & i0 [ 0 ] . m_signer , & i1 [ 0 ] . m_signer , sizeof ( i0 [ 0 ] . m_signer ) ) ; } ) ;
}
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing
Scheme by luigi1111:
Multisig for RingCT on Monero
2 of 2
User A (coordinator):
Spendkey b,B
Viewkey a,A (shared)
User B:
Spendkey c,C
Viewkey a,A (shared)
Public Address: C+B, A
Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a
A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants)
A and B watch for incoming outputs
B creates "half" key images for discovered output D:
I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D)
B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D),
and sending the pubkeys with I2_D.
A also creates "half" key images:
I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D)
Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D
Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction).
A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D
to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R).
At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r,
which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo).
B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well).
B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D
to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well.
NOTE:
A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively.
Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible:
A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B.
B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A.
The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time!
The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature).
2 of 3
User A (coordinator)
Shared viewkey a,A
"spendkey" j,J
User B
"spendkey" k,K
User C
"spendkey" m,M
A collects K and M from B and C
B collects J and M from A and C
C collects J and K from A and B
A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK)
A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM)
B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK)
B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate
Address: N+O+P, A
The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other
needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two.
Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties:
A gives j to B
B gives k to C
C gives m to A
Address: J+K+M, A
3 of 3
Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others.
The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it
or send it back to A.
N-1 of N
Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around
(using either the secure or insecure method).
For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up):
[4 of 5]
User: spendkey
A: a
B: b
C: c
D: d
E: e
a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A
Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with
the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys.
Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each.
Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning:
1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image)
2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator
must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use.
You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might
also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format.
You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc.
The process is somewhat cumbersome:
To create a N/N multisig wallet:
- each participant creates a normal wallet
- each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant
- each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N)
As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent:
- each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant
- each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants
Then, a transaction may be initiated:
- one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT"
- this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file
- the initiator sends this file to another participant
- that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx"
- the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again
- if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed
- the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 21:34:26 +00:00
// first pass to determine where to detach the blockchain
for ( size_t n = 0 ; n < n_outputs ; + + n )
{
const transfer_details & td = m_transfers [ n ] ;
if ( ! td . m_key_image_partial )
continue ;
MINFO ( " Multisig info importing from block height " < < td . m_block_height ) ;
detach_blockchain ( td . m_block_height ) ;
break ;
}
for ( size_t n = 0 ; n < n_outputs & & n < m_transfers . size ( ) ; + + n )
{
update_multisig_rescan_info ( k , info , n ) ;
}
m_multisig_rescan_k = & k ;
m_multisig_rescan_info = & info ;
try
{
refresh ( ) ;
}
catch ( . . . ) { }
m_multisig_rescan_info = NULL ;
m_multisig_rescan_k = NULL ;
return n_outputs ;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2016-11-07 19:28:15 +00:00
std : : string wallet2 : : encrypt ( const std : : string & plaintext , const crypto : : secret_key & skey , bool authenticated ) const
{
crypto : : chacha8_key key ;
crypto : : generate_chacha8_key ( & skey , sizeof ( skey ) , key ) ;
std : : string ciphertext ;
crypto : : chacha8_iv iv = crypto : : rand < crypto : : chacha8_iv > ( ) ;
ciphertext . resize ( plaintext . size ( ) + sizeof ( iv ) + ( authenticated ? sizeof ( crypto : : signature ) : 0 ) ) ;
crypto : : chacha8 ( plaintext . data ( ) , plaintext . size ( ) , key , iv , & ciphertext [ sizeof ( iv ) ] ) ;
memcpy ( & ciphertext [ 0 ] , & iv , sizeof ( iv ) ) ;
if ( authenticated )
{
crypto : : hash hash ;
crypto : : cn_fast_hash ( ciphertext . data ( ) , ciphertext . size ( ) - sizeof ( signature ) , hash ) ;
crypto : : public_key pkey ;
crypto : : secret_key_to_public_key ( skey , pkey ) ;
crypto : : signature & signature = * ( crypto : : signature * ) & ciphertext [ ciphertext . size ( ) - sizeof ( crypto : : signature ) ] ;
crypto : : generate_signature ( hash , pkey , skey , signature ) ;
}
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return ciphertext ;
2016-11-07 19:28:15 +00:00
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
std : : string wallet2 : : encrypt_with_view_secret_key ( const std : : string & plaintext , bool authenticated ) const
{
return encrypt ( plaintext , get_account ( ) . get_keys ( ) . m_view_secret_key , authenticated ) ;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
std : : string wallet2 : : decrypt ( const std : : string & ciphertext , const crypto : : secret_key & skey , bool authenticated ) const
{
2016-11-17 20:21:11 +00:00
const size_t prefix_size = sizeof ( chacha8_iv ) + ( authenticated ? sizeof ( crypto : : signature ) : 0 ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( ciphertext . size ( ) < prefix_size ,
error : : wallet_internal_error , " Unexpected ciphertext size " ) ;
2016-11-07 19:28:15 +00:00
crypto : : chacha8_key key ;
crypto : : generate_chacha8_key ( & skey , sizeof ( skey ) , key ) ;
const crypto : : chacha8_iv & iv = * ( const crypto : : chacha8_iv * ) & ciphertext [ 0 ] ;
std : : string plaintext ;
2016-11-17 20:21:11 +00:00
plaintext . resize ( ciphertext . size ( ) - prefix_size ) ;
2016-11-07 19:28:15 +00:00
if ( authenticated )
{
crypto : : hash hash ;
crypto : : cn_fast_hash ( ciphertext . data ( ) , ciphertext . size ( ) - sizeof ( signature ) , hash ) ;
crypto : : public_key pkey ;
crypto : : secret_key_to_public_key ( skey , pkey ) ;
const crypto : : signature & signature = * ( const crypto : : signature * ) & ciphertext [ ciphertext . size ( ) - sizeof ( crypto : : signature ) ] ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( ! crypto : : check_signature ( hash , pkey , signature ) ,
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error : : wallet_internal_error , " Failed to authenticate ciphertext " ) ;
2016-11-07 19:28:15 +00:00
}
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crypto : : chacha8 ( ciphertext . data ( ) + sizeof ( iv ) , ciphertext . size ( ) - prefix_size , key , iv , & plaintext [ 0 ] ) ;
2017-01-14 10:47:45 +00:00
return plaintext ;
2016-11-07 19:28:15 +00:00
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
std : : string wallet2 : : decrypt_with_view_secret_key ( const std : : string & ciphertext , bool authenticated ) const
{
return decrypt ( ciphertext , get_account ( ) . get_keys ( ) . m_view_secret_key , authenticated ) ;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2016-11-28 14:07:25 +00:00
std : : string wallet2 : : make_uri ( const std : : string & address , const std : : string & payment_id , uint64_t amount , const std : : string & tx_description , const std : : string & recipient_name , std : : string & error )
{
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cryptonote : : address_parse_info info ;
if ( ! get_account_address_from_str ( info , testnet ( ) , address ) )
2016-11-28 14:07:25 +00:00
{
error = std : : string ( " wrong address: " ) + address ;
return std : : string ( ) ;
}
// we want only one payment id
2017-02-19 02:42:10 +00:00
if ( info . has_payment_id & & ! payment_id . empty ( ) )
2016-11-28 14:07:25 +00:00
{
error = " A single payment id is allowed " ;
return std : : string ( ) ;
}
if ( ! payment_id . empty ( ) )
{
crypto : : hash pid32 ;
crypto : : hash8 pid8 ;
if ( ! wallet2 : : parse_long_payment_id ( payment_id , pid32 ) & & ! wallet2 : : parse_short_payment_id ( payment_id , pid8 ) )
{
error = " Invalid payment id " ;
return std : : string ( ) ;
}
}
std : : string uri = " monero: " + address ;
2017-01-14 10:46:05 +00:00
unsigned int n_fields = 0 ;
2016-11-28 14:07:25 +00:00
if ( ! payment_id . empty ( ) )
{
uri + = ( n_fields + + ? " & " : " ? " ) + std : : string ( " tx_payment_id= " ) + payment_id ;
}
if ( amount > 0 )
{
// URI encoded amount is in decimal units, not atomic units
uri + = ( n_fields + + ? " & " : " ? " ) + std : : string ( " tx_amount= " ) + cryptonote : : print_money ( amount ) ;
}
if ( ! recipient_name . empty ( ) )
{
uri + = ( n_fields + + ? " & " : " ? " ) + std : : string ( " recipient_name= " ) + epee : : net_utils : : conver_to_url_format ( recipient_name ) ;
}
if ( ! tx_description . empty ( ) )
{
uri + = ( n_fields + + ? " & " : " ? " ) + std : : string ( " tx_description= " ) + epee : : net_utils : : conver_to_url_format ( tx_description ) ;
}
return uri ;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
bool wallet2 : : parse_uri ( const std : : string & uri , std : : string & address , std : : string & payment_id , uint64_t & amount , std : : string & tx_description , std : : string & recipient_name , std : : vector < std : : string > & unknown_parameters , std : : string & error )
{
if ( uri . substr ( 0 , 7 ) ! = " monero: " )
{
error = std : : string ( " URI has wrong scheme (expected \" monero: \" ): " ) + uri ;
return false ;
}
std : : string remainder = uri . substr ( 7 ) ;
const char * ptr = strchr ( remainder . c_str ( ) , ' ? ' ) ;
address = ptr ? remainder . substr ( 0 , ptr - remainder . c_str ( ) ) : remainder ;
2017-02-19 02:42:10 +00:00
cryptonote : : address_parse_info info ;
if ( ! get_account_address_from_str ( info , testnet ( ) , address ) )
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{
error = std : : string ( " URI has wrong address: " ) + address ;
return false ;
}
if ( ! strchr ( remainder . c_str ( ) , ' ? ' ) )
return true ;
std : : vector < std : : string > arguments ;
std : : string body = remainder . substr ( address . size ( ) + 1 ) ;
if ( body . empty ( ) )
return true ;
boost : : split ( arguments , body , boost : : is_any_of ( " & " ) ) ;
std : : set < std : : string > have_arg ;
for ( const auto & arg : arguments )
{
std : : vector < std : : string > kv ;
boost : : split ( kv , arg , boost : : is_any_of ( " = " ) ) ;
if ( kv . size ( ) ! = 2 )
{
error = std : : string ( " URI has wrong parameter: " ) + arg ;
return false ;
}
if ( have_arg . find ( kv [ 0 ] ) ! = have_arg . end ( ) )
{
error = std : : string ( " URI has more than one instance of " + kv [ 0 ] ) ;
return false ;
}
have_arg . insert ( kv [ 0 ] ) ;
if ( kv [ 0 ] = = " tx_amount " )
{
amount = 0 ;
if ( ! cryptonote : : parse_amount ( amount , kv [ 1 ] ) )
{
error = std : : string ( " URI has invalid amount: " ) + kv [ 1 ] ;
return false ;
}
}
else if ( kv [ 0 ] = = " tx_payment_id " )
{
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if ( info . has_payment_id )
2016-11-28 14:07:25 +00:00
{
error = " Separate payment id given with an integrated address " ;
return false ;
}
crypto : : hash hash ;
crypto : : hash8 hash8 ;
if ( ! wallet2 : : parse_long_payment_id ( kv [ 1 ] , hash ) & & ! wallet2 : : parse_short_payment_id ( kv [ 1 ] , hash8 ) )
{
error = " Invalid payment id: " + kv [ 1 ] ;
return false ;
}
payment_id = kv [ 1 ] ;
}
else if ( kv [ 0 ] = = " recipient_name " )
{
recipient_name = epee : : net_utils : : convert_from_url_format ( kv [ 1 ] ) ;
}
else if ( kv [ 0 ] = = " tx_description " )
{
tx_description = epee : : net_utils : : convert_from_url_format ( kv [ 1 ] ) ;
}
else
{
unknown_parameters . push_back ( arg ) ;
}
}
return true ;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2016-12-25 08:18:15 +00:00
uint64_t wallet2 : : get_blockchain_height_by_date ( uint16_t year , uint8_t month , uint8_t day )
{
uint32_t version ;
if ( ! check_connection ( & version ) )
{
throw std : : runtime_error ( " failed to connect to daemon: " + get_daemon_address ( ) ) ;
}
if ( version < MAKE_CORE_RPC_VERSION ( 1 , 6 ) )
{
throw std : : runtime_error ( " this function requires RPC version 1.6 or higher " ) ;
}
std : : tm date = { 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 } ;
date . tm_year = year - 1900 ;
date . tm_mon = month - 1 ;
date . tm_mday = day ;
if ( date . tm_mon < 0 | | 11 < date . tm_mon | | date . tm_mday < 1 | | 31 < date . tm_mday )
{
throw std : : runtime_error ( " month or day out of range " ) ;
}
uint64_t timestamp_target = std : : mktime ( & date ) ;
std : : string err ;
uint64_t height_min = 0 ;
uint64_t height_max = get_daemon_blockchain_height ( err ) - 1 ;
if ( ! err . empty ( ) )
{
throw std : : runtime_error ( " failed to get blockchain height " ) ;
}
while ( true )
{
COMMAND_RPC_GET_BLOCKS_BY_HEIGHT : : request req ;
COMMAND_RPC_GET_BLOCKS_BY_HEIGHT : : response res ;
uint64_t height_mid = ( height_min + height_max ) / 2 ;
req . heights =
{
height_min ,
height_mid ,
height_max
} ;
2017-02-24 17:17:22 +00:00
bool r = net_utils : : invoke_http_bin ( " /getblocks_by_height.bin " , req , res , m_http_client , rpc_timeout ) ;
2016-12-25 08:18:15 +00:00
if ( ! r | | res . status ! = CORE_RPC_STATUS_OK )
{
std : : ostringstream oss ;
oss < < " failed to get blocks by heights: " ;
for ( auto height : req . heights )
oss < < height < < ' ' ;
oss < < endl < < " reason: " ;
if ( ! r )
oss < < " possibly lost connection to daemon " ;
else if ( res . status = = CORE_RPC_STATUS_BUSY )
oss < < " daemon is busy " ;
else
oss < < res . status ;
throw std : : runtime_error ( oss . str ( ) ) ;
}
cryptonote : : block blk_min , blk_mid , blk_max ;
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if ( res . blocks . size ( ) < 3 ) throw std : : runtime_error ( " Not enough blocks returned from daemon " ) ;
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if ( ! parse_and_validate_block_from_blob ( res . blocks [ 0 ] . block , blk_min ) ) throw std : : runtime_error ( " failed to parse blob at height " + std : : to_string ( height_min ) ) ;
if ( ! parse_and_validate_block_from_blob ( res . blocks [ 1 ] . block , blk_mid ) ) throw std : : runtime_error ( " failed to parse blob at height " + std : : to_string ( height_mid ) ) ;
if ( ! parse_and_validate_block_from_blob ( res . blocks [ 2 ] . block , blk_max ) ) throw std : : runtime_error ( " failed to parse blob at height " + std : : to_string ( height_max ) ) ;
2016-12-25 08:18:15 +00:00
uint64_t timestamp_min = blk_min . timestamp ;
uint64_t timestamp_mid = blk_mid . timestamp ;
uint64_t timestamp_max = blk_max . timestamp ;
if ( ! ( timestamp_min < = timestamp_mid & & timestamp_mid < = timestamp_max ) )
{
// the timestamps are not in the chronological order.
// assuming they're sufficiently close to each other, simply return the smallest height
return std : : min ( { height_min , height_mid , height_max } ) ;
}
if ( timestamp_target > timestamp_max )
{
throw std : : runtime_error ( " specified date is in the future " ) ;
}
if ( timestamp_target < = timestamp_min + 2 * 24 * 60 * 60 ) // two days of "buffer" period
{
return height_min ;
}
if ( timestamp_target < = timestamp_mid )
height_max = height_mid ;
else
height_min = height_mid ;
if ( height_max - height_min < = 2 * 24 * 30 ) // don't divide the height range finer than two days
{
return height_min ;
}
}
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2017-08-02 13:44:19 +00:00
bool wallet2 : : is_synced ( ) const
{
uint64_t height ;
boost : : optional < std : : string > result = m_node_rpc_proxy . get_target_height ( height ) ;
if ( result & & * result ! = CORE_RPC_STATUS_OK )
return false ;
return get_blockchain_current_height ( ) > = height ;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2017-08-27 20:04:56 +00:00
std : : vector < std : : pair < uint64_t , uint64_t > > wallet2 : : estimate_backlog ( uint64_t min_blob_size , uint64_t max_blob_size , const std : : vector < uint64_t > & fees )
2017-08-26 15:23:54 +00:00
{
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THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( min_blob_size = = 0 , error : : wallet_internal_error , " Invalid 0 fee " ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( max_blob_size = = 0 , error : : wallet_internal_error , " Invalid 0 fee " ) ;
for ( uint64_t fee : fees )
{
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( fee = = 0 , error : : wallet_internal_error , " Invalid 0 fee " ) ;
}
2017-08-26 15:23:54 +00:00
// get txpool backlog
epee : : json_rpc : : request < cryptonote : : COMMAND_RPC_GET_TRANSACTION_POOL_BACKLOG : : request > req = AUTO_VAL_INIT ( req ) ;
epee : : json_rpc : : response < cryptonote : : COMMAND_RPC_GET_TRANSACTION_POOL_BACKLOG : : response , std : : string > res = AUTO_VAL_INIT ( res ) ;
m_daemon_rpc_mutex . lock ( ) ;
req . jsonrpc = " 2.0 " ;
req . id = epee : : serialization : : storage_entry ( 0 ) ;
req . method = " get_txpool_backlog " ;
bool r = net_utils : : invoke_http_json ( " /json_rpc " , req , res , m_http_client , rpc_timeout ) ;
m_daemon_rpc_mutex . unlock ( ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( ! r , error : : no_connection_to_daemon , " Failed to connect to daemon " ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( res . result . status = = CORE_RPC_STATUS_BUSY , error : : daemon_busy , " get_txpool_backlog " ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( res . result . status ! = CORE_RPC_STATUS_OK , error : : get_tx_pool_error ) ;
epee : : json_rpc : : request < cryptonote : : COMMAND_RPC_GET_INFO : : request > req_t = AUTO_VAL_INIT ( req_t ) ;
epee : : json_rpc : : response < cryptonote : : COMMAND_RPC_GET_INFO : : response , std : : string > resp_t = AUTO_VAL_INIT ( resp_t ) ;
m_daemon_rpc_mutex . lock ( ) ;
req_t . jsonrpc = " 2.0 " ;
req_t . id = epee : : serialization : : storage_entry ( 0 ) ;
req_t . method = " get_info " ;
r = net_utils : : invoke_http_json ( " /json_rpc " , req_t , resp_t , m_http_client ) ;
m_daemon_rpc_mutex . unlock ( ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( ! r , error : : no_connection_to_daemon , " get_info " ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( resp_t . result . status = = CORE_RPC_STATUS_BUSY , error : : daemon_busy , " get_info " ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( resp_t . result . status ! = CORE_RPC_STATUS_OK , error : : get_tx_pool_error ) ;
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uint64_t full_reward_zone = resp_t . result . block_size_limit / 2 ;
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std : : vector < std : : pair < uint64_t , uint64_t > > blocks ;
for ( uint64_t fee : fees )
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{
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double our_fee_byte_min = fee / ( double ) min_blob_size , our_fee_byte_max = fee / ( double ) max_blob_size ;
uint64_t priority_size_min = 0 , priority_size_max = 0 ;
for ( const auto & i : res . result . backlog )
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{
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if ( i . blob_size = = 0 )
{
MWARNING ( " Got 0 sized blob from txpool, ignored " ) ;
continue ;
}
double this_fee_byte = i . fee / ( double ) i . blob_size ;
if ( this_fee_byte > = our_fee_byte_min )
priority_size_min + = i . blob_size ;
if ( this_fee_byte > = our_fee_byte_max )
priority_size_max + = i . blob_size ;
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}
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uint64_t nblocks_min = priority_size_min / full_reward_zone ;
uint64_t nblocks_max = priority_size_max / full_reward_zone ;
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MDEBUG ( " estimate_backlog: priority_size " < < priority_size_min < < " - " < < priority_size_max < < " for " < < fee
< < " ( " < < our_fee_byte_min < < " - " < < our_fee_byte_max < < " piconero byte fee), "
< < nblocks_min < < " - " < < nblocks_max < < " blocks at block size " < < full_reward_zone ) ;
blocks . push_back ( std : : make_pair ( nblocks_min , nblocks_max ) ) ;
}
return blocks ;
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}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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void wallet2 : : generate_genesis ( cryptonote : : block & b ) {
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if ( m_testnet )
{
cryptonote : : generate_genesis_block ( b , config : : testnet : : GENESIS_TX , config : : testnet : : GENESIS_NONCE ) ;
}
else
{
cryptonote : : generate_genesis_block ( b , config : : GENESIS_TX , config : : GENESIS_NONCE ) ;
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}
}
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}